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LIABILITY FOR BAD FAITH AND THE PRINCIPLE WITHOUT 
A NAME (YET) 
 
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM* 
 
*** 
 
In this article, Kenneth Abraham examines the concept of liability for bad 
faith practices on the part of insurers.  Abraham asserts that liability for 
bad faith is a concept that has existed for roughly half a century despite its 
inability, as of yet, to be recognized as part of the formal body of insurance 
law. Abraham details what has been, to some extent, a transmogrification 
with respect to the bad faith claim handling practices of the insurance 
industry.  What once could be dismissed as nothing more than the 
occasional isolated incident, or “screw up,” can now be characterized by 
incidences of systemic bad faith.  Abraham provides four examples, each 
one highlighting some form of systemic bad faith practice undertaken by an 
insurer.  Abraham closes with a discussion of the uniqueness of the insurer-
consumer relationship and how that relationship creates obligations of fair 
dealing for insurers which simply do not exist for other private enterprises. 
 
*** 
 
 In 1994 the TEXAS LAW REVIEW devoted an entire Symposium 
issue to the developing law governing insurers’ liability for bad faith.1  My 
contribution to that Symposium was called “The Natural History of the 
Insurer’s Liability for Bad Faith.”2 The organizers of this Conference have 
asked me to revisit my piece, and to make some observations about the 
                                                                                                                 
*David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of 
Virginia School of Law. This Article is a slightly revised version of my 
presentation at “Bad Faith and Beyond: A Conference on the Law of Claims 
Practices,” held at Rutgers-Camden Law School on February 29, 2012. 
1Symposium, Law of Bad Faith in Contract and Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV. 
1203 (1994). 
2 Kenneth S. Abraham, The Natural History of the Insurer's Liability for Bad 
Faith, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1295 (1994). Robert H. Jerry, II, wrote a piece for that 
Symposium commenting on my Article, entitled The Wrong Side of the Mountain: 
A Comment on Bad Faith’s Unnatural History, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1317 (1994). Dean 
Jerry has been generous in preparing a piece commenting on this Article as well. 
See Robert H. Jerry, II, Bad Faith at Middle Age: Comments on Abraham, 
“Liability for Bad Faith and the Principle without a Name (Yet),” 19 CONN. INS. 
L.J. 13 (2012). 
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development of liability for bad faith in the eighteen years since then. 
 I will do exactly that. But I also want to try to situate the 
developments in bad faith law over the past two decades within a larger 
context. I want to suggest that liability for bad faith reflects a broader 
principle. This is a principle that, as my title suggests, does not yet have a 
name, but that treats insurers as having obligations that are more 
demanding than those imposed on ordinary contracting parties, though not 
as demanding as those we impose on governments. An obligation to handle 
claims fairly is one of the obligations that flows from this principle, though 
it is not the only one. 
 In the modern state, insurance often falls in between these two 
poles of private contract and governmentally-provided entitlement. 
Insurance is brought into being by private contract, but our political system 
relies on insurance to promote economic well-being and to serve as a social 
safety net. In a series of separate doctrines and practices insurance law 
recognizes this, but it has not yet articulated a single principle that reflects 
what connects them.  
 
I. THE RISE OF SYSTEMIC BAD FAITH CLAIMS  
 
 In my 1994 Article I argued that liability for bad faith had by then 
become a mature field. I suggested that, whereas the field had been much in 
the flux of early development during the preceding several decades, it was 
by then becoming stable. I cited a number of reasons for this conclusion, in 
addition of course to the fact that the field was at that point over thirty 
years old, and arguably older.3 Thirty or more years seemed to me to be 
about the amount of time it takes most sub-fields of law to reach at least the 
beginning of maturity. 
 In an Article published a decade later, Douglas Richmond 
chastised me in the opening sentence of his piece for what he took to be my 
implication that liability for bad-faith was not a severe threat for insurers.4 
To that charge I would reply here that there is a difference between an 
unstable threat and a stable one. My point was that the field had matured 
from early instability to the point where it was now merely posing a stable 
threat to insurers. After all, insurers are in the business of dealing with 
stable problems. In fact, they sell protection against stable, predictable 
problems. So what I took to be increasing stability in the field of liability 
                                                                                                                 
3 See Abraham, supra note 2, at 1295-1308. 
4 Douglas R. Richmond, Bad Insurance Bad Faith Law, 39 TORT TRIAL & INS. 
PRAC. L.J. 1, 1 (2003). 
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for bad faith seemed to me to be a salutary development for insurers. 
  To continue the metaphor, I would say that the field is now in 
middle age, and like many who are at that stage of development, 
unanticipated difficulties have arisen, some of one’s own doing and some 
the fault of others. From the vantage point of 2012, the most striking 
feature of the field as it stood in 1994 was that it was almost entirely 
concerned with claims for what I would call “sporadic” or “isolated” bad 
faith.  A single claim person or group of claim personnel had allegedly 
misbehaved. Sometimes it was alleged that this misbehavior had violated 
the standards of the insurer in question, and sometimes it was not. And it 
may well be that at trial the plaintiff made an effort to blame not only the 
individual claims personnel who had misbehaved, but also to blame their 
employer, the insurer. But the unstated premise that hung over the majority 
of bad faith claims in the years running up to 1994 was that these were 
isolated incidents; that they departed from what ordinarily occurred; and 
that they reflected a divergence between what the insurer as an entity 
intended to occur and what had actually occurred. In short, these cases 
involved, or were thought to involve, screwups.  
 There still are a lot of these cases. To draw an analogy to products 
liability, most of the reported cases involved allegations of what appeared 
to be something like “manufacturing defects.”  Long ago the law of torts 
decided that there should be liability for injuries caused by manufacturing 
defects–departures of an individual product unit from the manufacturer’s 
intended design. Claims for sporadic bad-faith handling of a claim are 
analogous. It is true that in many instances manufacturers’ design 
specifications are more precise and more detailed than an insurer’s 
prescribed claims handling practices. But the logical structure of 
manufacturing defect suits and of sporadic bad-faith claims is parallel.  
  A new type of claim, however, has emerged in the last two 
decades. These claims have been based on what some observers have 
called institutional, or systemic, bad faith.5 These are more like design 
defect claims in products liability. They do not involve allegations that 
there was a single screwup in the handling of a particular claim. Rather, 
these are cases in which the insurer is alleged to have adopted a company-
wide policy of handling claims in a manner that the plaintiff argued 
constituted bad-faith, even if there was only one actual plaintiff in the bad-
                                                                                                                 
5 See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Defining and Confining Institutional Bad 
Faith in Insurance, 46 TORT & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1 (2010); James A. Varner, Tiffany 
R. Drust & Debra T. Herron, Institutional Bad Faith: The Darth Vader of Extra-
Contractual Litigation, 57 FED’N DEF. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 163 (2007). 
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faith suit. 
 
II. FOUR EXAMPLES 
 
 I want now to give you four examples. Several, but not all, involve 
claims for bad-faith claims handling, and one does not involve claims 
handling at all. But each of them involve what might be called bad faith, 
and help to make the point that I will develop after I describe them.  
 In State Farm v. Campbell, the nation’s largest auto insurer was 
alleged to have had a national scheme of taking cases to trial in order to 
meet the corporate fiscal goal of capping payouts on claims, nationwide. 6  
This scheme was referred to as State Farm’s Performance, Planning and 
Review or “PP& R” policy. The suit alleged bad faith against a State Farm 
liability insurance policyholder after State Farm refused to settle a tort suit 
against him and the jury returned a verdict in excess of his policy limits.7 
He sued State Farm, and the jury in his bad-faith case returned a verdict of 
$2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive 
damages.8 These verdicts were reduced, in part by a decision of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, but in the end they were still substantial. 
 Based on my conversations with them, I can say that the people at 
State Farm continue to deny that the company had the particular policy that 
was found to have led to the bad faith claims handling in that case. They 
have engaged in at least one retreat that I know of in which they 
brainstormed about how to ensure that the actions that took place in that 
case do not happen again. They think of what happened as a screwup, as a 
misapplication of company policy rather than as an application of policy. 
That will often be the insurer’s perception in these institutional, or systemic 
bad-faith cases. But what makes these cases different from sporadic bad-
faith cases is that the institutional bad-faith cases are not litigated only 
about whether an acceptable policy was misapplied in a particular 
claimant’s case. They are litigated, at least in part, over the question 
whether there was a company-wide policy that was rotten to the core. 
 My second example comes from the first-party side and involves 
UNUM Provident, a disability insurer. UNUM apparently, or at least 
allegedly, had a policy of what can plausibly be called cheating in the 
handling of what it referred to as “subjective” disability claims.9 These are 
                                                                                                                 
6 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 415 (2003). 
7 See id. at 414. 
8 Id. at 415. 
9 For an account, see Merrick v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 594 F. Supp. 2d 
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claims based on mental or emotional disorders whose existence cannot be 
proved by concrete medical evidence. Basically, UNUM allegedly decided 
not to pay these claims but instead to require insureds to provide objective 
medical evidence that they had a disability, which they ordinarily could not 
do.  UNUM set targets for resolving these claims based on its own profit 
goals and regardless of the merits of the claims themselves. They allegedly 
did this, among other things, by setting claim closure targets that were 
endorsed by high level management and the Board of the company. 
 A third example hasn’t resulted in any damages claims that I know 
of, although there may have been a few. This is the contingent commission 
controversy of 2003 and 2004. As you will recall, certain insurers, AIG 
among them, were revealed to have been secretly paying brokers 
commissions that were contingent on the subsequent claim and loss 
experience of the brokers’ clients – the policyholders to which the insurers 
issued policies. There is now a literature addressing whether contingent 
commissions should or should not be permitted, but no one that I know of 
has argued that it was okay to keep them secret.10 The issue is whether an 
obligation on the part of brokers to disclose the existence of a contingent 
commission arrangement is sufficient, or whether, instead, such 
commissions ought to be prohibited outright, at least for the consumer 
segment of the market, or for all applicants, whether consumer or 
commercial. 
 This is not an example of bad-faith claims handling. But it is an 
example of a practice that at least arguably was in bad faith. It was a secret 
deal between the broker and the insurer to whom the broker was steering 
applicants for insurance. I have cited this example, not because I 
necessarily want to argue that there should be a cause of action of some 
sort against either the broker or the insurer for damages caused by the 
wrong, but to suggest that there is a broader principle underlying bad-faith 
claims than may appear. Liability for bad-faith claims handling is about 
more than bad-faith claims handling. But first, on to my fourth example. 
 In the early 1990s, Allstate Insurance Company became concerned 
about its profit levels. It hired McKinsey & Co., and (to oversimplify a bit) 
these consulting geniuses had the deep insight that Allstate could increase 
its profits if it paid less for claims. McKinsey recommended the redesign of 
                                                                                                                 
1168 (D. Nev. 2008). 
10 See, e.g., J. David Cummins & Neil A. Doherty, The Economics of 
Insurance Intermediaries, 73 J. RISK & INS. 359 (2006); Daniel Schwarcz, 
Differential Compensation and the “Race to the Bottom” in Consumer Insurance 
Markets, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 723 (2009). 
6            CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL         Vol. 19.1 
 
a number of different claim processes. Jay Feinman described this whole 
process and the different redesigns very effectively in his book, DELAY, 
DENY, DEFEND.11  One of the claim process redesigns, with the acronym 
“MIST,” standing for “minor impact soft tissue”12 – mostly whiplash – had 
as its purpose cutting down on payments for this kind of claim, and taking 
cases to trial if a satisfactory settlement could not be negotiated. This 
policy applied to both Allstate’s own policyholders making Uninsured 
Motorists claims, and to third-party suits against Allstate’s own liability 
insurance policyholders. Some of the guidelines for claim valuation were 
computerized and some claims personnel allegedly adhered slavishly to 
what the computer told them to do. 
 Now there is nothing necessarily wrong with using computer 
programs to guide claim valuation, and nothing wrong with trying to cut 
back on claim payments if they are too high. It certainly is unwise, and it 
might even be bad faith, to rely only on what a computer tells you a claim 
is worth.  But that was not what was fundamentally wrong with what 
Allstate is alleged to have done. If you have an acceptable metric for 
deciding whether you are currently paying too much for a given category of 
claims, then that metric might appropriately be used to guide claim 
valuation. I’m not sure what an acceptable metric would be, since it is not 
as if there is some objective, freestanding value to a tort claim. But let’s 
suppose hypothetically that in principle there could be such a metric. For 
example, if Allstate could have gotten the data, the average of what GEICO 
and Nationwide paid for these claims in analogous cases might have been 
an appropriate metric for Allstate. 
 But that’s not what Allstate allegedly did. It didn’t use some 
acceptable metric for valuing claims. Its metric allegedly was how much 
less it needed to pay in order to make its desired profit. An insurer can 
certainly set premium rates on this basis. It can decide how much to charge 
you for coverage based in part on how much it needs to charge in order to 
make an acceptable profit. Once you have paid for coverage, however, 
you’re entitled to have the Uninsured Motorist claims you make, and 
lawsuits that are brought against you, settled based on some kind of 
principle other than how much profit your insurer wants to make. 
 Now I’m well aware that many of the victims of this practice by 
Allstate were not its own policyholders, but people who brought suit 
against Allstate’s policyholders. And we know that the question whether a 
                                                                                                                 
11 JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES 
DON’T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 56-103 (2010). 
12 Id. at 31. 
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liability insurer is liable for bad faith to a party who brings suit against the 
insurer’s policyholder is largely settled. This is what is sometimes referred 
to as the Royal Globe problem, after the 1979 California case holding that 
there is such a duty.13  But the Royal Globe rule is dead, and with the 
exception of a very few isolated cases, that is not the law. It might be that 
conduct like Allstate’s violates a state’s Unfair Claim Practices Act and 
warrants a regulatory fine, but it would be a stretch to imagine that there 
could be a cause of action by a non-policyholder against Allstate for 
damages resulting from its practices. 
 
III. A BROADER PRINCIPLE? 
 
 Those are my four examples. Now let’s take stock. All involve 
institutional, or systemic bad faith. One case – State Farm v. Campbell, is a 
third-party bad-faith case in which the conventional bad faith remedy was 
available. A second, UNUM Provident, was a set of first-party bad faith 
cases in which the conventional bad-faith remedy was available. A third, 
the contingent commission controversy, did not directly involve claims at 
all, and while the conduct in question might generate civil liability, it is 
more likely to be restitutionary liability than the kind of liability for 
extracontractual damages that is threatening enough to deter misconduct. 
An insurer or a broker won’t be deterred from capturing an undeserved 
gain through a contingent commission if the only remedy for doing so is 
that it has to refund the commission or pay it to the policyholder.  So fines 
were necessary in that situation. My last example did involve misbehavior 
in the claims process, by Allstate, but many of the victims were third 
parties who did not have a cause of action for any damages they may have 
suffered as a result of the misbehavior. 
 What links these examples together, I think, is not merely that each 
involved something that we would be willing to describe as “bad faith.” 
There are two additional links. First, the bad- faith behavior in all these 
examples involved, or allegedly involved, something systematic or 
institutional rather than being an isolated screwup. And second, the bad-
faith behavior in each instance is something that we probably would 
tolerate, and have the common law tolerate, if it were a different sort of 
business enterprise that engaged in this behavior.  If a building contractor 
adopted a systematic policy of charging for every minor change from an 
architect’s working drawings, because it had decided that its profits were 
insufficient, we would not consider this an occasion for legal intervention. 
                                                                                                                 
13 Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979). 
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If an auto parts retailer had a secret deal with some manufacturers that it 
would be paid an annual rebate that increased if products liability suits 
against the manufacturer decreased, we would consider this no business of 
those who purchased the auto parts in question, even if this affected which 
customers were influenced to buy which kinds of parts. These would be 
examples of harsh, slightly unsavory dealing, but that’s about it.  
 On the other hand, suppose that the government engaged in these 
kinds of behaviors. Then we would probably consider them to be 
constitutional violations. Suppose the government decided to adopt a more 
stringent test for disability under the Social Security Act, not because it had 
been misapplying the statute, but because it concluded that it was paying 
too much out in benefits. That would almost certainly violate beneficiaries’ 
right to due process of law. Or suppose that the U.S. Army secretly paid its 
own recruiters higher bonuses for recruits who signed up for the Corps of 
Engineers rather than for Artillery training, because the costs of providing 
medical care for the former were lower than for the latter. We would think 
that the due process rights of the recruits had been violated, because they 
had a right to know whether they were being steered to the Corps of 
Engineers by the recruiters’ financial interest in the particular enlistment 
choice they made. 
 If some of you disagree with my admittedly shallow constitutional 
analysis, I hope that at least you agree that we would find the government’s 
actions in these hypotheticals far more blameworthy than the analogous 
behavior in the hypotheticals involving private enterprise. We expect far 
less of most private enterprises in the way of fair dealing and fair process 
than we expect of government. Customers deal with private enterprises in 
arms-length transactions where self-interest is expected to be operative. 
People deal with government as constituents or citizens where government 
is expected to be concerned with the welfare and fair treatment of those 
whom its actions and decisions affect. 
 By now it should be obvious where I am headed. Insurance 
companies do not fit into either of the categories we have for determining 
how much fairness we expect from an enterprise or institution. We expect 
more of insurers than we expect of ordinary private enterprises, though we 
may not expect as much of insurers as we expect of government. That is 
what links the four different examples of bad faith that I offered earlier, 
even though some are governed by the law of bad faith and some are not. 
In each instance our sense of what makes an insurer’s behavior wrongful 
turns in part on the core nature of insurance and insurance companies. 
Insurers owe, or ought to owe those with whom they deal, a higher 
obligation of fair dealing than ordinary private enterprises typically owe 
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those with whom they deal.  As critical legal theory taught us decades ago, 
the public-private distinction tends breaks down in such instances.14 
 This notion is already reflected, though somewhat selectively and 
only partly expressly, at various places in the law governing insurance. 
First and foremost, of course, the law of bad faith is a reflection of the 
notion that insurers owe their policyholders higher duties than ordinary 
contracting parties owe their customers. There is also the occasional 
judicial assertion, which typically doesn’t go very far or is rejected on 
appeal, that insurers are fiduciaries or quasi-fiduciaries. And of course 
there is the very practice of administrative regulation of the terms of 
insurance policies. In my view the justification for insurance regulation 
must not only be the typical one that is given for economic regulation – 
market failure or market imperfections. In addition, I think that we regulate 
insurance, and that there is support for regulation, so that regulators will 
have the opportunity to ensure that the requisite level of fair dealing occurs, 
whether or not it would be provided by a perfectly operating market. 
 For example, we place limits on the characteristics that insurers can 
use in creating premium classifications,15 and to me that looks for all the 
world like a version of equal protection’s prohibition of legislation that 
employs suspect categories. In fact, that kind of insurance regulation 
actually goes farther than constitutional equal protection would require. 
Similarly, in at least a few cases, the courts may be on the lookout for 
coverage defenses that insurers assert as subterfuges, when the insurers 
cannot prove their actual basis for denying the claim. For example, 
defenses based on exclusions or conditions that obviously do not apply, but 
which the insurers assert anyway when they suspect but cannot prove fraud 
in the application for coverage or deliberate wrongdoing such as arson.16 
                                                                                                                 
14 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982). 
15 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 144-56 (5th 
ed. 2010). 
16 That may well be what happened in Heller v. Equitable Life Assurance 
Society of U.S., 833 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1987), where a disability insurance policy 
covered lost income resulting from the “complete inability of the Insured, because 
of injury or sickness, to engage in the Insured’s regular occupation.” Id. at 1255. 
The policyholder was a cardiologist who specialized in invasive procedures and 
contracted carpel tunnel syndrome, a condition affecting the dexterity of his hand 
and fingers, nine months after he purchased the policy. Id. The insurer denied 
coverage on the ground that, because the insured refused to consent to have 
surgery for the condition, he had violated the policy requirement that he be under 
the “regular” care of a physician. Id. at 1257. But it might just as easily have 
10            CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL         Vol. 19.1 
 
This looks to me to be an awful lot like a common law version of a due 
process requirement. 
 If I am correct, then the law governing liability for bad-faith 
handling of insurance claims is not an isolated exception to the law of 
insurance contracts, but just one manifestation of a broader and deeper 
principle that runs through this entire body of law: the notion, partly 
embodied in legal doctrine, partly in administrative regulation, and partly 
in a more general legal ethos, that more in the way of regularized and 
consistent treatment of applicants and insureds, and more in the way of fair 
process, can be expected of insurers than we have a right to expect of most 
other private enterprises. 
 Admittedly, this is only an underlying principle or value, what I 
have elsewhere called a “regulative ideal.”17 There is not a body of legal 
doctrine that systematically reflects the principle. Indeed, I would have to 
say that at present the principle is only selectively reflected in legal 
doctrine. For example, we don’t have a body of legal doctrine that protects 
all those who were disadvantaged by Allstate’s conduct, and administrative 
regulation doesn’t completely fill the gap either. Some might say that I am 
therefore misidentifying a principle, or seeing a principle where it doesn’t 
exist. Fair enough. I am not trying to close debate about this, but to open up 
debate by offering a conceptual insight to be tested against our intuitions 
and against the law as it stands. If I am capturing our intuitions correctly 
but I am not accurately describing the law as it stands, then we can either 
adjust our intuitions or we can consider changing the law. 
 Moreover, I have been painting with a very broad brush. It seems 
pretty clear that we should expect the law governing the two forms of 
insurance that are most essential to individual well-being, health insurance 
and consumer auto insurance, to more systematically reflect the principle 
than the law governing other, less essential forms of insurance. There is 
also room for distinguishing generally between consumer and commercial 
insurance. Sizable corporate policyholders’ dealings with their insurers are 
in many respects identical to their dealings with other private enterprises, 
and do not need as much legal regulation of the sort that I have been 
                                                                                                                 
denied coverage on the ground that the insured was still able to “engage” in his 
“regular occupation". The insurer’s stated basis for denying coverage was so likely 
to fail that the alternative of suspected fraud is a far more plausible explanation for 
the insurer’s fighting the claim all the way to its unsuccessful appeal to the Seventh 
Circuit.  
17 Kenneth S. Abraham, The Expectations Principle as a Regulative Ideal, 5 
CONN. INS. L.J. 59, 63 (1998). 
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describing. If insurance law could manage, predictably and inexpensively, 
to distinguish between individuals and small businesses, on the one hand, 
and large enterprises, on the other hand, that might make sense. But that’s 
an issue for another day. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 To sum up, I think that we should more frequently be thinking 
about insurers as distinctive enterprises with a set of obligations that are 
neither those of private parties nor those of government. Some scholars 
have called this conception, or something like this, “insurance as 
governance.”18 That is not right, however, among other reasons because it 
implies an element of democratic or participatory control – as in labor 
unions or homeowners associations – that is not present in insurance and 
that we probably don’t want to be present in insurance. I’m not talking 
about turning stock insurance companies into mutuals. Nor am I talking 
about the coercive power of insurers, their capacity to “govern” the 
behavior of their policyholders. I am not talking about negative rights 
against insurers, but positive rights. Not freedom from something, but 
freedom for something. And also I don’t think that conceiving of insurance 
as a product gets us very far on this score, though it may be a useful 
construct for some purposes.19 The fair process that we expect from 
insurers we don’t expect and should not expect from the makers of chain 
saws. 
 The character of the principle I discern in insurance law is one of 
obligation resting on the nature and contemporary importance of insurance, 
not resting on the consent and trust that are part of governance. Few 
individuals trust their insurers or consent to anything meaningful in 
connection with their purchase of insurance. What might we call the 
obligations reflected in this principle? Quasi-constitutional? Good faith? 
Fair treatment? I don’t think that any of these names fit, but I don’t have a 
better one. Maybe we should have a naming contest. In any event, I do 
know this: although the principle may not have a name yet, the principle is 
lurking in our law, and recognition of the principle’s existence will enhance 
                                                                                                                 
18 See, e.g., RICHARD V. ERICSON, AARON DOYLE, & DEAN BARRY, 
INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE (2003). 
19 See Daniel B. Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial 
Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389 (2007); Jeffery 
W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 813 
(2009). 
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our understanding of what insurance law is, and what insurance does. 
BAD FAITH AT MIDDLE AGE:  COMMENTS ON “THE 
PRINCIPLE WITHOUT A NAME (YET),” INSURANCE LAW, 
CONTRACT LAW, SPECIALNESS, DISTINCTIVENESS, AND 
DIFFERENCE 
 
ROBERT H. JERRY, II* 
 
*** 
 
 In this article, Robert Jerry expounds on Professor Abraham’s 
article on insurer liability for bad faith by pointing out that the concept of 
institutional bad faith is not a new phenomenon, but rather, one that is as 
old as the insurance industry itself.  Jerry focuses on Abraham’s depiction 
of the “specialness” and “distinctiveness” of insurance, while exploring 
additional instances of “rotten to the core” systemic bad faith dating as far 
back as the nineteenth-century.  Much like Abraham did in his article on 
bad faith, Jerry uses these examples of systemic bad faith to further his 
assertion that the insurance industry, due to its “specialness,” is held to 
higher standards of care than other realms of “ordinary business.” 
 
*** 
 
In “Liability for Bad Faith and The Principle Without a Name 
(Yet),” Professor Kenneth Abraham discerns an original and compelling 
way to express one of the core insights upon which much of the modern 
law of insurance is built: that insurance has special characteristics not 
found in the other things, services, information, etc. which individuals and 
institutions value and acquire, and that the law governing insurance 
transactions is itself special, distinctive, and different.1 Through the 
decades, this insight has been expressed, if not always entirely accurately, 
in a number of different ways: insurance is a special kind of chattel or 
                                                                                                                 
* Dean and Levin, Mabie and Levin Professor, Fredric G. Levin College of 
Law, University of Florida. This paper is based upon a presentation originally 
given at the Rutgers Bad Faith & Beyond Conference: A Conference on the Law of 
Claims Practices, in Camden, New Jersey, on February 29, 2012, available at 
http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/bad-faith-beyond (last visited July 22, 2012).  I want to 
express thanks to Lindsay Cohen, L’13, for her research assistance. 
1 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability for Bad Faith and the Principle without a 
Name (Yet), 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2012). 
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quasi-chattel;2 insurance, as an aleatory contract instead of a commutative 
contract, involves an uneven exchange of values that leads to the “peculiar 
legal aspects” of the contract;3 the relationship between insurer and insured 
is fiduciary, or quasi-fiduciary, in nature;4 an insurance contract is more 
than an “ordinary contract” and insurance law is more than “ordinary 
contract law”;5 insurance contracts are imbued with heightened obligations 
of good faith and fair dealing;6 in insurance contracts the duty of good faith 
is a “one way street,” unlike general contracts where the duty runs both 
directions;7 and so on.  
                                                                                                                 
2 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 900, at 34 
(3d ed. Jaeger 1963).  See Estrin Constr. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 
413, 424 n.10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (describing “equally valid” analysis that treats 
insurance policy as “in the nature of a special chattel rather than a contract”).  
Imagining insurance as a chattel leads to the argument that insurance policies 
contain an implied warranty of fitness for an intended purpose, but implied 
warranty analysis has not gained traction in the insurance cases.  
3 EDWIN M. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 62 (2d ed. 1957). 
4 See Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 524, 531 (3d Cir. 
1997) (insurer’s duty of good faith toward insured is predicated on fiduciary 
relationship created when the contract is formed); Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 
565, 571 (Ariz. 1986) (relationship between insurer and insured is not fiduciary 
relationship, but has some elements of a fiduciary relationship). Cf. Lyerla v. 
AMCO Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir. 2008) (applying Illinois law, no 
fiduciary relationship exists between insurers and insureds).  For more discussion, 
see Douglas R. Richmond, Trust Me: Insurers Are Not Fiduciaries to Their 
Insureds, 88 KY. L.J. 1 (2000).   
5 See, e.g., Victor v. Turner, 496 N.Y.S.2d 761, 764 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) 
(“[I]nsurance industry transactions with consumers are not governed by ordinary 
contract law.”); Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. 
U. L. REV. 737, 744 (2000) (“Insurance is a contractual relationship, but courts and 
legislatures have developed a body of insurance law that is distinct from the 
mainstream of contract.”); Dudi Schwartz, Interpretation and Disclosure in 
Insurance Contracts, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 105, 113 (“[I]nsurance law’s 
rules, including interpretive rules, were designed to distinguish the insurance 
industry from other fields of contract law.”) (citation omitted).  
6 See, e.g., Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 271 Cal. Rptr. 246, 251-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1990) (“[B]ecause of the ‘special relationship’ inherent in the unique nature of an 
insurance contract, the insurer’s obligations attendant to its duty of good faith are 
heightened.”); Nugent v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 752 F. Supp. 2d 46, 56 
(D.D.C. 2010) (insurance contracts have special characteristics that “warrant 
heightened liability” for breach of the duty of good faith) (citation omitted).   
7 See, e.g., Johnson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 533 N.W. 2d 203 (Iowa 
1995) (Iowa does not recognize tort action for “reverse” bad faith by insurer 
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The common theme running through the foregoing expressions 
emerges from the unique characteristics of insurance itself. All contracts 
involve transfers of risk in some way, typically at the margin of some other 
sale or exchange, but what distinguishes insurance contracts is the fact that 
they exist for the purpose of transferring risk. Courts have sought to 
capture this idea, usually when deciding the boundaries of state regulatory 
authority over transactions that have the look and feel of insurance but may 
be something else, in the principle that to constitute an insurance contract, 
the transfer and distribution of risk must be the “principal object and 
purpose” of the contract,8 the very essence of the exchange that gives the 
contract its “distinctive character.”9 Because the party casting off risk 
through an insurance contract has such an extreme amount of reliance on 
the presumed enforceability of the contract and puts so much financial and 
emotional well-being at stake in the transaction, all in circumstances where 
the insurer knows from the beginning of the magnitude and importance of 
this investment (indeed, the insurer markets the product through assurances 
of security to the insureds), the protections afforded by law to this party 
must be safeguarded with utmost rigor. Through the years, these ideas have 
presented themselves in insurance law through pro-insured results and 
outcomes that would ordinarily not be predicted if the laws of contract, tort, 
agency, equity, or remedies were applied in their expected ways.  
Working in ground well plowed by others for decades, Professor 
Abraham finds a new and creative way to describe insurance law’s 
“specialness.” He invites us to visualize placing insurance law on a 
continuum: insurance law puts obligations on insurers that are more 
rigorous than what are placed on ordinary contracting parties, but less 
rigorous than the principles under which we test the actions of governments 
and state actors. The lens that Professor Abraham uses to capture this 
insight is systemic or institutional bad faith.   
The law of bad faith is the thread in insurance law where insurers 
can be held liable in tort for bad faith performance of the contractual duties 
they owe insureds; “[t]he tort duty contemplates that insurers must deal 
fairly with insureds and conduct their affairs in good faith.”10 As Professor 
                                                                                                                 
against insured who brings frivolous bad faith claim against insurer); Douglas R. 
Richmond, The Two-Way Street of Insurance Good Faith: Under Construction, 
But Not Yet Open, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 95 (1996).   
8 See Jordan v. Group Health Ass’n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939). 
9 See GAF Corp. v. Cnty. School Bd., 629 F.2d 981 (4th Cir. 1980).  
10 ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING 
INSURANCE LAW 156 (5th ed. 2012).  
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Abraham explains, systemic, institutional bad faith is the most recent 
evolution in this thread. The cases in which the law of bad faith was 
routinely applied after the doctrine’s emergence and development in the 
1970s and 1980s typically involved an individual insured’s claim that the 
insurer in the specific claims processing sequence in which the insured and 
insurer were involved committed breaches in claims handling that caused 
damage to the insured, and this damage can be remedied adequately only 
under the remedial regime of tort law.  
In contrast, the institutional or systemic bad faith claim involves a 
situation where an insured takes a dispute over a single loss and challenges 
the insurer’s practices and procedures as those occurred in claims 
processing for all similarly situated claimants, essentially arguing that the 
insurer’s practices were designed to reduce, or perhaps even eliminate, fair 
payments to all claimants.11 Thus, the notion is that institutional bad faith is 
a new kind of bad faith claim that has emerged in the past couple of 
decades, and policing these questioned systemic practices under the law of 
bad faith represents an expansion of the territory in which bad faith law 
operates.12  
Although the bad faith cases of recent years in which plaintiffs 
allege systemic or institutional insurer bad faith conduct are departures 
from the circumstances in which bad faith was alleged in the past, this does 
not mean that claims against insurers for institutional, systemic misconduct 
are new. Professor Abraham refers to these alleged systemic practices as 
ones that are “rotten to the core”;13 I would suggest that allegations of 
                                                                                                                 
11 See Douglas R. Richmond, Defining and Confining Institutional Bad Faith 
in Insurance, 46 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1, 1 (2010) (“Essentially, the 
theory of institutional bad faith allows a plaintiff to expand a dispute over a single 
loss into a widespread attack on an insurance company's practices and procedures”; 
citing MICHAEL R. NELSON ET AL., EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LITIGATION AGAINST 
INSURERS § 2.11, at 2-59 (2009)); James A. Varner, Tiffany R. Drust & Debra T. 
Herron, Institutional Bad Faith: The Darth Vader of Extra-Contractual Litigation, 
57 FED’N DEF. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 163, 163 (2007) (“Institutional bad faith is 
the ‘Ebola’ virus of extra contractual litigation . . . . [I]t can . . . grow explosively 
and wreck not only litigation management budgets, but can also seriously deplete 
corporate equity and shareholder value.”). 
12 Richmond observes that “[t]here. is a surprising lack of case law on 
institutional bad faith given the frequency with which such allegations are made. 
This disparity is probably attributable to the fact that carriers settle many 
institutional bad faith cases to avoid discovery costs and potentially severe damage 
exposure.”  Richmond, supra note 11, at 4 n.8.    
13 See Abraham, supra note 1, at 12. 
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systemic, “rotten to the core” insurer practices have been made for decades, 
with the major and important difference between those older allegations 
and the more modern ones is that the earlier claims did not have a law of 
bad faith in which the allegations could be packaged and presented. If these 
practices existed today and were being challenged today, they would be 
packaged in the same wrapping in which the modern systemic, institutional 
bad faith claims are alleged.  
If the amount of litigation and commentary in the literature in the 
early twentieth century are reliable guides, one of the prominent early 
examples of systemic, institutional bad faith conduct by insurers involved 
insurers’ delay in action on applications. Like today, insurers took the first 
premium payment with the application, but did not issue the policy until a 
period of time passed during which the insurer evaluated whether to accept 
the risk. During this period the insurer would have use of the insured’s 
money, but, in the absence of a binder providing temporary coverage, the 
applicant had no protection. Even with a temporary written binding receipt, 
the coverage was often so conditional that the applicant who suffered a loss 
during the period the binder was in force received no compensation. Many 
binders by their terms purported to eliminate coverage if the application 
would be unacceptable to the insurer’s underwriting department.  The 
frequency of ex poste determinations of ineligibility was itself a matter of 
concern for insureds, and the longer the insurer could delay acting on 
applications, the less exposure the insurer would have on the risk. Yet if no 
loss occurred during the period between application and policy issuance, 
the policy’s coverage upon issuance would be backdated to the time of the 
application, so the insurer engaged in this practice essentially received a 
payment for nothing. Delaying action on the application lengthened the 
period during which this imbalance existed. Like a number of other insurer 
practices that caught the attention of the public, legislators, regulators, and 
the Armstrong Commission, this practice was one of those that was “rotten 
to the core,” and it was one that, apparently, was institutional and systemic.  
 Courts confronting this practice in the early twentieth century had 
considerable trouble regulating insurers’ delay in acting on applications 
because the legal doctrines of that time were inapplicable.14 Unless a 
temporary binder was issued, there was no contract between applicant and 
insurer to which contract law principles could be applied; furthermore, 
                                                                                                                 
14 For examples of cases declining to hold the insurer liable for delay in acting 
on an application, see Savage v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., 121 So. 487, 489 
(Miss. 1929) (fact that insurer is granted franchise to do business in the state does 
not impose upon them a duty to consider promptly all who apply). 
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there was no basis for finding that the insurer had taken action that would 
create a contractual obligation. The applicant made the offer to form the 
contract with the application; if the application was not accepted, no 
contract was formed. Courts correctly described the insurer’s inaction on 
the application as “silence,” but under the rules of contract law, silence did 
not constitute acceptance absent special circumstances,15 none of which 
existed in the typical fact pattern. Construing the insurer’s retention of the 
premium as a promise to be bound was not a plausible interpretation of the 
usual circumstances. Estoppel, as it was understood both then and now 
under the label “equitable estoppel,” did not fit because there was no false 
or misleading statement inducing reliance.16 Promissory estoppel as a basis 
for recognizing the existence of a contract was a doctrine in its infancy; yet 
the insurer made no promise that might induce detrimental reliance, which 
was essential from the beginning of the doctrine’s history to finding an 
enforceable promise in the absence of offer, acceptance, and a 
consideration that was the object of a bargained-for exchange.17  
 As we now know, many courts attempted to regulate the insurer 
misbehavior, and these courts, looking for ways to extend the established 
doctrines of that era, approved the principle of imposed responsibility 
grounded in the recognition of a duty to act.18 The circularity of this 
                                                                                                                 
15 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 cmt. a (1981) 
(“Acceptance by silence is exceptional. Ordinarily offeror does not have power to 
cause the silence of the offeree to operate as acceptance. . . . The exceptional cases 
where silence can be acceptance . . . [are] those where the offeree silently takes 
offered benefits, and those where one party relies on the other party’s 
manifestation of intention that silence may operate as acceptance.”). 
16 The elements of equitable estoppel are generally described as: (1) belief and 
reliance on a representation; (2) a change of position because of the representation; 
(3) detriment or prejudice caused by the change of position.  See, e.g., Cothern v. 
Vickers, Inc., 759 So.2d 1241, 1249 (Miss. 2000) (discussing elements in context 
of former supervisor’s action against employer); Lybbert v. Grant Cnty., 1 P.3d 
1124, 1128 (Wash. 2000) (discussing elements of equitable estoppel in context of 
county’s effort to assert insufficient service of process as affirmative defense).   
17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (elements of 
promissory estoppel are a promise and substantial reliance that is actual and 
reasonably foreseeable, in circumstances where enforcing the promise is necessary 
in the interests of justice).   
18 See, e.g., Boyer v. State Farmers’ Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 121 P. 329, 331 (Kan. 
1912) (hail insurance policy that issued policy day after crop was destroyed by 
hailstorm is liable in damages due to unreasonable delay by its soliciting agent in 
forwarding the application); Wilken v. Capital Fire Ins. Co. of Lincoln, 157 N.W. 
1021, 1022-23 (Neb. 1916) (bank’s delay in returning application was act of agent 
2012         COMMENT ON “PRINCIPLE WITHOUT A NAME”            19 
reasoning begs the question of exactly where this duty came from.  Some 
courts found it in the idea that a company doing business under a franchise 
assumes a duty toward the public,19 but why this would be so is not 
obvious.  Presumably the intended logic underlying this conclusion is that 
the protection afforded the franchise through its enforcement by the state 
created a reciprocal obligation – essentially, a quid pro quo – on the part of 
the franchise holder to serve the state, i.e., the public, with prompt action 
on the public’s requests, applications, etc. Failure to do so breached the 
duty, and damages caused by the breach could be remedied in tort.  
 This reasoning sounded plausible and authoritative, and, expressed 
as a rationale for a decision, seemed to have its anchor in other more 
familiar legal principles with which we are comfortable. But as frequently 
illustrated during the centuries in which the common law has evolved, new 
reasoning when applied to other similar situations can cause extreme 
havoc. For example, if the existence of the insurance franchise is what 
establishes the duty, the duty to act must presumably exist in the business 
activities of other kinds of corporations and business organizations 
operating under franchises. An obvious example is a bank; thus, does it 
follow that a bank which receives an application for a loan and delays 
acting upon it breaches the duty to act and thereby commits a tort?20  
Of course, if we sense that this goes too far and that a bank should 
not be liable for delay in acting on an application for a loan, we are 
challenged to explain why a franchise to engage in the insurance business 
imposes a more robust duty to act without delay.  Taking up the challenge, 
we would argue that “ordinary business” is not the same as the insurance 
business. Banks and other lenders acting on applications for loans are 
engaged in “ordinary business,” like those who sell products, services, 
licenses, information, and so forth. These products, services, etc. are not the 
                                                                                                                 
of insurer, and insurer is responsible for damage caused by delay in acting on 
application); Behnke v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 41 F.2d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 1930) 
(under Wisconsin law, insurance company may be liable for delay in passing upon 
application). 
19 See Duffy v. Bankers’ Life Ass’n, 139 N.W. 1087, 1090 (Iowa 1913) 
(insurance company “holds and is acting under a franchise from the state”).  
20 See, e.g., Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 7 F.3d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 
1993) (affirming district court’s finding that “the Bank had no fiduciary duty to 
accept or respond promptly”); Armstrong Bus. Servs., Inc. v. AmSouth Bank, 817 
So. 2d 665, 681 (Ala. 2001) (“‘There is . . . no tort liability for nonfeasance for 
failing to do what one has promised to do in the absence of a duty to act apart from 
the promise made.’” (quoting Morgan v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 466 So. 2d 107, 
114 (Ala. 1985))). 
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same as insurance -- which is special, distinctive, and different. Because 
insurance is special, the duties that attach to the corporation or business 
organization engaging in the insurance business are greater. If the principle 
we use to justify finding a duty to act would also make those engaged in 
“ordinary business” liable, then we must be applying the wrong principle to 
the problem arising in the “ordinary business.” Insurance is special; it is 
distinctive; it is different. The insurance business is imbued with the public 
interest in a way that “ordinary business,” such as the business of banks 
making loans) is not.  
Interestingly, the framework just described is exactly where the 
law is landing in the early twenty-first century. On the issue of whether 
lenders ought to have liability in tort for negligent delay in processing an 
application for a loan, it is easy to see that an applicant for a loan could be 
harmed with the loss of favorable financing terms due to the passage of 
time during which the lender delays. Yet the consensus, at least thus far, 
from cases that date back to shortly after the explosion in insurance bad 
faith litigation, is that recognizing tort liability for lenders in the financial 
industries is problematic, and, except for rare exceptions that have not 
garnered a strong following,21 courts have not embraced the idea.22 It 
appears that the insurance business is special, but the lending business is 
not, and the more rigorous analysis applied to insurance industry practices 
by insurance law is not something that is or will be applied in similar 
fashion in the lending industry. 
Thus, perhaps the decisive reason for recognizing an insurer’s tort 
duty to act promptly on an application for insurance is not the existence of 
the franchise but is instead the existence of a relationship imbued with the 
public interest. To what other analogous situations might this principle 
apply? Consider markets for employment: it is certainly in the public 
interest that those who are able to work have jobs that enable them to earn 
salaries or wages sufficient to support themselves and their dependents. But 
are we willing to use public interest analysis to create a rule that employers, 
many of whom obviously do not operate under franchises, are obligated to 
act promptly on applications for employment? The answer is, apparently, 
no. So here, as with lending, we conclude that employment, 
notwithstanding its obvious importance, is “ordinary business” -- or it is 
                                                                                                                 
21 See Jacques v. First Nat. Bank of Md., 515 A.2d 756, 762 (1986) (bank that 
agrees to process application for loan owes customer duty of reasonable care in 
processing and determination of the application). 
22 See Nan S. Ellis & John A. Gray, Lender Liability for Negligently 
Processing Loan Applications, 92 DICK. L. REV. 363, 366-68 (1988). 
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not “business” at all under some kind of conclusory rule that “employment 
is labor, and business is business.” As we keep delay in acting upon 
applications for employment out of the realm where courts will provide a 
remedy, we embrace the idea that insurance is somehow special, 
distinctive, different, and in need of a different legal framework than what 
applies to other “ordinary” business practices in other markets, 
notwithstanding the obvious importance of the transactions that occur in 
those other markets.  
The foregoing, of course, is exactly Professor Abraham’s point. 
Upon a close look, the decades-old recognition of the insurer’s tort duty to 
act promptly on applications comes from the legal system’s negative 
reaction to institutional, systemic, rotten-to-the-core bad faith practices that 
compromise the value of seeking and securing insurance protection. In 
other words, insurers have a responsibility to act promptly on applications; 
this obligation is embedded in the nature of the insurance business, where 
security from the risks of loss is the subject of the bargain; damage is 
foreseeable in the absence of the insurer’s reasonably diligent action on the 
application; negligent retention of the application without prompt action 
sounds like a tort; and courts are comfortable finding a tort-based duty to 
act promptly on an insurance application, with damages flowing from the 
breach of this duty. If the delay in acting on the application cases had arisen 
in the late twentieth and early twentieth-first century, they surely would 
have been pleaded as bad faith cases, consistently with the other examples 
referenced by Professor Abraham and other commentators. Reduced to its 
essence, the practice of insurer delay in responding to applications appears 
to have been a systemic, institutional practice sharing the “rotten to the 
core” characteristics of the practices that have produced the bad faith 
claims processing litigation of recent years. The law’s response to the older 
practices reveals the specialness and distinctiveness of insurance as 
profoundly as the modern responses continue to demonstrate.  
In addition to the duty to act on applications, there are other 
examples in the past of what we would today label institutional, systemic 
bad faith. Of the four modern examples of institutional, systemic bad faith 
discussed by Professor Abraham, the one involving contingent 
commissions does not involve bad faith claims processing. How much is 
wrong with contingent commission arrangements and the manner in which 
such secret commission deals should be regulated are unresolved questions 
today; the regulatory options range from disclosure of the arrangements on 
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the one hand to outright prohibition on the other.23 This controversy is 
reminiscent of a past widespread industry practice – premium and 
commission rebating -- where the question was whether to regulate and, if 
so, how.  Early in the twentieth century, the question of whether premium 
and commission rebating was valid was settled in the legislative arenas 
with the answer “no.”24 This history is revealing on the subject of insurance 
law’s specialness, distinctiveness, and difference. 
The anti-rebate statutes have their roots in the rapid expansion of 
the life insurance industry in the late nineteenth century, and it is fair to 
characterize that period of expansion as endemic with high pressure sales 
tactics, deceptive trade practices, and very high agent commissions.25 In 
this wild-west market, agents created a variety of ways to refund portions 
of their commissions to customers, and rebating gradually became 
perceived as an evil that led to inequality and discrimination among 
applicants, with the privileged getting good deals unavailable to the general 
public. Rebating came to be considered a threat to the integrity of the 
insurance business, and insurance regulators acting in the public interest 
sought to prohibit it. That rebating of commissions in the insurance setting 
is an untoward business practice remains the prevailing view today. 
Yet, interestingly enough, rebates of commissions, payments, or 
other consideration through renegotiated business arrangements are met 
with less hostility when they occur outside the insurance business. In real 
estate transactions, for example, it is common for a person represented by a 
broker during negotiations with a prospective buyer over price to 
simultaneously renegotiate the commission to be paid her agent in the 
transaction. Similarly, cash-back rebates when a consumer buys a product 
and meets certain eligibility conditions are not seriously questioned as 
unfair price discrimination, and cash-back rebates for making purchases 
with a credit card are virtually the norm. By analogy to these practices, one 
can legitimately wonder what would be wrong with negotiating an 
                                                                                                                 
23 See generally, Hazel Beh & Amanda M. Willis, Insurance Intermediaries, 
15 CONN. INS. L.J. 571, 591-94 (2009); Daniel Schwarcz, Beyond Disclosure: The 
Case for Banning Contingent Commissions, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 289, 321-23 
(2007). 
24 For discussion of the history of this practice, see Robert H. Jerry, II & 
Reginald Robinson, Statutory Prohibitions on the Negotiation of Insurance Agent 
Commissions: Substantive Due Process Review Under State Constitutions, 51 
OHIO ST. L.J. 773, 776-80 (1990). 
25 See Constitutionality of Ins. Anti-Rebate Law, 1996 Alaska Op. Att’y Gen. 
(Apr. 22). 
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individualized commission with an insurance agent based on the value of 
the agent’s services and the prospective insured’s interest in using them.  
Yet as a matter of statutory law, the insurance agent is required to 
decline summarily any such request for a refund of a portion of the 
commission on the grounds that doing so would be illegal.26 Whether this 
regulatory framework is wise is a question for another day (and if 
contingent commissions are declared illegal, the wisdom of that prohibition 
will also continue to be debated). The fact remains, however, that a practice 
tolerated in other contexts is prohibited in insurance, reminding us that 
insurance is special, distinctive, and different. What we tolerate in other 
business settings with regard to commission splitting, rebating, etc. is not 
tolerated in insurance under the reasoning that this would create 
impermissible inequities among classes of purchasers and might even 
threaten the solvency of insurers if premium rebates became too common. 
This has the effect of treating insurance as a quasi-public good; just as 
similarly situated consumers should pay the same rates for water, 
electricity, or fire protection, similarly situated consumers should not be 
able to strike back-room deals that change the price paid for the same 
product, and insurers should not be able to engage in systemic, institutional 
practices that advantage a privileged few at the expense of the many.  This, 
again, is precisely the point made by Professor Abraham: 
 
[T]the bad faith behavior in each instance is 
something that we probably would tolerate, and 
have the law tolerate, if it were a different sort of 
business enterprise that engaged in this behavior. 
. . . If an auto parts retailer had a secret deal 
with some manufacturers that it would be paid an 
                                                                                                                 
26 See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Butler, 770 So. 2d 1210, 1221 (Fla. 2000) 
(declaring anti-rebate statutes unconstitutional “to the extent they prohibit title 
insurance agents from rebating a portion of their risk premium”); Dep't of Ins. v. 
Dade Cnty. Consumer Advocate's Office, 492 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. 1986) 
(holding the Florida statute unconstitutional “to the extent they prohibit rebates of 
insurance agents' commissions”). The California rebate law was repealed by 
Proposition 103 in 1988. See, The McCarran-Ferguson Act Before the Antitrust 
Modernization Comm’n (Oct. 18, 2006) (statement of Jay Angoff, Of Counsel, 
Roger Brown & Associates), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Statement_Angoff.pd
f (last visited July 22, 2012). Despite the invalidity of the statutes in those two 
states, there are no readily available indications that consumers are seeking to 
negotiate rebates or commission returns with agents, brokers, or insurers. 
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annual rebate that increased if products liability 
suits against the manufacturer decreased, we 
would consider this no business of those who 
purchased the auto parts in question, even if this 
affected which customers were influenced to buy 
which kinds of parts. These would be examples 
of harsh, slightly unsavory dealing, but that’s 
about it.27 
 
This point is correct not only with respect to the examples discussed by 
Professor Abraham but also with respect, in the insurance setting, to the act 
of rebating itself.  
Another example of institutional, systemic bad faith from the past 
is found in claims processing regulations created in the early twentieth 
century.  Insurers’ use of the defense of misrepresentation has a long and 
interesting history, but the portion of the narrative relevant here involves 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century practice where life insurers 
frequently alleged misrepresentation by the applicant when a claim for 
proceeds was filed many years after the policy had been issued. In these 
circumstances, the beneficiaries had great difficulty refuting, and would 
perhaps be unable to refute, the insurer’s assertion of the defense.  Aware 
of the mismatch between beneficiaries and the insurer in this setting, many 
insurers took advantage and pressed the disparity to their financial 
advantage, or at least so the common wisdom ran.  This systemic, 
institutional, “rotten-to-the-core” practice led to the widespread enactment 
of incontestability statutes early in the twentieth century. If a similar kind 
of regulation exists in another contracting context, it is obscure. Once 
again, this systemic, institutional insurer practice, and the regulatory 
response to it, illustrates that insurance has a special, distinctive status 
among the relationships, products, and services that consumers purchase 
and acquire.  Not surprisingly, the law governing insurance recognizes this 
specialness and assumes the characteristics and dimensions of a body of 
law operating in its own field with its own principles and rules.   
I like the statement “[l]ife is uncertain”28 because it expresses in 
three words the basic truth upon which all of the business and law of 
insurance, not to mention most human behavior, is based.  I also like 
Professor Leonard Moldinow’s observation that “our clear visions of 
                                                                                                                 
27 See Abraham, supra note 1, at 13. 
28 Robert H. Jerry, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 9 (1st ed. 1987).   
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inevitability are often only illusions.”29 Blending these two insights yields a 
third:  In life and in law, one can always look back and say “there are many 
different ways this could have unfolded.”  Just as the core insight that 
insurance law is special, distinct, and different can be articulated in 
different ways,30 the path through which this core insight is manifested in 
the law could have evolved differently than it did, and there are multiple 
paths that its future evolution might take.   Looking backwards, we might 
observe that the core insight has been in the middle of some jurisprudential 
currents that flowed parallel to those of insurance law during most of the 
twentieth century.  A notable example is the analysis of Friedrich Kessler 
presented in his 1943 article in the Columbia Law Review on standardized 
forms,31 arguably the most prominent of the early explorations of the 
challenges standardization poses to the principles of contract law. Kessler 
used insurance policies as his principal example, discussed the problem of 
insurers’ delay in acting on applications, and presented what was probably 
the first articulation of the doctrine of reasonable expectations.32 Early in 
the article, Kessler explained how courts had succeeded in reaching just 
decisions in construing ambiguous claims against the policies’ drafters – 
even in cases where there was no ambiguity. He then observed that these 
techniques, however, were unable to address a problem arising in contract 
formation – delay in acting on an application. He observed that courts 
                                                                                                                 
29 LEONARD MLODINOW, THE DRUNKARD’S WALK: HOW RANDOMNESS 
RULES OUR LIVES 218  (2008).   
30 See supra pp. 1-2.  
31 Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion–Some Thoughts About Freedom of 
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943). 
32 Kessler plainly recognized “reasonable expectations” permeates “our whole 
law of contacts,” and embraced the notion that contract terms should be rewritten 
to fulfill reasonable expectations. Id. at 629, 637. However, credit for recognizing 
the doctrine of reasonable expectations is given to Professor Robert Keeton, who 
while a professor at Harvard Law School wrote a seminal article titled Insurance 
Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions. Robert Keeton, Insurance Law 
Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970).  
Professor Keeton’s thesis was that many courts had applied familiar rules to the 
end of not enforcing clear contract language based on one of the parties' 
“reasonable expectations” of coverage. Id. This two-part article is a remarkable 
work that brought together a large number of related principles, all of which serve 
to demonstrate why insurance and the law governing it are special.  Kessler, 
however, put squarely on the table the notion that with standardized contracts, “[i]t 
can hardly be objected that the resulting task of rewriting, if necessary, the contents 
of a contract of adhesion is foreign to the function of common law courts.” 
Kessler, supra note 31, at 637 (emphasis added).   
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seeking to solve this problem had invoked a tort law duty to act promptly 
on an application as the solution.  
Kessler’s broader point was essentially to advocate, like some 
other scholars of that era, that contract law be divided into dual 
frameworks:  one for negotiated contracts between parties with roughly 
equal information and bargaining power, and one for contracts created 
through the use of standardized forms. He wrote:  
 
[Here is the] basic issue with which the courts in the 
insurance cases are confronted. It is: can the unity of the 
law of contracts be maintained in the face of the increasing 
use of contracts of adhesion? The few courts which allow 
recovery in contract and the many which allow recovery in 
tort feel more or less clearly that insurance contracts are 
contracts of adhesion, and try to protect the weaker 
contracting party against the harshness of the common law 
and against what they think are abuses of freedom of 
contract. The courts denying recovery, on the other hand, 
cling to the belief that an application for insurance is not 
different from any other offer, and they are convinced that 
efforts to build up by trial and error a dual system of 
contract law must inevitably undermine the security 
function of all law, particularly since courts are ill 
equipped to decide whether and to what extent an 
insurance contract has compulsory features.33 
 
Kessler favored a dual system where standardized contracts received 
heightened regulation. Importantly, a major reason he came to that 
conclusion was because he understood that insurance involved a different 
kind of contract, where the subject of exchange was more important than 
the ordinary commodities exchanged in other contracts.  To preserve and 
promote this value, he proposed that the law of torts be used to “nullify 
those parts of the law of contracts which in the public interest are regarded 
as inapplicable.”34  
 Professor Abraham’s continuum, where insurance law rests in the 
middle between ordinary contract law on the one hand and government 
regulation on the other, is entirely consistent with Professor Kessler’s 
observation that contract law’s unity was not sustainable, and that 
                                                                                                                 
33 Kessler, supra note 31, at 636 (emphasis added). 
34 Id. 
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standardized contracts (e.g., insurance contracts) needed a different system 
of governance than ordinary contracts freely negotiated between parties of 
roughly equivalent bargaining power.  Kessler’s embrace of tort principles 
to deal with the problem of an insurer’s delay in acting on applications was 
essentially the equivalent of putting the tort-driven new principles of the 
“new contract law” in the center of the continuum.  
 Later in the twentieth century, Professor Robert Keeton addressed 
the question of the insurers’ delay in acting on an application in his 1971 
Basic Text on Insurance.35  He began with an overview of the limitations of 
existing estoppel, contract, and tort doctrines to address the harm caused by 
insurers’ delay.36 Having catalogued various reasons these doctrines were 
inadequate to address the issue, he advanced arguments for “a somewhat 
broader liability than that imposed in tort.”37  His initial argument was 
essentially an economic efficiency rationale without the dressing of the 
vocabulary of law and economics; he essentially suggested that insurers 
could spread the risk of delay’s harm across premium-paying insured more 
efficiently.38 His second argument came back to the fundamental premise 
that insurance law is different, distinctive, and special.  Invoking and citing 
Kessler, he observed that insurance transactions almost always involve “the 
standardized mass contract” and “courts should develop a different set of 
doctrines for such cases, rather than allowing technical doctrines of 
contract law to defeat liability when public interest would be served by 
imposing it.”39  Moreover, just as “railroad companies have been required 
to furnish transportation to all qualified passengers and shippers, . . . an 
insurance company might similarly be regarded as a public service 
company, under a legal duty to insure upon reasonable terms all properly 
qualified applicants.”40  Keeton wrote that the case law as of 1971 had not 
yet reached the ‘insurance as public service company’ principle, but he 
believed a ‘different kind of contract law’ was already being applied, even 
if courts “seldom expressed [it] in this way.”41 
Bad faith has now reached middle age.  With the helpful insights of 
Professor Abraham, we can now see in bad faith’s evolution additional 
evidence that insurance law is special, distinctive, and different, and we 
                                                                                                                 
35 ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW (1971).   
36 Id. at 45-48. 
37 Id. at 48. 
38 Id. at 48-49. 
39 Id. at 49. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 50. 
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have another way to express it.  As a result, “our understanding of what 
insurance law is, and what insurance does” is, in fact, now deeper.42    
 
 
                                                                                                                 
42 See Abraham, supra note 1, at 13. 
THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW—A PRIMER 
 
RONEN AVRAHAM1 
 
*** 
 
This article presents a law and economics perspective on the topic of 
insurance law as a whole.  In doing so it provides both an overview major 
topics in insurance law as well as a discussion on the major themes of the 
economic analysis of insurance law and its leading cases.  The paper also 
presents a theoretical framework—the two islands functional approach—
that can help solve insurance law puzzles.  Ultimately, this paper could 
help any insurance law judge, lawyer, or student as well as any legislature 
to correctly conceptualize and solve the legal problems facing courts and 
insurance lawyers alike. 
 
*** 
 
Imagine two islands.  
These two islands are identical in almost every way—from their 
white sand beaches, to their elaborate hotels, to their coconut oil powered 
insurance text book printing facilities. The only difference between the 
islands is the insurance regime for automobile accidents. On the first island, 
everyone buys first-party insurance. This means that if you are involved in 
a car accident you file a claim with your own automobile insurance 
company which will pay for your damages. On the second island, however, 
everyone is required to buy third-party liability insurance, and first-party 
insurance is not available. This means that if you are involved in car 
accident you file a claim with the insurance company of the person who hit 
you. Which island would you prefer to live on?  
On the first island, you enjoy the benefit of choosing your own 
insurance. You can ensure that you buy from a company that is reliable and 
will pay for any harm you incur in the case of an accident. You can also 
guarantee you have as much coverage as you want, so driving your Bentley 
around town is a less harrowing prospect. But not everything is great about 
this island. You may, in fact, not drive carefully enough, knowing that after 
all you are fully insured, or almost so. And what about the fact that being a 
                                                                                                                                      
1 Thomas Shelton Maxey Professor in Law, University of Texas School of 
Law. I thank Kyle Logue, Ariel Porat, Uriel Procaccia, Daniel Schwarcz, Peter 
Siegelman, and Charlie Silver for their excellent comments on previous drafts. I 
thank Nathaniel Lipanovich for superb research assistance. 
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victim of an accident—even one that is not your fault—may raise your 
premiums because it is your insurance company that is paying for the 
damage? A first-party insurance regime may also penalize the poor, whose 
cars may be less inwardly safe, since insurance premiums would reflect not 
only the likelihood of the insured being harmed in an accident but also the 
magnitude of the harm, and unsafe cars do not adequately protect drivers. 
A first-party insurance regime could also incentivize drivers to buy more 
outwardly dangerous cars—cars with ramming guards, or behemoth trucks 
that would do grave damage to another car in an accident—but would leave 
the driver and her vehicle relatively unharmed, resulting in lower 
premiums. 
Now let’s look at the second island. Since third-party liability 
insurance premiums reflect not the potential of harm to you, but the 
potential for you to negligently harm others, they only penalize you for 
being negligent in an accident, not for simply being in an accident. This 
incentivizes drivers to not drive negligently and might lead to a safer 
driving environment. Third-party liability insurance may also incentivize 
cars that are more outwardly safe. However, it also puts the insured at the 
mercy of other drivers—who may be incentivized to buy minimum 
coverage from less than reliable operators—potentially becoming 
judgment-proof for large-scale accidents. If you are hit by a driver without 
enough coverage, you may have to bear a large portion of your harm 
yourself.  
There is a lot more to be said, but for now let us pause and think:  
can you tell which island is better? Without a more nuanced theoretical 
analysis and a wealth of empirical evidence it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to decide. The purpose of this article, in fact, is not so much to answer this 
question – which has been discussed by Guido Calabresi almost three 
decades ago2 – but rather  to provide a theoretical framework helpful to 
answering this and similar questions. This framework can provide judges 
and policy makers a first approximation to determine the best normative 
solution, from a law and economics perspective, for many different 
insurance law disputes. Since insurance law is heavily embedded in 
insurance theory, the latter being primarily the economics of insurance, my 
hope is that by explaining the foundations of insurance theory readers will 
find it easier to understand insurance law. More precisely, this article 
                                                                                                                                      
2 See Guido Calabresi, First Party, Third Party, and Product Liability 
Systems: Can Economic Analysis of Law Tell Us Anything About Them?, 69 IOWA 
L. REV. 833 (1984). 
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intends to present the theoretical and practical difficulties posed by 
insurance law and to propose a conceptual framework—the two islands 
approach—as a way to better conceptualize the shortcomings and 
inefficiencies of insurance law’s various doctrines.  
The theoretical framework presented here should help transform 
the way courts interpret insurance contracts (in short, subjective and 
objective interpretation of the parties’ intentions) to a simple thinking tool 
which allows courts first, to identify the relevant variables and second, to 
determine the optimal solution. Even when the framework cannot provide a 
definite answer, it at least provides a road map for asking the relevant 
questions to focus the analyst’s attention on the relevant missing empirical 
data.3  
The standard insurance dispute arises because the insurer denied 
coverage, relying on the language of the contract, or a general principle of 
insurance law, such as lack of insurable interest. How can we know 
whether the denial is justified? The tension in such situations is between 
the ex-post and the ex-ante, between providing coverage to the insured who 
had suffered a loss, and not distorting the insured’s (and the insurer’s) 
incentives to minimize loss.  
If the denial of coverage serves a sound function in the insurance 
market, then it should be upheld. For example, if the denial of coverage 
eliminates insureds’ strategic behavior while not creating a larger problem 
of insurers’ strategic behavior, then it is probably justified. Such is the 
exclusion, for example, on coverage of liability for intentional torts. 
Another example would be the exclusions of coverage for automobile 
accidents from homeowners insurance which could be justified in that 
insurers ensure the pool of homeowner insureds contains similar risks, 
eliminating cross subsidization of those without cars of those with cars, 
which, as we will see below, might lead to inefficient risk classification. If 
the administrative costs in determining the validity of an exclusion are too 
high, a bright-line rule might be appropriate.  Other times, when 
administrative costs are not a problem, a case-by-case approach which 
evaluates a specific exclusion is ideal.   
                                                                                                                                      
3 Others have previously argued American courts should use a more normative 
approach when deciding insurance law issues.  See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products 
Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1389 (2007) (arguing courts should treat insurance litigation similar 
to how products liability litigation is treated, and do so by looking to the value of a 
given policy term). 
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I call the approach proposed here “the two islands functional 
approach” because it requires the analyst to focus on the function of the 
coverage denial. The analyst ought to compare two states of the world—
two islands—one where the relevant exclusion exists and one where it does 
not. Much like in the opening example for this paper, on these islands, 
everything else is the same except for whether or not the denial of coverage 
exists. Sometimes, one island is clearly superior to the other. On other 
occasions, the superiority of any given solution depends on (sometimes 
missing) empirical evidence. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 1 begins 
with an overview of insurance and the relationship between the contracting 
parties, discusses some historical and conceptual background to insurance, 
and then explains why we need insurance at all. Section 2 starts dealing 
with impediments to the efficient insurance contract. It discusses the most 
important impediments—those evolving from the double-sided asymmetric 
information between the parties. Section 3 discusses other impediments to 
efficient contracting such as transaction costs and externalities. It highlights 
more complicated factors which differentiate the sale of insurance and the 
sale of other goods—such as the existence of agents and the conflict of 
interest it brings about. At measured intervals throughout Sections 2 and 3 I 
use the Two Islands Functional Approach to evaluate one of the solutions 
to insurance impediments.  These illustrations are not meant to be 
exhaustive, as that would be impossible, but rather to demonstrate how the 
approach can be used to assist a judge or other decision maker. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION TO INSURANCE 
 
 A.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSURER AND INSURED 
 
Insurance is a legal mechanism by which the insured pays a 
premium to purchase from an insurer some financial protection against a 
future potential loss. The goal of this transaction is to provide the insured 
protection from financial risks to her assets, health, and life, or from third 
party claims, while incentivizing her to guard against those risks.  
In many ways, insureds, purchasers of insurance, are like other types of 
consumers in their need for some type of legal protection against sellers, in 
this case insurance companies, or insurers.  However, insureds may even be 
in a worse position than other consumers because insureds do not buy 
anything tangible that they can use immediately and return to the store if 
they do not like it. An insured cannot return his health insurance and begin 
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comparison-shopping once he is in a hospital. Rather, insureds purchase a 
promise for future financial protection in the case of a covered occurrence. 
The problem is that the product sold, insurance coverage, is not usually 
well defined in the minds of insureds. What exactly is covered under the 
policy? What type of “protection” will be delivered? What constitutes an 
“occurrence” which triggers coverage?  Not only are all of these left 
undefined in the minds of insureds, but they are all widely litigated 
questions. That there are so many hidden characteristics in the product of 
insurance compared with other goods and services, and that as a result there 
is a lot of room for insurers’ strategic behavior, suggests that insureds 
require even more protection than other consumers.   
But that is just part of what is unique about insurance. Perhaps 
unlike other types of consumer contracts, the sellers/insurers deserve some 
protection as well.  
Sellers in other industries usually price their product or service 
based primarily on the cost of its production and the seller’s market power. 
While the market equilibrium price is determined by the supply and 
demand for the product, the seller’s costs of production are almost never 
correlated with consumers’ demand for the product. Consumers’ demand, 
in turn, is a function of their preferences, available substitutes, and a host of 
other factors. But in insurance markets, things are different. An individual’s 
risk type— her hidden characteristics or level of engagement in strategic 
behavior—determine not only the demand but also directly affect the cost 
of the product.4 While sellers in other consumer contracts may be exposed 
to some small financial risk if a consumer’s check bounces, or to some 
legal risk if their product is defective, that risk is limited. In contrast, the 
cost of production of insurance coverage crucially depends on the insured’s 
strategic behavior and hidden characteristics. In the health insurance 
market, for example, it is the insured’s lifestyle and dietary choices, and in 
the automobile insurance market, the insureds driving decisions. Thus, 
insurers are not only exposed to the risks regular sellers are exposed to, but 
also to a much greater risk of systematically under-pricing their product 
due to asymmetry of information between them and their insureds 
regarding  their insureds’ strategic behavior or hidden characteristics. 
However, one has to remember that unlike insureds, insurers are well aware 
of the asymmetric information problem and the risks it carries and they 
                                                                                                                                      
4 Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and 
Empirics in Pictures, 25 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 115 (2011).  
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have developed various means, to be detailed below, to combat this 
problem.  
But that is still not the entire story.  
The reason why insurers deserve some protection goes deeper. In 
regular goods and services industries a financial collapse of a seller will 
lead to losses only for the various entities it contracted with, such as its 
employees, shareholders, suppliers, etc.  It will not lead to a great loss to its 
existing customers. Existing customers might be harmed if they need to 
replace, upgrade, or repair their goods, but they usually do not lose the 
money they initially spent on the product. In contrast, when an insurance 
company cannot deliver on its promise, some customers will be left with 
large uncompensated losses while others will lose the money paid for the 
covered period. Many of them will no longer be able to find coverage 
elsewhere, and those who would might have to pay a much higher 
premium. While this may be a problem in other industries where money is 
paid in advance, ordinarily it is not as pronounced as in insurance, where 
contracts may last for decades. This suggests that in addition to the normal 
social welfare reason to ensure contracts are efficient (more on this below), 
there is a strong consumerist reason to ensure insurance contracts are 
sustainable—therefore guaranteeing that insurance companies do not 
collapse and cause insureds to forfeit their premiums. This, in turn, means 
that there is a consumerist reason for the contracts to be efficient. Efficient 
contracts—those made with perfect information and low transaction 
costs—are those that maximize social welfare while still sustaining the 
company providing the contract.   
Hidden characteristics and strategic behavior are much greater risks 
in the insurance industry than in most other sales industries. Both the seller 
and the consumer may have hidden characteristics or engage in strategic 
behavior. But because of the abstract nature of the good, the negative effect 
of the characteristics is much more pronounced in an insurance contract. 
The risk of double-sided hidden characteristics and strategic behavior is 
that the contract between the parties will not be efficient and the costs of 
these unknown risks will not be properly allocated. In particular, as will be 
explained below, these informational impediments give rise to problems of 
adverse selection, reverse adverse selection, moral hazard, and reverse 
moral hazard.  
The economic analysis approach to insurance law employs the 
efficient insurance contract paradigm. According to this paradigm, 
insurance law should be viewed as doing not much more than protecting 
insureds and insurers from contracting inefficiently due to transaction costs 
primarily in the form of each other’s strategic behavior and hidden 
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characteristics. That is, at least, the approach this article takes in addressing 
the problems posed by these informational asymmetries and destructive 
incentives, as well as other economic inefficiencies such as administrative 
costs, negative externalities, correlated risks, non-competitive pricing and 
irrational behavior.  
This article adopts an ex ante outlook toward the evaluation of 
insurance disputes, refocusing the discussion from the facts of a particular 
case—where tragic events can often cloud a court’s judgment—to how a 
ruling would affect the overall pool of insureds and society at large.  This 
can be seen in the applications of the Two Islands Functional Approach 
throughout the paper. 
 
 B. SOME HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
In the historical record, the first instances of insurance date back to 
the Babylonians in the fourth millennium B.C.  Insurance plans and the law 
have interacted since at least the time of Hammurabi’s Code, which 
included references to primitive private insurance contracts.  Public 
insurance policies first appeared during the time of ancient Rome, 
including the government’s underwriting of merchants’ losses due to 
storms or capture at sea.  Private risk spreading was common from ancient 
times to the post middle-ages through friendly societies that spread the cost 
of some risks among their members.  Such societies existed in what is 
currently China, India, Greece, Israel, Italyand other countries in medieval 
Europe, providing insurance against illness, death, marine and fire risk, and 
even legal liabilities. And of course, rudimentary risk-sharing arrangements 
such as share-cropping have been common throughout history. While not a 
formal insurance, these arrangements served many of the same purposes. 5 
Today’s modern insurance industry provides a wide variety of products.  
These products can be classified in multiple ways.  First, the classification 
may focus on who bears a loss.  For example, first-party insurance covers 
losses sustained by the actual holder of the insurance policy.  Health-care 
insurance is an example.  If an insured gets sick and has to pay for care, 
thus bearing the loss, the insured herself is reimbursed.  Third-party 
insurance, on the other hand, covers losses caused by the holder onto 
others, when the holder could be exposed to legal liability for causing that 
                                                                                                                                      
5 DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE 
RISK MANAGER 27-28 (2002). For ancient Israel, see Babylonian Talmud, Baba 
Kama 117.  
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loss.  Malpractice liability insurance is an example.  If a lawyer makes a 
mistake and causes his client a loss, the lawyer’s insurer pays the client 
who actually had to bear the loss.6   
Another way to categorize insurance is by the type of loss insured.  
Health insurance protects against costs associated with health care.  
Malpractice liability insurance protects against costs associated with 
malpractice.  Likewise, life insurance covers costs associated with the loss 
of life and property insurance covers damage to property.   
The modern industry is also surrounded by a broad institutional 
infrastructure.  The institutions are those common to all areas of the law: 
legislatures, regulators, and courts.  In the United States, insurance is 
largely governed by state rather than federal law.7  While laws may 
prescribe or prohibit certain behavior by insureds or insurers—such as 
requiring people to have coverage, or requiring insurers to provide 
coverage—mostly legislatures create regulatory schemes and delegate 
rulemaking authority to agencies and commissioners.  The role insurance 
commissioners or agencies perform varies widely by jurisdiction.  
Generally, the administrative function is divided into rulemaking—such as 
creating requirements for certain types of coverage—and enforcement—
ensuring insurers follow the rules.  Courts also participate in the policing.  
They have a large role in defining the contractual relationship between 
insureds and insurers and between the insurance companies and the 
regulators.8   
 
 
 
 C. SOME FUNCTIONS OF INSURANCE 
 
                                                                                                                                      
6 It is possible to see liability insurance as first party insurance.  The lawyer is 
forced to pay for the harms she caused, and the liability insurer is merely repaying 
the lawyer for this personal loss.  Nonetheless, it is common practice to classify 
liability insurance as third-party insurance, and treat the loss being insured against 
as that of the outside party. 
7 Though the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 are major exceptions.   
8 Michelle Boardman, Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
1105, 1107 (2006) (contending that most policy language, specifically boilerplate 
language so prevalent in policies, is targeted at courts, not the insureds); see also 
Schwarcz, supra note 1 (arguing there is a role for courts in the regulation of 
insurance, and that role should mirror products liability law). 
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The underlying theme to all these historical developments and 
theoretical principles is that individuals have a natural tendency to 
recognize and be concerned about risk, whether to themselves, others, or 
their property.9   
Indeed, the vast majority of individuals, at least in the context of 
possible large future losses, tend to respond to risk with risk aversion—the 
preference for certainty over uncertainty with regard to future losses.  Risk 
aversion, a concept developed by the Swiss mathematician Daniel 
Bernoulli, explains why an individual would rather pay $10,000 for an 
insurance premium than $1,000,000 for a loss that occurs with a one in 
hundred chance. More generally, a risk-averse individual will pay a small 
premium now to protect against potentially large, but uncertain losses in 
the future, when in all likelihood the total premiums paid will be more than 
the eventual loss.  While risk aversion has been traditionally considered a 
near universal condition, risk neutrality (indifference to certainty or 
uncertainty with regard to future losses) and risk-affinity (preferring 
uncertainty over certainty) are also possible preferences.10 
One of the most important developments in modern insurance came in the 
formalizing of the basic principle of insurance in 1713 by Jacob Bernoulli, 
who was Daniel Bernoulli’s uncle. The idea was that the sample mean for a 
probabilistic set nears the expected mean for an occurrence or process in 
                                                                                                                                      
9 Though recent work has looked at the fact that insureds do a relatively poor 
job of buying insurance they should buy, and refraining from buying insurance 
they should not buy. See Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Insurance Decision-
Making and Market Behavior, 1 FOUNDATIONS AND TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS 
64 (2005); see also Kyle D. Louge, The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How The 
Law Should Respond, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (2001-2002) (identifying reasons 
for under-insuring in the life insurance context and suggesting the best legal 
response). 
10 Some like to root risk aversion on the observation that people have 
diminishing marginal utility from money. But that is not a very helpful 
observation, because, among other things, people demonstrate great heterogeneity 
in levels of risk aversion in different contexts; A simpler approach is to consider 
risk aversion part of people’s preferences, which determine their demand for 
insurance. But see Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (advocating an 
alternative approach to the risk aversion hypothesis); Kahneman and Tversky’s 
work was later incorporated into legal theory. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein 
& Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1471 (1998). 
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the population as the sample size increases. For example, if the average risk 
of an insured getting a certain type of cancer is 5%, then the larger the pool, 
the closer the pool’s cancer rate will be to 5%. This is known as the law of 
large numbers.  The obvious extrapolation to be made is that pooling of 
risks reduces the risk per insured, as long as these risks are not perfectly 
correlated.  This principle is apparent in all the instances of insurance  
practices described below.   
Insurance policies utilize the law of large numbers to reduce 
uncertainty for risk-averse individuals.  The first step in that process is risk 
transfer, by which the risk of a certain event is shifted from one party to 
another.11  The law of large numbers, discussed above, allows an insurer to 
predict with reasonable certainty the aggregate losses it will pay in a given 
year—assuming that neither adverse selection nor moral hazard, both 
discussed below, bias the analysis—and to adjust its premiums accordingly.  
Thus premiums offered by an insurer equal the value of the risk of loss, 
plus administrative fees and profit to the insurer.  Insureds are willing to 
pay the excess over the value of the risk due to their risk aversion.12   
Risk aversion by itself, however, cannot fully explain the existence of the 
entire insurance industry.  For example, even companies which may be 
large enough to not be considered risk averse at all, indeed large enough to 
be able to buy the insurance company, purchase insurance coverage. These 
large companies do not need insurance to transfer risk as they are large 
enough to remain exposed to many of their dissimilar, independent risks 
                                                                                                                                      
11 Nearly every contract or transaction transfers risk in some way, such as the 
risk that a seller’s costs will go up and make the transaction unprofitable for her. If 
a buyer contracted for the right of specific performance—by explicitly or implicitly 
paying a premium—then she is insured against any increase in the seller’s costs 
because the buyer has already paid for the right to the receive the goods.  See 
Ronen Avraham & Zhiyong Liu, Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric 
Information: Exclusive Versus Optional Remedies, 8 AM. L. ECON. REV. 523 
(2006).  Insurance arrangements are somewhat unique in that the risk to be 
transferred is explicitly recognized by the arrangement—i.e. the risk that the 
policy-holder will fall ill or that her home will be flooded.  Of course, this is true of 
other forms of insurance.  For example, derivative financial instruments are tied to 
particular risks, such as changes in value of securities or commodities or even 
weather events. 
12 Premiums are also determined based on expected and incurred investment 
profits or losses, and the competitiveness of the markets. The expected rate of 
return for investments affects the premium that an insurance company needs to 
charge to maintain its margins. For simplicity I ignore that fact.  
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and cancel them out on their own—a strategy called risk diversification.13  
These large companies are considered more risk-neutral and capable of 
self-insurance than individuals, yet those companies typically carry very 
large insurance policies.14  So there must be another explanation besides 
risk-aversion for the existence of insurance and, in fact, there are many of 
them.15 
One of the simplest and most fundamental functions served by an 
insurer is the process of information gathering and knowledge production. 
In a way, all other functions of the insurer rely on its ability to gather data 
about the risks it intends to insure, including the frequency, severity, and 
variance thereof, and to translate that data into policies and premiums. This 
is why, as will be discussed below, the insurance industry is given some 
immunity from federal antitrust laws.     
Another explanation for why corporate entities purchase insurance 
policies is the cheap claim-handling service provided by insurers, 
particularly with regard to legal liability of corporations and health-
insurance coverage for their employees.  The insurance company saves the 
corporation administrative costs associated with receiving, processing, 
negotiating, and paying out claims.16  
Insurance also lowers negotiation costs between transacting parties 
as it allows them to not have to worry about detailing various risks in the 
contract between them. Insurance policies are thus an implicit party of 
nearly all commercial interactions because parties can rely on insurance to 
cover innumerable risks that would, if they had to be hedged in each and 
every contract, add tremendous negotiation costs to every contract. In 
addition, the existence of insurance reduces the need for and the cost of 
litigation in the commercial context, which also reduces the costs parties 
                                                                                                                                      
13 If the company is publicly held, then the true bearers of the risk, the 
stockholders, have also spread out their own risk by owning a diversified portfolio.  
See SCOTT E. HARRINGTON & GREGORY R. NIEHAUS, RISK MANAGEMENT & 
INSURANCE 171 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing reasons why companies purchase 
insurance even though shareholder risks are already diversified). 
14 Though the plans often have large deductibles that represent the share of the 
risk the company feels comfortable bearing. 
15 Victor Goldberg, The Devil Made Me Do It: The Corporate Purchase of 
Insurance, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 541, 543-44 (2009) (discussing various benefits that 
insurers provide to companies). 
16 Göran Skogh, Mandatory Insurance: Transaction Costs Analysis of 
Insurance, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOLUME II: CIVIL LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 521, 526 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000).   
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must account for in creating a transaction in the first place.  By reducing 
these costs, insurance plays an essential role in facilitating trade and 
commerce. 
Other explanations for carrying insurance include lowering the 
expected transaction costs of bankruptcy, lowering the corporation's 
expected tax liability, reducing regulatory constraints on firms, and 
shielding them from class actions filed against them.17   
Beyond these benefits, insurance companies also provide another 
important function  - that of loss prevention or minimization. Insurance 
companies have the institutional expertise and knowledge to suggest and 
implement cost-effective preventative measures.18  Consider, for example, 
fire insurance on a commercial property worth $1 million.  The chance of a 
fire destroying the property in a given year is 1%, which means the 
expected loss for that year is $10,000 and the insurance premium must be 
at least slightly more than that amount.  Now, assume that by installing a 
sprinkler system, the risk of a fire destroying the property is cut in half, 
meaning the premium to be paid is likely to be reduced to (slightly more 
than) $5,000.  If installing and maintaining the sprinkler system will cost 
less than $5,000 per year, and its installation can be easily verified by the 
insurer, the property owner has every incentive to invest in the sprinkler 
system—a “loss control”—which reduces the risk of the loss in return for a 
discounted premium.19 It is true that an uninsured person, generally, has an 
even stronger incentive to prevent losses. The problem, however, is 
knowing which steps to take, something that insurance companies are often 
experts at.  Furthermore, as will be explained below, in some contexts an 
entity on the verge of bankruptcy, without insurance, may have only 
minimal incentive to take care, as it has nothing to lose.  However, the 
                                                                                                                                      
17 See David Mayers & Clifford W, Smith, Jr., On the Corporate Demand for 
Insurance, 55 J. BUS. 281 (1982) (conducting extensive work on why public 
corporations purchase insurance); see also TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, 
ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES 
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 42 (2010) (documenting how Directors and Officers 
liability insurance shields corporations from losses due to securities class actions 
filed against them); Goldberg, supra note 14, at 543 (providing numerous reasons 
why insurance is value enhancing despite arguably being inefficient for a risk 
neutral company).  
18 Goldberg, supra note 14, at 543-44.  
19 KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 11 (1986). How deductions incentivize loss prevention will be 
explained below.  
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possibility of a reduced premium restores the incentive of even that entity 
to, for example, install the sprinkler system. 
Insurance has some socially beneficial functions which go beyond 
benefiting the direct parties to the insurance contract. One such function 
served by compulsory insurance companies is gatekeeping, which is 
accomplished in many of the most important sectors of modern economies. 
Automobile insurance is required to drive a car; homeowners insurance is 
often required to obtain a mortgage; and business owners insurance is often 
required to take out a commercial loan.  Insurers provide a way to screen 
and filter individuals before they are permitted to undertake important, but 
potentially socially harmful activities, thus serving effectively as quasi-
regulators. For instance, if a person has been in too many accidents for any 
insurance company to offer him an automobile policy, the result is that he 
cannot buy insurance and thus legally cannot drive a car.  This keeps 
society safer, at least as long as he does not drive without carrying 
insurance. The gatekeeping function, however, may not be a social benefit 
if the insurance industry acts inefficiently or considers factors—such as 
race, gender, or nationality—that society views as inappropriate for 
determining insurability.20 
Another positive externality of a functioning insurance market is 
that private insurance provides fast compensation to victims of disasters, 
accidents, and torts, easing the burden on tax-funded social insurance 
programs like Social Security disability benefits or FEMA’s Disaster Aid 
Programs.  For example, as of August 2006, only a year after the disaster, 
insurers had already paid $17.6 billion for wind damage from Hurricane 
Katrina.21 Without these payments, many more homeowners would likely 
have been forced to turn to the government for assistance.  
On the other hand, insurance affects social stratification in 
significant, meaningful ways. The ability to obtain (and to afford 
continuously) various types of insurance can be a serious and disconcerting 
divide between the well-off and the lower classes, leading many states, and 
recently the US Federal government, to provide national insurance, 
especially health insurance, to lessen stratification.  
Over all, insurance has many positive elements, and plays a 
necessary role in nearly all commercial transactions. However, insurance 
                                                                                                                                      
20 See Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. 
REV. 517 (1983). 
21 Joseph B. Treaster, Judge Rules for Insurers in Katrina, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
16, 2006 at C. 
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can create negative externalities as well. For example, it is possible that 
health insurance may encourage insureds to take less than optimal 
precautions to avoid sickness, or doctors to perform unnecessary 
procedures, or the medical device and drug industries to excessively 
innovate, since insureds are sheltered from the true costs of these actions.  
A policy makers committed to a well-functioning market should seek to 
minimize these adverse consequences of insurance. These impediments to 
efficient insurance contracts, and some potential solutions, are the core of 
this article and are discussed in the following sections. 
 
II. INFORMATIONAL IMPEDIMENTS TO EFFICIENT 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
 
According to the economic analysis of law, rational parties 
operating in a perfectly competitive market (without transaction costs) 
where everyone has complete information will voluntarily contract 
efficiently to maximize their joint welfare. Absent externalities, these 
contracts will also increase overall social welfare. That parties, especially 
insureds, are not always rational has been widely documented  will  be 
discussed in section 3 below,22. This section focuses on other impediments 
to efficient insurance contracts—informational impediments and strategic 
behavior. I discuss these impediments and offer possible contractual and 
doctrinal solutions to them.  
 
 A. INFORMATIONAL IMPEDIMENTS IN GENERAL 
 
Information impediments result from the existence of imperfect 
information with respect to the probability of the risk materializing and/or 
its scope. Information impediments also arise from the existence of 
information asymmetry between the insurer and the insured with respect to 
these factors. It is the second reason for information impediments—those 
stemming from asymmetric information—that is at the center of our 
discussions. Why? Because when the information held by the insurer (and 
the insured for that matter) is not perfect, but there is no problem of 
information asymmetry, the risk the insurer is facing is small. For example, 
an insurer who charges a premium equal to two percent of the total value of 
                                                                                                                                      
22 See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 8; Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating 
Consumer Demand in Insurance Markets, 3 ERASMUS L. REV. 23 (2010). 
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the property instead of three percent increased its risk by one percent of the 
value of the property, an increase which usually is not destructive for him.23  
More serious problems arise when information asymmetry exists between 
the insurer and the insured. Such asymmetry can exist at the pre-contractual 
stage; after the contract begins, but before the insured event occurs; or after 
the occurrence. Four problems which arise from the information 
asymmetry between the parties will be discussed in this section. When the 
insured has more information at the pre-contractual stage, which is relevant 
to the contracting itself, an adverse selection problem may occur. On the 
other hand, when the insurer has more information relevant to the contract 
itself, a reverse adverse selection problem may occur. After parties have 
entered the contract, whether before or after the insured event occurred, an 
informational gap about the insured’s behavior can lead to the problem of 
moral hazard, while informational gaps about the behavior of the insurer 
may lead to the problem of reverse moral hazard.  At the end of each of 
these discussions I will use the Two Islands Approach laid out in the 
preface to demonstrate how one can go about analyzing potential solutions 
to these problems. 
Before we turn to the analysis of these four problems it is worth 
mentioning that regulation of the insurance industry by the executive 
branch also has an important role in dealing with these problems. For 
example, the monitoring of insurance policies by the insurance 
commissioners ensures both that consumers are burdened with efficient 
disclosure duties, thus reducing the risk of adverse selection, and that the 
policies match the consumer's reasonable expectations regarding the scope 
of coverage, thus reducing the risk of reverse adverse selection. Further, 
capital and liquidity requirements enforced by the commissioners ensure 
that insurance companies meet their financial commitments to the insureds, 
preventing reverse moral hazard. And so on and so forth. Of course 
regulation is not a magic solution. Insurance commissioners often lack the 
necessary resources to monitor effectively, are vulnerable to political 
pressures, and some argue are often captured by market players or for 
various other reasons do not maximize social welfare. In this paper I do not 
focus on the functions of insurance commissioners, but rather on the 
available solutions that courts and the parties to an insurance contract have 
                                                                                                                                      
23 The picture may be different of course if the error is systematic and was 
done for many uninsured, or if without the mistake the insurer would not have 
agreed to insure the property at all, and there is no possibility of reinsurance. 
44          CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL         Vol. 19.1 
for dealing with the two pairs of problems resulting from asymmetric 
information. 
 
 B. ADVERSE SELECTION  
 
Foremost, information that insurers and insureds possess will 
inevitably end up being imperfect or asymmetric. Asymmetry of 
information leads to the problem of adverse selection.  A theoretical 
concept first appearing in the late nineteenth century, adverse selection 
describes the phenomenon of high-risk parties who, knowing their ‘type’, 
seek more insurance coverage than low-risk parties.  For example, a person 
with a personal or family history of certain medical problems will be more 
likely to purchase health insurance than a person who does not have such a 
history.  This result follows from insurers charging one premium rate to all 
(or at least many) insureds.  The insureds, though, have varying degrees of 
risk and are personally better able to determine their own risk than the 
insurers, who only know the average risk for a pool of observationally 
similar, but in fact heterogeneous, insureds.  This informational asymmetry 
allows high risk parties to obtain insurance at a premium that is lower than 
they would actually be otherwise willing to pay.  For low-risk parties, 
however, the premium charged to the entire pool is too expensive. Low-risk 
parties might object to cross subsidizing the high-risk parties—with 
insurers using the excess premiums of the low-risk parties to defray the 
costs of offering cheaper insurance to high-risk parties—and might 
therefore drop their coverage and leave the insurance pool.  Consequently, 
the average risk faced by the insurer increases, the premium must increase, 
and this cycle of adverse selection repeats itself and theoretically might 
lead to the risk pool unraveling completely—a classic death spiral.24  
In general, the risk of the total market unraveling increases along 
with the following factors: the heterogeneity of the insureds (whether both 
high and low risk insureds exist), the certainty of the insureds’ knowledge 
of their own risk level (otherwise, high risk insureds might not be 
excessively attracted to the pool), and the competiveness of the market 
(when there is a greater chance that another insurance company will 
offer lower premium for low-risk insureds). 
                                                                                                                                      
24 For a case study which explores a death spiral in the context of a health-
insurance plan see David M. Cutler & Sarah J. Reber, Paying for Health 
Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Competition and Adverse Selection, 113 Q. J. 
ECON. 433 (1998). 
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Of course, this is all known to the insurance companies which try to design 
their contracts in a way that will address this problem. Unfortunately, this 
is not a simple task because the asymmetric information brings with it 
strategic behavior such as when high-risk insureds pretend to be low-risk 
(for example by not reporting that they smoke). The following subsection 
provides some possible solution.  
 
1. Theoretical solutions to the adverse selection problem 
 
There are several possible solutions on the theoretical level.  The 
first and most basic is requiring disclosure by the insureds.  More accurate 
information regarding the characteristics and behaviors of the insured 
parties allows better assessment and pricing of the overall insurance pool. 
This is why insurance companies ask insureds to fill out long forms 
describing and bringing to light the potential risks the insureds bring to the 
pool.  
The information collected is used to differentiate premiums for 
insureds in a way that reflects their varying levels of risk, a process known 
as risk classification.  By dividing insureds according to their risk 
classifications in this way, an insurer may mitigate to some extent the 
problem of adverse selection, because similar risks pay the same premium.  
However, risk classification does not come free of disadvantages. By 
decreasing the extent of cross subsidization between insureds, insurers 
reduce the degree at which they spread risk among their risk-averse 
insureds.  This tradeoff between increasing ex-post coverage while 
eliminating the ex-ante incentive for strategic behavior on the part of the 
insured is fundamental to insurance and characterizes it more broadly. In 
reducing the problem of adverse selection, risk classification allows the 
insurer to reduce the average cost of insuring its pool while at same time, to 
the extent high-risk insureds leave its pool to be admitted elsewhere where 
the degree of cross subsidization is larger, it increases the average costs of 
its rivals.  
One may think there should be no limit to pursuing risk 
classification if one wants to combat adverse selection. In practice, besides 
the harm to the risk-spreading function of insurance, an attempt at too 
detailed a classification will often cost more than the benefit derived from 
it due to the costs involved in collecting, analyzing and utilizing the 
data. Thus, in life insurance it may be of no use to distinguish between 
female smokers and females non-smokers because the gap in life 
expectancy is not substantial enough or because the proportion of women 
who smoke is low and the extra cost of distinguishing between them is 
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high. Hence, a certain amount of cross subsidization, and therefore of 
adverse selection, will always remain. 
In some cases the insurer can afford not to invest resources at the 
contracting stage to ensure that the insured met its disclosure obligations, 
despite being of vital significance, because after the occurrence it might be 
able, perhaps more easily, to check whether the insured breached her duty 
of disclosure. When the information is easily discoverable after the 
occurrence and can serve as grounds for canceling the insurance contract or 
paying reduced benefits—both are self-help measures the insurer can take 
without a court—the insurer can make do with collecting information only 
after the occurrence. A simple example involves the question of whether an 
insured who died of lung cancer was a smoker. Instead of investigating the 
condition of the lungs of all insured persons who stated they were not 
smoking the insurer can only investigate those who died from lung cancer, 
thus saving resources across the entire pool. 
Classifying risk based on information collected from the insured, 
either by way of filling out questionnaires or by medical examinations, as a 
way to combat adverse selection, has many obvious limitations. The 
insured has an incentive to hide negative information from insurers, either 
because he is afraid the insurance company would refuse to insure him or 
because he wants to pay a lower premium. Insurance law, as we will see 
below, has developed various legal doctrines which punish insureds for 
material false representations, but it seems that despite this insureds do not 
always disclose private information, a fact that might lead to adverse 
selection. 
Is there a way insurance companies can get policyholders to 
disclose voluntarily whether they are high risk? The answer, as first shown 
by Rothschild and Stiglitz, is positive.25 By offering policies with diverse 
deductibles insurance companies incentivize the insureds to sort themselves 
into different risk pools based on a self-estimation of their own risk. High-
risk insureds will tend to purchase more insurance coverage and therefore 
will choose a lower deductible for a higher premium, while low-risk 
insureds will prefer higher deductibles for a lower premium. Rothchild and 
Stiglitz famously showed that under some distribution of insureds’ risk 
                                                                                                                                      
25 Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance 
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. ECON 629 
(1976).  Their paper is the canonical insurance application of George A. Akerlof, 
The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 
Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
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types what is called a ‘separating equilibrium’ may be reached where high-
risk types are fully covered but low-risk types are only partially insured.26 
In other words, self-selection by insureds may lead to an equilibrium where 
high-risk and low-risk insureds choose different policies (in terms of scope 
of coverage and the premium they pay for the scope of coverage they 
choose) so that effectively they voluntarily self-classify themselves into 
two separate pools without providing any further information about the 
risks they bring to the pool.  
On the other hand, if the proportion of high-risk insureds in the 
pool is small and low-risk individuals are sufficiently risk averse, then the 
economic justification for offering lower price and narrower coverage to 
the low-risk insureds diminishes and the equilibrium that will be created is 
a ‘pooling equilibrium,’ where both types of insureds are pooled together, 
paying the same premium for the same scope of coverage.  
Another way that insurance companies are encouraging self-selection is by 
offering multiple-period contracts. For example, consider a commercial by 
Allstate, a leading insurance company in the U.S, where it guarantees that 
automobile insurance premium will not go up for those involved in a car 
accident. Allstate markets this insurance by claiming it does not leave its 
policyholders in the lurch. In practice, this scheme may serve as a 
marketing device to create long-term relationships with the insureds 
allowing Allstate to gather information on the risk level of its 
policyholders. Moreover, the promise that the premium will not go up after 
an accident is especially tempting to drivers with private information as 
being at high risk of getting involved in multiple accidents. Those drivers 
will self-select into this program, allowing Allstate to classify them into 
their own special pool.27 
A few problems arise, however, when insurers risk classify their 
insureds.  First, because classification is never perfect, certain insureds (the 
less risky) essentially cross subsidize others (the more risky) when they pay 
a premium higher than the risk they actually present.  That creates not only 
problems of efficiency as insurance pools might unravel, or some low risk 
insureds will be driven out of the market, or get less coverage than they 
desired—problems which were discussed above—but also of distributive 
justice. Insurers—private or public—have the ability to redistribute 
resources between the classes they have separated by overcharging, 
                                                                                                                                      
26  Rothschild & Stiglitz, supra note 24, at 648. 
27 Allstate - Accident Forgiveness, YOUTUBE (Jun. 30, 2010), http://www. 
youtube.com/ watch?v=J2nJYf1iRdM. 
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intentionally or otherwise, the less risky and undercharging the more 
risky.28  In health insurance, for example, the healthy subsidize the 
chronically sick.  
A related potentially troubling issue with risk classification 
logically stems from the nature of classification which often raises sensitive 
matters of discrimination.  The reason is that the most obvious (and least 
expensive) way to divide a large group of individuals, with the goal of 
assigning them to different risk levels, is by observable characteristics like 
age, sex, and race.  Any parent of a male teenage driver feels the effect of 
this practice when he or she pays a much higher car-insurance premium for 
his or her son.   
Is it discriminatory to force those people who have a lower risk-
level, like women who drive on average less than men—although not 
necessarily more carefully—to subsidize the relatively more risky by 
having them pay the same premiums?29  
On pure welfare grounds the analysis is (at least theoretically) 
clear: in the implausible case where the correlation between risk and 
gender, race, or age is perfect, that is, when insureds have no residual 
private information about their own risk not captured by the classification, 
then allowing such classification is welfare enhancing as it eliminates the 
adverse selection that otherwise would exist. In all other cases, the social 
welfare implications of allowing such classification is an empirical 
question which requires comparing the ex-ante costs of strategic behavior 
with the ex-post costs of reduced coverage. More specifically, one would 
need to compare the loss caused by adverse selection in a pool without the 
classification to the loss caused by classifying risk pools when the 
correlation is less than one, thereby making insurance both over and under 
expensive to some people.30    
Obviously, whether a policy is discriminatory or distributively 
unjust is not necessarily uniquely determined, although might well be 
informed, by economic analysis. To what extent society is willing to 
                                                                                                                                      
28 For an analysis of the tension between risk distribution and risk 
classification see Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk 
Classification, 71 VA. L. REV. 403 (1985). 
29 See City of Los Angeles, Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S 702 
(1978) (banning gender based annuities provided by an employer under Title VII); 
Cour Constitutionnelle [CC] [Constitutional Court] Case C-236/09, para 47, Sept. 
30, 2010 (Belg.) (European Union Court of Justice actually banned insurers from 
even considering gender in determining insurance premiums). 
30 Einav & Finkelstein, supra note 3, at 121.  
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tolerate classifications such as race, gender, religion, or age varies greatly 
with the groups affected, but the process remains in many ways 
discriminatory nonetheless.31  
An interesting, controversial matter on the forefront of the 
insurance and adverse selection problem involves genetic testing and its 
value in predicting disease.  In one sense, the tremendous information 
advantage presented by genetic knowledge could lead to better loss 
prevention (for example people testing positive for HIV can be treated 
before they actually develop AIDS) and to more efficient risk 
classification.32  But the intensely private nature of that information, the 
risks of errors, the fear that it would leak to third parties or be used against 
relatives of the insureds, as well as the invasive means required sometimes 
(at least to date) to obtain it cheaply, may speak against permitting insurers 
to use genetic testing.  Another argument against such testing is that it is 
not “fair” to punish a person for things that were determined before his or 
her birth. From a law and economics perspective an argument against the 
usage of genetic testing for insurance purposes can be expressed in the 
claim that using information obtained from genetic testing might lead to a 
welfare loss stemming from the fact that realized risks might no longer be 
insured, the so-called Hirshleifer Effect.33 Imagine a test which predicts 
that a particular individual has a probability of 99% of developing cancer in 
the next ve years. Once the information is revealed, insurance companies 
might not want to insure those who tested positive. That is a social loss, as 
most risk averse people would be willing to pay a premium before they 
take the test to make certain that they were still insurable even if they tested 
positively.  
On the other hand, suppressing this information might deny the 
individuals access to preventative medical care, or to at least planning more 
optimally for their shorter expected life span. This creates a difficult 
dilemma, and jurisdictions, including the United States, have weighed in 
against the use of genetic testing by insurers for that very reason.34   
                                                                                                                                      
31 See Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax 
Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157, 207-27 (2003).  
32 Alexander Tabarrok, Genetic Testing: an Economic and Contractarian 
Analysis, 13 J. HEALTH ECON. 75 (1994).  
33 Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the 
Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971).  
34 Michael Hoy & Michael Ruse, Regulating Genetic Information in Insurance 
Markets, 8 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 211 (2005) (analyzing the economic 
efficiency aspect of allowing the use of genetic test results for risk classification). 
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A sensible compromise might be to allow insureds to know about their 
genetic makeup but prevent insurers from using it in their underwriting 
procedures. Unfortunately, the legal prohibition against using genetic 
testing has the potential to lead to further exaggeration of the adverse 
selection problem because of the asymmetry it creates.  Given that some 
individuals will undertake genetic testing for their personal knowledge or 
will infer their genetic makeup from their family history, those who know 
that they are high risk will view insurance as a worthwhile investment and 
will over-insure.  The opposite is true for those with knowledge of their 
own clean genetic make-up.   
This adverse selection effect of banning genetic testing was shown 
in a recent study of individuals at risk for Huntington Disease, a terminal 
genetic illness, and their propensity to purchase long-term care insurance—
insurance that covers the costs of nursing care later in life.35  The rates of 
Huntington Disease are extremely low among the general population, but if 
one parent has the disease you have a 50% chance of also having it and 
there is no cure.36  Those with the genetic mutation are guaranteed to 
require some sort of nursing care during their lives, making long-term care 
insurance very valuable.37  Not surprisingly then, those individuals who are 
at risk (have a parent with the disease) are two and half times more likely to 
own long-term care insurance, and those who have tested positive (100% 
chance of having the disease) are five times more likely to have the 
coverage when compared with the general population and controlling for 
various factors like age.38  While long-term care underwriters screen for 
those who have been diagnosed with the disease (and would reject an 
applicant who had previously tested positive), they do not ask whether a 
parent has Huntington Disease.39  Insurers can also not force the potential 
insured to undergo genetic testing to screen for Huntington or other 
diseases.  This illustrates the adverse selection issues that arise when one 
party (the insureds) can use genetic testing to gain private information but 
the other party (the insurer) cannot.40  
                                                                                                                                      
35 Emily Oster et al., Genetic Adverse Selection: Evidence from Long-Term 
Care Insurance and Huntington Disease, UNIV. CHI. BOOTH SCH. BUS. (June 8, 
2010), http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/emily.oster/papers/geneticadverse.pdf.  
36 Id. at 2. 
37 Id. at 3. 
38 Id. at 18. 
39 Id. at 7.   
40 In fact, the death spiral for the long-term-care insurance market may have 
already begun.  See Anne Tergesen & Leslie Scism, Long-Term-Care Premiums 
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A totally different solution for adverse selection is group-based 
insurance where insurance is offered to a group of people united by 
characteristics other than the risk insured against. All members of the group 
are automatically admitted without individual underwriting. Health 
insurance offered through employers, as in the U.S., life insurance offered 
through one’s bank, and automobile insurance offered through a trade 
organization are such examples. Because the risk insured against is 
randomly distributed in the group, the risk of the pool should not be 
excessively high. The benefits to the insureds from groups insurance stem 
from three sources. First, as was just mentioned the risk for adverse 
selection is null and therefore premiums can be kept low. Second, the 
administrative costs associated with group-based insurance are much lower 
than the costs associated with individual underwriting, and, third, the group 
often has market power that enables it to negotiate even lower prices. As a 
result, the premium offered in group-based insurance is appealing even to 
low-risk insureds. Those low-risk insureds prefer the group insurance 
coverage even though they cross subsidize the high-risk insureds, further 
eliminating the problem of adverse selection, because the premium is lower 
than in a homogeneous risk pool but one where underwriting is done 
individually.  
Another possible solution for adverse selection is eliminating 
coverage for preexisting conditions or a delayed coverage for these 
conditions. If a patient has cancer and knows that he would have to wait 
two years before he can get coverage in a new insurance company he 
would not adversely select into that pool, if only because he might die 
before the coverage would begin. But denying coverage for preexisting 
conditions creates terrible ex-post problems as the sickest people in society 
are left without care. Indeed, in the recent Healthcare reform (the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, known as the ACA) insurance 
companies are prohibited from denying coverage for preexisting 
conditions. In other countries, health insurance plans have always been 
mandated to accept every applicant for health-care coverage regardless of 
any preexisting conditions the insureds may have.  The societal value of 
this exclusion is discussed under the Two Islands Approach later in this 
section. 
                                                                                                                                      
Soar, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB2000 
1424052748703298504575534513798604500.html (reporting that rate increases of 
up to 40% were submitted to state regulators for approval to cover unexpected 
increases in insurer costs).  
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While it sounds noble, accepting every applicant who self-selects 
into the pool may restore the adverse selection problem. Ordinarily at least, 
it would. To prevent this from happening the prohibition of the preexisting 
condition exclusion is usually accompanied, as it is in the ACA, with a 
mandate requiring that everyone, including the young and healthy who 
might not otherwise apply for insurance, purchase coverage.41  
If everyone is required to purchase insurance, then more healthy people 
will be in the pool to subsidize the sick people.  While a greater number of 
sick people in the pool may put upward pressure on premiums, the 
increased number of healthy people, who might have been previously 
priced out of the pool by adverse selection, will likely keep premiums close 
to their original level, or lower.  Furthermore, the cycle of adverse selection 
where relatively healthy people are priced out by sick people, and then the 
moderately sick people are priced out by the very sick people, and so on, 
cannot happen because everyone is required by law to be included in the 
pool. Essentially, mandatory insurance is tantamount to a one single group-
based insurance pool, which, as we saw above, is a way to combat adverse 
selection.42  
A less extreme solution is to provide a lump sum subsidy toward 
the price of the policy, especially to the low risk individuals. This will lead 
to fewer low risk individuals remaining without insurance.  
In any case, uniform subsidies or mandatory insurance do not solve 
the distributive justice and discrimination concerns raised before. Charging 
every driver the same premium entails that good drivers subsidize bad 
drivers, that drivers who drive less subsidize drivers who drive more, and 
less directly, that the old subsidize the young and that women subsidize 
men. More generally, there is an inherent question with insurance as to how 
much the able and lucky should subsidize the unable and unlucky; with car 
insurance it is the safe drivers against the unsafe, with health insurance it is 
the healthy against the sick, and with liability insurance it is the non-
negligent-prone against the negligent-prone.  These questions are a bit 
easier to resolve when those subsidizing today will inevitably become those 
                                                                                                                                      
41 Such mandate was recently held constitutional by the U.S Supreme Court in 
Nat'l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  
42 If the administrative costs of processing claims are too high, it might be 
socially optimal to leave some low risk individuals outside of the pool, as the cost 
of providing them coverage might outweigh the benefits to them. In such cases, 
mandatory coverage might not be welfare enhancing. Einav & Finkelstein, supra 
note 2, at 123.  
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being subsidized tomorrow like when the young subsidize the old. In 
contrast, these questions become starker in situations when the relatively 
risky classification coincides with other social disadvantages, such as 
poverty.43 
 
2. Doctrinal solutions for the adverse selection problem 
 
Insurance law has found ways to facilitate the practice of some of these 
theoretical solutions in order to alleviate or prevent the effects of adverse 
selection.  Laws establishing a mandatory insurance framework—such as 
in automobile insurance—are an obvious example.  But other legal 
doctrines, which pertain more closely to disclosure and risk classification, 
are more intricate and arguably more significant in that they expose private 
information about insured parties to investigation by insurers. 
One such doctrine concerns the “warranties” proffered by the 
insureds prior to the conclusion of the insurance contract.  This practice 
engages the warranty doctrine, and according to its terms in the U.S., the 
insured party is permitted, prior to insurance contract formation, to make 
any truthful statement about itself that would lower its perceived risk and, 
consequently, its premium.44  If the insured party later makes a claim, 
though, and the insurer can prove any of those statements, however 
inconsequential, to have been false, the claim may be rejected.  Because of 
the high cost of a false statement, the warranty doctrine presents a fairly 
effective means to encourage accurate disclosure.  The associated frequent, 
costly investigations into pre-contractual statements and the potential for a 
penalty being imposed on the insured for simple pre-contractual 
carelessness, however, are substantial detriments to the warranty doctrine. 
A similar doctrine is that of misrepresentation.  Here, an insured party also 
makes pre-contractual representations to the insurer regarding the risk of 
the insured.  Under this doctrine, instead of being liable for any 
                                                                                                                                      
43 Mandatory insurance may also increase the risk of moral hazard, to be 
discussed further below. See Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of 
Automobile Insurance and Accident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities, 47 J.L. & 
ECON. 357 (2004). Same holds for state mandates requiring health insurance plans 
to cover medical treatment. See Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Diabetes 
Treatments and Moral Hazard, 50 J.L. & ECON. 519 (2007) (finding that mandates 
generate a moral hazard problem, with diabetics exhibiting higher BMIs after the 
adoption of these mandates).  
44 Seth Chandler, Insurance Regulation, 3 INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF L. & 
ECON. 837, 845 (2000).  
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misstatement, a future claim may only be denied if the insured knowingly 
made a misrepresentation which is material to the insured’s risk. Thus 
courts ask whether the insurer would have agreed to cover the risk at all, or 
whether the premium the insured has paid for the policy covering the event 
that actually occurred would have been materially higher if an accurate 
representation had been made.  Over time, the law in the U.S. has generally 
shifted from the stricter liability associated with warranties to a negligence-
based system of representations, whether through statutory action or 
common law.45 
Given a finding of breach of warranty or misrepresentation, the 
penalty for the insured party is typically voiding or reducing the insurance 
policy.  If the penalty is reduction, the amount owed to the insured is 
usually reduced to the amount that would have been available had no 
misrepresentation occurred prior to contract formation. The rationale for 
reduction is that, because it puts the insured in the same position as if her 
representations were correct, there is no incentive for the insured to be 
dishonest up front.  The problem, however, is that not all 
misrepresentations will be caught, and if the only penalty is reduction, 
insureds might gamble that they can get away with the misrepresentation. 
Voiding the policy outright provides an affirmative penalty, creating a 
stronger incentive for the insured to be honest at the outset.  
In some scenarios, like when an insured has been paying premiums 
for several years, certain statements and representations may not be 
challenged under the doctrines of warranty or misrepresentation, because 
after that much time has lapsed there is a high risk of erroneously 
determining either the validity, or falsity, of pre-contractual statements.  
This is the doctrine of incontestability.46 The purpose of incontestability is 
to prevent an insurer from opportunistically issuing policies to insureds and 
accepting years of premiums, all the while knowingly concealing a 
technicality with the application that would allow the insurer to later deny 
coverage should it so choose.47 Incontestability acts as de facto statute of 
                                                                                                                                      
45 Particular attention has been recently paid to the requirement that a 
materially higher premium would have been charged for insurance covering the 
particular event that actually occurred. In other words while some require that the 
misrepresentation contributed to the loss actually occurred, others require that it 
contributed to the risk of loss. Id. at 846. 
46 Id. at 846. 
47 See John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident 
Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 
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limitations insulating insured parties from “post-occurrence underwriting”, 
a practice which is profitable for the insurer but places large risks of 
forfeiture on a potentially innocent policy holder, who has presumably paid 
years of premiums up to that point.  Life insurance, health insurance, and 
disability insurance policies often contain an incontestability clause or are 
subject to an incontestability statute.48   
Incontestability clauses, however, do not strip insurers of all 
defenses.  Fraud is a common exception where insurers are allowed to 
challenge the validity of a policy, though what type of fraud avoids an 
incontestability clause is not always clear.  The California Supreme Court, 
for example, has differentiated between the insured sending an imposter to 
take his life insurance medical examination and a healthy person giving the 
name of someone else as the insured, but taking the medical examination 
herself:  the former is subject to incontestability, while the latter is not. The 
rationale given by the court for this discrepancy is that in the former case 
there was a valid contract between the parties, even though it was procured 
by fraud, and therefore the dispute was governed by the contract itself, 
including its incontestability clause.49 In the latter case there was no 
meeting of the minds between the insurer and the deceased person, as the 
deceased person was obviously not a party to the contract. The policy 
insured, if anyone, the person who completed the application and took the 
medical examination.50   
Another related doctrine is concealment, which punishes the 
intentional nondisclosure of information by the insured either when asked 
during the application process, or in the period that follows it.51 Given how 
easy it is for insurers to ask relevant questions and to collect relevant 
information, it is not clear that the doctrine of concealment should apply to 
incomplete application forms. Rather, the doctrine of concealment seems 
more relevant in the period after the insured filled out the applications but 
before the insurance company issued the policy, as well as in the period 
after the policy was issued and before the occurrence, because in these 
                                                                                                                                      
1315 (2007) (documenting how Unum/Provident knowingly took on policies with 
minor errors in them and then denied coverage on the basis of these technicalities).  
48 See, e.g., Halstead Consultants, Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 891 P.2d 926, 928 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S. v. Bell, 27 F.3d 
1274 (7th Cir. 1994).   
49 Amex Life Assurance Co. v. Superior Court, 930 P.2d 1264, 1266 (1997).   
50 Id.  
51 1 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 3.08(d) 
(2d ed. Supp. 2000). 
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periods insureds are not usually asked about changes in their risks, and 
therefore it makes sense to require them to initiate a disclosure of any new 
changes in their risk profile.  Indeed, courts have ruled that insureds may 
remain silent unless specifically asked by the insurer or the insured knows 
that the withheld information is material to the insurer’s decision to grant a 
policy.  In that sense concealment is not as far-reaching as the 
misrepresentation or warranty doctrines.  As with misrepresentation, 
however, the penalty for concealment is usually reduction of the scope of 
coverage or voiding of the insurance policy all together.52  
 
3. Returning to the Two Islands Approach 
 
The value of the two island approach can be seen clearly in the 
debate over coverage of preexisting conditions in health insurance, 
discussed earlier in this section as a theoretical solution to the problem of 
adverse selection.53  The Third Circuit addressed the preexisting medical 
condition exclusion in Lawson ex rel. Lawson v. Fortis Insurance Co.54  
The question in that case was whether a child, treated for symptoms of 
leukemia two days before the issuance of a policy but not diagnosed with 
leukemia until after, was excluded from coverage by a preexisting 
condition exclusion.55 Judge Alito found the policy language ambiguous as 
to whether the exclusion required treatment or diagnosis, and found for the 
insureds per contra proferentem.56  That decision merely limits the scope of 
the preexisting condition exclusion in those situations where a condition 
has not yet been diagnosed.  The court’s decision can be explained by the 
distaste anyone would have denying insurance to a child with leukemia. 
But that is an ex-post approach which focuses on the parties at bar, whereas 
                                                                                                                                      
52 Compare Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Higginbotham, 95 U.S. 380 (1877), 
with Stipcich v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311 (1928). In Stipcich the U.S. 
Supreme Court voided a policy where the insured did not disclose changes in its 
health that occurred between the date of application and the date of the issuance of 
a policy, where as in Higginbotham it did not.  
53 The exclusion has since been prohibited by the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-3 (West Supp. 2012). 
54 Lawson ex. rel. Lawson v. Fortis Ins. Co., 301 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2002).   
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 167. Contra proferentem is a doctrine which  dictates that an 
ambiguous provision in a contract should be construed against the drafter. As will 
be shown below, this doctrine combats reverse moral hazard.  
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the correct approach, as we saw, is the ex-ante which focuses on the 
function of insurance and the future implications a decision would carry.   
All else being equal, an island with an exclusion for preexisting conditions 
or illnesses will have far cheaper insurance premium than an island without 
the exclusion.  Indeed, an island without the exclusion could potentially 
have the adverse selection cycle discussed above, pricing out all but the 
sickest from the insurance market.  Without the exclusion, there would be 
little reason to buy insurance until you know you are sick.  Premiums 
would go up dramatically, causing fewer healthy people to buy insurance, 
causing premiums to increase, and so on.   
On an island with the exclusion, just as insureds know they cannot 
purchase fire insurance after their houses burn down, they would know 
they cannot purchase health insurance after they are diagnosed with a 
disease.  In a well-functioning market that knowledge should incentivize 
everyone to purchase coverage in advance. Thus, healthy and sick people 
are jointly members of the insurance pool, and once sick people are 
diagnosed, their care costs are subsidized by the healthy people’s premium.  
It is clear, therefore, as a general theoretical matter, the preexisting 
condition exclusion is important, at least when insurance coverage is not 
mandatory.57  However, to make a judgment about the Lawson case 
specifically, the discussion must be sharpened.   
In the Lawson opinion the issue was not the overall value of the 
preexisting condition exclusion, but whether it should be applied when 
symptoms have been treated without a diagnosis of the actual condition.58  
Adding the court’s chosen “island” to the above analysis, the issue 
becomes close.  That “island” would only void the exclusion for people 
treated without being diagnosed with a specific illness.  This is a relatively 
small group of claims, limited further by excluding instances where there is 
an indication of bad faith or fraud.  The adverse selection issue would be 
                                                                                                                                      
57  If individuals are mandated to purchase insurance then they cannot wait 
until after they discover they are sick to purchase insurance, and thus the problems 
preexisting decision exclusion are designed to prevent never come to be.   
58 In the Lawson case, there was some circumstantial evidence that the 
condition, or at least a serious condition, was suspected by the daughter’s family 
prior to the issuance of the insurance policy.  Specifically, the grandmother was a 
registered nurse, and the health insurance was applied for on the same day the 
daughter was originally taken to the doctor. Lawson, 301 F.3d at 161. But the court 
thought differently. To quote then Judge Alito, “[h]ere, there is no evidence that 
the possibility that Elena's condition was actually leukemia ever entered the minds 
of Elena's parents or Dr. Parikh.” Id. at 166.    
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vastly smaller than if there was no preexisting condition exclusion at all.  
There would still be some adverse selection, however, if the patients 
themselves suspect they have a serious disease even before they are 
officially diagnosed, leading to some increase in premiums.59  Additionally, 
there will be higher administrative costs due the required case-by-case 
analysis as to whether a condition has actually been diagnosed, or if 
symptoms have merely been treated, and if there is any indication of bad 
faith or fraud.  The higher administrative costs will also lead to an increase 
in premiums.  The higher premiums associated with more coverage could 
well be preferable to cheaper premium and no coverage, but to identify the 
pool’s welfare maximizing “island”, further information is needed about 
the frequency and costs of such circumstances.  If such empirical 
information exists, it should be presented to the courts. Otherwise, the court 
needs to “guestimate” it itself.    
Here we have seen that while the Two Islands Approach does not 
provide a definitive answer, it does allow us to look at the situation 
objectively. The court in Lawson probably got it right but only because of  
the overall effect of its decision on insurance pools, rather than any 
sympathy for a plaintiff with leukemia. 
 
4. Adverse Selection—The Empirical Evidence  
 
Although a formidable problem theoretically, there is only little 
evidence that in certain insurance markets adverse selection exists and 
almost no  evidence to suggest that adverse selection is actually a major 
problem for the insurance industry at large..60 Alma Cohen and Peter 
Siegleman provide several explanations for the disconnect between theory 
and practice.  One is that it is hard to measure adverse selection 
                                                                                                                                      
59 This would be further reduced by implementing some type of waiting 
period, where new insureds do not receive full coverage until a certain period of 
time has elapsed since they purchased coverage, unless they were previously 
covered, as is currently the case with most United States health insurance policies.   
60 Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance 
Markets, 77 J. RISK & INS. 39 (2010) (surveying a wide-ranging literature and 
concluding that whether adverse selection exists varies across insurance markets 
and pools of insurance policies); Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance 
Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004). For a study finding 
adverse selection see Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, Selection Effects in the 
United Kingdom Individual Annuities Market, 112 ECON. J. 28, 47 (2002) 
(showing significant adverse selection in the United Kingdom annuity market).  
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empirically. Many empirical papers attempt to estimate adverse selection 
by comparing the insurance costs of those with ample insurance coverage 
with the costs of those with less. But that, as Liran Einav and Amy 
Finkelstein show, is problematic on various grounds, as any difference 
could equally be attributed to moral hazard.61 There are also theoretical 
explanations for why adverse selection is not detected. As was discussed 
above, some forms of insurance, such as car insurance, are mandatory.  
Mandatory insurance prevents adverse selection because low risk insureds 
cannot opt out of the pool. Another explanation might be that insureds’ 
informational advantage vis-à-vis insurers is not really that large, and that 
insureds fail to use whatever private information they do have, so at the end 
of the day insurers’ superior predictive ability offsets whatever 
informational advantage insureds might use.  Adverse selection might also 
not be prevalent because, as was explained above, insurance companies 
have developed various underwriting practices (such as deductibles, 
waiting periods, or group-based insurance), and because courts have 
developed various doctrines, all of which encourage disclosure of private 
information to combat the problem. Lastly, adverse selection might not be 
detected because it is offset by another phenomenon called “propitious” or 
“advantageous” selection. This stems from the fact that in the real world 
there is heterogeneity in risk-aversion. Whereas the early models of adverse 
selection, such as Rothschild and Sitglitz from 1976, conveniently assumed 
people have the same preferences when it comes to risk, there is substantial 
literature documenting heterogeneity of risk preferences between different 
individuals and different insurance markets. Specifically, to the extent that 
those who are more risk-averse (and therefore more likely to carry 
                                                                                                                                      
61 For an excellent explanation of the methodological difficulties in measuring 
adverse selection see Einav & Finkelstein, supra note 2, at 126-36. One way to 
separate the two effects is to test the impact of an exogenous change in an 
insurance contract on existing versus new insureds. If existing insureds change 
their behavior, or if reported losses increase, that would be a sign of a moral hazard 
effect. If, in contrast, the chance of accidents differs between new and old policy 
holders, that would be a sign of an adverse selection effect.  See Jaap H. Abbring et 
al., Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance: Can Dynamic Data Help to 
Distinguish?, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N, PAPERS & PROC. 512 (2003) (using dynamic 
insurance data to distinguish moral hazard from adverse selection); Patrick Bajari, 
Han Hong & Ahmed Khwaja, Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Health 
Expenditures: A Semiparametric Analysis (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 12445, 2006) (arguing that the two inefficiencies can be 
separated through regression analysis).  
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insurance policies) are also low risk individuals, that is, they are more 
likely to pursue safe (non-risky) behavior, then a phenomenon known  as 
“propitious” or “advantageous” selection may emerge. These low-risk 
individuals who propitiously select into the pool may well offset the cost of 
the high-risk insured who adversely select into the pool.62 While in theory 
insurance markets can face both adverse selection and propitious selection, 
current empirical methods do not allow separating their effects.  
It is worth mentioning that “propitious” or “advantageous” 
selection, while not necessarily welfare enhancing, is usually beneficial to 
the insurer.63 Accordingly, insurers seek to bring about propitious selection 
by rigging the incentive structure of the policy to only entice low-risk 
individuals. Offering a free health club membership as an incentive to 
purchase life insurance selects for healthy individuals—who else would 
                                                                                                                                      
62 See David Hemenway, Propitious Selection, 105 Q.J. Econ. 1063 (1990); 
see also David de Meza & David C. Webb, Advantageous Selection in Insurance 
Markets, 32 RAND J. ECON. 249 (2001). 
63 The usual underinsurance result in adverse selection models arises because 
insurance companies anticipate self-selection of high-risks into their pool and 
therefore set high premiums, making it unattractive for low-risks to join the pool, 
even though the low-risk individuals would be more than willing to pay the 
actuarially fair price for their coverage. In “propitious” or “advantageous” 
selection, the presence of risk-averse yet cautious types causes insurers to lower 
premiums and thus draws into the market less risk-averse people (who do not place 
a high value on coverage), but which are high-costs types. These people value the 
insurance at less than their expected costs and therefore on efficiency grounds 
should not have been insured. Put differently, whereas adverse selection entails 
that some people who should have been insured will not get insurance because they 
were priced out, “propitious” or “advantageous” selection entails that some people 
who should not have been insured (because the administrative costs of providing 
them insurance are higher than their expected loss), will nonetheless get coverage. 
See John Cawley & Tomas Philipson, An Empirical Examination of Information 
Barriers to Trade in Insurance, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 827, 829-30 (1999) (finding 
that the mortality rate of U.S. males purchasing life insurance is below that of the 
uninsured); Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry. Multiple Dimensions of Private 
Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market, 96 AM. ECON. 
REV. 938 (2006) (providing evidence that more cautious individuals are more 
likely to purchase long-term care insurance and also invest more in precautionary 
behavior but are less likely to eventually use a nursing home); Hanming Fang, 
Michael Keane & Dan Silverman, Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence 
from the Medigap Insurance Market, 116 J. POL. ECON. 303 (2008) (documenting 
advantageous selection in the market for Medigap coverage). 
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want the membership? In a novel example of this “cream-skimming,” one 
insurer was rumored to have offered applications for health insurance to the 
elderly only on the third-floor of its office, which was only reachable by 
stairs. The assumption was that if an elderly individual was able to traverse 
the stairs, then she was likely a lower-risk individual.64 A more common 
method is to market to the risk-averse under the assumption that they might 
be those who will take more care than necessary. This may explain the 
scary advertisement one sees on T.V. where one’s happy family life is 
financially destroyed because he did not have life insurance, or where an 
uninsured driver gets into a violent accident. Use of such high-pressure 
sales tactics to induce people into buying life and other forms of insurance 
is in a way an insurer-induced selection device: you don’t want to sell the 
product to anyone who actually needs to buy it; only to those who really 
want it but do not really need it.  
 
C. REVERSE ADVERSE SELECTION 
 
Adverse selection occurs not only among the insureds—insurers 
themselves are also susceptible to its effects.  “Insurer-side adverse 
selection” results when there is a disparity in the quality of policies offered 
by insurers and an information barrier that prevents insureds from 
accurately separating those policies into high and low quality.  The lower 
quality policies will be offered at lower premiums, attracting more insureds 
yet driving out of the market other insurers which offer higher quality 
coverage (but which high quality the insureds cannot observe) at a more 
expensive price, the so called “market for lemons”.65   
Eventually, a race-to-the-bottom leads to either low quality of 
coverage, costing much more than the benefits it actually provides, or non-
payment of claims by insurance companies who priced their premiums 
below the necessary levels required to stay solvent. Both effects result in 
negative public attitudes toward insurance as the externalities associated 
with non-paying or under-paying insurers build up.   
A famous example of the market of lemons in insurance policies is 
the fire insurance industry in the late nineteenth century where insurance 
companies offering property/casualty insurance policies sought to save 
                                                                                                                                      
64 Siegelman, supra note 59, at 1253.  
65 Akerlof, supra note 24. 
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money by ratcheting back coverage without informing consumers.66  In 
response, New York promulgated a mandatory policy form for fire 
insurance that was widely copied by other states. 67 
A recent study looked at homeowners’ insurance policies in six 
states and found some of the same problems in the modern insurance 
market as in nineteenth century New York.68  One variation of the study 
compared sixteen homeowners insurance policy types found in North 
Dakota and Pennsylvania to the HO3 standard policy provided by the 
ISO.69  Of the sixteen, five had substantially less generous coverage than 
the HO3 policy, eight had slightly less coverage but were consistent with 
HO3 terms, and three had more generous coverage.  Generally speaking, 
the negative deviations exceeded the positive deviations.  Following his 
analysis, Daniel Schwarcz expresses concern that some insurance carriers 
may be exploiting consumer ignorance by ratcheting back coverage while 
seeking to hide differences between their policies.70 He refers to this as the 
“exploitation hypothesis,”71 and it is a perfect example of reverse adverse 
selection. 
Policy differences are not inherently bad though.  In fact, offering 
insureds different coverage levels for different prices is one of the ways to 
get insureds to self-identify their risk level, as discussed in the previous 
section on theoretical solutions to adverse selection.  A problem arises, 
however, when heterogeneity in coverage is combined with a lack of 
transparency.  The lack of information in many insurance markets occurs at 
two stages.  For example, homeowners cannot access policy forms prior to 
purchasing the insurance. Second, even when insureds receive policy forms 
                                                                                                                                      
66 See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1268-70 nn.9-11 (2011) (citing various studies of early 
insurance policies and the standardization of fire insurance forms around the New 
York form). 
67 See George W. Goble, The Moral Hazard Clauses of the Standard Fire 
Insurance Policy, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 410, 410 (1937). As Goble explains, 
“[b]efore the advent of the standard fire insurance policy there were in use in the 
United States almost as many policy forms as there were companies.” Id. 
68 See Schwarcz, supra note 65, at 1277-1308. 
69 ISO, Insurance Services Office, is a provider of legal and regulatory 
services to insurers including homeowners’ insurance forms portfolio. See 
generally id. at 1308-17, for a discussion on why the policies were chosen and how 
they were analyzed.  
70 Id. at 1315. 
71 Id. 
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after payment the terms are “virtually indecipherable.”72  This lack of 
information makes it impossible for consumers to select insurance based 
upon coverage terms, and creates an environment where consumers can be 
exploited by insurers offering an inferior product at a higher price. 
There are a number of possible solutions to the problem of reverse 
adverse selection.  The foremost solution to this problem is regulation.  For 
example, by limiting the prices at which policies may be offered and by 
requiring insurers to maintain sufficient assets to pay out on claims, the 
government prevents the race-to-the-bottom and non-payment problems 
directly.  
One of the major themes of regulatory reform to combat this 
problem is transparency. Transparency could be achieved by making policy 
forms and terms available online and requiring insurers to compare their 
policies to a standard form baseline, like the HO3 form.  Regulators could 
also require simplified policy language that is comprehendible by the 
average insured.  These two reforms would prevent insurers from hiding 
policy differences and allow consumers to make educated choices about 
their coverage options.73 
However, transparency alone may not be enough to combat this 
serious problem.  Other options include creating a standard form or at least 
a default policy that consumers would have to opt out of.74 In this way it 
would be impossible for insurers to secretly ratchet down coverage.  
Mandatory floors provide similar protections, and, as the 19th century fire 
insurance example teaches us, legislation mandating minimum standards is 
already used in many states to ensure policies meet minimum quality 
standards.75  
1. Returning to the Two Islands Approach  
 
One way courts can combat reverse adverse selection is to not 
strictly enforce an “increased risk” exclusion against an unsuspecting 
                                                                                                                                      
72 Id. at 1318. 
73 Id. 
74 As will be discussed in Section 3 (e) infra, the vast majority of insureds will 
not make any changes to the standard form, so it is important that these protections 
are adequate. 
75 See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient 
Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market 
Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 63-64 (1999) (arguing mandated policy provisions 
are an efficient way to battle the reverse adverse selection problem). 
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insured.  As mentioned above, one place we see reverse adverse selection is 
when insurance companies sell policies with specific coverage exclusions, 
but because of various information impediments the insured is not aware of 
the clause.  An “increased risk” clause eliminates from coverage any 
incident that was caused by an increased hazard within the control of the 
insured.76  A fire caused by the insured smoking in bed is a perfect example 
of an action that, under a strict reading of such an exclusion, would not be 
covered under the insured’s policy.  In deciding these cases, courts have 
often held that such a loss is covered by insurance policies even though the 
incident is specifically excluded.77  The question becomes whether we want 
courts to enforce increased risk clauses under these circumstances, and in 
our analysis we again set up two islands.  Remember that each two-islands 
exercise starts anew to allow us to focus on the ex-ante effects of the 
proposed rule.  Therefore the two islands we have created are identical in 
every way except for the enforcement of increased risk clauses. 
On the first island, the increased risk exclusion is fully enforced, 
and so any actions by the insured that increase the risk of an incident will 
lead to a finding of no coverage.  Even common actions such as smoking in 
bed would not be covered on this island.78  As a result, insureds have 
stronger incentives to refrain from smoking in bed and policy premiums 
should be lower because fewer events are covered. The costs of reduced 
coverage, however, are that insureds will not be able to obtain insurance for 
these accidents because such coverage would not be available.79    
On the second island, the increased risk clause is not strictly 
enforced by courts, so a fire caused by smoking in bed will still receive 
coverage.  Insureds’ incentives to refrain from smoking in bed are diluted 
and more events will be covered, which means that policy premiums will 
be higher.  However, insureds now have less risk of remaining homeless 
after losing their house to a fire accidently caused by them, thus avoiding a 
cost that is potentially very high. 
                                                                                                                                      
76 See Schwarcz, supra note 65, at 1283-84 (discussing increased risk clauses 
and quoting several examples). 
77 ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 376 (2d ed. 1996). 
78 Although smoking inside may be less prevalent now than it was in previous 
generations, smoking is still the cause of around 15,000 residential fires each year, 
many of which originate in the bedroom late at night. FEMA, Smoking Causes 
Nearly 15,000 Residential Fires in United States (2005), available at 
http://www.fema.gov/news-release/smoking-causes-nearly-15000-residential-fires-
united-states. 
79 It is hard to imagine a secondary market for smokers insurance. 
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Looking at these two islands and adopting the perspective of the 
entire pool of insureds, we can attempt to determine which they would 
prefer:  higher premiums for increased coverage yet diluted incentives to 
take care, or lower premiums for less coverage and increased incentives to 
take care.   
One reason for preferring the second island is that people may 
reasonably expect, even if they do not actually expect, that they will be 
covered for their own clumsy actions.  Both homeowners and liability 
insurance capture this point. Specifically, people may want to be able to 
smoke in bed and, on the small chance a fire begins, have these costs 
covered by insurance.  The insured already has other strong incentives to 
not burn down his or her home without this exclusion – his own safety is at 
stake –  so not enforcing the exclusion is not expected to dilute their 
incentives to take care.80 While people in the insurance pool who do not 
smoke may oppose having to cross subsidize those who want to smoke in 
bed, they could still benefit from this clause if they, for example, like to 
burn scented candles in their bedroom, or otherwise engage in activities 
that carry increased risk of loss.    
Moreover, it may be the situation that on both islands the insured 
actually expects that the event will be covered.  If this is the case, then the 
insurance companies may be able to charge the same amount of premiums 
on both islands because insureds are not aware they should be demanding 
lower premiums on the first island (without coverage).  The risk of 
insurance companies exploiting the ignorance of insureds by charging the 
same premium regardless of the exclusion provides another reason for 
courts to mandate coverage, even when it is specifically excluded by an 
increased risks clause.  
In this analysis we have seen an example where, unlike the child 
with leukemia, a judge or jury might be unsympathetic to the plight of the 
insured because it is well known that smoking in bed can cause fires.  
However, by viewing the effects on the insurance pool as a whole, and 
seeing that the risk of diluted incentives is not large and that the 
corresponding benefit (lower premiums) may not be present, it seems clear 
                                                                                                                                      
80 See Saul Levmore, Obligation or Restitution For Best Efforts, 67 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1411, 1424 (1994). 
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that in many circumstances the increased risks clause should not be strictly 
enforced.81  
 
D. MORAL HAZARD 
 
Another systemic risk insurers face is known as “moral hazard.”  
Moral hazard consists of the risk of three distinct kinds of behavior by 
insureds, all of which are hidden from the insurer.  The first is when 
insureds take less than optimal care in protecting themselves against the 
insured risk.  The second behavior categorized as moral hazard is when 
insureds make less of an effort to minimize their loss should the risk occur.  
The third action, somewhat more controversially defined as moral hazard 
because it can also be plain fraud, is the exaggeration of losses by insureds 
to get higher reimbursements.  The first behavior is considered ex-ante 
moral hazard, while the second is considered ex-post moral hazard.  The 
third behavior, depending on its magnitude, is sometimes considered ex-
post moral hazard, but sometimes is considered fraud. In all these cases the 
insureds externalize costs onto the pool. Why? Because the insurer cannot 
distinguish between insureds who do and those who do not behave in a 
moral hazard way, the insurer charges the same premium to all insureds, 
leading to cross subsidization. The risk for such “immoral” behavior by the 
insureds was dubbed by insurance companies in the nineteenth century 
“moral hazard”.  82   
Take, for example, a property owner with a piece of real estate 
worth $1 million. She is concerned with fire damage, which at a 10% 
likelihood each year will destroy the entire value of the property.  Thus, her 
expected cost from fire damage is $100,000 per year.  The property owner 
also knows that with a janitor properly maintaining the property, the 
probability of a fire is reduced to 1% and therefore the expected cost falls 
to $10,000.  She can hire a janitor for $30,000 per year, bringing the total 
expected cost of fire damage, plus a janitor, to $40,000.  Therefore, 
investing in care is efficient for an uninsured property owner—she has 
invested $30,000 in care and has saved $90,000 in expected costs. 
                                                                                                                                      
81 Other actions that are intentionally dangerous, like making explosives in the 
basement, would undergo a different analysis and likely lead to a different 
conclusion. 
82 Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 250-
51 (1996). 
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The problem begins when the property owner purchases insurance. 
Fire insurance could serve as a substitute or as a complementary solution to 
the property owner’s concerns.  If an insurer has no way of monitoring the 
property or the janitor’s work, it will charge an annual premium of 
$100,000 plus the insurer’s administrative costs and profit. The insured 
who knows she is fully insured and cannot be monitored will have no 
incentives to optimally invest in prevention. She has no incentive to hire a 
janitor because it would not reduce her premium at all. This hazard of 
“morally” inappropriate behavior by insureds—of not taking what would 
ordinarily be cost-effective precautions—is “moral hazard.”  
Moral hazard is often a problem also in the third-party liability 
insurance context.  Take, for example, automobile liability insurance.  
Beginning in the 1970s, most American states adopted a requirement that 
drivers be covered by automobile liability insurance.83  In theory at least, 
drivers covered by liability insurance would take less care than those not 
covered.  Without insurance, a negligent driver causing an accident would 
bear the cost of the harm the accident caused.  With insurance, the driver 
no longer bears that cost, thus her financial incentive to take care to avoid 
an accident is diluted.84  
A necessary but insufficient condition to the characterization of 
moral hazard is that the suboptimal behavior of the insured is the result of 
the insurance coverage. Thus, the insured’s behavior must be examined in 
relation to her conduct in the state of the world where she was not covered. 
An insured who never arms the alarm in her house (even in states of the 
world where she was not insured) is a higher-risk insured and may pose a 
problem of adverse selection to the pool, but does not pose a moral hazard 
problem to the pool because her inefficient behavior is not as a result of the 
insurance coverage. In contrast, if an insured does not activate the alarm 
before she leaves the house—an inefficient behavior that is hidden from the 
insurer—as a result of the insurance coverage she is acting in a moral 
hazard way. 
And why is such an action still an insufficient condition for the 
characterization of moral hazard? Because not every behavior of the 
insured—even if it is because he is covered— is necessarily suboptimal or 
poses a disturbing moral hazard problem. For example, there is a concern 
that health insurance brings about ex-post moral hazard because insured 
                                                                                                                                      
83 Cohen & Dehejia, supra note 42, at 358. 
84 Whether or not this theoretical prediction holds in practice will be discussed 
below.  
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people consume more health services as a result of being insured. But not 
every over-consumption (relative to consumption in the absence of 
insurance) is problematic since the very purpose of insurance coverage is to 
ensure that when the insured person gets sick, she can afford expensive 
medical treatments that otherwise could not be provided to her. Although 
insureds may demand plastic surgery on the grounds that they have a 
medical need, may replace their eye glasses too often, or may visit the 
dental hygienist beyond what is reasonably necessary because they do not 
bear the full economic costs of these treatments, it is hard to believe that 
people will seek a heart transplant or brain surgery solely because they are 
insured.85 
How can one tell when the insured's decision to get medical care is 
a legitimate and efficient, and when it is a moral hazard behavior which 
creates a social loss? 
Here is a mental exercise that may help resolve this issue, at least 
theoretically. Suppose an insured needs a kidney transplant, which costs 
$50,000, and he is insured under a policy which enables him to choose one 
of two options. Option one: the insured undergoes the kidney transplant 
and the insurer will indemnify him for its $50,000 costs. Option two: the 
insurer would send him a check for $50,000 for his personal use. Now let’s 
assume that Insured A tells the insurer that he is indifferent between the 
two options while Insured B says he prefers the check. What can we learn 
about A and B from their answers? An insured who really needed a kidney 
transplant will be indifferent between the two possibilities, since in each 
case he will undergo a transplant and remain financially neutral. This is our 
Insured A, and we can deduce therefore that A's decision to undergo a 
transplantation is efficient. The interesting point here is that A’s decision is 
efficient even though it is quite possible that without the insurance money 
A might have chosen to not undergo the transplant. In other words, even 
though A's decision to undergo a kidney transplant is a result of the fact 
that he has insurance, his behavior is not considered a disturbing moral 
hazard. In fact, A’s choice fulfills the very purpose of insurance.  
In contrast, an insured who would prefer the check, B in our 
example, is signaling that undergoing a kidney transplant is not his 
preferred use of the money and therefore that is probably not an efficient 
option. Therefore, if the insurer offered Insured B only the option to be 
                                                                                                                                      
85 JOHN A. NYMAN, THE THEORY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE 104 
(2003); John A. Nyman, Is Moral Hazard Inefficient? The Policy Implications Of 
A New Theory, 23 HEALTH AFF. 194, 195 (2004).  
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reimbursed for the costs for the surgery (option one above) and Insured B 
chooses to undergo the kidney transplant, it is clear that Insured B’s 
decision to undergo the transplant is not only as a result of having an 
insurance coverage, but it is also inefficient. This situation reflects an 
inefficient allocation of resources and thus a disturbing moral hazard. 
Another way to look at this is to notice that providing insurance 
coverage creates two effects. The first is an “income effect” that allows the 
insured to consume medical care he could not otherwise afford. Under the 
“income effect” the insured would have undergone these treatments under 
either of our options above. Over-consumption of medical treatments in 
such a case does not create a distortion in the efficient allocation of 
resources and is therefore not problematic. The second effect is a 
“substitution effect,” whereby the insured will consume medical treatments 
he would not have consumed had he received cash in advance (just like 
insured B above). Only the “substitution effect” is problematic from a 
social welfare perspective because it does create a distortion in the efficient 
allocation of resources. As we shall see, the distinction between over-
consumption due to income effect and substitution effect is important for 
empirical studies attempting to measure the social welfare costs of moral 
hazard. 
Over-consumption due to income effect is one example of how 
what looks like moral hazard can actually increase social welfare. Another 
example engages the “theory of the second best.”86 For example, where 
medical services are provided in a non-competitive or monopolistic market 
the quantity offered is too low relative to the efficient outcome (known as 
the “first best”). In such a market, the excessive consumption of medical 
services due to (ex-post) moral hazard may offset some of the social loss 
due to smaller supply of medical services and bring on an increase in social 
welfare because it corrects the market failure stemming from the 
monopolistic market. In effect, the “excess” caused by moral hazard may 
bring the level of consumption closer to a socially desirable level, the “first 
best.”  The same holds when as a result of budget constraints, lack of 
information, or various cognitive biases, insureds do not consume enough 
medical services, for example preventive medicine. With preventative 
medicine, a certain level of consumption is required to prevent disease and 
save on future costs, so again moral hazard may lead to an increase in 
social welfare because it offsets a market failure.  While these examples of 
                                                                                                                                      
86 R.G. Lipsey & R.K. Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. 
OF ECON. STUD. 11, 11 (1956-57). 
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the potential benefits of moral hazard are interesting from a theoretical 
standpoint, it is clear that, with few exceptions, moral hazard remains a 
problem that needs to be combated. The next sections discuss various 
contractual and doctrinal solutions to the moral hazard problem.   
1. Contractual Solutions for the Moral Hazard Problem 
 
On a theoretical level, solving moral hazard requires 
disincentivizing the deviations from the optimal level of care.  Such a 
solution can be approached from multiple angles. The first approach 
involves the stick—punishing carelessness by denying coverage when the 
insured was negligent in preventing the loss, in minimizing the loss, or in 
exaggerating its scope. The second approach is the carrot—rewarding 
carefulness. Third, we can more closely align the insured’s incentives with 
the insurer’s, for example, by forcing the insured to bear some of the risk. 
Let’s start with the carrot. Essentially, moral hazard is a 
paradigmatic principal–agent problem where the agent (the insured) 
exercises at least some control over the level of risk that the principal (the 
insurer) incurs. One way to ameliorate this problem is to have the parties 
“contract on care” by coming to a mutually beneficial agreement where the 
insured agrees to take certain precautions in return for lower premiums.  
This approach requires insurers to first determine what people should do to 
lower the likelihood of an occurrence.  With that information, the insurer 
then requires the insureds to take those measures as a condition of an 
insurance policy.  Costly problems may arise for the insurer, however, in 
both ascertaining that information and in monitoring insureds, whether on a 
continuing basis or in retrospect. 
In the example above if an insurer can monitor the property and 
know that the janitor in fact is doing his job, the insurer can reward the 
insured a “carrot” by lowering the premium to just over $10,000.87 
Alternatively, if the insurer discovers after the occurrence that the insured 
violated his obligation according to the policy to hire a janitor, the insurer 
can deny coverage (the stick).  These methods align the incentives of the 
insured and the insurer and motivate the insured to do the socially optimal 
thing by hiring the janitor.    
                                                                                                                                      
87 Another example of this contracting on care is the common practice of 
Israeli insurers to condition automobile insurance on the installation of electronic 
anti-theft devices. 
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While the carrot and stick approach would seem to solve the moral 
hazard problem, in many cases the insurer cannot effectively monitor the 
insured’s care-taking behavior, nor can it cheaply investigate the reasons 
for the loss. Like in the case of adverse selection, carefully designing the 
policy contract may help. Deductibles and co-insurance clauses in the 
policy force insureds to bear some specified amount or percentage of harm 
(respectively), thereby forcing the insured to internalize some of the cost of 
an occurrence and incentivizing careful behavior.  Policy limits, or caps on 
the total amount payable under the policy, similarly provide a strong 
incentive to avoid risky behavior and to minimize total harm. The higher 
the deductibles and co-insurance payments are, the lower the premiums are. 
Similarly, the lower the policy limits are, the lower the premiums are. 
While not a perfect solution—because it dilutes the ex-post coverage for 
the insured—this is another way of at least partially aligning the ex-ante 
interests of the insurer and the insured. 
To better appreciate the way deductibles and co-insurance clauses 
magically align parties’ incentives, let us return to our property owner and 
her $1 million property.  This time, she has an insurance policy which 
contains a co-insurance clause of 35%, in this case $350,000, to be borne 
by the insured in the event she files a claim for a total loss of her property, 
leaving the insurer to bear a risk of $650,000. With no janitor and a 10% 
probability of an accident, the owner’s premium is $65,000, her personal 
expected uninsured cost of fire damage is $35,000, and therefore her total 
expected costs are $100,000.88  But, if she hires a janitor and the probability 
of an accident falls to 1%, her expected uninsured cost is now $3,500—one 
percent of the deductible—plus the $30,000 for the janitor’s salary, totaling 
$33,500. Add to this the $65,000 premium charged and the total is $98,500, 
which is lower than without a janitor. Thus, with the deductible, an insured 
has a monetary incentive to hire the janitor, and thus reduce risk, even if 
doing that cannot be verified by the insurer. (Furthermore, that reduced risk 
can result in a lower premium because the risk is now only 1%, meaning 
premiums should really be only $6,500. With the lower premiums, overall 
                                                                                                                                      
88 The owner’s premium is $65,000, because it equals the damage the insurer 
bears multiplied by the 10% chance of harm. Here, I am ignoring the 
administrative fees and profits also charged by the insurer.  Her personal expected 
uninsured cost of fire damage is $35,000 because it equals the deductible 
multiplied by 10%.  
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expected costs for the insured are only $40,000.89) The result is that the 
insured, acting self-interestedly, decided to hire a janitor, even though that 
decision is not observable to the insurer, which is the socially efficient 
outcome. This is the way a well-planned co-insurance clause can solve a 
moral hazard problem in a way that is  beneficial to all.  
By and large, moral hazard is combated by deductibles in cases of 
small losses, co-insurance in cases of medium losses, and caps (or policy 
limits) in cases of large losses. Deductibles are fixed dollar amounts borne 
by insureds, say $1,000 for car insurance.  They provide incentives to keep 
small claims out of the administratively expensive insurance system. This 
is especially important because including small claims in the system would 
mean a larger portion of premiums would go towards administrative costs. 
Co-insurance clauses are fixed percentages of the loss borne by the insured, 
say 35% of any claim as seen in the previous paragraph.  They combat 
strategic behavior for medium claims because the dollar amount insureds 
have to bear increases with the claim. Lastly, caps, or policy limits, combat 
strategic behavior for large claims by forcing any costs above the cap onto 
the insured.  
Unfortunately, deductibles and co-insurance are not perfect 
solutions for all lines of insurance.  In the health insurance market, for 
example, the insured generally has to cover all expenses up to the 
deductible, then pays a portion (10–20%) of his care up to the out-of-
pocket maximum, and then has no costs associated with additional 
insurance until he reaches his policy maximum.  Therefore if the insured is 
conscious not just of the price of each item of care he consumes (like an 
MRI), but focuses on his expected expenditures for the entire year, then 
varying the deductible or the co-pay might not change the behavior of the 
insured as expected.90  A recent paper by researchers at MIT and Stanford 
                                                                                                                                      
89$30,000 cost of janitor plus $6,500 premium plus $3,500 expected loss borne 
by insured. The insured will find it worthwhile to hire a janitor even when he 
initially misleads the insurer to believe he has a janitor (when in fact he does not) 
and in return is being charged only $6,500 as premium. Without a janitor his costs 
will be $41,500 ($6,500 premium plus $35,000 expected losses), whereas with a 
janitor his costs will be $40,000.  
90 For example, assume a deductible of $3,000, co-insurance of 20%, an out-
of-pocket maximum of $5,000, and total expected medical costs of $20,000 for the 
year.  Our hypothetical insured’s co-insurance would be $3,400 (.20*17,000) and 
so his total costs ($6,400) would exceed the out-of-pocket max.  If the deductible is 
lowered to $2,000 or raised to $4,000, his co-insurance costs still cause him to 
exceed his out-of-pocket maximum for the year and so will not change his 
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University found that insureds did in fact “look forward” to the future costs 
of medicine.91  In other words, insureds take into account the actual price 
and the future price when making medical care decisions.92  These results 
must be considered when an insurer is trying to influence consumer 
behavior through co-pay, deductibles, and co-insurance.  
Another way the insurer can protect itself from moral hazard 
without exerting control over the insured is by classifying insureds 
according to their experience with the loss to be insured—called experience 
rating.93  In other words, insurers threaten higher premiums for those 
insureds with the highest losses, incentivizing the insureds to invest in 
minimizing their losses (as well as reducing cross subsidization of high-risk 
insureds by low-risk insureds). Some insurers offer policies that are 
experience rated retrospectively, meaning that the premium is set after the 
loss experience is known. Insureds with lower losses receive refunds for 
part of their premiums, while a surcharge is levied on those with higher 
losses.  
An interesting question is when experience rating, as opposed to 
deductibles or co-insurance, should be used to combat moral hazard. 
Experience rating is more often used for third-party rather than for first-
party insurance, whereas deductibles and co-insurance clauses usually 
apply to first-party but not to third-party insurance. The reason is two-fold: 
First, deductibles better reduce the administrative costs associated with the 
processing of small claims, which are more prevalent in the first-party 
insurance context.  Second, experience rating works better for repeat 
players, which are more often found in the third-party liability insurance 
context.94 
                                                                                                                                      
consumption.  If co-pays for each doctor’s visit count towards the out-of-pocket 
total, then they too will not influence a forward looking insured with high expected 
yearly costs. 
91 Aviva Aron-Dine et al., Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: How Important 
Is Forward Looking Behavior? 26-27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 17802, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17802. 
92 Id. 
93 ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 15. 
94 Patricia Danzon argued that liability insurance policies do not have 
deductibles because of the problem of reverse moral hazard, which will be 
discussed below. Specifically, the insured is exposed to moral hazard with respect 
to the insurer’s legal defense efforts. Not having deductibles makes insurers bear 
the full costs of coverage in case they do not defend vigorously, and thus dilutes 
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However, in automobile insurance, which has a strong first party 
component to it, experience rating is prevalent (in addition to deductibles), 
whereas it does not exist in third-party medical malpractice coverage. The 
reason for that is primarily because automobile accidents are frequent 
enough and fault is often not hard to determine, whereas medical 
malpractice claims are too infrequent to allow estimating risk components 
for individual physicians and because it is widely believed that apparent 
differences in number of lawsuits among physicians are the result of chance 
or misinformation, not negligence. This stems from a belief that the legal 
system is incompetent in accurately determining doctors’ fault.95 
Lastly, as was mentioned above, sticks are also a possible means to 
control moral hazard. One stick that can mitigate moral hazard is to limit 
the types of occurrences for which the insurer will compensate the insured.  
Such exclusions typically include high-risk behavior or, in the case of 
liability insurance, intentional torts such as battery.96  In an obvious way, 
exclusions pressure the insured party to avoid the proscribed behavior.  
As was mentioned above, in addition to the ex-ante moral hazard, 
there is also an ex-post moral hazard, i.e. moral hazard that happens after 
the occurrence. One of the general concerns in this context is that in 
indemnity policies, the insured will not take sufficient measures to 
minimize the damage stemming from the realization of risk, or would file a 
claim for excessive losses. Here, transferring part of the risk to the insured 
(for example, by having deductibles) would not help because the covered 
event had already happened and the deductible is a sunk cost (In fact, there 
is a concern that the higher the deductible is, the greater the incentive the 
insured has to exaggerate a claim in order to recover the deductible 
amount).97 
                                                                                                                                      
the reverse moral hazard problem. Patricia M. Danzon,  Liability and Liability 
Insurance for Medical Malpractice, 4 J. HEALTH ECON. 309, 319-20 (1985). 
95 However, this traditional explanation for insurers’ failure to utilize 
experience ratings in medical malpractice insurance has been brought into doubt in 
recent years. See D. M. Studdert et al., Special Article, Claims, Errors, and 
Compensation Payment in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
2024, 2031(2006) (saying that the malpractice liability system is relatively accurate 
in sorting claims and that most insurance dollars are spent on valid claims).  
96 Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Insurance Law, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 346 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (discussing 
intentional acts in regard to insurance law). 
97 Georges Dionne & Robert Gagné, Deductible Contracts Against Fraudulent 
Claims: Evidence From Automobile Insurance, 83 REV. ECON. & STAT. 290, 298 
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Insurance companies deal with ex-post moral hazard in several 
ways. First, they refuse to insure non-pecuniary losses because proving 
their scope is hard and sometimes impossible.98 Second, insurance 
companies audit claims that, due to different characteristics, are suspected 
to involve ex-post moral hazard. In such claims, insurers will involve 
private investigators, appraisers, and doctors to investigate the claim on 
their behalf. But because these investigations are expensive, insurers find it 
hard to commit to investigating all claims or even only those that are 
suspected. Thus, in many cases a random investigation of claims actually 
deters better than non-random investigations.99 Moreover, false or 
exaggerated claims often lack external characteristics known to insurers to 
be highly correlated with false or exaggerated claims. In such situations 
post-occurrence investigations may be inefficient. Therefore, a better 
strategy is for insurance companies to design the policies so that insureds 
have fewer incentives to engage in ex-post moral hazard to begin with. 
Indeed, one way to deal with such an ex-post moral hazard is by 
designing insurance contracts so that the incentives of the insured to 
exaggerate a claim are small. A simple way to do that is by substituting 
indemnity policies for stated-value policies, which require the insurer to 
pay the value stated in the contract regardless of the actual value of the 
loss.100 In the jurisdictions that recognize stated-value policies, if the 
insured property is completely destroyed the insurer cannot look beyond 
the policy to determine the actual value of the property.  Instead, the full 
                                                                                                                                      
(2001) (finding that in automobile insurance, the larger the deductible is, the larger 
the loss reported, especially in accidents with not witnesses).  
98 There is a debate in the literature whether the lack of insurance for non-
pecuniary losses stem from insureds’ lack of demand, or from lack of supply due to 
market failures. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Non-Pecuniary Costs 
of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law,108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 
1789-99 (1995); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort 
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1546-47, 1553 (1987); Ronen Avraham, Should Pain-
And-Suffering Damages Be Abolished from Tort Law? More Experimental 
Evidence, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 941, 945-46 (2005). 
99 Dilip Mookherjee & Ivan Png, Optimal Auditing, Insurance and 
Redistribution, 104 Q.J. ECON. 399, 413 (1989). Obviously, relying on third 
parties’ investigations raises issues of collusion and fraud. See Ingela Algar & 
Ching-to Alberta Ma, Moral Hazard, Insurance and Some Collusion, 50 J. ECON. 
BEHAVIOR & ORG. 225, 226 (2003). 
100 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of First Congregational Church of Austin v. Cream 
City Mut. Ins. Co. of Milwaukee, Wis., 96 N.W.2d 690, 695 (Minn. 1959).   
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value stated in the policy must be paid. The principle here is “caveat 
venditor”—insurers have to make sure at the contracting stage that the asset 
is properly valued. On the other hand, such contracts prevent a false 
representation as to the magnitude of the loss. Stated-value contracts 
provide certainty to both parties and reduce post-occurrence investigation 
costs. Insurance of jewelry is a common example of stated-value policies.  
As we have seen before, there is always a tradeoff between 
providing coverage ex-post and not distorting incentives for proper 
behavior. While stated-value policies reduce the incentives for ex-post 
moral hazard they may under-indemnify a risk-averse insured, thereby 
creating a welfare loss. Insurance companies can, therefore, offer a hybrid 
between an indemnity contract (which fully compensates the insured but 
creates incentives for ex-post moral hazard) and a stated-value contract 
(where such incentives do not exist but the insured may find himself under-
compensated). Such hybrid policies will be partially dependent on the size 
of the damage and will therefore induce weaker incentives for ex-post 
moral hazard. An example of this is a policy which under-compensates 
types of losses where false representations are relatively prevalent, such as 
back pain with no clinical markers, and generously compensates types of 
losses where false representations are extremely difficult, such as losses of 
limbs101 
2. Doctrinal Solutions for the Problem of Moral Hazard 
 
Moral hazard presents the greatest risk when the insured party has 
no personal stake in the property or person covered by the insurance policy.  
Thus, a simple method of countering that problem is to require the insured 
to have an insurable interest in the covered item.  An insurable interest 
exists where the relationship between the beneficiary of the insurance 
contract and the thing to be covered are such that it is reasonable to assume 
the beneficiary has a significant benefit or advantage from the continued 
existence of the insured item. Thus, in life insurance an insurable interest 
exists where the relationship of the parties are such that there are 
                                                                                                                                      
101 Keith J. Crocker & John Morgan, Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing 
Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts, 106 J. POL. ECON. 355, 355 
(1998). See also Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” Breach of Contract by First-Party 
Insurers, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 429 (1996); Keith J. Crocker & Sharon 
Tennyson, Insurance Fraud and Optimal Claims Settlement Strategies, 45 J.L. 
ECON. 469, 470 (2002). 
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reasonable grounds, either pecuniary or contractual or by blood or affinity, 
to expect a significant benefit or advantage to the beneficiary from the 
continuance of the life of the insured. 
In the early days of insurance, an insurable interested was not 
required. For example, in 1743 insurers offered 3:1 odds on the survival of 
George II when he personally led his army in the Battle of Dettingen.102 
Anyone could have purchased those contracts. Only in 1774 Britain 
enacted the Life Assurance Act which required the beneficiary to have an 
insurable interest. Since then more legislatures followed suit. However, 
courts have also played a role in shaping this practice by refusing to 
enforce insurance contracts that do not have an insurable interest.  One 
pointed example is “murder policies.”  These are life insurance policies that 
de facto incentivize the murder of the insured by the beneficiaries of such 
policies.  Courts typically void these policies and cut off the payment to the 
beneficiary in order to undermine their criminal incentive.103  Moreover, 
courts have even shown a willingness to recognize wrongful death suits 
filed by insureds’ families against the issuers of such policies. In this way 
courts have diluted the incentives of both murderous beneficiaries and 
irresponsible insurers to engage in life insurance policies where the 
beneficiaries have no insurable interest.104  
Despite the obvious benefit of requiring an insurable interest, it is 
important not to over-void policies for formalistically lacking this 
requirement.  Indeed courts have found insurable interests in various forms, 
including a legal or equitable interest in the property; a factual expectancy; 
a contractual right; and a legal liability.  The most common insurable 
                                                                                                                                      
102 Yoni Appelbaum, Have Insurance Companies Forgotten the Meaning of 
Insurance?, THE ATLANTIC, May 7th, 2012, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/05/have-insurance-companies-
forgotten-the-meaning-of-insurance/256677/.  
103 See Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism—and 
Crime, 102 MICH. L. REV. 268, 315 (2003). 
104 Many states have statutorily imposed and defined insurable interest 
requirements. See 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 359 (2007). For example in California, 
Section 10110 of the Insurance Code, reads: “Insurable interest. Every person has 
an insurable interest in the life and health of: (a) Himself. (b) Any person on whom 
he depends wholly or in part for education or support. (c) Any person under a legal 
obligation to him for the payment of money or respecting property or services, of 
which death or illness might delay or prevent the performance. (d) Any person 
upon whose life any estate or interest vested in him depends.” Cal. Ins. Code § 
10110 (West 2005).  
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interest is a legal or equitable interest in property.  Thus, a person has an 
insurable interest in the house she owns.  The factual expectancy doctrine, 
however, makes clear that legal title to property is not a requirement for an 
insurable interest.  Instead, an insured need only have a reasonably certain 
expectation for a gain or other pecuniary interest in the subject property.  
Thus, if there is a factual expectation that property will soon pass to a 
putative insured, that insured has an insurable interest.  A contractual right 
to property can also create an insurable interest.  This doctrine allows 
secured creditors, such as mortgagees, to obtain insurance for property 
securing a debt.  Lastly, a legal liability gives rise to an insurable interest.  
If a putative insured is legally liable in the event of the destruction of 
certain property, but that insured does not have actual title to the property, 
an insurable interest still exists up to the value of the liability.   
The common thread through all types of insurable interest is a 
direct and reasonably certain pecuniary interest in the object being insured.  
A merely speculative interest is not sufficient.105  The exception to the 
general rule that pecuniary interest is enough to establish an insurable 
interest is life insurance, where a strong emotional interest between the 
beneficiary and the insured is also an avenue to an insurable interest.106  
Without the insurable interest requirement, insurance could be used to 
create risky situations instead of removing risk, as it is intended to do.  
Another feature of most, especially first-party, insurance contracts 
that protects against moral hazard, and which is closely related to the 
insurable interest requirement, is the indemnity principle—an insured may 
only recover compensation up to the smaller of the amount covered and the 
amount lost.  This principle mitigates the incentive of the insured to acquire 
too much coverage and then to cause the loss to her property when 
insurance coverage is greater than the value of the property covered.  But, 
“value of the property” must be understood appropriately, as it typically 
reflects replacement cost and not actual cash value.  For example, most 
goods have a lower cash value after they become used than when 
                                                                                                                                      
105 See, e.g., Gossett v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 948 P.2d 1264, 1272-73 
(Wash. 1997).   
106 While often the beneficiary of a life insurance policy does have a pecuniary 
interest in the life of the insured, specifically the beneficiary has an interest in the 
continued stream of income from the insured, it is not a requirement. There is 
nothing that would prevent the purchase of life insurance benefitting a loved one 
when the beneficiary has no possible expectation of monetary gain from the 
insured’s continued life.   
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purchased new, but insurance will typically cover the cost of replacement 
of a new warehouse, provided the moral hazard is not too great.   
Whether the value to be paid is actual cash value or replacement 
value is an issue that can be contracted on.  Many homeowners’ insurance 
policies provide for replacement value in the event of total destruction of 
the property.  The risk of moral hazard created when the actual cash value 
is significantly lower than the replacement value can be mitigated by only 
providing the replacement value if the recovery is actually used to replace 
the property.107 
Although the indemnity principle applies to most insurance 
contracts, accident and health insurance are not fully included and life 
insurance is usually not at all included in that category.  The reason for this 
is one of valuation; courts are reluctant to value a person’s life or limbs. In 
the health and accident insurance contexts, courts do not want to engage in 
the evaluation of the medical treatment insureds have received and 
determine whether it is excessive or not. In the life insurance context, for 
instance, if it cannot first be determined what the actual value of a person’s 
life is, it is impossible to determine if the amount of the policy exceeds that 
value. However, when the purpose of life insurance is strictly financial, say 
insuring the life of a debtor to guarantee recovery of the debt, the 
indemnity principle will dictate that the recovery will be limited to the 
amount of the financial interest, here the amount of the debt. 
Another solution stemming from the indemnity principle is to 
prohibit over-insurance and under-insurance.  As we saw, improper levels 
of first-party insurance potentially increase moral hazard by creating 
incentives for careless behavior that could result in windfall recoveries.  
One may wonder why states have to regulate the prohibition over-insurance 
and under-insurance. After all, the negative incentives created for insureds 
by over-insurance would be handled by the principle of indemnity which 
would prevent recovery which is too high. However, the administrative 
costs and information-gathering problems associated with fully enforcing 
the indemnity principle create a chance that over-insurance could lead to 
windfall recoveries despite the protections the indemnity principle 
provides.  Stated-value policies, which were discussed above, may further 
enhance the problem if the value is not correctly established.   
Moreover, over-insurance does not emerge solely due to the 
insured’s strategic behavior. Often insurers have incentives to sell too 
                                                                                                                                      
107 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Farmers Ins. Co., 86 S.W.3d 401, 401-03 (Ark. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
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much coverage with the knowledge that the principle of indemnity will 
prevent courts from forcing them to ever pay the full value of the policy. 
This means that the insurance company can charge a premium that is 
higher than their actual risk associated with an occurrence.  As a result, 
many states have solved the over-insurance problem by explicitly 
prohibiting in their codes over-insuring, thus reducing both parties’ 
strategic behavior.  
Under-insurance creates different, but potentially severe, negative 
incentives.  In fire and property coverage, for instance, small losses are far 
more frequent than large losses.  Yet, policy prices are determined linearly, 
increasing at a set rate as the value of the policy increases.  Thus, $50,000 
of coverage costs half as much as $100,000 of coverage, even if the value 
of the house is $100,000.  The likelihood that any loss will only be partial 
creates a strong incentive to only purchase the $50,000 of coverage, and 
still be covered for the most likely losses.  This incentive would distort the 
insurance market, diluting the incentives to purchase coverage for large 
losses, which is one of the fundamentals functions of insurance.  
One can dilute the insureds’ incentive to under-insure by setting 
the premiums based on the lower probability of a larger loss instead of a 
purely linear pricing system. However, a more common approach to 
address the problem of under-insurance is through coinsurance pegged to 
the value of the property.  If an insured covers only a small portion of her 
property, her co-insurance will be higher.  If, on the other hand, a policy is 
valued at the actual value of the property, little or no co-insurance will be 
required. For example, a homeowners policy may contain a clause that, in 
the event of a loss, and if the coverage is less than 80% of the replacement 
value, the insurer will pay only the proportion of the loss which the total 
coverage bears to 80% of the replacement cost.108  Under such a clause, if a 
house is worth $100,000, but coverage is only $60,000, then the insurer 
will only pay 75% of any claim ($60,000 over $80,000 equals 75%).  If, on 
the other hand, the insured purchases coverage of at least 80% of the value 
of the house, the insurer will pay 100% of any loss ($80,000 over $80,000 
equals 100%).  In this way, coinsurance provisions provide an incentive for 
insureds to purchase coverage for most of the value of their property.109   
                                                                                                                                      
108 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 272 (5th 
ed. 2010).   
109 Id. Some companies no longer price their policies using the linear approach 
described above but rather use a more complicated pricing method which allows 
them to abandon coinsurance terms. As early as 1981 some scholars had suggested 
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From the doctrine of indemnity follows the doctrine of 
subrogation, which allows a first- party insurer to step in for the insured 
and pursue his or her legal rights against tortfeasors after compensating for 
a loss. For example, suppose a water pipe bursts near an insured’s house, 
and that insured makes a proper claim to her homeowner’s insurance 
carrier.  If that carrier pays the claim, it then has a right of subrogation to 
exercise the insured’s legal rights.  If the water pipe bursting resulted from 
a tort, the insurer has a legal right of action against the tortfeasor.110  
Subrogation keeps premiums lower in that it permits the insurers to recover 
part of their expenses from tortfeasors and by reducing insureds’ moral 
hazard in that it avoids the potential problem of double-recovery which 
would exist if subrogation were not part of the insurance contract. Thus, 
subrogation is overall an efficient arrangement.  
Extending the doctrine of subrogation, one could also argue that an 
insured should be prohibited from settling a tort case regarding a loss for 
which it carried insurance.  Take for instance an insured who was tortiously 
injured in a car accident, and who is also covered by health insurance.  The 
insurer, through its right of subrogation, is entitled to any recovery related 
to the medical expenses.  The insured, therefore, has a strong incentive to 
structure any settlement in a way that none of the recovery is attributable to 
medical costs.  In that way, the insured will have her medical costs paid for 
by the insurer, and keep the whole of the settlement.  However, in doing so, 
the insured externalizes costs to the entire insurance pool.  For this reason, 
it could be advantageous to allow first-party insurance companies to exert 
some control over settlements, or their structure, in these situations.  
Indeed, in practice there is often a three-way split among the plaintiff, her 
attorney and the insurer.111  
Similar negative incentives exist in the context of third-party 
liability insurance.  There, a tortfeasor covered by liability insurance may 
wish to avoid the burdens of litigation because any liability attributed to her 
would be paid by the insurer.  To avoid litigation, the insured could 
therefore settle up-front for the policy maximum, even if the actual harm 
                                                                                                                                      
coinsurance was becoming obsolete. See Michael L. Smith & David L. 
Bickelhaupt, Is Coinsurance Becoming Obsolete?, 48 J. RISK INS. 95, 95 (1981). 
110 See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
72, 74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Self-Insurers' Sec. Fund v. ESIS, Inc., 251 
Cal. Rptr. 693 (1988)). 
111 Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and The Moral Economy of Tort 
Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 304-08 (2001).  
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was less than the settlement amount.  This behavior too externalizes costs 
to the pool and decreases the efficiency of the insurance market.   
To prevent insureds from settling too often, or, more generally, 
from not defending the claim against them very vigorously, general liability 
policies impose on the insurer the duty to defend the claim. The idea is that 
it would be advantageous to allow the insurer to act on the insured’s behalf, 
presumably with better resources and stronger incentives than the insured.  
But that creates a new problem as now the insurer is the agent of the 
insured, acting on his behalf. These agency relationships create the problem 
of “reverse moral hazard,” which will be discussed below.  
As mentioned above, there is also the danger of ex-post moral 
hazard where the insured exaggerates it losses in order to get monies he 
does not deserve. We saw that insurance companies have a number 
of contractual tools to deal with this problem.  
One of them is the stated-value policy. These policies are common in lines 
of insurance where the principle of indemnity does not necessarily apply 
such as life insurance, health insurance and accident or disability insurance. 
Once the indemnity principle does not apply, the justification for 
subrogation falls as well.  
Courts handle the problem of ex-post moral hazard in the same 
manner they dealt with misrepresentations that occur before the issuance of 
contract. When the insured does not cooperate with the insurer after the 
occurrence so that the insurer can determine its liability, or when the 
insured submits fraudulent claims, courts generally approve a reduction in 
the insurance benefits and often allow insurers to not pay them at 
all, even in cases where but for the insured’s post-occurrence behavior 
(exaggerating his loss) the insured would have been entitled to reduced 
benefits. One may even argue that such situations justify damages paid to 
the insurer from the insured to further deter these misrepresentations.  
3. Returning to the Two Islands Approach 
 
As discussed above, one way to combat moral hazard is to use 
deductibles and caps on losses to align the incentives of the insurer and the 
insured.  One common exclusion along these lines is the “loss of market” 
exclusion for business interruption insurance coverage.  Business 
interruption insurance provides coverage for lost profits due to the 
interruption of business after a covered peril occurs, such as fire, flood, or 
wind. Business interruption insurance is typically added, by endorsement, 
to an insurance policy covering damage to an insured's property.  The loss 
of market exclusion excludes from that coverage any  lost profits due to the 
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business’s market disappearing.  The loss of market could be due to 
economic decline, competition, or shifts in demand that happened after the 
occurrence. The loss of market exclusion has been a source of increasing 
debate in recent years due to catastrophic events such as the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center and Hurricane Katrina, which have 
destroyed entire markets.  The general question, as usual, is whether that 
exclusion should be honored.  
To analyze whether the exclusion is desirable, we once again create 
two identical islands except that one island has the exclusion and one does 
not.  On the island that ignores the loss-of-market exclusion, business 
owners can purchase insurance which essentially guarantees they make a 
profit even when the demand for their product will never bounce back after 
an occurrence.  This might lead to a large moral hazard problem.  After an 
occurrence, if it is guaranteed that a company will be covered up to its 
previous level of profitability, what incentive does that company have to 
strive to restore its earlier business efforts? After a fire, for instance, an 
owner of a restaurant with lost profits coverage would have no incentive to 
work hard to get back some business when she is guaranteed to make at 
least as much money as she was making before. That restaurant owner 
could take that lazy attitude until customers return on their own.  
On the island that enforces the loss-of-market exclusion, however, 
there is no such moral hazard problem; the company must do everything it 
can to earn business back after a disaster.  While this is an advantage, the 
disadvantage of the island is that there is less coverage. Due to an 
occurrence, a business may not be able to survive until the market returns.  
The reason for insurance in the first place is protecting the business in the 
event of a covered peril, so it is likely a reasonable insured would be 
willing to pay the higher premiums in exchange for the protection of her 
business.  
The question becomes one of incentives. Economic analysis 
suggests that policies should not exclude loss of market (that is the policy 
should provide coverage) when the risk of moral hazard is relatively small. 
Consider for example Duane Reade, which dealt with business interruption 
insurance in the context of the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center.112  
The court decided that the destruction of the World Trade Center where 
Duane Reade ran a store, and Duane Reade’s resulting lost profits, were 
clearly a covered peril, and that the “loss of market” provision did not 
                                                                                                                                      
112 See Duane Reade, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 279 F. Supp. 2d 
235, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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encompass the destruction a market due to terrorist attack.113  In other 
words, because the market loss was due to a covered peril—the destruction 
of the business—the resulting lost profits were covered.   
The court got it right, only for the wrong reasons. As the example 
with the fire in the restaurant above suggests, we want to provide incentives 
to business owners to work hard to restore customer traffic after an 
occurrence. Therefore the court is wrong to provide coverage for loss-of-
market only because it was originally initiated by a covered peril. However, 
when it comes to catastrophic events, where there is nothing the business 
owner can do to bring customers back to his store (think about ground zero 
in the years post 9/11), there is no risk of distorting incentives.  The interest 
in providing coverage should therefore prevail, and the market exclusion 
should not be honored.  
However, it is unlikely a reasonable insured would want to pay for 
coverage to keep a business around in perpetuity even though there is no 
demand for the business. Thus, even in catastrophic events the coverage 
could not be unlimited. The Duane Reade court took this approach to the 
timing issue.  It ruled lost profits were to be covered and the loss market 
exclusion should not be honored—in other words, coverage should last— 
only for the time it would reasonably take “to rebuild, repair, or replace” 
the specific store at issue.114   
4. Moral Hazard—The Empirical Evidence 
 
As discussed above in the section on empirical evidence for 
adverse selection, one problem with empirically measuring either moral 
hazard or adverse selection is distinguishing one’s effects from the other.  
For example, an unhealthy person would be more likely to buy health 
insurance (adverse selection), while a person with insurance may be more 
likely to adopt unhealthy habits, knowing that he has insurance in case he 
became sick (moral hazard). In both cases the empiricist observes a 
correlation between high-risk individuals and scope of coverage. In other 
words, it is easy to observe a positive correlation between the demand for 
coverage and the number or scope of insurance claims, but it is difficult to 
determine whether this correlation is the result of adverse selection, moral 
hazard, or some combination of the two. This inability to separate the two 
problems poses policy consequences as well, since ameliorating either the 
                                                                                                                                      
113 Id. at 239-40.   
114 Id. at 239. 
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potential welfare losses of moral hazard or adverse selection requires 
separate policy tools. To curtail moral hazard, insurers would increase 
deductibles to encourage healthful activities and discourage waste by 
exposing consumers to the true cost of their medical care.115 To reduce the 
potential problem of adverse selection, on the other hand, requires stricter 
disclosure laws for potential insureds to allow insurers to better screen for 
pre-existing conditions, or alternatively, a health-insurance mandate as 
discussed above.  
But not being able to distinguish between moral hazard and 
adverse selection is not the only problem with the empirical literature. 
Potentially a more worrisome problem is that the empirical literature fails 
to distinguish between the moral hazard which stems from the “substitution 
effect,” and that which stems from the “income effect.” As discussed 
above, the former is welfare decreasing and the latter is welfare 
increasing.116 Thus, that people consume more healthcare because they 
have insurance is not worrisome from a policy making perspective as long 
as the excess consumption is due to the income effect. Similarly, the fact 
that people search for a job for a longer period of time because they have 
unemployment insurance is not necessarily worrisome, as long as the 
excess search period is only due to the impact of the insurance on their 
liquidity constraints.117  
For several decades health economists have been finding evidence 
interpreted as ex-post moral hazard in health insurance. The most important 
study is the Rand Health Insurance Experiment, which randomized people 
into different insurance plans, thus eliminating adverse selection effects 
stemming from the insured’s ability to choose the type of coverage she 
wishes.  The Rand Experiment, as well as other studies, found that demand 
for medical care is elastic with respect to its out-of-pocket costs. In other 
                                                                                                                                      
115 However, “cost-sharing” is a blunt and not necessarily efficient way of 
reducing over-consumption of health insurance. Empirical evidence shows that 
when consumers have to bear a higher proportion of their health costs, they do cut 
back on spending, but they do so on both frivolous and beneficial procedures. See 
Mary Reed et. al., High-Deductible Health Insurance Plans: Efforts to Sharpen a 
Blunt Instrument, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1145, 1145 (2009).  
116 See supra p. 69.  
117 Raj Chetty, Moral Hazard Versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment 
Insurance, 116 J. POL. ECON. 173, 173-75 (2008) (separating moral hazard effect 
and liquidity constraints effect in unemployment insurance).  
86          CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL         Vol. 19.1 
words, people carrying health insurance are responsive to the personal cost 
of healthcare and therefore ex-post moral hazard exists.118  
The Rand Experiment approach (as well as other studies) presents 
several empirical challenges  to analyzing people’s utilization of medical 
care as a function of their scope of insurance coverage. First, the scope of 
the plan coverage might be endogenous. Generous health insurance plans 
might boost utilization of medical services, or, areas where people need or 
demand more medical services will be areas where people demand more 
generous health insurance coverage, without these studies being able to 
isolate which one is operating in practice. Second, as was just discussed, 
not every variation in consumption that follows a variation in insurance 
coverage can be tied to ex-post moral hazard. It is conceivable that when 
insurance coverage expands, the consumption of medical services, 
especially by budget-constrained people, will increase since the price will 
become affordable.  This is the income effect discussed above. It is only the 
increase in demand due to the substitution effect which is worrying, but 
such type of increase in demand is much harder to empirically identify.   
So far I have dealt with ex-post moral hazard. An equally 
interesting question is the extent to which one would expect to see ex-ante 
moral hazard. It is worth mentioning that even a small effect is important 
because even if the chances the individual’s moral hazard behavior has an 
impact on her probability of being involved, say, in a fatal accident is 
small, it may still cause a large social problem at the aggregate. Thus, for a 
population of 100 million people, a one percentage-point increase in the 
probability of a fatal accident creates a million more deaths.  
In general, the empirical literature fails to establish ex-ante moral 
hazard in health care.119 In the context of automobile insurance, one would 
think that an insured driver is not going to drive more recklessly than he 
otherwise would, as there are plenty of uncompensated losses associated 
with an accident (including uncompensated bodily injuries) besides the cost 
of repairs. Yet, using an instrumental-variables approach, Cohen and 
Dehejla find evidence that automobile insurance does have moral hazard 
                                                                                                                                      
118  The Rand study found an overall medical-care price elasticity of about -
0.2, which means that as the personal costs increases by say, 10%, the demand for 
medical care decreases by 2%. See Peter Zweifel & Willard G. Manning, Moral 
Hazard and Consumer Incentives in Health Care, in HANDBOOK OF HEALTH 
ECONOMICS 410, 454. (A.J. Culyer & J.P. Newhouse eds., Elsevier Science B.V. 
2000). 
119 Id. at 446.   
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costs, leading to an increase in traffic fatalities.120 Because they cannot 
distinguish between the income effect (careful drivers drive more miles 
which might be optimal despite the increase in fatalities) and the 
substitution effect (careful drivers no longer take care, which is always not 
optimal) caused by automobile insurance, Cohen and Dehejla cannot 
identify the net welfare effect of automobile insurance.121  
 
E. REVERSE MORAL HAZARD 
 
Just like there is reverse adverse selection, there is arguably also 
reverse moral hazard. It is not insured parties alone that behave 
strategically once the insurance contract is in place—insurers are similarly 
the perpetrators of opportunistic behavior, finding it easy and advantageous 
to mistreat their insureds once they are locked in a contract.122  This is 
especially true because barriers to litigation can prevent insureds from 
challenging insurer abuse.  
While insurers and policyholders have similar interests at the ex-
ante contractual stage, a fundamental conflict of interests arises in the post-
occurrence stage. At the contractual stage they will agree to a policy that 
minimizes total loss-related costs, including defense costs, because that will 
be efficient and will keep the premiums low.  But ex-post (after insurance 
is purchased and claims arise) the insurance company might have different 
incentives than the insured about whether the loss should be covered and—
                                                                                                                                      
120 Alma Cohen & Rajeev Dehejia, The Effect of Automobile Insurance and 
Accident Liability Laws on Traffic Fatalities, 47 J.L. & ECON. 357, 357 (2004). 
See also Sarit Weisburd, Identifying Moral Hazard in Car Insurance Contracts 27 
(Hebrew Univ., Working Paper, 2010), available at  http://pluto.mscc.huji.ac.il/ 
~saritw/moralhazard_sep12.pdf.  
121 Similarly, Bernard Fortin and Paul Lanoie have documented an increase in 
work injuries correlated to the implementation of North American workers’ 
compensation programs, which provide employees with fast access to damages for 
work related injuries. Bernard Fortin & Paul Lanoie, Incentive Effects of Workers 
Compensation: A Survey, in HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 421, 421 . (Georges 
Dionne ed., Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000). 
122 As far as I know, the idea of reverse moral hazard was first mentioned by 
Patricia Danzon. See Danzon, supra note  93. See also Eric D. Beal, Posner and 
Moral Hazard, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 81, 97 (2000); William Choi & Lan Liang, 
Reverse Moral Hazard of Liability Insurers: Evidence from Medical Malpractice 
Claims, 39 APPLIED ECON. 2331, 2331-32 (2007). . 
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in liability insurance contract—how defense of the claim should be 
exercised.  
Take for example, the insurer’s decision whether to cover a claim. 
After the occurrence, insurers have the dual role of both deciding whether a 
certain claim is covered under the policy, and paying the damages 
associated with that claim if it is determined to be covered. As one would 
expect, insurers often have the economic incentive to decide coverage 
exists in as few situations as possible, knowing that they are often 
effectively insulated (or “insured”) from being sued due to insureds’ lack of 
sophistication, knowledge, and resources.  This is a reverse moral hazard. 
(While one could imagine a system where insurers are not the judge and 
financier of a claim, and instead these decisions are made by separate 
entities, that is not the world we live in.)   
As with ordinary moral hazard, there are multiple ways to counter 
reverse moral hazard on a theoretical level.  First, full and detailed 
disclosure of the coverage decisions insurers make could be required, 
whether to potential customers (thus harnessing market forces to eliminate 
unethical insurers) or complaining insureds (thus exposing the unethical 
practices).  Second, such disclosure could be used to punish opportunistic 
behavior by insurers. Insurance regulators, for instance, could analyze the 
disclosures and impose fines on, or revoke the licenses of, the worst 
behaving insurance companies.  Third, individual insureds could have a 
legal claim for damages resulting from bad faith denial by insurers. Fourth, 
independent and simplified alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
could make it easier to challenge insurers’ decisions.123 
Doctrinally, there are several principles of contract law which serve 
to mitigate the effects of reverse moral hazard.  One is the interpretive 
principle of contra proferentem—that ambiguities in any contract will be 
construed against its drafter.  For insurance contracts, the drafter of course 
is the insurer.  Thus, the doctrine of contra proferentem prevents insurers 
from taking advantage of gray areas of policy coverage and instead 
incentivizes clear, unambiguous policy writing.  However, whether or not 
that incentive outweighs the incentive to maintain ambiguous, boilerplate 
policy terms, is a very complicated question.124 
                                                                                                                                      
123 See Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case 
Study of the British and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 
TUL. L. REV. 735, 810-11 (2009). 
124 Bad boilerplate is often perversely incentivized by the very rulings that 
would seem to cut against it in that a term that has an established, known cost may 
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Ambiguities come in multiple forms.  A policy can be ambiguous 
because it is vague in and of itself.125  A policy can also be considered 
ambiguous if it does not address a certain situation.  An example of this is 
litigation arising out of the attack on the World Trade Center where it was 
unclear, based on the language of a policy, whether each plane strike was 
an “occurrence,” or the entire event was an “occurrence.”126  Lastly, a 
policy can be ambiguous if two or more of its provisions conflict.  For 
example, a Second Circuit case found a policy ambiguous when one of its 
provisions seemed to extend airplane insurance to trips between the United 
States and the Caribbean, and another provisions indicated the policy only 
applied to flights over the continental United States.127  To generalize, a 
policy is ambiguous if “it is reasonably susceptible to two meanings.”128 
Even if the policy writing is clear, it can still be opportunistic when an 
insurer includes unambiguous, but still self-advantageous, provisions.  This 
is an issue because insureds may be unaware of the provision and its impact 
on the insurance coverage, and may think they are covered for an 
occurrence when under the stated policy terms they are not.  To counteract 
that problem, courts have applied what have been called “allied” doctrines 
with contra proferentem, including waiver, estoppel, and the “insured’s 
reasonable expectations” doctrine.129   
                                                                                                                                      
be more valuable than one whose cost or benefit is unknown.  For more on the 
complex relationship of policy drafters and the courts, see Michelle E. Boardman, 
Contra Proferentum: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
1105, 1111 (2006). 
125 See, Columbia Heights Motors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275 N.W.2d 32, 34 
(Minn. 1979).   
126 See World Trade Center Props., L.L.C. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 
154, 158 (2d Cir. 2003).  The policy limited recovery to $3.5 billion per 
occurrence.  Id. If each plane strike was an occurrence, the insured could collect a 
total of $7 billion, whereas if the entire event was an occurrence, the insured could 
only collect $3.5 billion.  Id. 
127 Vargas v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 838, 840 (2d Cir. 1981) (involving 
a trip from New York to Puerto Rico, with stops in Miami and Haiti to refuel, 
where the airplane crashed before it reached Puerto Rico).  The court found, 
because the policy was ambiguous, the policy covered the incident. Id. at 842. 
128 Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 531, 537 (1996). 
129 See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy 
Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970). The term “insured’s reasonable 
expectations” was coined by Professor Robert Keeton in 1970 when he recognized 
that courts provide coverage even when the exclusion is not ambiguous.   
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Though recognized in only a minority of jurisdictions, the 
reasonable expectations doctrine allows courts to enforce an insurance 
contract despite an unambiguous exclusion contained therein if the 
exclusion goes against the reasonable expectations of the insured.  Some 
jurisdictions distinguish between sophisticated and unsophisticated 
insureds, recognizing that sophisticated parties may contract for such 
exclusions in exchange for lower premiums.130  Waiver and estoppel are 
heavily fact-dependent doctrines, with courts relying on the particulars of 
the policy and the relationship between the insured and insurer to determine 
whether coverage should be granted despite a policy term indicating 
otherwise.131  The societal value of the reasonable expectations doctrine is 
examined in more detail, via an application of the Two Islands Functional 
Approach, in the next subsection. 
As mentioned previously, a special type of reverse moral hazard 
exists in liability insurance policies around the decisions regarding the 
defense of a claim.  Problems of reverse moral hazards arise because the 
insurer acts as an agent of the insured, but might maximize its own interests 
rather than the insured’s interests. For example, because insurers often care 
only about their financial exposure in a specific case, they may prefer to 
settle a lawsuit instead of litigating. But the insureds, whose reputation and 
livelihood depend on the outcome, might prefer to defend against such suit 
in court to clear their name. Another example is when an insured’s 
potential liability to its victims is higher than the policy limit, but any 
potential settlement would be at or close to the policy limit. The insurer has 
incentives to pursue the litigation because the payout would be the same, 
while the insured might be happy to settle for the amount of the policy 
limit, because this will ensure he or she bears no personal liability.132   
Parties combat reverse moral hazard through the design of the 
insurance policy. As was mentioned above, many liability insurance 
contracts include provisions requiring the insurer to defend a suit unless the 
insured consents in writing to a settlement. Over time, courts have also 
found ways to deal with reverse moral hazard in the context of defense 
decisions. For example, courts have often penalized insurance companies 
                                                                                                                                      
130 See Hazel Glenn Beh, Reassessing the Sophisticated Insured Exception, 39 
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 85, 85-86 (2003). 
131 See ABRAHAM, supra note 107, at 70-71. 
132 See Charles Silver & Kent Syverud,  The Professional Responsibilities of 
Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255, 266 (1995) (discussing these 
problems and many other conflicts of interest arising in such situations).  
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who subordinate the insureds’ interests to their own.133  That helps solve 
the first problem mentioned above, where insurers settle and consequently 
harm the insureds. With respect to the second problem, where insurers 
refuse to settle and harm the insureds, several states’ supreme courts have 
affirmed judgments against insurance companies for bad faith refusal to 
settle where they gambled with their insureds’ money.  In Crisci, for 
example, an insurer refused to settle a claim by a tenant against the 
landlord (the insured).134  The insured’s policy limit was $10,000; the 
lowest settlement demand by the plaintiff-tenant was also $10,000.  As a 
test for whether an insurer has liability above a policy limit after it refused 
to settle, the court relied on whether a prudent insurer without policy limits 
would have accepted a settlement offer.  In that case, the court believed 
such an insurer would have settled and therefore awarded the insured 
damages in the amount she had to pay to her tenant.135  This rule prevents 
insurers from gambling with insured’s money.136   
Interestingly, and somewhat counter-intuitively, insurers’ power to 
strategically refuse to settle which seems to harm the insured when viewed 
from an ex-post perspective, may in fact benefit the insured when viewed 
from the ex-ante perspective. Such strategic behavior by the insurer 
functions as a commitment device that the insurer would reject victims’ 
excessive settlement offers.137 Thus, insurers may extract better settlements 
from the insureds’ victims, which will lead to lower premiums to the class 
of insureds.  Still, if settlement negotiations fail, the insured might discover 
she has to pay judgment way beyond the policy limit, a risk she might not 
want to bear.   
In more extreme scenarios, it is even possible to get punitive 
damages if the insurer denied coverage while violating the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.  Insurers who attempt to take advantage of an 
insured in an improper manner may be required nonetheless to pay out on 
                                                                                                                                      
133 Kent Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 75 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1990). 
134 See, e.g., Crisci v. The Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, 426 P.2d 173, 175 
(Cal. 1967).   
135 Id. at 177. 
136 See also Alan O. Sykes, Judicial Limitations on the Discretion of Liability 
Insurers to Settle or Litigate: An Economic Critique, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1345, 1373-
74 (1994) (using an economic analysis of bad faith claims for refusal to settle to 
suggest courts should not interfere with contracts between insureds and insurers).   
137 Michael J. Meurer, The Gains from Faith in an Unfaithful Agent: 
Settlement Conflicts between Defendants and Liability Insurers, 8 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 502, 502-22 (1992).  
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an insurance policy where a repudiation of the insurance contract or a 
denial of coverage is made in bad faith.138  State Farm Mutual Auto 
Insurance Co. v. Campbell showed punitive damages against insurance 
companies for bad faith denial of coverage are available, even if there are 
due process limits to the size of the punitive damages award.139  In State 
Farm, the liability insurer refused to settle a car accident case even though 
“a consensus was reached early on by the investigators and witnesses that 
Mr. Campbell’s [the insured’s] unsafe pass had indeed caused the crash.”140  
Rejecting the at-policy-limit settlement offer, State Farm told Campbell he 
need not worry as he would not be held liable for the accident. The jury 
returned a verdict three times the limit of Campbell’s policy, and, at first, 
State Farm refused to cover the excess, or the cost of appealing the 
judgment.  At one point State Farm even told the Campbells they would 
have to sell their house.  After the Campbells lost the appeal State Farm did 
pay it in full, but that was too little too late as in a separate lawsuit against 
State Farm the court awarded punitive damages for its treatment of 
Campbell.141  While this case sends a clear message to insurers to not deny 
coverage in bad faith, it has been argued that claims against insurers for 
bad faith denials of coverage cause more harm than good due to courts’ 
limited abilities to accurately identify opportunistic behavior by insurers.142 
In sum, insurers in third-party liability policies usually assume the duty to 
defend the insured. This gives insurers control over the case and thus works 
to prevent insureds from failing to defend a claim vigorously or settling 
with the insurers’ funds too easily.143 At the same time, requiring an insurer 
to receive the insured’s consent on any settlement agreement and imposing 
liability for a bad-faith refusal to settle by the insurance company lowers 
the agency costs associated with the fact that insurers act on behalf of the 
insureds.  
                                                                                                                                      
138 Silberg v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1108-09 (Cal. 1974); Chandler, 
supra note 44, at 850-52. 
139 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003).   
140 Id. at 413. 
141 Id. at 413-14. 
142 See Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” Breach of Contract by First-Party 
Insurers, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 443 (1996). 
143 In contrast, Directors and Officers insurance policies state that it is the 
insured’s responsibility to defend a claim when one occurs. Yet, these policies still 
prohibit the insured from settling without the insurer’s consent.  
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1. Returning to the Two Islands Approach 
 
An excellent candidate for the Two Islands analysis for this section 
is the reasonable expectations doctrine.  Take for instance a Minnesota 
Supreme Court decision from 1985.  In Atwater Creamery, the issue was 
whether an insurance policy covered a break-in where there was no visible 
evidence of forcible entry.144   The policy quite clearly excluded coverage 
where there is no physical evidence of forcible entry. Yet, the court decided 
that despite the language of the policy, where it is clear that a burglary 
happened by unrelated parties, there should be coverage.  In ignoring the 
language of the policy the court relied on the reasonable expectations 
doctrine, with a focus on the ex-post bargaining power of the parties, not 
the future effects of its decision.145   
Under the two islands functional approach,  the question in that 
case should have been, all else being equal, whether an island that allows 
the physical-evidence exclusion is better than an island that does not allow 
the exclusion.  To answer that one needs to inquire about the function of 
the exclusion. The exclusion is designed to screen out coverage for 
burglaries by someone associated with the insured—inside jobs. The island 
that allows the exclusion places the costs of burglaries without physical 
evidence on insureds, yielding two effects on insureds: insureds are 
motivated to monitor their property against an inside job, and they will be 
more likely to take precautions to prevent clean “out-side” burglaries by 
locking their property or using alarm systems. In other words, the exclusion 
reduces moral hazard associated with insurance burglary policies by 
incentivizing the insured to take optimal care.  One could expect there will 
be fewer burglaries as a result of the exclusion, and premiums will be 
lower, both social benefits.   
On the other island, where the exclusion is not enforced, insureds 
will have less incentive to secure valuables, and may even be incentivized 
to defraud insurers by burglarizing their own property.  Either way 
premiums and social loss would be higher.   
                                                                                                                                      
144Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 274 
(Minn. 1985).   
145 See id. at 277-79.  The Iowa Supreme Court in C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. 
Allied Mut. Ins. Co., cited by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Atwater, also relies 
on fairness to the insured to apply the reasonable expectations doctrine to ignore a 
similar definition of burglary. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 274 
N.W.2d 169, 177 (Iowa 1975). 
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It seems therefore that as a general matter excluding burglaries 
where there is no sign of forcible entry is desirable because “inside jobs” 
are hard to detect by the insurer and relatively easier to prevent by the 
insured.  The exclusion therefore maximizes social welfare for the entire 
pool of insureds. Between providing more coverage (for clean outside jobs) 
and not distorting the incentives to take care against inside jobs, the latter 
seems a better option.146  
But, in the Atwater Creamery case there was no suggestion that 
anyone associated with the insureds was involved in the burglary.  
Furthermore, it was clear that proper precautions were taken to secure the 
property.147 The Minnesota Supreme Court decided to provide coverage in 
this case. Was that a good decision? In this situation, the island the 
Minnesota Supreme Court chose would still fight the moral hazard problem 
because by conditioning its decision on the finding that no insider was 
involved the court did not dilute the incentives insureds have to not 
participate in self-burglaries and to take adequate precaution. At the same 
time, in those situations where the insured acted in a socially beneficial 
way, that is, when she took optimal precautions, providing coverage (by 
ignoring the language of the contract) would distribute the risk of clean 
“outside jobs” across the entire pool of insureds.  Most likely a welfare 
gain. 
While the court’s opinion in Atwater Creamery might well 
maximize the pool’s welfare, one needs to remember that the down-side of 
the decision is that it opens the door for costly, case by case analyses of 
every similar situation. For this reason, and because it provides coverage in 
cases such as clean outside jobs, the island the Minnesota court chose 
would have higher premiums than an island with the full exclusion 
enforced. Insureds, however, might prefer higher premium in exchange for 
the additional coverage.   
The result in this case is not unambiguous, and to determine the 
best island empirical data comparing the increased risk of extending 
                                                                                                                                      
146 Daniel Schwarcz comes to the opposite conclusion about these clauses, 
arguing that the potential moral hazard benefits of the exclusions are low because 
there is little that can be done to prevent against internal thefts, and if insurers do 
have evidence of fraud then they can deny the claim on that basis.  See Schwarcz, 
supra note 65, at 1288.  Schwarcz also notes that many of these clauses were 
rejected by courts decades ago, but have since returned to homeowners policies.  
Id. 
147 Atwater Creamery, 366 N.W.2d at 274. 
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coverage to clean inside jobs (which should be excluded) against the net 
benefit of covering clean outside jobs (which should be covered) is needed. 
Selectively ignoring the exclusion would certainly combat moral hazard 
more than always ignoring the exclusion, and would likely be less effective 
at combating moral hazard than always honoring the exclusion, but where 
in that spectrum the Minnesota court’s decision would fall is unclear.  
Furthermore, the administrative cost of selectively ignoring the exclusion is 
also hard to determine, although it is certainly more costly to selectively 
ignore the exclusion than always honoring it or always ignoring it:  a 
bright-line rule will almost always be cheaper to enforce than a case-by-
case analysis.  Thus, the Minnesota court’s decision can be justified if clean 
outside jobs is such a prevalent phenomenon that covering them provides 
more benefit than covering only dirty, or forced-entry, outside jobs creates 
costs in forgone coverage, and if the administrative costs associated with 
proving an incident were not an inside job are not too large.148  
As this example has demonstrated, the two islands analysis  will 
not always provide the answer, but it does give us a good, basic framework 
for answering the question. 
 
F. SUMMARY 
 
This section discussed the major impediments to the efficient 
insurance contract—hidden characteristics and strategic behavior. These 
problems manifest themselves in adverse (and reverse adverse) selection 
and moral (and reverse moral) hazard. According to the economic analysis 
of law, one of the main roles of insurance law is to protect the parties from 
strategically exploiting hidden information. Indeed, the contractual and 
doctrinal solutions discussed in this section do just that. These solutions, 
however, do not come without a price tag. For both adverse selection and 
moral hazard the challenge is to strike a balance between diluting both 
parties’ strategic behavior while providing maximum coverage, and the two 
islands approach can often help courts and other decision makers strike that 
balance. 
                                                                                                                                      
148 One may still wonder why insurers did not find a simple way to design 
language that supplements the forced entry requirement. Their failure to do so 
suggests that insuring clean outside jobs is hard to do without also creating a big 
loophole into which many inside jobs will fit. 
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III. OTHER IMPEDIMENTS TO EFFICIENT INSURANCE 
CONTRACTS 
 
The previous section discussed informational problems and the 
strategic behavior they create as impediments to an efficient insurance 
contract. However, there are many other systemic factors that impede the 
creation of efficient insurance contracts including transaction costs, 
externalities, correlated risks, non-competitive pricing and insures’ 
irrational behavior. In this section I briefly discuss them. At the end of the 
discussion of these five additional impediments I will use the two islands 
approach to analyze a solution to one of them- the problem of correlated 
risks. 
 
A. TRANSACTION COSTS 
 
One systemic impediment to insurance contracts is transaction costs, 
part of the larger administrative costs category.149  Such costs arise in the 
arranging and executing of a transaction, and in extreme cases may exceed 
the value that the transaction itself would create.  Thus, the transaction, 
which would otherwise be efficient, is not pursued by the parties.150  
In the insurance world, one common solution to the transaction cost 
problem has been the standard form.  Standard forms have long been 
thought to present several advantages for the parties to an insurance 
contract: (1) creation of economies of scale in drafting which may lower 
premiums; (2) greater likelihood of terms with predictable meanings; (3) 
facilitation of price competition; and (4) facilitation of the collection and 
aggregation of claim and loss data for use in rate-setting.  This subsection 
evaluates the current usage of standard forms as a way of combating 
transaction costs.    
Addressing the first potential advantage, the economies of scale for 
insurance contracts were once especially valuable because insurance 
contracts must be filed and approved by state regulators.  This gave 
insurers a strong incentive to collectively draft their contracts and submit a 
single contract for approval, rather than having each one approved 
                                                                                                                                      
149 Administrative costs include any extra cost incurred in the business of 
insurance.  They include transaction costs, but also the costs necessary for any 
insurance company to run, the costs to market policies to consumers, the costs in 
adjudicating disputes, etc.   
150 ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 14. 
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individually.151  Recently though, new changes have reduced these 
regulatory burdens.  As of today, all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia utilize an electronic platform called the System for Electronic 
Rate and Form Filing (SERFF), which provides for easier approval of 
policy forms.152  Indeed, a study of homeowners insurance policies, finds 
anecdotal evidence suggesting that the vast majority of insurance policies 
submitted to state regulators are approved.153  If new contract forms are 
easily approved, then regulatory transaction costs may now be almost 
nonexistent, and the benefit from economies of scale from collective policy 
drafting lessened.   
Moving on to the second advantage, insurers may rationally prefer 
the predictability of complicated terms which courts have already 
interpreted over the clarity of untested terms.154 The stability of standard 
forms is further increased due to path dependency where insurers fear that 
deviation from the traditional language of the contract might be perceived 
as an attempt to mislead insureds. Yet, the actual benefit of predictability of 
meaning is difficult to ascertain, as courts have often diverged on the 
meaning of even common terms such as “sudden.”155  Thus, this benefit of 
the standard form may also be overstated.   
Third, many scholars have argued that standardized forms allow 
for competition because consumers can more easily compare coverage and 
pricing details.156  On the other hand, when the standard forms are drafted 
collectively and every insurer uses the same form, the forms eliminate 
competition over the substance of the coverage provided and discourage 
innovation in the formulation of terms.  Indeed, in the early 1900s a 
standard insurance form and pricing schedule were proposed specifically to 
prevent “ruinous competition” between insurers.157  More recently, an 
entity called the Insurance Services Organization (ISO) has produced 
                                                                                                                                      
151 Schwarcz, supra note 65, at 1272. 
152 See Nat’l Assoc. of Ins. Comm’rs, About SERFF, SERFF, http://www.serff 
. com/ about.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2012). 
153 Schwarcz, supra note 65, at 1276. 
154 See id. at 1273 (arguing that “network effects” are created by a wealth of 
case law applying contract language, especially in the property and casualty 
insurance lines where policies attempt to categorize a large number of potential 
future scenarios, and that insurers will use specific language to “tap into this pool 
of precedent”). 
155 See Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Wis. 1990).   
156 Schwarcz, supra note 65, at 1272. 
157 Id. at 1270. 
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standard forms and aggregated data in the property and casualty lines.  
Until the late 1980s, the ISO also published advisory rates with its standard 
forms, a practice which dampened competition between insurers.158 While 
these rates could not be mandatory due to antitrust laws, they did provide a 
potential vehicle for price-fixing or collusion within the insurance industry.  
This history suggests that standard forms may actually reduce competition 
rather than facilitating it, although the jury is still out on this benefit. 
Indeed, the life and health insurance business have survived and thrived 
without the existence of an ISO-like entity.  
The last benefit of the standard form to be analyzed is that it allows 
the aggregation of loss data, which can only be done when companies 
utilize the same coverage.  While this was once important for insurance 
companies, most modern insurers are very large, and are able to collect 
enormous amounts of information that is specific to their company—
specific information that is more relevant to their risk calculations than 
what would be collected from all insureds under a standard form.159  
Technological advances have also helped in this area, reducing its 
importance. 
To sum up, the standard form may still reduce transaction costs, 
but its actual benefit to insurers and insureds could be overstated.  In 
practice, however, the insurance industry may actually be moving away 
from the standard form.  This is evidenced by recent finding that there is 
now “substantial heterogeneity” in homeowner’s insurance policies.  
Rather than solving problems related to transaction costs and competition, 
however, this change may just create a whole new set of problems as 
consumers lack the ability to comparison shop between policies. 160 
 
B. EXTERNALITIES 
 
Another impediment to efficient insurance contracts is the 
externality problem.  Externalities, or more particularly negative 
externalities, are costs of an action or transaction that are projected onto 
                                                                                                                                      
158 ABRAHAM, supra note 107, at 34.   
159 Schwarcz, supra note 65, at 1275. 
160 See id. at 1318 (finding that in practice the variety between insurance forms 
can make it impossible for consumers to comparison shop because they lack access 
to policy information and many of the contract details are extremely complex).  
While Schwarcz only investigated homeowners policies, this trend may also hold 
true for other types of insurance coverage. 
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non-parties or society as a whole, rather than being borne by the parties to 
the transaction.  One of the principle justifications of the American tort 
system is to force wrongdoers to pay for the harm they cause. In other 
words the tort system forces tortfeasors to internalize their externalities. 
Liability insurance helps insulate tortfeasors from paying for their actions, 
thus it makes negative actions cheaper, and externalizes some of the costs 
onto society—or at least onto the tortfeasors’ insurers.161 On this view, 
liability insurance is a welfare reducing institution.  
Interestingly, liability insurance also prevents externalities. Some 
individuals and companies are judgment proof, meaning they do not have 
enough assets to pay for harm they may cause. Because a judgment proof 
entity will not have to compensate victims in the event of a loss, it has a 
lower incentive to take care than a non-judgment-proof entity. In contrast, 
insured entities are not judgment-proof, thus they may have more incentive 
to take care than non-insured entities, as long as the insurance company can 
provide them incentives to take care.162 Requiring an otherwise judgment-
proof driver to carry insurance leaves him or her to bear the cost of 
dangerous driving (via higher premiums) rather than leaving the victim or 
society (via the tax and transfer system) to pay.  
If liability insurance both externalize costs and prevents cost 
externalization at the same time, is it a welfare decreasing or welfare 
increasing institution? The insurance industry has developed ways to deal 
with negative externalities, mainly through experience rating, and refusing 
to insure certain high-risk entities or activities. Knowing that their premium 
might go up if they are in a car accident, drivers take more care thus at least 
partially internalizing the social costs of driving with insurance coverage.  
But not all is so rosy with liability insurance. Historically, liability insurers 
tried to limit their exposure by writing in the insurance contract clauses—
called diminution clauses—which allowed them to reduce their own 
liability on account of the insolvency of the insured (the wrongdoer), in 
essence restoring the judgment-proof problem.163 The diminution clauses 
                                                                                                                                      
161 See Steven Shavell, On the Social Function and the Regulation of Liability 
Insurance, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 166, 175 (2000). 
162 See Steven Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements and Compulsory 
Liability Insurance as Solutions to the Judgment-Proof Problem, 36 RAND J. 
ECON. 63, 63 (2005). 
163 Chandler, supra note 43, at 854. The historical reason for this is that in the 
past liability insurance policies provided true indemnification for losses incurred 
by policyholders.  A condition for true indemnity is that the policyholder pay the 
 
100          CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL         Vol. 19.1 
imposed costs on the victims of the insured, who were not fully 
compensated for the harm they suffer. These clauses exacerbated the moral 
hazard problem because these potential tortfeasors paid lower premiums 
that reflected that not all their victims were compensated. As with other 
problems discussed in this paper, insurance law has developed internal 
doctrines to remedy many of these more nuanced types of externalities, 
including this one. Nowadays, anti-diminution laws, also called bankruptcy 
provisions, prohibit the inclusion of diminution clauses into the policy.164  
Another insurance law doctrine developed to combat externalities 
arises in the context of subrogation.  As we saw above, it is a general 
principle of subrogation, and a common clause in first-party insurance 
contracts, that if the insured releases a wrongdoer of liability when, 
otherwise, the first-party insurer would have had a claim against that 
wrongdoer through its right of subrogation, then the insured forfeits his 
claim under the policy.165  This protects the insurer’s ability to exercise its 
subrogation rights.  The general principle prevents insureds from 
externalizing the cost of harm caused to them onto their first-party insurers. 
If the rule was not so, insureds could exchange a release of liability for 
something of benefit from the wrongdoer, and still require the insurer to 
pay for the harm. However, courts have made an interesting exception for 
releases of liability of the wrongdoer prior to the wrongful action.166  Such 
release often comes up in construction contracts where the contractor is 
released from any liability arising during its performance of the contract.  
In exchange for the liability release, the hiring company (the insured) 
receives a discount. The hiring company then has to rely on its first-party 
coverage.  
Despite the potential externalities, courts allowing prior liability 
releases can be justified in several ways. First, when insureds are 
unsophisticated, exculpatory clauses are often contained in fine print on 
standard form contracts that people do not read—such as the common 
                                                                                                                                      
loss and ask to be reimbursed.  In the case of judgment-proof policyholders, 
insurers benefited automatically from policyholders’ inability to pay.   
164 The interplay of mandatory minimum liability coverage with prohibitions 
on diminution of coverage in bankruptcy works an interesting effect, in that it 
weakens the protection bankruptcy laws provide for insureds by requiring them to 
spend prospectively on insurance—a payment that cannot be discharged, since it is 
in advance—for the benefit of victims whose claims are dischargeable. 
165 See, e.g., Great N. Oil Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 189 N.W.2d 
404, 408 (Minn. 1971).   
166 See id. at 406-07.   
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limitation of liability in parking garages tickets. Even if a driver sees the 
limited liability notice, it is probably not reasonable to ask drivers to notify 
their first-party insurers every time they enter a parking garage that they 
have just agreed to release the parking garage from liability and therefore 
that the first-party automobile insurer is exposed to higher risk. Second, 
when insureds are sophisticated, the practice of releasing putative 
wrongdoers from liability can be justified if first-party insurers can better 
monitor or risk-classify their insureds than liability insurers of construction 
contractors can monitor or risk-classify their insureds or insureds’ clients. 
This can happen if first party property insurers know well the value and 
risks associated with the property they insure whereas the contractor’s third 
party liability insurers may have less information about those whom their 
insureds may damage in the course of their activities. In any case, it should 
be remembered that first party insurers can easily deal with this externality 
by explicitly requiring insureds not to release putative wrongdoers from 
liability, even prior to the act, in the policy.   
Insurance law also proscribes, in many instances, liability coverage 
for fines incurred from intentional misconduct and for punitive damages.  
That sort of coverage, if permitted, would remove the deterrent effect of 
fines by reducing or eliminating the cost to the actor himself; in other 
words, by allowing him to externalize that cost.167  For this reason, some 
countries do not allow indemnity for criminal sanctions. Courts should also 
be cautious in interpreting too broadly insurance policy clauses providing 
coverage for civil fines (such as in Directors and Officers policies) and 
carefully consider any externalities that such policies may create. The more 
broadly courts construe that fine coverage, the freer insureds are to violate 
whatever law imposes the fine and force their costs onto society.  Such 
coverage allows insureds to participate in whatever activity the fine 
provision is intended to curb without bearing the cost of the fine.168   
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
167 But see George L. Priest, Insurability and Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. 
REV. 1009, 1012 (1989) (cautioning that as views change regarding punitive 
damages, it may become more desirable to allow insurance for them). 
168 But see Tom Baker & Sean Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance 
Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 487, 533 (2007) (finding some deterrence effect from directors and 
liability insurance because the providers seek to factor in the risk of legal 
violations into the premiums). 
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C. CORRELATED RISKS 
 
Correlated risks are those risks that, if they come to fruition, will 
affect a large portion of the insurance pool.  Hurricanes, floods, and acts of 
war are examples of these types of risks.169  They pose a problem for 
insurers for two reasons:  they affect a large portion of the insurance pool—
meaning the insurer will have to have access to a lot of cash to honor 
claims; and the timing of when the risk will occur is unpredictable.  Thus, 
in a year when a correlated risk occurs, an insurer’s loss ratio will be 
extremely high—meaning the insurer must pay out far more than it takes 
in.  Covering correlated risks therefore would require insurance companies 
to keep large amounts of capital liquid, something the institutional 
infrastructure of the capital markets makes very unappealing.170  Without 
liquid capital to pay claims, however, an insurance company would become 
insolvent when correlated risks come to fruition.   
Correlated risks are not so much an impediment to efficiency but a 
category of risks that are generally hard to insure.  As discussed above, the 
insurance market works because risk-averse insureds transfer their risks to 
the insurer who spreads those risks among all the insured parties.  In this 
way the insurer fills a large pool by charging small premiums to cover the 
losses of the unfortunate few whose risks come to fruition. The law of large 
numbers allows an insurer to charge a certain premium which reflects only 
a small fraction of the actual loss an individual would suffer if the risk 
materializes.  The ratio of the losses paid out over the premiums 
collected—plus any interest made on capital held—is called the loss ratio. 
171  In order to be sustainable, the loss ratio must be under one—or 100%, 
                                                                                                                                      
169 An interesting form of correlated risk appears in the liability insurance 
context and is called “sociolegal risk.” See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 177-78 (1985). In some 
situations, for example, one high court ruled all commercial general liability 
policies within the court’s jurisdiction covered expenses incurred due to America’s 
Superfund statute. A.Y. McDonald Indus., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 
607, 621 (Iowa 1991). With one court ruling, liability insurers in the jurisdiction 
were exposed to millions of dollars more liability than they were previously.  
170 Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Catastrophe Insurance, Capital 
Markets, and Uninsurable Risks, 64 J. RISK & INS. 205, 208, 213 (1997). 
171 Id. at 211. 
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depending on the scale used—meaning the premiums collected in a given 
year are greater than the losses paid out.172   
How can one deal with correlated risks? Sometimes the state takes 
it upon itself to provide insurance for such risks. Flood insurance created 
through the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 is one example. 
Sometimes the state provides reinsurance for such risks. The Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act of 2002 is an example of that. Other times, insurers 
have to find their own solutions. As is well known, insurers extend their 
protection through diversification of risk.  Diversification of the risks to 
which the insurer (through the insured parties) is exposed occurs in two 
ways:  diversification with regard to a particular risk and across different 
types of risks.173  For particular risks, the principle is essentially the same 
as the law of large numbers. More individuals protecting against the same 
risk reduces the uncertainty faced by any one of them, provided the risks 
are not perfectly correlated with each other.  For different types of risks, the 
overall chance of loss is reduced by hedging exposure related to the risk of 
a particular event, such as a tornado, against exposure to other events, such 
as a fire. 
Because insurance is often sold through retail, many policyholders 
are localized in the same geographic regions—making the hurricane risk 
correlated between a large bulk of the insureds. That is why 
diversification—both in covering different types of risk and covering larger 
geographical areas—is so important to protect against correlated risks.  
Another way to protect against correlated risks is purchasing reinsurance in 
local or foreign markets, and when the private market cannot supply it, 
from the government.174  Lastly, insurers often exclude those types of risks 
                                                                                                                                      
172 Id. at 208. The rare exception—loss ratios over 1—could come in sectors 
where the risk materializes long after premiums are collected such as life 
insurance. Another possibility is insurance for rare events—like natural disasters— 
where the premiums collected in a given year are less than the losses paid out if the 
event happens, but because the event only happens rarely, say an average of every 
10 years, the company can still make a profit.  
173  TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS 4 (2d ed. 2008).  
174 Government programs—such as the National Flood Insurance Program—
can provide insurance for correlated risks, though the value of public sector 
involvement is up for debate.  See Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Rules 
Rather than Discretion: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina, 33 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 101, 102-03 (2006). But see J. David Cummins, Should the 
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from their policies—war, pollution and flood exclusions in homeowners’ 
policies are such examples. Those who want flood or pollution insurance 
must get it separately. At the end of this section I apply the two-island 
approach to the problem of correlated risks.  
 
D. NON-COMPETITIVE PRICING 
 
Another obstacle to efficiency to be discussed is non-competitive 
pricing.  Pricing problems arise when there are significant impediments to 
competition between insurers, whether on account of capital requirements, 
unfair competition, or regulatory standards.175 As in any market, such 
conditions result in inefficiently high prices and lead to a less-than-ideal 
amount of insurance being purchased.  It must be noted, though, that legal 
interference to correct these pricing problems may create more costs than 
benefits, for example, where premiums are artificially kept down, which 
may cause insurers to respond by reducing the quality of their contracts.   
The problem of competitive pricing is linked to problems discussed 
above. Collectively drafted standard form contracts and path-dependency 
present parallel problems, in that they limit insurers’ flexibility to offer 
differing, competitive terms to insureds, thus harming overall competition.  
Offering contracts which deviate from norms might be interpreted as an 
attempt to mislead consumers. Similarly, it has been argued that both 
plaintiff and defense lawyers have incentives to keep insurance contracts 
complicated in order to maintain their role as informed intermediaries 
between insurers and insureds. Sometimes, the result could be inefficiently 
restrictive or onerous terms, especially in compulsory insurance regimes 
where insurers have greater capacity to dictate terms. 
  Limited competition has long been considered a social negative, 
and is regulated by federal antitrust law.  Insurance, though, was 
considered a matter of state law under the U.S. Constitution, and the 
insurance market was therefore traditionally exempt from antitrust law.  In 
1945, reacting to a U.S. Supreme Court case which subjected insurance 
companies to federal antitrust laws,176 Congress enacts the McCarran-
                                                                                                                                      
Government Provide Insurance for Catastrophes?, 88 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS 
REV. 337, 338 (2006).   
175ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 13. 
176 United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 552-53 (1944), 
superseded by statute, McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2006), 
as recognized in U.S. Dep’t. of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 (1993).  
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Ferguson Act, which provided that federal antitrust law would apply to the 
insurance market in each state beginning in 1948 unless the state had 
passed its own legislation.  Within several years, every state passed its own 
legislation which preempts the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Today, insurance 
markets are still largely exempt from federal antitrust laws.   
 
E. RATIONAL (OR IRRATIONAL) BEHAVIOR BY THE INSURED 
 
The final obstacle to be discussed is irrational behavior. Much of 
the behavior by insureds discussed in this Primer has been assumed to be 
rational. However, as in many other areas, consumers do not always make 
the economically efficient decision when it comes to insurance.   The field 
of behavioral economics, which explores and explains how people act in 
the real world, provides some useful insights into how best to take 
advantage of a variety of irrational biases held by the majority of insureds.  
Some of the major decision-making anomalies that affect insurance 
companies include:  loss aversion, status quo bias, choice overload, value 
of zero, availability bias, and hyperbolic discounting—and the list goes 
on.177  The field of behavioral economics is too large to be covered in a 
paper of this length, but the following discussion provides a taste of how 
behavioral economics might be helpful in complimenting the theories of 
insurance law discussed in other sections. 
The first bias amongst insured is loss aversion, or the idea that 
people feel more pain from a loss than they do pleasure from a gain.178  In 
other words, the joy and pain in losing twenty dollars and gaining twenty 
dollars would not cancel each other out (despite the equal but opposite 
economic outcomes).  For insurance purposes, this translates to a 
preference for steady premiums rather than rates that vary up and down 
over time.  Loss aversion also explains one of the most irrational decisions 
a consumer can make: purchasing an extended warranty.  Under this 
theory, the insured categorizes the extended warranty as a cost rather than a 
loss. Therefore the cost of the warranty is weighed less than the expected 
                                                                                                                                      
177 Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1471 app. at 1548-50 (1998); Jeffrey Liebman & Richard 
Zeckhauser, Simple Humans, Complex Insurance, Subtle Subsidies 7-8 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14330, 2008), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14330.  
178 Jolls et al., supra note 177, at 1484. 
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loss from product failure, and that product-loss calculation is exaggerated 
because of loss aversion. 179   
Status quo bias has also proved to be very powerful in predicting 
behavior, and basically resonates with the idea of inertia from physics.  
This translates into people being more likely to accept form contracts 
(which represent the status quo) rather than making individual choices.180  
Much of this may have its roots in loss aversion, or that people are worried 
about making a choice that ends up being risky.  When faced with a variety 
of options, discussed below as choice overload, many insureds opt to keep 
the status quo.  A natural quasi-experiment that demonstrates the power of 
the status quo bias took place couple of decades ago.181  Changes in 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey automobile insurance laws introduced the 
option of giving up some of one’s right to sue, with a corresponding 
reduction in insurance rates.  In New Jersey, the default was to have a 
reduced right to sue, and a driver had to opt in to the full right to sue by 
paying more.  In Pennsylvania, the default was retaining the full right to 
sue, and one could receive a discount for opting out.  Since the option is the 
same and only the default is different, one would expect that insureds 
would act based on whether the reduction in premiums was worth the lost 
right to sue, leading to similar results in both states.  Instead, only twenty 
percent of drivers in New Jersey opted into the full right to sue, and 
seventy-five percent of Pennsylvania drivers retained this right.182  In other 
words, about three-fourths of all drivers did nothing. 
A related anomaly is choice overload which predicts that when 
given too much information potential insureds may become overwhelmed 
and do nothing, even if their actions would be beneficial.  Insurers must be 
aware of the danger of increasingly complex terms as it may serve to 
confuse buyers and cause them to not make the best choices for their 
situation.183  Health care is a great example of the numerous decisions that 
must be made by an insured.  Even if the employer has made many of the 
                                                                                                                                      
179 Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Law and Economics after the Behavioral 
Turn: Learning from Insurance, 27 (Oct. 10, 2011), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/petrie-flom/workshop/pdf/baker.pdf.  
180 See supra Part 2.C. 
181 Eric. J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance 
Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35, 48 (1993). 
182  Id. 
183However, insurers may be intentionally confusing insureds via choice 
overload.  See Schwarcz, supra note 66, at 1268 (“[F]irms may be exploiting 
consumer ignorance to draft inefficiently one-sided contracts.”). 
2012        ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW                     107 
choices for their employees, an employee still must choose a plan (PPO, 
HMO, etc.), pick a deductible and finally decide when and how much 
medical care to consume.184  These decisions can be very difficult, and 
behavioral studies have shown that human beings are not good at predicting 
high-consequence, low-probability risks (even though they must do this to 
choose their efficient level of insurance).185 
A phenomenon that extends well past the insurance world is 
people’s bias towards the value of zero.  Individuals are very attracted to 
free promotions, to the point of acting irrationally.  For example, when 
Amazon.com rolled out its free shipping promotion for all orders above a 
certain dollar value the Amazon.com operation in every country except for 
France saw an increase in sales.  In France, Amazon.com was charging the 
equivalent of $.20 instead of nothing for shipping on large orders, and this 
tiny amount was enough to prevent the increases in order size seen in other 
countries.186  The value of zero applies equally to insurance too, as 
consumers will appreciate additional services at “no additional cost.”187  Of 
course the costs of the policy just include these services, but the customer 
feels like they are getting something for free. 
An additional decision making anomaly relevant to insurance is the 
availability bias.  This theory details how people generally assess the 
chances of an event occurring based upon specific examples in their lives, 
and can also be thought of as a rule of thumb bias.188  As was mentioned 
earlier in the paper, the expected yearly cost of an incident is the 
probability of the event multiplied by its cost.  This means that if people 
think the probability is higher, they will be more likely to purchase 
insurance.  A great example of the availability bias comes from 1990 when 
a business consultant and self-proclaimed climatologist predicted there to 
be a .5% chance that an earthquake would occur in eastern Missouri during 
an upcoming two day span.189  This prediction received significant press 
                                                                                                                                      
184 Liebman & Zeckhauser, supra note 177, at 5–6. 
185  Id.  
186  Bridge Strategy Grp. LLC, Behavioral Economics: A New Frontier for 
Insurance?, A VIEW FROM THE BRIDGE (May 2009), 
http://www.bridgestrategy.com/topics/behavioral_economics. 
187 For example, 21st Century Insurance offers a free Security Advantage 
Program to all its customers which includes roadside assistance, identity theft 
restoration, and travel and medical assistance. 21st Roadside Assistance, 21ST 
CENTURY INS, http://www.21st.com/insurance-products/security-advantage.htm. 
188 Jolls et al., supra note 177, at 1477. 
189 Johnson et al., supra note 180, at 37. 
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coverage but was refuted by other earthquake experts.  Still, State Farm 
reported that more than 650,000 policyholders added earthquake insurance 
to their homeowners policy, mostly in the two months prior to the predicted 
date.190  The earthquake never happened, but people were still made more 
aware of the chances of an earthquake and therefore wrongly calculated the 
earthquake probability to be higher than it actually was.  More broadly 
speaking, it has been shown that “[p]eople tend to conclude, for example, 
that the probability of an event (such as a car accident) is greater if they 
have recently witnessed an occurrence of that event than if they have 
not.”191   
The last bias to be discussed here is hyperbolic discounting.  This 
occurs when individuals use a large discount factor to compare current 
benefits to future benefits.192  If you have heard of the time value of 
money193 then this concept should sound familiar.  However, most people 
will use the wrong discount factor when deciding between present 
consumption and future benefit. This leads to underinvestment in future 
health care and a lack of preventative medicine.  In theory a rational 
insured would make the correct choice about their health care plan and 
undergo economically efficient preventative care, but behavioral 
economics predicts, as indeed was empirically confirmed,  that this does 
not happen in the real world. 
This section has discussed the irrationality of insureds, and it adds 
a few additional layers of complexity to the analysis of efficient insurance 
contracts.  Most importantly, the irrational behavior by insureds must be 
taken into account when making ex-ante predictions, and many times it can 
be worked into the models we use to predict behavior.  The other important 
takeaway is that our theoretical solutions to market inefficiencies are not 
perfect.  The full effects of behavioral economics is beyond the scope of 
any introduction to law and economics, but know that applications of the 
theoretical and contractual solutions to the impediments to efficient 
                                                                                                                                      
190  Id. at 38. 
191 Jolls et al., supra note 177, at 1477. 
192 Liebman & Zeckhauser, supra note 176, at 7-8. 
193 This concept holds that money now is better than money later, and that the 
exact amount greater it is can be calculated based upon the expected rate of return.  
If interest rates are 5%, then the “present value” of receiving $1000 in five years is 
$783.53.  In other words, if you received that amount and invested it you would 
have $1000 in five years.  Among many things, this is why the lotto payouts are 
higher if you opt for the installment plan rather than a lump sum—the lotto 
organization invests the rest of the money and ends up paying less overall. 
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insurance contracts are able to account for both the rational and irrational 
behavior of insureds.   
 
1. Returning to the Two Islands Approach 
 
For brevity’s sake I will not apply the two islands approach to 
every one of the impediment discussed in this section. Instead I will apply 
it only to the problem of correlated risks. The two island approach shows 
the utility of exclusions associated with correlated risks.  Consider the 
flood exclusion in homeowner’s policies.  On one island, floods are 
excluded, and on another they are covered.  If a flood hits each island, the 
majority of houses on that island are going to be damaged.  On the island 
that does not cover floods, premiums will be lower than the island where 
floods are covered.  Without more, it is a close call—higher premiums with 
coverage or lower premiums without coverage. The answer depends on the 
probability of flood, people’s risk aversion, the size of the losses, and other 
factors. However, the analysis must consider that floods are a correlated 
risk.  This fact likely makes the island without coverage more desirable.  
On the other island, because the flood will hit all of the insureds, the 
insurer might not have enough cash to pay all of the premiums, leading to 
insolvency, or will have to charge exceedingly high premiums to cover 
such an island-wide event.  An insolvent insurer is clearly not good for 
insureds, and therefore flood exclusions, and other catastrophic correlated 
risk exclusions, are socially useful. Of course, insureds can always 
purchase flood insurance separately from companies—or public agencies—
which specialize in such risks, but that is a different issue from whether a 
general homeowner’s policy should have such coverage.    
Two cases demonstrate how courts do, and how they should, use 
the economic factors discussed above to interpret flood exclusions in 
homeowners policies.  Kane v. Royal Insurance Company of America 
involved a standard flood exclusion clause and a dam failure in Colorado.  
The court found that because the water damage occurred from a natural 
body of water invading normally dry land, it was unambiguously a flood 
under the policy. 194  In Ferndale Development Co. v. Great American 
Insurance Co., on the other hand, a burst water pipe was found not to be a 
flood under similar terms in an insurance policy.195   
                                                                                                                                      
194 Kane v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 768 P.2d 678, 681 (Colo. 1989). 
195 Ferndale Dev. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 527 P.2d 939, 940 (Colo. App. 
1974). 
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In each of these cases the respective courts based their decisions on 
interpretations of the meaning of “flood.”  Is there really a difference 
between a flood caused by a failing dam and a flood caused by a ruptured 
valve on a city water line?  Under the functional approach the relevant 
question is the purpose of the flood exclusion which, as discussed above, it 
is to prevent insurers from being exposed to correlated risks. A dam failure 
will likely lead to the inundation of a large area, possibly an entire town.  
This is the same type of correlated risk that the flood exclusion is meant to 
avoid.  On the other hand, a burst pipe is likely to only affect a small 
number of houses around the pipe.  This type of occurrence is not likely to 
lead to correlated losses, thus it should not be interpreted as being under the 
umbrella of the flood exclusion.   
In today’s world of large, national insurance companies, though, 
correlated risks actually threatening insurers’ solvency are less likely.  
Most insurers cover insureds across a state, or the entire country.  It is 
unlikely any one flood will affect a large percentage of a given insurer’s 
insureds.  Thus, in our ongoing example, the islands are quite large, and the 
risk of a flood leading to insolvency is small.  If there is no threat to a large 
portion of the insurance pool, there is actually no correlated risk problem.  
The question becomes again whether higher premiums for coverage are 
better than lower premiums for no coverage.  This is another example of a 
situation where more empirical information as to what a rational insured 
would do behind the veil of ignorance is necessary.  That is the proper 
question behind any insurance dispute. Unfortunately, the needed empirical 
evidence to answer this question (such as the frequency and distribution of 
floods, their costs, etc.) is often missing, so courts will have to decide based 
on other framework. But as long as the question is focused in the right 
direction, more and more often the right answer is within reach. 
 
F. SUMMARY 
 
As has been shown, there are many additional impediments to the 
efficiency of the insurance market in addition to moral hazard and adverse 
selection.  Transaction costs, externalities, correlated risks, non-competitive 
pricing, and irrational behavior all serve as partial barriers to the 
maximization of social welfare.  While various strategies can be employed 
to battle each of these impediments, none of the strategies are completely 
effective and they often create additional problems that must be dealt with.  
Standard forms are an ideal example.  While they are useful in lowering 
transaction costs, they certainly do not eliminate them.  Furthermore, the 
forms may sometimes lower competition and even make it easier for 
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insurers to collude when fixing their pricing.  Consumers’ irrational 
behavior vis-à-vis standard forms is another reason for concern. When 
courts or legislatures examine a particular legal problem in insurance law, 
all of the impediments must be kept in mind and the effects on these 
inefficiencies of any new rule or reform must be considered. Over time, 
through judicial decision-making, doctrine should be refined so as to 
consider the function of the exclusion before a court. On the one hand, 
insurers should not be able to use their greater bargaining power—
including greater resources and expertise—to unfairly take advantage of 
insureds.  On the other hand, exclusions generally serve a useful purpose, 
and if courts do not consider that purpose when ruling whether to uphold or 
void an exclusion, they risk creating a less efficient insurance market and 
hurting the entire pool of insureds.   
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The modern insurance market arose from a desire to manage and 
distribute risks.  It is, by definition, a system where customers pay now to 
receive financial protection later, if they need it.  Like many other 
consumers, purchasers of insurance need protection.  Unlike other sales 
situations, however, there is an inherent need to protect the sellers—
insurers—as well.  Insurers should be seen as a nexus of insureds. The 
reason that both parties need protection arises primarily from informational 
impediments. These main impediments are: adverse selection, reverse 
adverse selection, moral hazard and reverse moral hazard.  In addition, 
many other impediments to efficiency arise in the insurance context, 
including: administrative costs, negative externalities, correlated risks, non-
competitive pricing and irrational behavioral. Other impediments, such as 
conflicts of interest, were not discussed in this paper. Most insurance policy 
clauses, and almost all of the appropriate ones, are designed to address one 
or more of these impediments.   
Any lawyer or judge dealing with the insurance field should keep 
the impediments in mind.   Judges in particular should consider the 
function an exclusion clause plays in the policy before they decide whether 
to honor it.  In most circumstances insurers have unquestionably more 
bargaining power, putting them in a better position than insureds to protect 
themselves.  For this reason insurers’ actions should be closely policed. 
That being said, just because a certain exclusion seems to treat an insured 
harshly in a given case does not mean it should be voided.  The question is 
not so much whether the plaintiff who suffered a loss should recover based 
on the language of policy, because deciding questions of coverage based 
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solely on the language of the policy is never simple.  Rather, the question 
should be whether a rational plaintiff behind a veil of ignorance would 
have been willing to pay for the disputed coverage without knowing 
whether he would ever need it, given that such coverage might distort 
parties’—and the entire insurance pool’s—incentives. This is exactly the 
pool of insureds’ perspective, and this is the efficient insurance contract 
paradigm employed here.  
The two islands functional approach facilitates a users’ ability to 
determine which side of a dispute maximizes social utility.  It relies on the 
ex-ante perspective to refocus a decision from the (often heart wrenching) 
effects on a specific insured to the overall impact on the pool of insureds 
and, if externalities exist, on society.  This refocusing is made easier in the 
insurance context once the view of insurers is appropriately shifted from a 
faceless company to a pool of similar people who all pay money to the 
insurance company in exchange for its possible protection later.  The two 
island approach allows the analyst to balance the advantages of extended 
coverage against the possible incentive distortions such extension carries 
while considering all of the possible effects of either side of a ruling. The 
result of this inquiry is often that more information is necessary.  While this 
is not ideal, at least it focuses the decision-maker in the proper direction.  
In other words, the right question is always the first step towards the right 
answer.  The two island approach offers a way to find the right question 
and not infrequently even answer it. 
 
STRANGER-INITIATED ANNUITY  
TRANSACTIONS AND THE CASE FOR  
INSURABLE INTEREST 
 
KENDALL J. BURR 
THOMAS F.A. HETHERINGTON 
DAVID T. MCDOWELL 
 
*** 
 
This article addresses the issue of whether insurable interest 
requirements similar to those which have already been enacted in many 
states to prohibit the practice of Stranger-Originated Life Insurance 
policies (STOLIs) should also be made applicable to Stranger-Originated 
Annuity Transactions, or ‘STATs.’  The article makes the case that they 
should by highlighting the inherent similarities that exist between STATs 
and STOLIs while also analyzing the flawed reasoning behind the lone case 
to hold that insurable interest requirements are not applicable to STATs.  
The authors then discuss various state insurance statutes and advance the 
argument that many of them may already prohibit STAT contracts from 
being entered into.  In other words, the statutory framework for 
criminalizing STAT schemes may already be in place, in which case, the 
issue becomes the charge of the courts whose job it will be to interpret 
these statutes. 
 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Variable annuities have traditionally been viewed as long-term 
investment vehicles that offer a number of desirable benefits, including a 
guaranteed future income stream, favorable tax treatment, and standard or 
enhanced death benefits paid to a beneficiary in the event of untimely 
death.  Savvy investors, however, claim to have discovered a “loophole” in 
these products, exploiting them to invest aggressively in the securities 
markets with the assurance that any short-term losses will be borne by the 
insurance company.  To implement their strategy, they recruit terminally ill 
individuals to serve as the measuring lives for annuities with built-in death 
benefits, which provide a full and prompt refund of the investors’ 
premiums if their high-risk investments go awry.  This predation on sick 
individuals—who often claim not to have understood that their poor health 
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was being exploited as a hedge against market losses by a total stranger—
raises a significant legal question:  should these “Stranger-Originated 
Annuity Transactions,” or “STATs,”1 be rescinded as unlawful wagers on 
human lives, violating the well-established “insurable interest” requirement 
applied in life insurance cases?  Examining the pertinent laws applicable to 
annuities and life insurance, persuasive arguments can be made that 
insurable interest laws apply to annuity products, and that stranger 
investors may not use the products to profit from the deaths of other human 
beings. 
 
II. THE PRODUCT: VARIABLE ANNUITIES 
 
A variable annuity is a product, primarily sold by life insurance 
companies, that incorporates certain features of an investment account and 
life insurance.  Fundamentally, an annuity is a contract pursuant to which a 
purchaser agrees to make one or more premium payments to the issuer up 
front, during an “accumulation phase,” and the issuer agrees to make a 
series of payments thereafter, either to the purchaser or to a designated 
beneficiary, during a “payout phase.”  Thus, an annuity is essentially a loan 
from the purchaser that the insurer pays back over time.  An annuity may 
be “fixed,” meaning the insurance company promises to pay a minimum 
rate of interest or a set dollar amount for each periodic payment, or 
“variable,” allowing the premiums to be invested in mutual funds or other 
options in the bond and equity markets.2  Variable annuity products offer a 
range of benefits that make them appealing to individuals interested in both 
preparing for retirement and safeguarding against untimely death.  Variable 
annuities typically offer three major categories of benefits:  guaranteed 
income distribution, favorable tax treatment, and death benefits.3   
First, variable annuities provide a guaranteed distribution of 
periodic income.  An annuity may be structured so as to make payments for 
a period certain, but is more commonly structured as a “life annuity,” made 
payable for the duration of the lifetime of a designated “annuitant.”  The 
                                                                                                                 
1 Also sometimes referred to as “Stranger-Originated Annuities” (“STOAs”) 
or “Stranger Originated Life Annuities” (“STOLAs” or “STOAs”).  
2 Variable annuities are regulated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, whereas fixed annuities are not considered securities and are 
therefore not regulated by the SEC. Annuities, SEC, http://www.sec.gov 
/answers/annuity.htm (modified Apr. 6, 2011).  
3 See Variable Annuities: What You Should Know, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/ 
investor/pubs/varannty.htm#vch (modified Apr. 18, 2011). 
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income distribution schedule and amounts are typically fixed at the time of 
annuitization, the point at which the contract owner agrees to freeze all or 
some of the funds invested in the accumulation phase and use them to 
commence distributions in a payout phase.  Thus, a fundamental 
characteristic of a life annuity is its ability to provide a guaranteed source 
of income lasting as long as the uncertain lifetime of the annuitant.  This 
offers a form of “longevity insurance,” protecting the designated 
beneficiary against the possibility that the annuitant will outlive the assets 
available from the accumulated value of the investment at the point of 
annuitization.  Given this framework, a purchaser of a variable annuity will 
often name the same person as both annuitant and beneficiary, or will 
designate one person as the annuitant and his or her spouse, child, or other 
family member as the beneficiary. 
The second attractive feature of a variable annuity is its favorable 
tax treatment.  Under the Internal Revenue Code, variable annuities owned 
by individuals may be invested during the accumulation phase in a tax-
deferred manner,4 much like a Roth 401(k).  As a variable annuity is 
funded during the accumulation phase with after-tax dollars, any internal 
accumulation remains tax free.  Once annuitized, any amounts withdrawn 
from the annuity during the payout phase over and above the amounts 
contributed are taxable.  These market profits are taxed at ordinary income 
tax rates rather than capital gains rates.  As such, the utility of the variable 
annuity is maximized if used as a long-term investment vehicle. 
Third, a variable annuity typically includes a “Guaranteed 
Minimum Death Benefit” (“GMDB”) to be provided to the beneficiary 
upon the annuitant’s death.  Usually, the life insurer offers a standard death 
benefit provision already built in to the base contract, generally 
guaranteeing the beneficiary an amount no less than the greater of (1) the 
total face value of the account, or (2) the total of all premiums paid, minus 
any adjusted withdrawals from the account.  Enhanced or “stepped-up” 
GMDB options are often available à la carte for additional fees, either as 
part of the annuity contract or as a contract rider.  A stepped-up GMDB 
option may, for example, allow the customer to “lock in” the account’s face 
value as of a specified date, if the account’s investments have been 
performing well.  The issuer may also offer a “high water mark” or 
“anniversary ratchet” option, which looks at the account face value on each 
contract anniversary date and guarantees a minimum GMDB based on the 
highest account value as of any of those dates.  Or the company might offer 
a “roll-up” option, guaranteeing a minimum rate of return on the invested 
                                                                                                                 
4 See generally I.R.C. § 72 (2012). 
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funds.  Various combinations of these enhanced options may also be 
available. 
While other elective features may also be available for additional 
fees,5 these three main advantages—guaranteed income distribution, tax-
deferred investment, and death benefits—are frequently the defining 
features of a variable annuity product.  Because these products incorporate 
death benefits, as well as lifetime benefits whose duration is tied to the date 
of the annuitant’s death, it is often treated as an insurance contract, or as a 
hybrid product combining features of an investment product and life 
insurance.  Whether a variable annuity is actually legally defined as life 
insurance varies from state to state, as discussed in further detail below.   
 
III. THE BACKDROP: STOLI 
 
Before examining how the death benefit component of variable 
annuities has been recently exploited to pursue risk-free investment 
opportunities by third-party investors, it is first necessary to examine recent 
developments in the life insurance industry.   
Over the past decade, investors and agents have developed a gray 
market in life insurance known as Stranger Originated Life Insurance 
(“STOLI”).6  STOLI refers to any transaction or arrangement by which an 
investor seeks to purchase a life insurance policy on the life of an 
individual, typically an elderly insured, even though the investor does not 
have an insurable interest in the insured’s life.  The investor typically pays 
the premiums and structures the transaction so that the investor obtains 
ownership of the policy, the beneficial interest of a trust holding the policy, 
or otherwise secures control of the policy through a variety of clandestine 
transactions, enabling it to re-sell the policy or its controlling interest on the 
life settlement market.  STOLI promoters use various methods to acquire 
interests in life insurance policies.  The investor might agree to buy the 
                                                                                                                 
5 Insurers may, for example, offer various guaranteed lifetime benefits for an 
additional charge, such as a guaranteed minimum income benefit (“GMIB”), 
promising a minimum income stream during the payout phase, or a guaranteed 
minimum accumulation benefit (“GMAB”), which, after a set period of time 
(usually 10 or 20 years), resets the account’s value to a guaranteed accumulation 
amount.  Insurers also sometimes offer “bonus credit” features, such as a promise 
to add a bonus contribution to the accumulated value based on a specified 
percentage of purchase payments, typically ranging from 1% to 5%. 
6 Also referred to as Investor-Owned or Stranger-Owned Life Insurance 
(“SOLI” or “IOLI”). 
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policy outright from the insured on a pre-determined date, or purchase a 
beneficial interest in a trust holding the policy.7  Or the policy might be 
funded by premium financing for a period of two years (the typical 
statutory contestability period of a life insurance policy), after which the 
insured is given the option of either paying off the loan, which typically has 
large administrative fees and a high interest rate, or surrendering the policy 
to the investor in full satisfaction of the loan.8   
STOLI practices pose significant problems for the life insurance 
industry.  STOLI often promotes fraud, incentivizing investors and agents 
to encourage exaggeration of the insured’s net worth and income in order 
to qualify for larger death benefits,9 and sometimes takes place even 
without the knowledge or complicity of the insured.10       
The most significant problem posed by STOLI, however, is its 
noncompliance with the well-established requirement that a life insurance 
policy’s initial owner, beneficiary, or both must possess an insurable 
interest in the life of the insured.  This requirement is based on public 
policy and is designed to prevent wagering on human lives, which creates 
perverse economic incentives to hasten the insured’s death.11  As discussed 
in further detail below, nearly all states impose insurable interest 
                                                                                                                 
7 See Life Prod. Clearing LLC v. Angel, 530 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (describing STOLI scheme whereby policy was owned by an irrevocable 
trust and the insured, who had initially named himself as trust beneficiary, sold his 
beneficial interest to a funding third-party investor shortly after policy issuance).   
8 See Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 596 F. Supp. 2d 882, 885 (D.N.J. 
2009) (describing a “typical STOLI transaction” as involving an up-front cash 
payment in exchange for a promise of a future sale of the policy, use of a trust to 
hold the policy, and funding of premiums through non-recourse premium 
financing). 
9 See, e.g., Settlement Funding, LLC v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., No. 06 
CV 5743(HB), 2010 WL 3825735, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (STOLI policy 
on life of elderly insured was based on application claiming that she had a net 
worth in excess of $12 million, even though she lived in an apartment and had 
assets of less than $100,000). 
10 E.g., id. (evidence showed that insured’s signature was forged on trust 
agreement, insured was not in the same state as where the agreement was 
purportedly signed, and notary had never met the insured or notarized the trust 
agreement). 
11 See, Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881) (insurable interest 
required as a matter of public policy to avoid the issuance of life insurance “by 
which the party taking the policy is directly interested in the early death of the 
assured”). 
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requirements in a life insurance transaction.  Due to the proliferation of 
STOLI practices in the last decade, many states have also recently enacted 
additional statutes specifically targeting STOLI transactions and clarifying 
that they violate the insurable interest requirement.  For example, the 
California Insurance Code, as amended in 2009, defines entering into a 
STOLI arrangement as a “fraudulent life settlement act,”12 and defines 
“STOLI” to include any arrangement designed to “initiate the issuance of a 
life insurance policy in this state for the benefit of a third-party investor 
who, at the time of policy origination, has no insurable interest, under the 
laws of this state, in the life of the insured.”13  A majority of states have 
already enacted legislation specifically targeting STOLI practices just in 
the past few years,14 with additional legislation in other states likely to 
follow. 
                                                                                                                 
12 CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.1(g)(1)(B) (West 2012). 
13 Id. § 10113.1(w) (adding, “Trusts that are created to give the appearance of 
insurable interest and that are used to initiate policies for investors violate 
insurable interest laws and the prohibition against wagering on life.”); see also id. 
§ 10110.1(e) (same). 
14 At least twenty-seven states thus far have enacted statutes specifically 
defining and prohibiting STOLI practices, nearly all since 2008, including Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, 
West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-443.02 (West 
2002 & Supp. 2011-2012) (prohibiting STOLI); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-81-802(24) 
(LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2011-2012) (defining STOLI as unlawful practice); 
CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.1(g)(1)(B), (w) (West 2005 & Supp. 2012) (describing 
STOLI as fraudulent life settlement act); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 38a-465 (defining 
STOLI), -465j (2011) (entry into any practice or plan that involves STOLI 
constitutes fraud); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-59-2(24) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011) 
(defining STOLI as unlawful practice); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 431E-2 (defining 
STOLI), -24 (2005 & Supp. 2009) (prohibiting entering into any practice or plan 
that involves STOLI); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 41-1951(15) (defining STOLI), 
1962(1) (2010) (prohibiting any act that constitutes or promotes STOLI); 215 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 159/5 (defining STOLI), 159/50  (prohibiting entering into 
STOLI), and 159/72 (West 2008 & Supp. 2011-2012) (crime of life settlement 
fraud includes entering into any arrangement which involves STOLI); IND. CODE 
ANN. §§ 27-8-19.8-7.8 (defining STOLI), 27-8-19.8-20.1 (LexisNexis 2008) 
(prohibiting the issuance, solicitation, or promotion of STOLI); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 508E.2(12) (West 2007 & Supp. 2011-2012) (defining STOLI as unlawful 
practice); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-5002(f)(5) (K.S.A 2011 Supp.) (same); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 304.15-020(15) (West 2006) (same); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, 
§ 6802-A(12-A) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 
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Thus, the past few years have witnessed a flurry of legislation and 
an industry-wide spotlight on the STOLI issue.  Legislators and life 
insurers, focusing their efforts solely on life insurance policies owned by 
strangers, apparently did not foresee that despite these tightened 
restrictions, some opportunistic investors would move on to exploit 
variable annuities in an analogous but unanticipated manner.   
 
IV. STATs 
 
The life insurance industry is now facing a new challenge from 
brokers and investors orchestrating the purchase of variable annuities 
offered by life insurance companies, referred to as “Stranger-Originated 
Annuity Transactions,” or “STATs.”  STATs are the subject of a well-
publicized lawsuit currently pending in federal court in the District of 
                                                                                                                 
60A.0782(12) (defining “STOLI practices”), 60A.0784 (making it “unlawful” to 
“engage in STOLI practices or otherwise wager on life”), 60A.0786(1) (creating 
presumption of STOLI practices where, inter alia, the premiums are financed by 
means other the assets of the insured or someone “closely related to the insured by 
blood or law”), and 60A.0789 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011-2012) (insurer may bring 
declaratory judgment action to declare STOLI policies void); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. 408-D:2(XVI) (defining STOLI), D:12(I) (LexisNexis 2011) (prohibiting the 
solicitation, promotion, or knowing participation in any STOLI activities); N.Y. 
INS. LAW § 7815 (McKinney 2000 & Supp. 2012) (defining STOLI as prohibited 
practice); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33.4-01(23) (2010) (same); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. §§ 3916.01(W) (defining STOLI), and 3916.171 (any contract, arrangement 
or transaction entered into in furtherance of STOLI act is “void and 
unenforceable”), 3916.172 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011-2012) (promoting STOLI 
constitutes fraud); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 4055.2(13) (West, Westlaw through 
2012) (defining STOLI as unlawful practice); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 744.318(18) 
(defining STOLI), 744.369 (2011) (prohibiting entering into any practice or plan 
involving STOLI); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-72-2(26) (West, Westlaw through 
2012) (defining STOLI as unlawful practice); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-50-102(12) 
(2011) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31A-36-102(18) (defining STOLI), 31A-36-
113(2)(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2010) (prohibiting the entering into any practice 
involving stranger-originated life insurance); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 3835(18) 
(defining STOLI), 3844(a)(2) (2009) (prohibiting any activities resulting in or 
intending to result in the issuance of STOLI); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
48.102.006 (West, Westlaw through 2012) (defining STOLI as unlawful practice); 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-13C-2(18) (LexisNexis 2011) (same); WISC. STAT. ANN. 
632.69(w) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011-2012) (same). 
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Rhode Island,15  in which two life insurance companies, Transamerica Life 
Insurance Company and Western Reserve Life Assurance Company of 
Ohio, claim to have been defrauded by STAT arrangements masterminded 
by Rhode Island attorney Joseph Caramadre and carried out with the 
collaboration of investors and brokerage firms.16   
Caramadre, a real-estate specialist, believed he had discovered a 
“loophole” in the variable annuity product that allowed their use to 
facilitate aggressive short-term investments.17  By locating individuals with 
extremely poor health and a short life expectancy who would be willing to 
act as “annuitants” for variable annuities with GDMBs, Caramadre realized 
that one could engage in high-risk, short-term investments with the 
expectation that any potential losses would be borne by the insurance 
company upon the individual’s death.   
To implement their strategy, STAT originators like Caramadre first 
seek out potential annuitants with terminal illnesses, recruiting such 
individuals through a number of unsavory methods that have drawn 
national attention.  Caramadre, for example, published advertisements in 
the Rhode Island Catholic, an official diocese publication, stating 
“Terminal Illness?  $2,000 in CASH, Immediately Available.”18  The ads 
further promised that the funds were offered by a “compassionate 
organization” hoping to provide “financial assistance” to those near death.19  
STAT originators also target church patrons and workers and patients in 
nursing homes, hospices, and hospitals, circulating flyers or through direct 
solicitation20 and generally offering between $2,000 and $5,000 for their 
participation.21   
                                                                                                                 
15 See W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Conreal LLC, 715 F. Supp. 
2d 270 (D.R.I. 2010) on reconsideration in part sub nom. W. Reserve Life 
Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Caramadre, 847 F. Supp. 2d 329 (D.R.I. 2012). 
16 See generally W. Reserve’s Amended Complaint, W. Reserve Life 
Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Conreal LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 270 (D.R.I. 2010) (No. 
09-564S). 
17 Id. at ¶¶ 12-13, 20; see also Mark Maremont & Leslie Scism, Investors 
Recruit Terminally Ill to Outwit Insurers on Annuities, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704479704575061392800740492
.html. 
18 Maremont & Scism, supra note 17. 
19 Id. 
20 See, e.g., Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶ 17; Jim Connolly, Senior 
Recounts Brush with STOA as Commissioners Determine Tools to Fight It, THE 
INS. BELLWETHER BLOG (May 21, 2010, 12:57 AM), 
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Once a terminally ill individual is identified, the STAT originator 
arranges for a licensed agent of an annuities brokerage firm to provide and 
sign an application for a variable annuity, designating an investor as the 
owner and beneficiary and having the terminally ill individual serve as the 
annuitant.  The annuitization date is usually far enough in the future that a 
terminally ill annuitant will likely never receive an annuity payment.  
STAT sponsors opt on the application for either a standard or stepped-up 
GMDB, guaranteeing that the beneficiaries will receive a death benefit 
totaling at least the amount of premiums paid, and in some cases also 
purchasing additional enhanced benefits.22  The GMDB acts as a safety net, 
allowing the investor to make aggressive investments within the variable 
annuity with the expectation that, if they do not perform well, the insurance 
company will pay out at least the total of all premiums paid upon the 
annuitant’s death.   
 
V. THE NATIONAL RESPONSE 
 
STATs have been widely criticized since coming to national 
attention over the past two years, with particular focus on the disturbing 
manner in which terminally ill annuitants are recruited.  Often, the 
individuals or their families claim to have been misled about the nature of 
the arrangement, believing that the solicitors were simply offering 
charity.23  As one such individual later testified to the National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”), “What if I die now?  He’s going to 
collect.  I don’t want to see him get that kind of money.  Not for bodies.  
I’m not going to sell my body.”24  Another individual testified to a federal 
grand jury that Caramadre and his associates never mentioned annuities at 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.theinsurancebellwether.com/2010/05/senior-recounts-brush-with-stoa-
as.html. 
21 Linda Koco, Testimony Rips into Stranger-Originated Annuities in Different 
Ways, NAT’L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH (June 14, 2010), 
http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2010/06/14/feature-testimony-rips-into-
strangeroriginated-ann. 
22 See Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 19, 28, 45, 62. 
23 See Koco, supra note 21 (noting testimony from Rhode Island’s 
Superintendent of Insurance that the annuitants “are unclear on their participation 
in the annuity contract” and believe that they are receiving a charitable gift); see 
also Olsen Testifies to NAIC: Annuity Transactions Raise Regulatory Questions, 
ACTUARIAL UPDATE, July, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.actuary.org/ 
files/publications/Actuarial_Update_July_2010.pdf. 
24 Connolly, supra note 20. 
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all, and never told him that someone would profit from his wife’s death, 
saying, “They preyed on the sick and the weak at a vulnerable time.”25  The 
plaintiffs in the Rhode Island cases have even alleged that some of the 
annuitants’ signatures may have been forged.26   
However unsavory and exploitative STAT tactics may appear, 
questions still remain regarding their legality.  The similarities between 
STATs and STOLI practices are obvious, particularly their exploitation of 
elderly or ill individuals for the profit of investors with no genuine interest 
in the continued life of those individuals.  But despite the flurry of recent 
statutory enactments relating to STOLI, legislatures have yet to expressly 
tackle STATs.  The NAIC held hearings in May 2010 at which numerous 
groups, including the Life Insurance Settlement Association (“LISA”), the 
National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors (“NAIFA”), and 
the American Council of Life Insurers (“ACLI”), testified in condemnation 
of STATs and described them as sharing many of the same troubling 
characteristics of STOLI practices, but not all groups were yet prepared to 
announce their support of implementing new regulation or legislation to 
directly address STATs.27   Several state insurance departments have issued 
bulletins regarding the potential harms of STATs, but they have not openly 
condemned them as illegal per se, instead opting to merely warn life 
insurers and recommend the implementation of safeguards.28   
Courts have yet to resolve open questions regarding the legality of 
STATs.  The Securities and Exchange Commission is investigating 
Caramadre and his associates for possible violations of the securities 
                                                                                                                 
25 Katie Mulvaney, Philanthropist Accused of Profiting from Terminally Ill, 
PROVIDENCE J.-BULL. (Mar. 7, 2010).   
26 See, e.g., Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶ 24. 
27 See Gary A. Sanders, Vice President of Securities and State Government 
Relations, National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, Statements 
before NAIC Life Insurance and Annuities Committee Public Hearing on Stranger 
Originated/Owned Annuities (May 20, 2010), available 
at: http://www.naifa.org/advocacy/documents/naifatestimonyfornaichearing.pdf; 
Doug Head on behalf of LISA and the ACLI at the May 20, 2010 NAIC hearing, 
available at http://www.naic.org/committees_a.htm.  
28 See, e.g., Companies Encouraged to Have Safeguards in Place to Limit 
Potential Exposure to Stranger Originated Annuity Transactions, OH. DEPT. OF 
INS. (Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.insurance.ohio.gov/Consumer/Documents/Stranger 
%20Originated%20Annuity%20Transactions.pdf; Bulletin No. 2010-02, LA. DEPT. 
OF INS. (July 6, 2010), http://www.ldi.state.la.us/docs/CommissionersOffice 
/legal/Bulletins/Bul2010-02_cur_StrangerOriginatedAn.pdf (bulletins issued by 
the Departments of Insurance of the states of Ohio and Louisiana). 
2012         STATs AND INSURABLE INTERESTS                     123 
123 
 
laws,29 but that investigation is still ongoing.  Caramadre and his colleague 
were also indicted by a grand jury on charges including conspiracy, mail 
fraud, wire fraud, identity theft, aggravated identity theft, and money 
laundering.30  Outside of Rhode Island, several other lawsuits have been 
filed involving disputes regarding the validity and enforceability of 
stranger-initiated annuities, and whether insurance companies must remain 
bound to those contracts.31  However, only one court, the District of Rhode 
Island in dealing with Caramadre’s scheme, has thus far rendered a 
substantive decision directly addressing the validity of STATs, Western 
Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Conreal LLC (hereinafter 
“Conreal”).32  Moreover, that court’s conclusion, that the contracts were 
not voidable for lack of insurable interest nor contestable on fraud grounds, 
is based on a tenuous interpretation of Rhode Island statutes and, as 
discussed further below, raises more questions than it answers.  Regardless, 
in at least forty-nine states, the question as to whether STATs should be 
viewed as analogous to STOLI policies, and potentially subject to 
rescission under existing insurable interest laws, remains a matter of first 
impression. 
 
                                                                                                                 
29 See generally Indictment, Securities and Exchange Commission v. 
Caramadre et al., No. 1:10-mc-00052-S (DLM) (D.R.I. 2010). 
30 See Katie Mulvaney, Two Men Plead Not Guilty to Defrauding Elderly, 
Dying, PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 1, 2011, at 5. 
31 For example, in MetLife Investors USA Insurance Co. v. Zeidman, 734 F. 
Supp. 2d 304 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), a STAT was issued and the terminally ill annuitant, 
Sherry Pratt, died twelve days later.  MetLife later investigated and then rescinded 
the annuity, and the contract owner, the Zeidman Trust, did not contest rescission; 
it sought only the return of the $975,000 purchase price for the annuity.  Id. at 308.  
MetLife thereafter interpleaded those funds with the court, citing competing claims 
to the funds by the Zeidman Trust and the estate of Ms. Pratt.  Id.  The court issued 
an opinion addressing various claims asserted by Ms. Pratt’s estate against the 
Zeidman Trust and MetLife, ultimately holding that the estate had failed to 
adequately allege its claims.  The only claim by the estate against MetLife was an 
alleged violation of the Illinois Right of Publicity Act, claiming that MetLife had 
used Ms. Pratt’s identity for an annuity without her consent, but the court 
dismissed the claim because the statute required a “public” use of one’s identity to 
be actionable.  Id. at 311-12.  The court then granted MetLife’s petition for 
discharge.  Id. at 316.  The decision did not involve any discussion regarding the 
validity or enforceability of the annuity itself, however, given the Zeidman Trust’s 
concession to rescission.   
32 See W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Conreal LLC, 715 F. Supp. 
2d 270 (D.R.I. 2010).  
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VI. COMPARING AND CONTRASTING STATs AND STOLI 
 
STATs and STOLI arrangements share several key elements.  For 
both types of transactions, a third-party investor is the real party in interest 
acquiring the product, despite having no familial relationship or other 
interest in the life of the individual insured or annuitant.  Both also involve 
the exploitation of a product offered by life insurance companies, and both 
involve products that guarantee a death benefit.  But obvious distinctions 
between life insurance policies and variable annuities are worth 
consideration before addressing whether STATs should be subject to 
insurable interest requirements. 
First, life insurance policies and variable annuities trigger different 
financial obligations on the part of the issuing insurer during the named 
individual’s lifetime and after his or her death, and thus implicate different 
interests for the insurer with respect to that individual’s longevity.  In the 
case of life insurance, the insurer hopes to benefit by continuing to receive 
premium payments for the duration of the insured’s life.  As such, 
insurance companies have a clear interest in obtaining more thorough 
information from applicants seeking life insurance that will enable them to 
more accurately assess the mortality risk of persons and determine proper 
risk classes for each policy, so as to maximize average expected profits.   
By contrast, issuers of variable life annuities only continue to 
receive premium payments during the accumulation phase, but not after the 
contracts are annuitized.  Moreover, before STAT exploitation, the only 
perceived profitable use of variable annuities was for long-term 
investments.  Customers who purchase annuities were therefore viewed as 
self-selecting, being highly unlikely to commit large proportions of their 
funds to a long-term investment if their health was poor.33  Thus, for a 
typical non-STAT annuity with a GMDB, the initial mortality rate is 
roughly 1%.34  Based on this risk assessment, most insurers did not see a 
need to engage in extensive underwriting, and structured their variable 
annuity applications and contracts accordingly, unaware that the mortality 
risk for a STAT, by definition, would approach 100%.35  Thus, insurance 
                                                                                                                 
33 See ACLI, supra note 27, at 4. 
34 Nancy Bennett, Senior Life Fellow, American Academy of Actuaries, 
Actuarial Considerations of Stranger Initiated Annuity Transactions 5 (July 9, 
2010), available at http://www.actuary.org/pdf/life/AAA%20Comments%20 
to%20NCOIL%20on%20Stranger%20Originated%20Annuities%20final%207-9-
2010.pdf. 
35 Id. 
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companies have historically had comparatively few financial incentives to 
examine a prospective annuitant’s health or life expectancy, and thus do 
not engage in the same degree of underwriting they ordinarily require of 
prospective insureds.   
These different underwriting requirements may make it more 
difficult for an insurer to prove fraud in a STAT case than in a STOLI case.  
STOLI disputes are likely to involve more clear evidence of fraud and 
misrepresentation, given that an applicant must answer direct questions on 
the policy applications regarding their medical condition and finances.  
Annuity applications often do not ask such questions.  Of course, the 
evidence in a particular STAT case may still show express 
misrepresentations, or a failure to disclose the annuitant’s failing health or 
the fact that the beneficiary and the annuitant are total strangers, despite a 
duty to do so.  The Rhode Island plaintiffs, for example, allege that 
Caramadre set up a relatively low initial premium on the application, 
invested conservatively, to avoid arousing the suspicions of the insurer, and 
then, after issuance, dramatically increased the premium payments and 
transferred the funds into riskier investment options.36  Caramadre and his 
associates, however, respond that the insurer does not request medical 
information or inquire about the relationship between the annuitant and the 
beneficiary, and argue that the application, contract, or prospectus are silent 
on such issues.37   
Another key difference between life insurance policies and variable 
annuities relates to the duration of the contract’s contestability period.  Life 
insurance policies typically have clauses providing that they are contestable 
on grounds of material misrepresentation for a period of two years, and 
most states have enacted statutes requiring insurers to promise no more 
than two years of contestability in life insurance contracts.38  But although 
state statutes sometime allow insurers to provide for up to two years of 
contestability for annuity contracts,39 some insurers still opt for a shorter 
contestability period and choose to make their annuity contracts 
                                                                                                                 
36 See Amended Complaint, supra note 16, at ¶ 21. 
37 See generally Answer and Counterclaim, Transamerica Life Ins. Co. v. 
Caramadre, No. 09-471 S (D.R.I. Apr. 8, 2011). 
38 See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.5 (West 2006); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT 
5/224(c) (West 2000); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3203(a)(3) (McKinney 2008); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 627.455 (West 2011); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1101.006(a) (West 2009). 
39 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-15-18 (LexisNexis 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
627.466 (West 2011). 
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incontestable from the date of contract issuance.40  Again, such business 
decisions reflect the perceived self-selective nature of annuity applicants, 
and demonstrate how insurers simply did not foresee how variable annuity 
products might be exploited by stranger investors.   
The Conreal opinion shows that such business decisions may come 
back to haunt the insurer.  There, the court determined that the fact that the 
insurers drafted their annuity contracts as incontestable from the “policy 
date” foreclosed any argument by the insurers that the policies should be 
rescinded due to fraud.41  Notably, the court still allowed the insurers to 
pursue fraud claims seeking damages from Caramadre and his associated 
sponsors, agents, and brokers, noting that “unlike Harry Potter’s 
‘Invisibility Cloak,’ which could conceal not only Harry, but anyone who 
wore it,” the incontestability clauses could not be invoked by third parties 
to the contract.42  But as to the owners of the annuities, and the validity of 
the contracts themselves, the court dismissed all fraud claims as 
incontestable.43 
Still, despite these varied distinctions, a key functional similarity 
between a life insurance policy and a variable annuity with a GMDB 
remains:  both products provide a death benefit, and if purchased by a 
stranger investor, can therefore be exploited to provide a significant 
monetary payout upon the death of an individual in which the purchaser 
has no insurable interest. 
 
                                                                                                                 
40 For example, the Rhode Island STATs cases all appear to have involved 
contracts providing that they were incontestable from the “policy date.”  See W. 
Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Conreal LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 270, 279-80 
(D.R.I. 2010).  
41 Id. at 279-80. 
42 Id. at 281. 
43 Id. at 280. Insurable interest claims, however, would in most states survive 
the contract’s contestability period.  Most state laws provide, at least in the 
insurance context, that insurable interest is an issue that goes to contract formation, 
rendering the contract void ab initio, and thus may be raised at any time regardless 
of any contestability clause therein.  See 1 LEE R. RUSS, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D 
§ 240:82 (2009) (“The majority of jurisdictions follow the view that an 
incontestable clause does not prohibit insurers from resisting payment on the 
ground that the policy was issued to one having no insurable interest—such a 
defense may be raised despite the fact that the period of contestability has 
expired.”). 
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VII. LEGAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN “INSURANCE” AND 
“ANNUITIES” 
 
Before addressing whether insurable interest rules should apply to 
annuity products, it must be noted that courts have long recognized various 
legal similarities and distinctions between life insurance policies and 
variable annuities in various contexts.  Courts have treated the two types of 
products differently for such varied purposes as to compel issuers of 
variable annuities to comply with securities laws,44 to allow national banks 
to sell annuities,45 or to address their tax treatment.46  But as the Seventh 
Circuit noted after examining numerous cases and treatises addressing the 
similarities and differences between insurance and annuity products, “The 
most we can conclude from these long lists of cases and treatises is that 
annuities are not exactly insurance policies, but that the two have multiple 
similarities.  Thus courts and treatise writers have stated that the two 
products are different in some situations, and the same in others.”47  The 
court then concluded that “none of the cases or treatises authoritatively 
answers the question that we must decide.”48  While the issue before that 
court is not pertinent here,49 it demonstrates that given the numerous 
                                                                                                                 
44 See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) 
(discussing the differences between life insurance and variable annuities and 
concluding that the latter had to be registered under the Securities Act of 1933).  
Interestingly, a key reason for the Supreme Court’s conclusion was its 
understanding that a variable annuity “places all of the investment risk on the 
annuitant, not on the company. . . . The companies that issue these annuities take 
the risk of failure.  But they guarantee nothing to the annuitant except an interest in 
a portfolio of common stocks or other equities -- an interest that has a ceiling but 
no floor.”  Id. at 71-72.  STATs, however, do not follow these conventions; the 
investor is guaranteed a floor in the form of a GMDB, and the insurer is misled 
into unwittingly assuming all of the risks in the investment portfolio.  
45 See NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 
251, 263-64 (1995) (noting various similarities and distinctions between annuities 
and insurance, and deferring to the Comptroller of the Currency’s decision to treat 
them as distinct products for purposes of the National Bank Act, noting that his 
conclusion was “at least reasonable”). 
46  See Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941) (focusing on the 
differences between insurance risks and investment risks in examining estate tax 
dispute). 
47 Am. Deposit Corp. v. Schacht, 84 F.3d 834, 840 n.4 (7th Cir. 1996). 
48 Id. 
49 See id. (examining the specific question as to whether annuities should be 
considered to be “insurance” for purposes of the McCarran Ferguson Act). 
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similarities and differences between the two types of products, any analysis 
of whether they should be treated similarly or differently depends entirely 
upon the nature of the legal issue being considered.  Here, the salient 
question is whether insurable interest requirements should apply to both 
products. 
 
VIII. PUBLIC POLICY REASONS FOR REQUIRING INSURABLE 
INTEREST FOR VARIABLE ANNUITIES 
 
A review of the historical development of the insurable interest 
requirement suggests that it should apply equally to variable annuities with 
GMDBs for the same reasons it applies to life insurance policies.  The 
requirement was first imposed in eighteenth-century Great Britain in an 
effort to combat the so-called “dead pools” or “death pools” popular at the 
time, in which aristocratic gamblers wagered on when royals and other 
celebrities would die first.50  Prior to 1750, the common law had only 
condemned wagers on human life when accompanied by a criminal act, 
such as murder to collect on a policy.51  In the third quarter of the 
eighteenth century, however, gambling on human life began to be seen as 
an independent moral hazard, a concern plausibly related to growing 
unease over slavery and the concept of trafficking in the commerce of 
human lives.52  Thus, Parliament enacted the Life Assurance Act in 1774, 
holding that any insurance policy made to benefit a person who had “no 
interest” in the life of the person insured would be deemed “null and 
void.”53 
This insurable interest requirement was reinforced in the common 
law of the United States as a matter of public policy.  For example, the 
United States Supreme Court recognized this public policy requirement in 
1881 in Warnock v. Davis, explaining that without such an interest, “the 
contract is a mere wager, by which the party taking the policy is directly 
interested in the early death of the assured.  Such policies have a tendency 
to create a desire for the event.”54  The Supreme Court reiterated the same 
concerns in Grigsby v. Russell, a 1911 opinion rendered by Justice Oliver 
                                                                                                                 
50 See Timothy Alborn, A License to Bet: Life Insurance and the Gambling Act 
in the British Courts, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 1 (2007). 
51 Id. at 2. 
52 Id. (citing GEOFFREY CLARK, BETTING ON LIVES: THE CULTURE OF LIFE 
INSURANCE IN ENGLAND 1695-1775, 62-63 (Manchester University Press 1999). 
53 Life Assurance Act 1774, 14 Geo. 3 c. 48, § 1 (1774).   
54 Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881). 
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Wendell Holmes:  “A contract of insurance upon a life in which the insured 
has no interest is a pure wager that gives the insured a sinister counter 
interest in having the life come to an end.”55  The “very meaning” of 
insurable interest, Justice Holmes explained, “is an interest in having the 
life continue.”56  Recent court decisions addressing STOLI disputes have 
reiterated these principles in holding that modern statutes imposing 
insurable interest requirements are based on these fundamental public 
policy concerns.57  
Thus, although the insurable interest requirement has since been 
incorporated into the insurance codes of nearly every state,58 the 
                                                                                                                 
55 Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1911) (adding, “although that 
counter interest always exists . . . the chance that in some cases it may prove a 
sufficient motive for crime is greatly enhanced if the whole world of the 
unscrupulous are free to bet on what life they choose.”). 
56 Id.  Warnock and Grigsby also address a key issue more applicable to 
STOLI policies than to STATs --  the alienation of the contract to one with no 
insurable interest.  While Warnock invalidated an assignment of ninety percent of a 
policy’s proceeds executed contemporaneously with the application for the policy, 
see Warnock, 104 U.S. at 781, Grigsby clarified that a lack of insurable interest on 
the part of a prospective assignee does not bar the sale of an in-force life insurance 
policy, see Grigsby, 222 U.S. at 156-57.  Grigsby clarified that this freedom to 
alienate only applies to policies that are issued with a valid insurable interest in the 
first instance and there is no pre-existing agreement to assign, noting an important 
distinction:  “And cases in which a person having an interest lends himself to one 
without any, as a cloak to what is, in its inception, a wager, have no similarity to 
those where an honest contract is sold in good faith.”  Id. at 156.  While 
assignment or some other method of alienation is frequently a key component of a 
STOLI transaction, however, STATs often involve no alienation at all.  The 
application typically just names the third-party investor as owner and beneficiary, 
and the annuitant signs the application as the annuitant only.  See, e.g., W. Reserve 
Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Conreal LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 270, 274 (D.R.I. 
2010).   
57 See, e.g., Life Prod. Clearing LLC v. Angel, 530 F. Supp. 2d 646, 652-55 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (analyzing rationales given in Warnock and Grigsby, as well as a 
December 19, 2005 opinion by the Office of General Counsel on behalf of the New 
York State Insurance Department noting that STOLI activities seeking to procure a 
policy “solely as a speculative investment for the ultimate benefit of a disinterested 
third party . . .  is contrary to the long established public policy against ‘gaming’ 
through life insurance purchases.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lincoln 
Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 596 F. Supp. 2d 882, 888-89 (D.N.J. 2009); Lincoln 
Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Schwarz, No. 09-03361, 2010 WL 3283550, at *7 (D.N.J. 
Aug. 18, 2010). 
58 See discussion infra Part X. 
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requirement is not a creature of statute.  As the Supreme Court recognized 
in Warnock, the prohibition of the wagering on human lives is founded in 
public policy “independently of any statute on the subject.”59  This 
distinction is reflected in recent statutory amendments addressing STOLI 
cases, which are typically worded so as to reflect that insurable interest 
statutes recognize and apply pre-existing insurable interest requirements, 
which are based on public policy and common law.   
California’s new 2009 legislation, for example, added a subsection 
providing that certain STOLI arrangements, through the use of trusts or 
special purpose entities, “violate the insurable interest laws and the 
prohibition against wagering on life,”60 plainly recognizing and referring to 
pre-existing legal standards.  Another provision in the same section, which 
existed both before and after the 2009 amendment, adds, “[t]his section 
shall not be interpreted to define all instances in which an insurable interest 
exists.”61  In other words, the California legislature recognized that the 
contours of the insurable interest laws were incapable of being precisely 
defined by statute.  To expect otherwise of state legislators is unreasonable, 
particularly in a modern world where investors continue to invent new and 
unanticipated ways to exploit human lives for profit.  Thus, by specifically 
prohibiting certain STOLI practices in 2009, the California legislature was 
not trying to fix a pre-existing statutory loophole or create a new rule of 
law, but to confirm that a new, previously unforeseen type of transaction 
was of a nature that violated existing laws. 
When examining the scope of state laws on insurable interest, 
courts should therefore be mindful not only of pertinent statutes and case 
law, but also of the fundamental public policy interests underlying those 
statutes and judicial opinions.  Such interests are implicated no differently 
by STATs than by STOLI policies, both of which are structured to provide 
a death benefit to a third-party investor who stands to gain financially from 
the death of a human being.   Indeed, STAT investors are essentially using 
variable annuities as life insurance policies; the product is being used in 
such a manner as to use it almost entirely for its life insurance feature, in 
conjunction with a short-term market play.  STAT investors who purchase 
annuity products for that purpose should be viewed as subjecting 
                                                                                                                 
59 Warnock, 104 U.S. at 779; see also Schwarz, 2010 WL 3283550, at *7 
(citing Warnock, 104 U.S. at 779) (holding that the original public policy interest 
in precluding insurance absent an insurable interest “is the law in New York”).  
60 CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1(d) (West 2010). 
61 CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1(i) (West 2010) (amending CAL. INS. CODE 
§10110.1(g) (2004)). 
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themselves to a contract that public policy dictates to be of the type that 
must have insurable interest to be valid and enforceable. 
The twin public policy rationales historically given for the 
insurable interest requirement—prohibiting the morbid practice of 
gambling on human lives and eliminating a perverse incentive to commit 
murder (sometimes called the “moral hazard” rationale)—have in some 
circles been attacked as no longer being compelling concerns in a modern 
world.62  However, as demonstrated by the eagerness of modern 
legislatures to enact laws prohibiting STOLI practices,63 modern societies 
do apparently continue to believe that wagers on human lives by 
disinterested investors still pose a legitimate threat to the public interest.  
Indeed, at least one recent case suggests that the moral hazard concern, 
while it may appear to be implausible in modern times, may not be a simple 
paranoia of the past.  In September 2008, 74-year-old Germaine Tomlinson 
was mysteriously found having drowned in her bathtub in Indiana, fully 
clothed and wearing high heels.  The last person to see her alive was her 
son-in-law, the beneficiary of a $15 million insurance policy on her life, 
who had been with Ms. Tomlinson at a bar the night of her death, drove her 
home, and escorted her into the house.  Police first concluded that the death 
was accidental, but reopened their investigation after learning that Ms. 
Tomlinson died the day before her son-in-law’s deadline to either repay a 
$1.3 million loan he had taken out to finance the policy premiums or risk 
surrendering the policy to the lender.64  Police were unable to find clear 
evidence of foul play, but courts allowed civil suits to proceed.65  Even if 
such incidents are unlikely or rare today, the mere threat thereof is not too 
far-fetched, which helps explain why the moral hazard concern played a 
part in supporting the recent wave of anti-STOLI legislation nationwide.  
                                                                                                                 
62 See, e.g., Roy Kreitner, Speculations of Contract, or How Contract Law 
Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love Risk, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1096, 1123 
(2000) (arguing that the gambling rationale has only been paid “lip service” in 
court decisions like Grigsby, and that courts instead relied more heavily on the 
moral hazard concern implicated by an incentive to hasten another’s death); Jacob 
Loshin, Insurance Law's Hapless Busybody: A Case Against the Insurable Interest 
Requirement, 117 YALE L.J. 474, 483-90 (2007) (arguing that even the moral 
hazard rationale is too imprecise to justify an insurable interest requirement). 
63 See supra note 14. 
64 See Mark Maremont & Leslie Scism, Inquiry Into Death in Indiana 
Reopened, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2010, at A7.   
65 See K. McLaughlin, Drama Builds in Hilbert Suit, 31 INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J., 
November 6, 2010, at A3. 
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STAT cases create similar moral hazard risks; indeed, at least one 
STAT plaintiff has alleged that the annuitant had voiced fears that STAT 
originators sought to kill her.66  Although it may arguably be difficult to 
imagine a white-collar STAT investor carrying out or orchestrating a 
calculated killing for profit, the moral hazard public policy rationale has 
never targeted a specific demographic of suspected would-be murderers.  
Indeed, such temptations could theoretically be exacerbated in STAT cases, 
given the volatility of the stock market.  One might imagine, for example, a 
sudden downturn decimating the investor’s high-risk portfolio, and an 
urgent need for cash flow that a GMDB payout might provide.  Although 
STAT annuitants are selected with the expectation that they will pass away 
soon, the uncertainty as to the timing of that passing may prove frustrating 
for an investor with substantial sums invested in a fluctuating market.  A 
STAT investor might even have fewer qualms about orchestrating the 
carrying out of such a deed given the individual’s terminal illness. The 
objective of the public policy is simply to eliminate such incentives that 
could conceivably result in disastrous consequences. 
Another public policy concern that supports an insurable interest 
requirement for STATs is their negative impact on the market itself.  The 
other parties to a STAT investor’s high-risk speculation do not know that 
the investor is not actually undertaking such risks, given its concealed 
knowledge of the GMDB safety net.  Such conduct may expose the 
investor to liability to such third parties, and, as in Caramadre’s case, may 
also invite investigation by the S.E.C.  But it can also be seen as 
sufficiently damaging to the market to justify another public policy 
rationale for preventing STATs.  The securities laws themselves, and 
related doctrines such as the fraud-on-the-market theory, are based on 
similar public policy concerns that the integrity of the securities markets 
requires a “philosophy of full disclosure.”67  The imposition of an insurable 
interest requirement for STATs would be an effective way to reduce such 
risks.  
 STATs also negatively impact the market by disrupting the 
economics in the annuity industry.  Annuity providers are faced with a 
                                                                                                                 
66 See, e.g., Complaint in Eouity [sic] and Law at 44-45, Pratt v. Flowers., No. 
2010-L-002155, 2010 WL 687509 (Ill. Ct. Cl. 2010) (alleging that annuitant had 
stated her fear that “these people are trying to kill me.”). 
67 Tad E. Thompson, Messin' with Texas: How the Fifth Circuit's Decision in 
Oscar Private Equity Misinterprets the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 86 N.C. L. 
REV. 1086, 1093 (2008) (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230, 
(1988)) (discussing public policy interests underlying Rule 10b-5 and the fraud-on-
the-market theory). 
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problematic choice – either they must invest in additional underwriting, or, 
if they choose not to do so, they must increase the prices charged to the 
public to account for the market losses that STAT investors will pass on to 
the company.  Either way, the annuity providers would have to pass on 
these additional costs to the customers who buy their annuity products, and 
may have already done so.68 
With the exception of the last two market-based justifications for 
barring STATs, the other public policy interests noted above are well-
established and provide the basis for current statutes codifying insurable 
interest requirements.  As examined below, these public policy concerns 
are not in conflict with such statutes.  These concerns, however, were 
inexplicably ignored by the Rhode Island District Court in Conreal. 
 
IX. THE FLAWED ANALYSIS IN CONREAL 
 
Conreal is the sole judicial opinion thus far rendered addressing 
the applicability of the insurable interest requirement to stranger-originated 
variable annuities.  The justification for that conclusion, however, is flawed 
in several respects. 
First, the court assumed that the insurable interest requirement only 
applied to products fitting statutory definitions of “insurance.”69  The court 
presupposed that the sole basis for the requirement was statutory, citing a 
provision in the state insurance code prohibiting the procurement of an 
“insurance contract” without an insurable interest.70 Thus, the court’s entire 
discussion is framed exclusively within the limited confines of an analysis 
of whether annuities can be considered “insurance products” or as “hybrid 
products” under statutory definitions.71  But the court did not seriously 
consider the possibility that other non-statutory bases for an insurable 
interest requirement existed based on common law and public policy.72   
                                                                                                                 
68 A similar argument has been made regarding STOLI transactions, which 
caused a reduction in lapse rates due to the fact that investors do not typically 
allow policies to lapse.  This forces insurers to increase premium rates for their 
products, further harming ordinary consumers.   
69 W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. v. Conreal LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 270, 276 
(D.R.I. 2010). 
70 Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-4-27(a) (2010)). 
71 Conreal, 715 F. Supp. 2d. at 276-79. 
72 The court even quoted language from an older Rhode Island case that 
arguably supported a common-law argument for applying the doctrine outside the 
context of insurance, holding that “a purely speculative contract on the life of 
another is . . . objectionable on the grounds of public policy.”  Id. at 276 (quoting 
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The court did briefly examine state cases in seeking to differentiate 
annuities from life insurance, quoting an 1877 Rhode Island Supreme Court 
decision noting that other transactions resulting in “speculation upon the 
chances of human life,” such as “when a man takes a transfer of an 
annuity,” have not been held void.73  But a “transfer of an annuity” is an 
entirely different type of transaction from a STAT.  An annuity purchaser 
buys the right to receive annuity payments lasting as long as the duration of 
the annuitant’s life, and thus has every hope that the annuitant stays alive.  
STAT originators, by contrast, set up the transaction from its inception so 
as to benefit the investor when the annuitant dies.  Not until recently, and 
certainly not in 1877, could the Rhode Island Supreme Court have 
anticipated that annuities could be exploited in a manner giving a stranger a 
contractual right to benefit from another’s death. 
In fact, the Conreal court went out of its way to deliberately skirt 
the question regarding the pertinence of the moral hazard rationale.  The 
court did briefly acknowledge the possibility that STATs may create a 
“temptation to shorten life,”74 but did not go on to consider whether such a 
danger was of public concern.  Instead, the court focused its discussion 
solely on a critique of the plaintiff insurers for their failure to ensure that 
their application procedures screened for insurable interest.75  Thus, by 
censuring the insurers for the fact that they did not foresee how variable 
annuity products might be exploited by investors recruiting terminally ill 
annuitants,76 the court sidestepped the more important question of whether 
there existed a valid public interest in eliminating an incentive to shorten 
life. 
Further, the Conreal opinion is based on a tenuous interpretation of 
the pertinent state statutes.  It noted that the Rhode Island Insurance Code 
                                                                                                                 
Cronin v. Vt. Life Ins. Co., 40 A. 497, 497 (R.I. 1898)).  This language, unlike the 
statute cited above, is not constrained to life insurance contracts.   
73 Id. at 278 (citing Clark v. Allen, 11 R.I. 439, 444 (1877)).   
74 Id. at 279 (quoting Cronin, 40 A. at 497). 
75 Id. 
76 Id.  Interestingly, the court also appears to recognize that these novel 
schemes were unanticipated, describing Caramadre as having “discovered” a 
loophole in the product itself, and describing his strategy as based on his “insight” 
regarding how the product could be exploited.  Id. at 273-74.  The court later 
describes the STAT originators as having “figured out how to game a flaw in the 
product.”  Id. at 278.  The court almost appears to be praising Caramadre for his 
ingenuity, but condemning the insurers for failing to come to the same realization 
first. 
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had separately defined the terms “life insurance” and “annuities,”77 but 
failed to examine why that distinction mattered in the STAT context.  As 
noted above, although treatises and cases alike conclude that the products 
are similar in numerous respects, various reasons exist for distinguishing 
between the two products in certain contexts, such as for purposes of 
taxation or securities registration.  Thus, while many states define “life 
insurance” as including annuities, others, like Rhode Island, have defined 
them differently.78  The key question, then, is not whether annuities are 
insurance products, but whether certain rules historically applied to 
insurance policies should also apply to annuity contracts that have only 
recently begun to be used in a similar manner.  There is no evidence that 
the Rhode Island General Assembly defined the terms “life insurance” and 
“annuity” for the purpose of excluding annuities from insurable interest 
requirements.   
The Conreal court, however, asserts that the General Assembly 
“reinforced the statutory distinction” between the two when it failed to 
mention annuities in the Life Settlements Act (“LSA”), which addressed 
STOLI practices.79  But as noted above,80 Rhode Island is but one of many 
states to recently enact STOLI legislation.  Like many other states, the 
General Assembly based the LSA on a model act recommended by the 
National Conference of Insurance Legislators.81  The model act and the 
LSA were both drafted well before STATs came to national attention in the 
past two years.  Thus, it is likely that the omission of any reference to 
STATs in the LSA was not a conscious exclusion, but a reflection of the 
fact that the legislature was simply unaware that variable annuities could 
similarly be exploited by stranger investors. 
Moreover, the language of the LSA itself again indicates that 
insurable interest legislation is designed to codify pre-existing insurable 
interest requirements.  Like the California anti-STOLI legislation cited 
above, Rhode Island’s LSA provides that STOLI arrangements through the 
use of trusts “violate insurable interest laws and the prohibition against 
                                                                                                                 
77 Conreal, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 276-77 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-4-0.1 
(2010)). 
78 See discussion infra Part X. 
79 Conreal, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 277 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-72-2 
(West 2010)). 
80  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-72-2(26) (West 2010). 
81 Trevor Thomas, Rhode Island Enacts Settlements Law, 
LIFEHEALTHPRO.COM (Nov. 11, 2009), 
http://www.lifeandhealthinsurancenews.com/News/2009/11/Pages/Rhode-Island-
Enacts-Settlements-Law.aspx. 
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wagering on life.”82 Thus, the statute sought to clarify that STOLI 
arrangements violate existing laws, not to announce that all other hitherto-
unknown schemes to wager on human life were fair game. 
Further, even if it were true that the court was constrained by the 
statutory language to restrict insurable interest requirements to “insurance” 
or “hybrid” products, the court still erred in concluding that they were not 
hybrid products, contending that GMDBs merely “sweeten the deal.”83  
While that might be the case for non-STAT annuities, where the purchaser 
expects the annuitant to live long enough to justify pursuing a traditional 
investment strategy, the GMDB is a fundamental component of a STAT 
transaction.  By placing a wager on whether aggressive investments will 
turn a profit before a stranger dies, and putting the entire risk of loss on the 
insurance company, STAT promoters have certainly made the life 
insurance component of the scam more than a mere “ancillary perk.”84   
 
X. A SURVERY OF STATE LAWS RELATING TO ANNUITIES 
AND INSURABLE INTEREST 
 
Conreal is the sole judicial opinion thus far rendered that examines 
whether insurable interest requirements might apply to variable annuities.  
But even if later Rhode Island courts or statutes do not overrule or 
contradict its holding, Conreal does not necessarily spell disaster for 
insurers or annuitants wishing to declare STATs void under the laws of 
other states.  An examination of other statutory schemes and related 
caselaw reveals that the framework underlying Conreal’s conclusion is not 
at all typical, and that in each state, sufficient statutory or common-law 
authority may already exist to support contrary conclusions. 
Two considerations are important in this analysis.  First, how states 
define the terms “life insurance” and “annuities” may or may not indicate 
whether the legislature intended that the latter should be treated as 
insurance products.  Thirteen states, encompassing California,85 Colorado,86 
                                                                                                                 
82 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-72-2(26) (2010). 
83 Conreal, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 278. 
84 Id. at 278-79. 
85 CAL. INS. CODE § 101 (West 2005) (“Life insurance includes insurance upon 
the lives of persons or appertaining thereto, and the granting, purchasing, or 
disposing of annuities.”). 
86 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1-102(12) (West 2011) (“‘Insurance’ means a 
contract whereby one, for consideration, undertakes to indemnify another or to pay 
a specified or ascertainable amount or benefit upon determinable risk 
contingencies, and includes annuities.”). 
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Florida,87 Illinois,88 Michigan,89 Mississippi,90 Nebraska,91 New Mexico,92 
North Dakota,93 South Carolina,94 Tennessee,95 Texas,96 and West 
Virginia,97 have statutes or case law that expressly define annuities as 
                                                                                                                 
87 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.602(1) (West 2011) (“The transaction of life 
insurance includes also the granting of annuity contracts, including, but not limited 
to, fixed or variable annuity contracts”). 
88 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/4 (West 2000) (defining “classes of 
insurance” — “Life.  Insurance on the lives of persons and every insurance 
appertaining thereto or connected therewith and granting, purchasing or disposing 
of annuities.”). 
89 MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 500.602(1) (LexisNexis 2008) (“‘Life’ 
insurance is insurance upon the lives and health of persons and every insurance 
pertaining thereto, and to grant, purchase, or dispose of annuities.”). 
90 Hamilton v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 17 So. 2d 278, 280 (Miss. 1944) 
(annuities not technically life insurance policies but are subject to provisions of 
insurance code regulating life insurance); State ex rel. Gully v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
of N.Y., 196 So. 796, 799 (Miss. 1940), overruled in part on other grounds, United 
Gas Corp. v. Leggett, 198 So. 763 (1940). 
91 NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-704 (2010) (requiring benefits of any “policy of 
insurance” to be payable to person with insurable interest in person’s life, and 
expressly providing that the term “policy of insurance” includes annuity contracts). 
92 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-7-2 (2000) (“‘Life’ insurance is insurance of 
human lives and every insurance appertaining thereto, and the granting, purchasing 
or disposing of annuities. . . ”). 
93 N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-26-11 (2010) (variable annuities categorized along 
with variable life insurance contracts as “insurance coverage”); id § 26.1-05-02 
(same); id. § 26.1-34.2-02 (definitions section relating to annuities includes 
definitions referring to “insurance, including annuities” and “insurance products, 
including annuities”). 
94 S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-1-20(19) (2002) (“The term ‘insurance’ includes 
annuities.”). 
95 TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-2-201(4) (2008 & Supp. 2011) (“For the purposes 
of this title, the transacting of life insurance includes the granting of annuities, both 
with and without a life or mortality contingency or element . . . .” ); see also H & R 
Block E. Tax Serv., Inc. v. State Dep’t of Commerce & Ins., Div. of Ins., 267 
S.W.3d 848, 858 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that statutory definitions of 
“contract of insurance” and “insurable interest” were circular and ambiguous, and 
that the broad definition could cover various types of contracts). 
96 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1102.001(1)(A) (West 2009) (definition of 
“insurance policy” includes annuity contracts). 
97 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-1-10(a) (LexisNexis 2011) (“Life insurance. -- 
Life insurance is insurance on human lives including endowment benefits, 
additional benefits in the event of death or dismemberment by accident or 
accidental means, additional benefits for disability and annuities.”). 
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insurance products.  Further, their rules relating to insurable interest do not 
seek to carve out annuities or other specific types of insurance products.98  
Nebraska even expressly includes annuity contracts in its insurable interest 
statute.99  Other states are not quite so explicit as Nebraska—which is not 
surprising, given the very recent advent of STATs—but the fact that these 
thirteen states define annuities as insurance suggests that courts confronted 
with STAT disputes in those states would have little choice but to 
distinguish Conreal. 
But the second consideration in examining state statutes is far more 
important:  regardless of whether a state legislature or court has chosen to 
define the products separately, the language of the state’s insurable interest 
laws may already be broad enough to cover annuities.  Many states do not 
expressly define annuities as insurance, and sometimes even define them as 
separate products, but their insurance codes still make clear that insurable 
interest requirements apply to annuities.  For example, New Jersey’s 
insurable interest statute, like Nebraska’s, explicitly applies to annuities100 
even though the code elsewhere defines them as separate from insurance 
products.101  In other states, it is clear from the structure of the code that the 
insurable interest requirement applies to annuities.  For example, Arizona’s 
insurance code provides, “Except as exemption or other provision is made, 
all provisions in this title applicable to life insurance shall be deemed 
applicable also to annuities.”102  That title includes an insurable interest 
statute that does not make any “exemption or other provision” excluding 
                                                                                                                 
98 See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10110.1 (West 2005) (insurable interest 
requirement does not carve out annuities); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.404 (West 2011) 
(same); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 500.2207 (LexisNexis 2008) (same); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 59A-18-4, 59A-18-5 (2000) (setting forth insurable interest 
requirements), and § 59A-18-1 (chapter applies as to all insurance policies and 
annuity contracts); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1103.052 (West 2009) (subchapter 
relating to insurable interest for life insurance policies “shall be liberally construed 
to implement the purposes of this subchapter”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-2 
(LexisNexis 2011) (insurable interest statute with no carve-out for annuities). 
99 NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-704 (2010). 
100 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:24-1.1 (West 2006) (setting forth insurable interest 
requirement and providing that it applies to life insurance, health insurance, and 
annuities). 
101 Id. § 17B:17-5 (defining “annuity” and noting that a contract that includes 
life insurance death benefits is still deemed to be an annuity “if such extra benefits 
constitute a subsidiary or incidental part of the entire contract”). 
102 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-254 (2002). 
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annuities from the requirement.103  This type of statutory framework is 
especially common.  Eighteen states, comprising Alabama,104 Alaska,105 
Arizona,106 Arkansas,107 Delaware,108 Georgia,109 Idaho,110 Indiana,111 
Kentucky,112 Louisiana,113 Maine,114 Maryland,115 Nevada,116 New 
                                                                                                                 
103 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1104 (2010); see also id. § 20-1101 
(clarifying scope of article that includes insurable interest requirement and 
excluding certain products, but not annuities). 
104 ALA. CODE § 27-14-2 (LexisNexis 2007) (“[T]his chapter applies as to all 
insurance contracts and annuity contracts”); § 27-14-3 (very next section, stating 
insurable interest requirement without any carve-out for annuities).  Alabama thus 
makes its insurable interest requirement applicable to annuities even though it 
defines them as separate products elsewhere in the code.  See § 27-5-3 (defining 
“annuity” as a separate type of contract from a life insurance policy as defined in 
§ 27-5-2, and noting that a contract that includes certain life insurance death 
benefits is still deemed to be an annuity “if such extra benefits constitute a 
subsidiary or incidental part of the entire contract”). 
105 ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.020(d) (2010) (defining insurable interest 
requirement as referring to “life, annuity, or health insurance”). 
106 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1101 (2010) (clarifying scope of article that 
includes insurable interest requirement and excluding certain products, but not 
annuities). 
107 ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-103 (2004) (defining insurable interest 
requirement); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-102 (Supp. 2011) (clarifying scope of 
chapter and excluding certain products, but not annuities). 
108 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2701 (1999) (explaining “this chapter applies to 
all insurance contracts and annuity contracts”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2704 
(1999) (describing insurable interest requirement with no carve-out for annuities). 
109 GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-3 (West Supp. 2011) (defining insurable interest 
requirement); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-2 (West 2003) (clarifying scope of chapter 
and excluding certain products, but not annuities). 
110 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1804 (2010) (defining insurable interest 
requirement); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1801 (2010) (chapter of code applies “as to 
all insurance contracts and annuity contracts”). 
111 IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-15.6-31 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) (insurable 
interest law applies to annuities in context of requiring producer to have an 
insurable interest in life of annuitant in order to have an interest therein); see also 
In re Estate of Powers, 849 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
112 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-040 (West 2012) (defining insurable 
interest requirement); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.15-010 (West 2012) (subtitle in 
code applies to annuities as well as life insurance).  Like Alabama, Kentucky has 
this framework despite explicitly defining annuities as separate products from life 
insurance.  See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.5-030 (West 2012). 
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Jersey,117 Oklahoma,118 South Dakota,119 Utah,120 and Wyoming,121 have 
similarly enacted statutes that either expressly state, or whose structure and 
                                                                                                                 
113 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:914 (2009) (stating provisions of insurance code 
apply to variable annuity contracts); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:901 (2009) 
(defining insurable interest requirement); see also bulletin issued by the state 
insurance department taking the position that STATs would violate insurable 
interest laws, see supra note 28. 
114 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2404 (2000) (defining insurable interest 
requirement); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2401 (2000) (chapter of code 
“applies as to all insurance contracts and annuity contracts”).  Maine has this 
framework despite some arguable inconsistencies in its code relating to whether 
annuities are deemed insurance products.  Compare ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-
A, § 3 (2000) (defining “insurance” broadly to include annuities), with ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 703 (2000) (defining “annuity” as a separate type of 
contract from a life insurance policy per § 702). 
115 MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 12-201 (LexisNexis 2011) (defining insurable 
interest requirement); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 12-102 (LexisNexis 2011) (article 
applies to insurance and annuity contracts).  This framework applies even though 
annuities are not defined in the code as life insurance products.  MD. CODE ANN., 
INS. § 1-101(d)(3) (LexisNexis 2011) (definition of “annuity” provides that it 
“does not include life insurance); see also Matthews v. Matthews, 647 A.2d 812, 
817 (Md. Ct. App. 1994) (annuity contracts are not technically life insurance). 
116 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 687B.040 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (defining 
insurable interest requirement); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 687B.010 (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2011) (scope of chapter of code “applies to all insurance contracts and 
annuity contracts”).  The statutes so provide despite having defined annuities as 
separate from insurance.   See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 688A.020 (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2011). 
117 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:24-1.1 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:17-
5 (West 2006).  
118 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3604 (West 2001) (defining insurable interest 
requirement); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3601 (West 2001) (clarifying scope of 
chapter and excluding certain products, but not annuities);  see also Baird v. 
Wainwright,  260 P.2d 1060, 1064 (Okla. 1953) (holding where annuity certificate 
provided a monthly annuity for insured during his lifetime, and at his death if 
aggregate of annuities was less than the premium paid the difference was payable 
to the beneficiary named in the policy, the contract was a combination life and 
annuity policy authorized to be executed by an insurance company). 
119 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-10-4 (2004) (defining insurable interest 
requirement); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-10-1 (2004) (“Chapters 58-10 to 58-12, 
inclusive, apply as to all insurance contracts and annuity contracts.”). 
120 UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-104 (LexisNexis 2010) (defining insurable 
interest requirement); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-101 (Supp. 2012) (defining 
scope of chapter and not carving out annuities); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-
2012         STATs AND INSURABLE INTERESTS                     141 
141 
 
placement in the code imply, that annuities are subject to the same 
insurable interest requirements as life insurance policies.   
Altogether, this review indicates that thirty-one of the fifty states 
either expressly define annuities as insurance products or otherwise 
indicate that insurable interest requirements apply to annuities.  In each of 
these states, strong arguments could be made that insurable interest 
requirements already apply to STATs under existing law.   
Such arguments might also be made as to some variable annuities 
in Hawaii and Washington, which have developed an interesting approach 
to the definitional question that is of direct relevance to STATs.  Both 
states have enacted statutes providing that whether life insurance rules 
apply to annuities depends on the nature of the death benefit.  If the GMDB 
is “not in excess of the greater of the sum of the premiums or stipulated 
payments paid under the contract or the value of the contract at time of 
death,” the provision “shall not be deemed to be life insurance and 
therefore not subject to the provisions of this code governing life insurance 
carriers.”122  But “[a] provision for any other benefit on death during the 
deferred period shall be subject to such insurance provisions.”123  
Presumably, that would include being subject to insurable interest laws.124  
Thus, in these states, a STAT that is limited to a standard GMDB allowing 
it to pursue risk-free investment, with a safety net promising only a 
premium refund, would arguably not be subject to insurable interest 
requirements, whereas a STAT with an enhanced or “stepped-up” death 
benefit, such as the “lock in,” “anniversary ratchet,” or “roll-up” options 
                                                                                                                 
1-301 (Supp. 2012) (including various definitions of terms that include annuities, 
including “business of life insurance” and “insurance business”); but see In re 
Estate of Clark, 354 P.2d 112, 117 (Utah Ct. App. 1960) (analyzing statutory 
definitions of life insurance and annuities in context of tax dispute, and holding, 
“We find nothing in these sections to justify the claim that an annuity contract such 
as herein involved should be classified as life insurance either for the purpose of 
estate tax or otherwise.”). 
121 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-15-102 (2011) (setting forth insurable interest 
requirement); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-15-101 (2011) (“This chapter applies to all 
insurance contracts and annuity contracts.”). 
122 HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10D-118(b)(2) (2005); see also WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 48.18A.030 (West 2010). 
123 HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10D-118(b)(2) (2005) (emphasis added); see also 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.18A.030 (West 2010). 
124 E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.18.030 (West 2010) (imposing insurable 
interest statute as applying to life insurance). 
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described above, would more clearly run afoul of insurable interest 
requirements. 
Insurers seeking to rescind STATs in the remaining seventeen 
states will have to deal with a variety of statutes and cases—or, in some 
states, an absence thereof—that may make it more difficult to establish that 
insurable interest is required for variable annuities.  Eight of these states—
consisting of Connecticut,125 Minnesota,126 Missouri,127 Montana,128 New 
York,129 North Carolina,130 Vermont,131 and of course, Rhode Island— 
present a statutory framework similar to that considered in Conreal.  In 
those states, statutes define annuities as separate products from life 
insurance, but do not explicitly speak to the issue of whether insurable 
interest laws apply to those separately defined annuities.  But again, that 
fact does not necessarily suggest that the legislatures in those seventeen 
states meant to exclude STATs.  Rather, it suggests only that those 
                                                                                                                 
125 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-1 (West 2012) (“This definition of 
‘annuities’ does not apply to payments made under a policy of life insurance.”). 
126 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.021 (West 2005) (sale of life insurance and 
annuity as a single product, e.g. with a rider or otherwise, expressly prohibited in 
Minnesota). 
127 MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.671 (West Supp. 2012) (where annuity contracts 
also provide death benefits by rider, the annuity and life insurance portions of the 
benefits shall be calculated separately as though it were a separate contract); see 
also Carroll v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S., 9 F. Supp. 223, 224 (W.D. 
Mo. 1934) (emphasizing distinct characteristics between annuities and life 
insurance contracts). 
128 MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-1-208 (2011) (defining life insurance without 
referencing annuities); see also Estate of Miles v. Miles, 994 P.2d 1139, 1144 
(Mont. 2000) (analyzing code in detail and noting that legislature could have, but 
did not, define annuities as life insurance or provide that they should be similarly 
treated). 
129 N.Y. INS. LAW § 1113(a)(1-2) (McKinney 2006) (defining annuities and 
life insurance policies as separate types of contracts); see also N.Y. INS. LAW 
§ 3205 (McKinney 2006) (insurable interest requirement only refers to life 
insurance contracts). 
130 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-7-15 (2001) (defining life insurance and annuities as 
separate products); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-58-70 to -86 (2001) (relating to 
insurable interest without speaking to which types of contracts require such an 
interest). 
131 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3717 (2009) (stating an annuity with death benefits 
of the kind provided by life insurance “shall nevertheless be deemed to be an 
annuity if such extra benefits constitute a subsidiary or incidental part of the entire 
contract.”). 
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legislatures have not yet been confronted with the possibility that strangers 
lacking insurable interests in the lives of terminally ill annuitants might 
exploit variable annuities.132  Four other states—Massachusetts,133 
Oregon,134 Virginia,135 and Wisconsin136—have insurable interest statutes 
whose phrasing or placement in the code suggests that the legislature did 
not intend them to apply to annuities.  And finally, as to the last five 
states—Iowa,137 Kansas,138 New Hampshire,139 Ohio,140 and 
                                                                                                                 
132 As argued above, if these states later enact legislation making insurable 
interest a requirement for annuities, such enactments would arguably not reflect a 
“change” to state law, but a recognition that STATs violate existing common-law 
and public policy grounds prohibiting the procurement of contracts by total 
strangers who stand to gain from another’s death. See supra p. 136. 
133 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 123 (West 2011) (requiring assent of 
insured not applicable to “contracts based upon the continuance of life, such as 
annuity or pure endowment contract . . . .”). 
134 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 743.024 (West 2011) (setting forth insurable 
interest requirement for personal insurance but then stating, “[t]his section does not 
apply to annuity policies.”).  This statute does so despite the fact that the Oregon 
code defines insurance to include annuities.  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 731.102 (West 
2011) (“‘Insurance’ so defined includes annuities.”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
731.170 (West 2011) (“For convenience, reference to ‘life insurance’ in the 
Insurance Code includes life insurance as defined in subsection (1) of this section 
and annuities as defined in ORS 731.154, except if the inclusion of annuities 
obviously is inapplicable or if the context requires, or the Insurance Code provides, 
otherwise.”). 
135 VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-301 (2007) (setting forth insurable interest 
requirement); id. § 38.2-300 (2007) (chapter does not apply to annuities).  This 
carve-out for annuities is made despite the fact that other statutes define annuities 
as insurance.  See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-602 (2007) (“‘Life insurance’ includes 
annuities.”); id. § 38.2-501 (2007) (“‘Insurance policy’ or ‘insurance contract’ 
includes annuities . . . .”). 
136 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 631.01 (West 2004) (chapters addressing life insurance, 
which include provisions relating to insurable interest, “do not apply to annuities”). 
137 See, e.g., Hult v. Home Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 240 N.W. 218, 227 (Iowa 
1932) (“[A] life insurance contract must be based upon an insurable interest, in the 
absence of which it becomes a wager contract.”).  Hult involved claims by an 
executor seeking to rescind annuity contracts that the deceased had purchased on 
her own life.  Although the court declined to apply the insurable interest rule to 
rescind the contracts at bar, its rationale for doing so arguably suggests that it 
would have reached a different result in a STAT case: 
If a person takes out a life insurance policy on the life of one 
in whom he has no insurable interest, there are three parties 
involved: First, the party who procures the insurance; second, the 
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Pennsylvania141—the statutory framework and case law does not provide a 
concrete answer.   
While this review does not exhaustively examine every potentially 
pertinent statute or case in each state, it at least suggests that Conreal 
should not necessarily be viewed as a dangerous precedent or as an 
invitation to STAT promoters to target other markets.  Because Rhode 
Island’s statutory scheme is unlike those of most other states, Conreal is 
easily distinguishable.142   
 
XI. OTHER POTENTIAL ISSUES IN STAT DISPUTES 
 
Even if a STAT dispute does not result in judicial rescission of the 
annuity contract on insurable interest grounds, other potential arguments 
                                                                                                                 
insurance company; third, the party insured.  Not so in this case.  
Here there are but the two parties, the one to whom the contract 
runs and the insurance company, which makes the contract.  
There is here no disinterested third party, whether viewed as an 
annuity contract or an insurance contract. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
138 Kansas has a statute prohibiting a “life insurance contract” without 
insurable interest, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-450 (West 2000), but the insurance code 
does not purport to define that term or to distinguish it from annuity contracts. 
139 New Hampshire law requires insurable interest for a “policy of life or 
endowment insurance,” N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 408:2 (LexisNexis 2009), but the 
insurance code does not define that term or to distinguish it from annuity contracts.  
But see Frederick v. Frederick, 687 A.2d 711, 714 (N.H. 1996) (noting a “long 
history of cases” viewing annuity beneficiaries with the same analysis used in the 
life insurance context). 
140 Ohio’s code does not define insurance or annuities, and its insurable 
interest rules are primarily based on common law, with uncertain applicability to 
annuities.  See, e.g., Donahue v. Carpenter, No. 91WD057, 1992 WL 66564 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1992) (sustaining appeal of judgment on interpleaded proceeds 
of annuity contract, but not directly addressing the parties’ dispute regarding 
whether insurable interest rules applied to annuities). 
141 Pennsylvania’s insurable interest requirement only applies to a “policy of 
life insurance,” 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 512 (West 1999), but the code does not define 
that term or distinguish it from annuities.  Some case law exists distinguishing the 
two types of products, but not in the context of insurable interest.  E.g., In re Estate 
of Bayer, 26 A.2d 202, 205 (Pa. 1942) (noting “obvious differences” between 
annuities and life insurance contracts and finding that they are to be treated 
differently for taxation purposes). 
142 See W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Conreal, 715 F. Supp. 2d 
270, 276-78, 280 (D.R.I. 2010). 
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might be made by insurers seeking to recover market losses paid to the 
investors in the form of GMDBs, such as by bringing causes of action for 
fraud or material misrepresentations.  The annuity contract’s contestability 
clause may bar such claims against the contract owner.  However, courts 
may, as in Conreal, still allow insurers to seek fraud damages from the 
other various sponsors, agents, and other collaborators in STAT 
schemes.143  An insurer might also claim that conduct by participating 
agents breached brokerage service agreements with the company,144 or a 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in such contracts.145  STAT 
promoters might also be subject to criminal liability and potential civil 
actions relating thereto, such as for forging annuitant signatures,146 paying 
money in exchange for such signatures,147 or insurance fraud.148 
Insurance companies should be well-prepared for the possibility 
that courts and juries may be skeptical of insurers’ claims because of 
companies’ failure to eliminate the potential risks of STATs.  Insurers draft 
the annuity applications, contracts, and prospectuses.  They do not request 
additional information or engage in thorough underwriting before issuing a 
variable annuity.  They control the assumptions used to set prices for the 
annuity fees, and have decided that the annuitant’s health is not a relevant 
factor.  Yet, none of these arguments should have any impact on whether a 
court is willing to enforce the public policy that is part and parcel of an 
insurable interest analysis.  Further, insurers might contend that they had no 
way of knowing that their annuity products would be exploited in this 
manner, and that their business decisions regarding the degree of 
underwriting needed were reasonable in light of historically low mortality 
rates for annuity applicants.  Even Conreal, after condemning the insurers 
for their lack of foresight in declining to recognize an insurable interest 
                                                                                                                 
143 Id. at 281-82.   
144 Such contracts, for example, often require the brokerage firm to train and 
supervise its agents, to indemnify the insurer for its agents’ wrongful acts, see, e.g., 
Complaint and Jury Demand at 16-17, W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. 
Conreal, 715 F. Supp. 2d 270 (2009) (No. 09-564-S), and might also obligate 
agents to use only approved materials to market the insurer’s products (which, 
presumably, do not include flyers distributed at hospices and churches).   
145 E.g., id. at 16. 
146 E.g., id. at 18. 
147 See Consolidated Memorandum in Response to Defendants’ Motions to 
Dismiss at 45, Transamerica Life Ins. Co. v. Lifemark Sec. Corp., No. 09-549/S 
(D. R.I. Feb. 1, 2010). 
148 E.g., Complaint, supra note 144, at 18. 
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requirement,149 still allowed the insurers to proceed with their fraud claims 
against the non-owner defendants despite not having specifically asked for 
the information withheld.150  
Conreal also acknowledged additional arguments for voiding the 
contracts that, like insurable interest, could “rope the owners back into the 
lawsuits” despite the contestability clauses.151  The plaintiff insurers raised 
arguments that the contracts might be void due to forgery of the annuitant’s 
signatures and fraud in the factum, based on the theory that the annuitants 
were tricked into signing without knowing the contracts’ true nature or 
contents.  The court declined to address the merits of such arguments, 
noting that the complaints had failed to adequately plead such claims, but it 
did grant them leave to amend.152  Importantly, the court recognized that 
such forgery or fraud in the factum could render the annuity contracts “void 
and not merely voidable,” thus depriving the owners of their 
incontestability defense because the pertinent clauses “never would have 
come into effect.”153  Thus, depending on the facts of a particular STAT 
case, such arguments could certainly be made to suggest that the annuity 
contracts were not validly formed and should be held void. 
One other potential argument relating to valid contract formation is 
also worth discussing, that there was no meeting of the minds between the 
owner and the insurer.  In other words, the insurer might contend that there 
was a mistake of fact—that the insurer reasonably believed that the selected 
annuitant was a typical, self-selecting individual whose life expectancy 
would be of sufficient duration to justify the long-term investment strategy 
ordinarily expected of the variable annuity product.  Mistake arguments, 
however, have historically been rejected in cases involving annuitants 
whose health problems were unknown at the time of the annuity 
purchase.154  Such cases might theoretically be distinguished based on the 
                                                                                                                 
149 Conreal, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 278-79. 
150 Id. at 281-82. 
151 Id. at 287 n.16. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. (citing R.I. Depositors Econ. Protection Corp. v. Bowen Court Assocs., 
763 A.2d 1005, 1009 (R.I. 2001); Giannone v. Ayne Inst., 290 F. Supp. 2d 553, 
563 (E.D. Pa. 2003)). 
154 See, e.g., Aldrich v. Travelers Ins. Co., 56 N.E.2d 888, 889 (Mass. 1944) 
(“It is difficult to see how any company could carry on an annuity business if the 
estate of an annuitant could rescind whenever it turned out that the condition of his 
health did not ‘warrant a reasonable expectation of life.’”); Am. State Bank of 
Bloomington v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 17 N.E.2d 256 (Ill. App. Ct. 1938); 
Woodworth v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 27 F. Supp. 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).  
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fact that they were mutual mistake cases brought by unknowingly ill 
annuitants,155 while STATs involve a unilateral mistake on the insurer’s 
part.  But the problem with a unilateral mistake argument, again, is the 
insurer’s typical decision not to inquire as to the annuitant’s health.  The 
Restatement of Contracts, for example, holds that the mistake of one party 
makes a contract voidable only when the mistaken party does not “bear the 
risk of the mistake.”156  It further explains that a party does bear the risk of 
a mistake—and thus, is not entitled to rescission—if “he is aware, at the 
time the contract is made, that he has only limited knowledge with respect 
to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats his limited knowledge as 
sufficient.”157  An insurer invoking the “meeting of the minds” argument 
should be prepared to address these considerations. 
In sum, various remedies might be sought from collaborators in 
STAT schemes.  Insurers may even in some cases be able to establish that 
the contracts should be held void for fraud vis-à-vis the annuitant.  But if 
the annuitant did participate knowingly, or there is not enough evidence to 
prove otherwise, rescission of a STAT contract will likely hinge on 
whether the insurable interest requirement applies to variable annuities 
under applicable state laws. 
 
XII. CONCLUSION 
 
STAT investors exploit a practical loophole in the variable annuity 
product, but it is far from clear whether there exists a legal loophole 
making such exploitation lawful.  To address the former, insurance 
companies should consider whether it still makes business sense to 
continue to engage in limited underwriting of annuity applications, and 
whether contestability clauses in their annuity contracts should be revised.  
With respect to the latter, however, it is not yet clear how legislatures and 
courts will address the issue.  Insurable interest requirements at common 
law and based upon public policy concerns may, depending on the laws of 
the pertinent jurisdiction, arguably already prohibited any stranger-
originated contracts that enable the stranger to benefit from the death of 
another human being.  Insurers may also pursue a number of other 
                                                                                                                 
155 Such cases typically involve suits by the annuitant’s estate, seeking to 
rescind a policy based on the fact that neither the annuitant nor the insurance 
company knew of the annuitant’s failing health.  See generally sources cited supra 
note 154. 
156 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 cmt. b (1981). 
157 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 introductory cmt. (1981). 
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agents, but rescission of the annuity contracts will in many cases hinge on 
how courts choose to interpret the scope of existing insurable interest laws. 
SUPERVISORY COLLEGES:  IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL 
SUPERVISORY COORDINATION 
 
KELLY KIRBY 
 
*** 
 
 This article looks at the insurance industry in the context of its role 
as a key player in the international financial system.  Specifically, how 
insurers and regulators alike are working towards a higher level of 
cooperation and coordination, both within their own jurisdictions and 
beyond, to assure that events such as the 2008 Financial Crisis are never 
repeated.  The article focuses on the rise of supervisory colleges and 
explains the need for states to meaningfully participate in these 
international forums which have the potential to identify and eliminate 
systemic risk.  The benefits as well as the obstacles presented by such a 
grand scheme of international supervision are laid out in detail by the 
author, who closes by making the case for supervisory colleges as a “step 
in the right direction for international regulatory success.” 
 
*** 
 
 The 2008 Financial Crisis was a devastating wake up to how 
institutions, both domestically and internationally, are systemically 
connected in ways regulators did not know existed.  To prevent a future 
breakdown, the United States is working towards identifying risks that are 
inherent in those connections, and mitigating potential harm to the financial 
system before it occurs.  Inextricably tied into this equation are insurance 
companies.  
 In the realm of insurance regulation, there are two trends working 
towards the same goal of international coordination and cooperation to 
create a more globally sustainable system of supervision.  First, there are 
the efforts of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(“NAIC”), representing state regulated insurance.  The NAIC has created 
task groups to address flaws in the United States insurance regulatory 
scheme to better identify weaknesses before they escalate into systemic 
risks.  Second, there is the creation of the Federal Insurance Office (“FIO”), 
representing the federal government’s movement into the realm of state 
dominated insurance.  The FIO has been charged with monitoring all 
aspects of the insurance industry to identify gaps in the regulatory regime 
that could lead to a systemic financial crisis.  In theory, it appears that the 
state and federal efforts are near mirror images of each other, but in 
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practice, the states still hold the power.  In order to keep control of that 
power, states and the NAIC are overhauling certain parts of the current 
insurance regulatory scheme to ensure that the FIO has no other reason but 
to remain an ally. 
 In particular, the NAIC is encouraging state insurance 
commissioners to participate in international forums where supervisors 
from across the world come together for the regulation, evaluation, and 
investigation of those insurance companies under their jurisdiction that are 
part of groups with cross-border operations.  These forums are called 
supervisory colleges.  This paper posits that supervisory colleges are a way 
to enhance state based insurance regulation in an increasingly international 
environment, but there are several obstacles that must first be addressed, 
and several concerns that may never go away.  
The discussion will read as follows: Part I will introduce the 
relevant NAIC initiatives for improved supervision; Part II will discuss the 
controversial new revisions to the Insurance Holding Company System 
Model Act that exponentially expand a state commissioner’s access to 
information; Part III provides an overview and introduction to supervisory 
colleges; Part IV discusses confidentiality amongst participating regulators 
in a supervisory college; Part V briefly discusses the potential implications 
of the FIO’s covered agreements and preemption powers; Part VI looks at 
Connecticut as a case study for recent developments in state involvement 
with supervisory colleges and international members; Part VII explains 
how the NAIC has facilitated state and foreign participation in supervisory 
colleges, as well as other efforts they have made in conjunction with the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors; Part VIII addresses 
several obstacles and concerns presented by supervisory colleges; Part IX 
thoroughly discusses whether the authority for state insurance 
commissioners to participate in supervisory colleges, as well as the 
commissioner’s expansion of powers, are within the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act’s definition of the ‘business of insurance’; and Part X concludes by 
recommending that the efforts taken thus far for state participation in 
supervisory colleges be continued in the future. 
 
I. SOLVENCY MODERNIZATION INITIATIVE:  THE 
 INCEPTION OF SUPERVISORY COLLEGES TO IMPROVE 
 GROUP SOLVENCY ISSUES. 
 
The Solvency Modernization Initiative (“SMI”) is a critical self-
examination of the U.S. insurance solvency system by state insurance 
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regulators that began in June of 2008. 1   Through SMI the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) is working to identify 
potential weaknesses in the current regulatory scheme exposed by the 2008 
financial crisis.  The NAIC outlined its objectives for SMI in the “Work 
Plan,” ranking US solvency framework (the “Framework”), group solvency 
issues, capital requirements, international accounting and regulatory 
standards, reinsurance, and corporate governance the top issues in need of 
attention. 2  Of particular relevance for this examination is the Group 
Solvency Issues Working Group (the “GSI Working Group”) and its Draft 
Memorandum on Groupwide Supervision (the “Draft Memorandum”), and 
the recently adopted amendments (the “Amendments”) to the NAIC’s 
Insurance Holding Company System Model Regulatory Act and Regulation 
(the “IHCA”).3 
Insurers and their holding companies are no longer limited to their 
domiciliary states as separate legal entities; rather, they are more akin to 
financial enterprises with their operations extending across borders into 
multiple jurisdictions.  In addition to the issues presented by cross-border 
operations, insurance companies are also subjected to cross-sector risks as 
part of a larger holding company.  The GSI Working Group addresses how 
these issues impact U.S. insurers, and how state insurance commissioners 
and regulators can best mitigate the attendant risks.  The Draft 
Memorandum notes that the U.S. insurance regulatory system has long 
operated with a “solo entity” approach to regulation, where focus channels 
on the insurer, whereas other jurisdictions have a more consolidated 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Insurance Oversight: Policy Implications for U.S. Consumers, Businesses 
and Jobs: Testimony Before the Subcomm. On Ins., Hous., and Cmty. Opportunity 
of the H. Comm. On Fin. Serv., 112th Cong. 10 (July 28, 2011) (statement of Susan 
E. Voss, President, Nat’l Ass’n Ins. Comm’rs) [hereinafter Statement of Susan E. 
Voss]. 
2  Leah Campbell & Tonisha Calbert, Overview of the NAIC’s Solvency 
Modernization Initiative, 18 METRO. CORP. COUNS. 20 (June 2010). 
3 The SMI Task force of the NAIC charged the GSI Working Group with 
“studying the current state of play of US group supervision recommending needed 
enhancements to the oversight of U.S. based insurers operating within corporate 
groups.” See Memorandum from The Group Solvency Issues (EX) Working Group 
to Director Christina Urias, Chair of the Solvency Modernization Initiatives (EX) 
Task Force 1 (Feb. 26, 2010) (regarding: “Report to Solvency Modernization 
Initiative (EX) Task Force on Suggested “Windows and Walls” Approach for 
Regulation of United States Based Insurers Operating within Corporate Groups) 
[hereinafter Draft Memorandum]. 
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approach to regulation, with focus on the entire holding company system.4  
The GSI Working Group’s examination adopts an approach more 
analogous to the latter, investigating how the enterprise group’s risks as a 
whole could potentially affect the insurance companies that operate under 
the group’s direction.   
To enhance group supervision, the Draft Memorandum suggests 
using a “windows and walls” approach to “provid[e] a window into group 
operations, while building upon, rather than rejecting, the existing walls 
which provide solvency protection to U.S. insurers.”5  In general, windows 
are regulatory enhancements that will strengthen review and access to 
group affiliate information, increase cooperation between regulatory 
jurisdictions, expand group financial assessment, and improve standards 
across regulatory jurisdictions.6  Participation in supervisory colleges for 
internationally active groups fall under these ‘windows.” 7   More 
specifically, a selection of regulatory “windows” suggested by the Draft 
Memorandum includes: state coordination on a national basis for sharing 
confidential information with international regulators, a “proactive 
confidential communication” approach in crisis situations between state 
regulators and international supervisors,8 access to meaningful information 
about unregulated entities, which include non-operating holding 
companies,9  and a “panoramic” view of group capital.10  Former NAIC !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 See Draft Memorandum, supra note 3, at 1.  The Draft Memorandum goes 
on to explain that in some cases, the U.S. regulatory scheme could perhaps more 
accurately be described as “solo plus.”  Id.  For instance, the U.S. supervisory 
regime employs a “lead” state concept for when two or more insurers that operate 
within a single group are domiciled in two separate states. Id.  
5 See Draft Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2. The goal of the “windows and 
walls” approach is to “provide much needed breadth and scope enhancements to 
solvency regulation while retaining the highest level of policyholder protection that 
exists currently.” Id.  
6 See Solvency Modernization in the Spotlight, NAIC UPDATE 3, Deloitte LLP, 
(Spring 2010); See also Draft Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2-3. 
7  See Draft Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2.  The GSI Working Group 
believes supervisory colleges to be, “the best optics . . . to be used to navigate 
through any potential financial crisis.” Id.  
8  The Draft Memorandum suggests an enhanced “Master MoU” as the 
mechanism to use when communication must be elevated to a higher standard. See 
Draft Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2. 
9  The Draft Memorandum suggests that the U.S. group solvency structure 
should enhance “broader access to information upstream and with regard to all 
holding company groups with regulated insurance entities and all affiliates in all 
tributaries.” Draft Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2. 
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President Susan Voss emphasized the importance of the GSI Working 
Group’s objectives when she reflected on the organization’s experience 
with insurance companies and their holding entities, affirming that it “is not 
enough to focus solely on transactions with insurance companies.”11 Voss 
suggested that the insurance industry needed “to look through our 
“windows” and understand the contagions that could impact insurers,” but 
to maintain  “an appreciation of the “walls” in place when examining 
material exchanges between the insurers and other parts of the group” in 
order to safeguard the assets supporting policyholder obligations.12 
 
II. THE AMENDMENTS TO THE INSURANCE HOLDING 
 COMPANY SYSTEM  REGULATORY ACT AND 
 REGULATION CHANGE THE PLAYING FIELD FOR STATE 
 INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 
 
Supervisory colleges are authorized under the NAIC’s December 
2011 Amendments to the IHCA Model Act (the “Amended Model Act”), 
the model statute governing control over and acquisitions of insurance 
companies. 13   Generally, the Amendments strengthen a state insurance 
commissioner’s access to information so that he may better regulate group 
financial strength.  They affect a greater sharing of regulatory information 
among states and countries where the affiliates of an insurer conduct 
business, with the parent company’s central place of business designated as 
the lead regulatory authority.  More specifically, the Amendments 
authorize multi-state coordination of regulatory filings, authorize insurance 
commissioners’ participation in supervisory colleges, strengthen regulators’ 
access to group affiliate information, and provide for the assessment of 
group financial strength upon initial application for control of a U.S. 
insurer.14 
The implementation of supervisory colleges would not take away 
any of the state insurance commissioner’s power to regulate and supervise 
the insurers or their affiliates within its jurisdiction—on the contrary, it 
would afford them more power than they previously had before the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 See Draft Memorandum, supra note 3, at 3. 
11 See Statement of Susan E. Voss, supra note 1, at 8.!
12 See id. 
13 NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGS., AND GUIDELINES: 
INS. HOLDING CO. SYS. REGULATORY ACT § 7 (2011) [hereinafter MODEL ACT]. 
14 Id. §§ 6-7.  See, e.g., Campbell & Calbert, supra note 2, for a succinct 
summary of the Amendments. 
154          CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL         Vol. 19.1 
!!
Amendments to the IHCA.  The Amendments provide for an insurance 
regulator, and in particular, a state insurance commissioner, to participate 
in a supervisory college with other regulators in order to better supervisor a 
domestic insurer that is part of a group with international operations, and to 
ensure the insurer is in compliance with the state code.15 
Additionally, the Amendments make weighty changes to the ways 
in which state commissioners are empowered to oversee and examine not 
only domestic insurers, but also the insurer’s holding company and its 
affiliates outside the commissioner’s jurisdiction.16  To facilitate the best 
use of these new powers, the Amendments provide for a state insurance 
commissioner’s participation in Supervisory Colleges to enhance the 
regulation of insurers that are part of an insurance holding company system 
with international operations.  The hope is that examination of the entire 
group’s operations will enhance the commissioner’s ability to ascertain the 
potential enterprise risks posed by the holding company system and 
affiliates to the domestic insurer.  These changes can primarily be found in 
Sections 6 and 7 of the Amended Model Act.   
First, Section 6 addresses the insurance commissioner’s powers to 
obtain the information necessary to best examine an insurer.  Section 6A 
grants state insurance commissioners the authority to examine insurance-
company affiliates to “ascertain the financial condition of the insurer, 
including the enterprise risk to the insurer by the ultimate controlling party, 
or by any entity or combination of entities within the insurance holding 
company system . . . .”17  “Affiliate” is defined in Section 1A of the Model 
Act to mean, “a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more 
intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 MODEL ACT, supra note 13, § 7; For a discussion of the Amendments, see 
Memorandum from Debevoise & Plimpton LLP to Clients, DEBEVOISE & 
PLIMPTON LLP (Apr. 6, 2011), available at http://www.debevoise.com/files/ 
Publication/a096850b-2e74-40c1-a497-fbbca9cdce5c/Presentation/Publication 
Attachment/d4fdb451-ac27-46fa-9906-2012904fabc4/NAIC2011SpringNational 
Meeting.pdf; Daniel A. Rabinowitz, NAIC Approval of “Supervisory College” 
Leaves Key Implementation Issues Unresolved, 5 BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS—
INSURANCE LAW (2011), available at http://www.chadbourne.com/files/ 
Publication/b0bfb51a-ff95-4b41-ba76-cfa397b83f16/Presentation/Publication 
Attachment/19c14f19-e13c-4b4f-b2e4-da0bf56a7420/Rabinowitz_ 
BloombergArticle_April11.pdf. 
16  MODEL ACT, supra note 13, § 6; see also, Rabinowitz, supra note 15 
(discussing state insurance commissioner’s expansion of powers). 
17 Id. § 6A. 
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with, the person specified.”18 Additionally, “enterprise risk” is defined in 
Section 1F of the Model Act to mean, “any activity, circumstance, event or 
series of events involving one or more affiliates of an insurer that, if not 
remedied promptly, is likely to have a material adverse effect upon the 
financial condition or liquidity of the insurer or its insurance holding 
company system as a whole.”19 
Section 6B explains how the commissioner may gain access to this 
necessary information for examination.  Under Section 6B(1), the 
commission may order any insurer to, “produce such records, books, or 
other information papers in the possession of the insurer or its affiliates as 
are reasonably necessary to determine compliance.”20  If the commissioner 
deems such information necessary to determine compliance with the act, 
Section 6B(2) describes the procedure for obtaining information not in 
possession of the insurer.21  The commissioner may order an insurer to, 
“obtain access to such information pursuant to contractual relationships, 
statutory obligations, or other method.”22 In the event that an insurer does 
not comply, or cannot obtain the requested information, the insurer must 
provide to the commissioner a detailed explanation of its reasons for 
failure.23 The commissioner may then use his own discretion to determine 
whether the explanation is compelling, or whether it is without merit.  
Upon finding the explanation is without merit, after notice and hearing, the 
commissioner may then charge the insurer who failed to provide the 
information a penalty for each day of delay, or suspend or revoke the 
insurer’s license. 
Section 6E further extends how a commissioner may deal with an 
insurer that fails to produce documents, by providing the power, “to 
examine the affiliates to obtain the information,” and “to issue subpoenas, 
to administer oaths, and to examine under oath any person for purposes of 
determining compliance with this section.” 24  Failure to comply with a 
subpoena is punishable as contempt of court.25 
These changes are significant because prior to the Amendments the 
commissioner’s authority was considerably more restricted.  A !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Id. § 1A. 
19 Id. § 1F. 
20 Id. § 6B(1). 
21 Id. § 6B(2). 
22 MODEL ACT, supra note 13, § 6B(2). 
23 See id. § 6B(2). 
24 Id. § 6E (emphasis added). 
25 See Id. 
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commissioner could only examine an insurer’s affiliates in the limited 
situations where, “the regulator had ordered the insurer to produce copies 
of books and records that were ‘reasonably’ necessary in order to determine 
compliance with laws, and [where] the insurer had failed to comply with 
such order.”26  The Amended Model Act “extend[s] the extra-territorial 
reach of state insurance regulators to examine and control insurance 
holding companies and insurers beyond their state borders.”27  
Second, Section 7 provides for a state insurance commissioner’s 
participation in supervisory colleges.  Under Section 7A of the Model Act, 
the Commissioner is granted, “the power to participate in a supervisory 
college for any domestic insurer that is part of an insurance holding 
company system with international operations in order to determine 
compliance by the insurer with this Chapter.”28 
Section 7C further clarifies what the commissioner’s participation 
in the college will entail.  This section provides that the commissioner may 
participate in a supervisory college “with other regulators” to assess the 
“business strategy, financial position, legal and regulatory position, risk 
exposure, risk management and governance process” as part of his 
examination process of individual insurers in accordance with Section 6.29  
“Other regulators” include those other “state, federal and international 
regulatory agencies,” responsible for the supervision of the insurer and its 
affiliates.30 Section 7C also gives the commissioner the power to enter into 
agreements with other jurisdictions’ regulators to ensure cooperation, as 
long as those agreements are consistent with the confidentiality 
requirements provided in Section 831 of the Model Act.32 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Rabinowitz, supra note 15 (citing NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, MODEL 
LAWS, REGS., AND GUIDELINES: INSURANCE HOLDING COMPANY SYSTEM 
REGULATORY ACT § 440-1 (1993)). 
27 Mary Jane Wilson-Bilk et al., United States: NAIC Proposes Expansive New 
Governance, Risk Management and Reporting Duties on Insurance Holding 
Company Systems; A New Liability Profile Emerges for Directors and Senior 
Management, SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN LLP 1 (July 26, 2010), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=105416 (discussing 
development of the Amendments).  
28 MODEL ACT, supra note 13, § 7A. 
29 Id. § 7C. 
30 Id.!
31 Id. § 8 (discussing confidential treatment of information obtained by the 
commissioner in the course of an examination).!
32 Id. § 7C.!
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Additional Amendments of interest include the requirement that a 
holding company report its Enterprise Risk at least annually on the newly 
created “Form F.”33  Form F, originally discussed as a supplement to Form 
B, requires the ultimate controlling person of an insurer to file an annual 
report with the state commissioner, identifying material risks within the 
holding company system that could pose financial and/or reputational 
“contagion” to the insurer. 34  The form outlines ten areas of a holding 
company’s operations which could potentially pose Enterprise Risk to an 
insurer, including items such as: business plans of the insurance holding 
company for the next twelve months, identification of material concerns of 
holding company raised by supervisory colleges, and identification of any 
negative movement with rating agencies.35   
Section 8A, Confidential Treatment, of the Amended Model Act 
authorizes the commissioner to use the “documents, materials or other 
information in the furtherance of any regulatory or legal action brought as 
part of the commissioner’s official duties.  The information contained in 
Form F would fall under this description.  As such, the commissioner 
would be within his boundaries to share such information with members of 
a supervisory college, including foreign regulators. 36   To ensure 
compliance with all the adopted revisions, it is likely the NAIC will modify 
their current accreditation standards to guarantee State implementation of 
the changes into their respective insurance holding company acts. 
 
III. INTRODUCTION TO AN OVERVIEW OF SUPERVISORY 
 COLLEGES 
  
Succinctly put, “supervisory colleges are groups of regulators from 
different countries that work together to oversee large cross-border !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Anthony Roehl, NAIC Adopts Revised Holding Company System Model Act 
Requiring Enterprise Risk Disclosure, MORRIS MANNING & MARTIN LLP (Mar. 
23, 2011), http://www.mmmlaw.com/media-room/publications/newsletter/ naic-
adopts-revised-holding-company-system-model-act-requiring-enterprise-risk-
disclosure. !
34  Wilson-Bilk et al., supra note 27, at 7 (discussing the Enterprise Risk 
Report in its preliminary context of the “Annual Report”).  The Annual Report 
would have been a supplement to the existing Form B, but instead was made into 
its own Form F.  Id.; see also Roehl, supra note 33.!
35 See Roehl, supra note 33; see also Wilson-Bilk et al., supra note 27, for a 
discussion of the Form F development.!
36 Wilson-Bilk et al., supra note 27, at 8.!
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financial organizations.”37  They are not decision-making bodies; rather, 
they are designed to share prudential information about cross-border 
institutions.38  Supervisory colleges are also meant to supervise companies 
at the group level, rather than legal entity level.39 
Supervisory colleges serve to provide a forum that facilitates a 
more comprehensive view of “all the activities of a multi-faceted, multi-
jurisdictional enterprise that could present a systemic risk to the individual 
enterprise and the financial system as a whole.40  They purport to act as a 
further element of an international framework for group-wide supervision, 
and function to provide a permanent forum for cooperation and 
communication between its involved members.41  Furthermore, supervisory 
colleges operate as a mechanism to develop cooperation and exchange of 
information among involved supervisors,42 and to coordinate supervisory 
activities on a group-wide scale under both baseline and worst-case 
scenarios.43 
Proponents of supervisory colleges emphasize the numerous 
potential benefits the forums could bring to the insurance industry.  
Supervisory colleges would enhance supervisory cooperation and 
coordination of internationally active groups by providing a uniform forum 
for crisis management, 44  help to close regulatory gaps, and increase 
information flow between home and host supervisors.45  As opposed to a 
temporary committee that is organized for a unique purpose in response to 
a crisis, supervisory colleges are flexible and permanent, enhancing  
cooperation and coordination among supervisory authorities.46  They would 
assist in avoiding redundant work because of the expanded coordination 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Wilson-Bilk et al., supra note 27, at 9.  !
38 Duncan Alford, Supervisory Colleges: The Global Financial Crisis and 
Improving International Supervisory Coordination, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 57, 
78 (2010).  !
39 Rabinowitz, supra note 15.!
40 Wilson-Bilk et al., supra note 27, at 9.!
41  INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORS, Guidance 
Paper on the Use of Supervisory Colleges in Group-Wide Supervision, Guidance 
Paper No. 3.8, § 1, ¶ 14 (Oct. 2009) [hereinafter IAIS Guidance Paper]. !
42 Id.!
43 Id. § 5.3, ¶ 62-72.!
44 Id. § 5.3.!
45 Id. § 5.1, ¶ 38; see also id. § 5.3, ¶ 63.!
46 Id. § 4, ¶ 34.!
2012               SUPERVISORY COLLEGES                                    159 
!
and communication, and would help to maintain the necessary levels of 
protection for policyholders.47 
Supervisory colleges are also designed to contribute to the stability 
of financial markets overall.48  Aggregated information may help to shed 
light on systemic risks that would not have been identified with an 
individual entity analysis.  In particular, a supervisory college may be able 
to consider the impact of a particular group on the insurance industry, on 
other sectors of an economy, as well as any systemic risks the group may 
present.49  Additionally, a supervisory college would facilitate information 
collection and analysis at the group level, including the compilation and 
analysis of information available on risk exposures, financial soundness, 
and governance of group entities.50  This creates a forum for the insurer to 
provide clarity to the supervisors, with respect to its operations and 
strategy, at a group-wide, as opposed to an individual entity, level.51 
The concept of supervisory colleges within the insurance sector is 
not entirely unique.  Europe has employed similar concepts with 
coordinating committees and the United States has a process in place for 
supervisory cooperation across its state based regulation system. 52   In 
particular, the European Union has utilized colleges to supervise financial 
institutions operating in multiple Member States.53 
Supervisory colleges would not replace entity level supervision; 
rather they would supplement that solo level supervision of single entities 
within a group, by using the exchange of information to coordinate 
supervisory activities on a group-wide basis.54  Effectively, the operation of 
a supervisory college is based on mutual trust and confidence among the 
involved supervisors. 55   Functionally, supervisory colleges will work 
differently depending upon the circumstances of the group and the 
jurisdiction in which the group operates.56 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 IAIS Guidance Paper, supra note 41, § 5.3.!
48 Id. § 2.2, ¶ 28; § 5.2, ¶ 57.!
49 Id. § 5.1, ¶ 42, § 5.2, ¶ 57.!
50 Id. § 5.1, ¶ 42.!
51 Id. § 5.2, ¶ 60.!
52 Id. §1, ¶ 17.!
53  See generally Duncan Alford, The Lamfalussy Process and EU Bank 
Regulation: Another Step on the Road to Pan-European Regulation?, 25 ANN. 
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 389 (2006).!
54 IAIS Guidance Paper, supra note 41, § 2.1, ¶ 19-21.!
55 Id. § 2.2, ¶ 25.!
56 Id. § 5.1, ¶ 46.!
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Supervisory colleges will be particularly useful because, as the 
IAIS guidance paper on the use of the colleges points out, “[t]here is a high 
level of divergence in the insurance industry regarding the nature of 
organisations [sic], the nature of regulation and supervision, and the 
development of markets and supervisory regimes in different 
jurisdictions.” 57   Supervisory colleges are strongly recommended for 
insurance groups that operate in multiple jurisdictions.58  More specifically, 
they are necessary where:  “significant cross-border activities and/or intra-
group transactions are conducted”;59 “effective group-wide supervision is 
essential to the protection of policyholders”;60 and, “effective group-wide 
supervision is essential to the financial stability of the market as a whole.”61 
 
IV. THE DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION IN 
SUPERVISORY COLLEGES MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH 
THE APPLICABLE CONFIDENTIALITY REQUIREMENTS 
 
A major concern with the use of supervisory colleges is ensuring 
that the dissemination of information is consistent with the applicable 
confidentiality requirements.  It will be the group-wide supervisor’s role to 
gather the relevant information, but it will also be his role to disseminate 
that information in accordance with the pertinent confidentiality 
agreements.62  Because there is no global law or regulation on confidential 
information, this responsibility to handle sensitive information 
appropriately will fall solely to the individual supervisor and the college.63 
Section 8 of the Amended Model Act discusses how a 
commissioner may use confidential documents, obtained in the 
examination process of an insurer, to assist in the performance of his 
duties.  Amongst the included parties with which the commissioner may 
share this information, are members of a supervisory college.  The section 
states that a commissioner, “may share documents, materials or other 
information, including the confidential and privileged documents, materials 
or information . . . with other state, federal and international regulatory 
agencies . . . including members of any supervisory college described in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 Id. § 6.1, ¶ 74.!
58 Id. § 6.1, ¶ 75.!
59 Id.!
60 IAIS Guidance Paper, supra note 41, § 6.1, ¶ 75.!
61 Id.!
62 Id. § 4, ¶ 36.!
63 Id. § 6.2, ¶ 102.!
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Section 7, provided that the recipient agrees in writing to maintain the 
confidentiality and privileged status of the document.”64  As previously 
discussed, Section 6 of the Amended Model Act provides for a 
commissioner to gain access to extensive information from both an insurer 
and its affiliates as long as he deems it required for an accurate 
examination.65 
These confidentiality agreements should touch upon when and 
what information can be disclosed to third parties and the insurance 
group. 66   Pertinent parties could include local supervisory/regulatory 
bodies, international organizations, or the public where appropriate. 67  
Agreements should also lay out any differences in the confidentiality 
requirements of information sharing during a normal basis, and sharing 
during a crisis situation. 
Despite the college’s reliance on supervisors laying all known 
information on the table, in certain circumstance, a “’need to know’ basis” 
for information sharing may be appropriate. 68   Such restrictions would !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64  MODEL ACT, supra note 13, § 8C(1) (additionally providing that the 
recipient of such information in a supervisory college has “verified in writing the 
legal authority to maintain confidentiality”).!
65 Id. § 6.!
66 The Basel Committee’s Good Practice Principles on Supervisory Colleges, 
recommends what to do before passing confidential information received from a 
fellow supervisor to a third part with a legitimate interest, as well as what to do in 
the event that a supervisor is legally compelled to disclose such information.  Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, Good Practice Principles on Supervisory 
Colleges (Oct. 2010), at 22.  First, in the event of a legitimate third party request 
for confidential information, the Basel Committee recommends that, “[p]rior to 
passing information to the third party, the recipient should consult with and seek 
agreement from the supervisor that originated the information, who may attach 
conditions to the release of information, including whether the intended additional 
recipient is or can be bound to hold the information confidential.”  Id.  Second, in 
the event that a supervisor is legally compelled to disclose information obtained 
confidentially to a third party, including a third party supervisory authority, the 
Basel Committee recommends that, “information that has been provided in 
accordance with a statement of mutual cooperation, [the supervisor that has been 
legally compelled to disclose] should promptly notify the supervisor that originated 
the information, indicating what information it is compelled to release and the 
circumstances surrounding its release.” Id. In all instances, the supervisor 
disclosing the information should use his best efforts to maintain the 
confidentiality of the information to the extent permitted by law.  Id. !
67 IAIS Guidance Paper, supra note 41, § 5.3, ¶ 73.!
68 Id. § 5.3, ¶ 65.!
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likely be dictated in previously drafted confidentiality agreements to avoid 
unintended turmoil.  For instance, during a crisis, the premise of 
widespread information may need to be limited to ensure timely responses. 
The timing and content of information to be disclosed to third 
parties must also be deliberated carefully.  Group-wide supervisors may 
find it wise to establish appropriate contacts with other sector participants, 
but they must consider their existing relationships within the college, and 
weigh these relationships against the potential value of the information 
additional new members may be able to provide.69 
Members must also be aware of any existing legal or jurisdictional 
restraints.  Supervisory colleges do not override the various individual 
jurisdiction’s’ legal responsibilities or standing supervisory relationships.70  
Where there are legal constraints to information sharing in a particular 
jurisdiction, supervisors looking to participate in the college should address 
these constraints to maintain the effectiveness of the college.71  Ultimately, 
a supervisory college will need to safeguard against any plan going beyond 
the authority of a supervisor, or surpassing any jurisdiction’s existing legal 
framework.72 
An alternative method of confidentiality to a traditional 
confidentiality agreement is a Memorandum of Understanding (“MoUs”).  
MoUs are information sharing agreements that ensure confidentiality and 
define the parameters in which information can be used.73  They are formal 
statements of mutual cooperation that outline procedures and provisions for 
confidentiality.74  A MoU should recognize that information must be shared 
between the relevant authorities in two countries in order to facilitate 
effective consolidated supervision of institutions that operate across their 
national borders.75   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 Id. § 4, ¶ 37.!
70 Id. § 5.1, ¶ 40.!
71 Id. § 6.1, ¶ 77.!
72 Id. § 6.2, ¶ 80.!
73 IAIS Guidance Paper, supra note 41, § 5.2, ¶ 54.!
74  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 66, at 20.  The 
publication further emphasizes that MoUs must be underpinned by, “trust and a 
network of relationships that are required for effective information sharing, 
particularly where confidential information is concerned.” Id.!
75  Additionally the MoU between the two countries should recognize the 
practice of information sharing in order to facilitate “solo supervision of group 
entities in the host jurisdiction.” Id.  The Basel Committee identified information 
sharing to be “contact during the authorisation [sic] and licensing process, during 
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Jurisdictions that are part of the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on 
Cooperation an Information Exchange (“IAIS MMoU”) are required to 
have their legislative regimes assessed to ensure strict confidentiality 
requirements are met as a precondition for joint supervisory activity.76  If 
each member of the supervisory college were a part of the IAIS MMoU, 
there would be no need for individual bilateral MoUs between the 
members.77  The IAIS MMoU allows regulators in different countries to 
work together in overseeing insurers, and it has 17 jurisdictions—though 
currently none are US regulators.78  A subgroup of the NAIC’s SMI Task 
Force working on the issue of supervisory colleges was given the task of 
surveying state laws to better see if states could participate in the IAIS 
MMoU.79 
 
V. THE FEDERAL INSURANCE OFFICE’S AUTHORIZATION 
OF THE UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN COVERED 
AGREEMENTS AND THE POTENTIAL FOR PREEMPTION 
OF STATE LAWS 
 
The Federal Insurance Office (“FIO”) Act authorizes the United 
States to jointly negotiate and enter into Covered Agreements with foreign 
governments, authorities, or regulatory bodies, and once entered into, 
authorizes the FIO to preempt a state insurance measure that conflicts with 
the Covered Agreement.80  A Covered Agreement is defined by the Act to 
be “a written bilateral or multilateral agreement regarding prudential 
measures with respect to the business of insurance,” entered into between !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
supervision of ongoing activities and during the handling of problem institutions.” 
Id.!
76 IAIS Guidance Paper, supra note 41, § 5.2, ¶ 54.!
77 Id. § 6.2, ¶ 103.!
78 Matthew Sturdevant, Connecticut Insurance Regulators Join Forces With 
Swiss Counterparts, HARTFORD COURANT (Sept. 23, 2011), 
http://blogs.courant.com/connecticut_insurance/2011/09/connecticut-insurance-
regulato-1.html. !
79 NAIC Pursues International Agenda, NAIC UPDATE (Deloitte LLP), Spring 
2010, at 7.!
80 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 502, 124 Stat. 1376, 1587 (2010).  A “state insurance measure” is 
defined by the Act to include “any State law, regulation, administrative ruling, 
bulletin, guideline or practice relating to or affecting prudential measures 
applicable to insurance or reinsurance.”  Id.!
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the United States and a foreign entity that relates to the business of 
insurance in order to achieve a level of protection “substantially 
equivalent” to that received under State regulation. 81  This means that the 
covered agreement must effectuate at least the same level of protection for 
insurance consumers as they receive under state regulation. 82   This 
preemption provision is awakened when a state measure is inconsistent 
with a Covered Agreement, and produces less favorable treatment for a 
non-U.S. insurer whose domiciliary jurisdiction is party to the 
Agreement.83 
Imagine a situation where a state joins a supervisory college with a 
non-U.S. member, and that state shares confidential information with the 
foreign entity.  If that foreign entity were to share that information with its 
government, and that foreign government were to decide it did not like 
what it saw, it could potentially used the information obtained from the 
supervisory college as leverage to wrangle the U.S. into a Covered 
Agreement that afforded the foreign government’s insurers more 
protection/similar treatment by a state that was previously afforded.  
Presented with this new information, the U.S. government may feel 
pressured into a Covered Agreement.  This may not be a bad thing, and the 
scenario is grossly obscure and unspecific, but should it be decided that the 
state measure now violates the new Covered Agreement and must be 
preempted, the state may be worse off than it was before participating in, 
and sharing information with, the supervisory college.  The chances of this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 Id.  More specifically, the covered agreement may be entered into between 
the United States and “one or more foreign governments, authorities, or regulatory 
entities.”  Id.  Additionally, the agreement must employ “prudential measures” in 
achieving said level of protection for insurance consumers.  Id.!
82 The phrase “substantially equivalent to the level of protection achieved” is 
defined by the Act to mean that, “the prudential measures of a foreign government, 
authority, or regulatory entity achieve a similar outcome in consumer protection as 
the outcome achieved under State insurance or reinsurance regulation.”  § 502, 124 
Stat. at 1587.  See e.g., Statement of Susan E. Voss, supra note 1, at 7.  Voss 
additionally pointed out that the FIO does not have general supervisory or 
regulatory authority over the business of insurance, but that the NAIC was willing 
to work with the FIO in terms of suggestions for improvements.  Id. at 7-8.!
83 § 502, 124 Stat. at 1583 (“A State insurance measure shall be preempted 
pursuant to this section or section 314 if . . . the measure—(A) results in less 
favorable treatment of a non-United States insurer domiciled in a foreign 
jurisdiction that is subject to a covered agreement than a United States insurer 
domiciled, licensed, or otherwise admitted in that State; and (B) is inconsistent 
with a covered agreement.”).!
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happening, if at all, are most likely few and far between, but states should 
be aware of the potential consequences that the FIO’s preemption provision 
could have, when it is examined in conjunction with the role of foreign 
governments and their possible access to confidential information through 
supervisory colleges. 
 
VI. CONNECTICUT AS A CASE STUDY FOR RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE INVOLVEMENT WITH 
SUPERVISORY COLLEGES AND INTERNATIONAL 
MEMBERS 
 
Connecticut Insurance Commissioner Thomas B. Leonardi has 
been a proponent of the proposals recommended by the NAIC for the 
Amended Model Act since his appointment in February 2011.  According 
to Commissioner Leonardi, “The model Holding Company Act would 
allow everyone to come to the table together, share information in a unique 
way, and would inevitably lead to more collaboration and cooperation in 
the insurance market.”84 
Although Connecticut has not yet officially adopted the changes 
into its insurance holding company system act, the state has made several 
moves towards international coordination and supervision.  A recent 
agreement between the Connecticut Insurance Department and the Swiss 
Financial Supervisory Authority provides for both parties to work together 
to regulate insurers. 85   The Connecticut Courant reported that, “A 
memorandum of understanding between the two is the formal basis for 
cooperation and coordination, including investigative assistance and the 
exchange of information, [according to] Donna Tommelleo, the insurance 
department's spokeswoman.” 86   The Courant additionally reported 
statements by Connecticut Insurance Commissioner Leonardi saying that:  
“‘The insurance industry is an international one and continues to expand its 
global reach . . . .  Regulating it cannot stop at the border and must be 
looked at in its totality.  This commitment will allow Connecticut and 
Swiss regulators to work effectively together and ensure market stability 
for consumer protection.’”87 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84  Pullman & Comley LLC, A Conversation With Connecticut’s New 
Insurance Commissioner Thomas B. Leonardi, CT INS. LAW UPDATE, 2, 
http://www.pullcom.com/news-publications-277.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).!
85 Sturdevant, supra note 78.!
86 Id.!
87 Id.!
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Connecticut also has an agreement already in place with De 
Nederlandsche Bank in the Netherlands which is similar to the one between 
the state and Switzerland.88  In addition to Switzerland and the Netherlands, 
Connecticut has a third agreement pending with the Germany Federal 
Financial Supervisory Authority (“BaFin”).89  The agreements with these 
countries in particular were pursued because Swiss Re and Munich Re are 
examples of companies that have a presence in Europe and Connecticut.90  
Furthermore, Connecticut’s Insurance Department is one of at least two 
states that have applied to be a part of the IAIS MMoU on Cooperation and 
Information Exchange.91 
 
VII. THE NAIC’S FACILITATION OF US AND INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATOR PARTICIPATION IN SUPERVISORY 
COLLEGES, AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
INSURANCE SECTOR WORKING TOWARDS 
INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION 
 
Within the last year the NAIC took serious steps to facilitate states 
participation in supervisory colleges.  The NAIC recently created an online 
form that allows international regulators to request a particular State’s 
participation in an international supervisory college.92 The “International 
Supervisory Colleges Request Form” is submitted to the insurance group’s 
appropriate leader and/or domestic supervisor who in turn will contact the 
international regulator directly.93 
Former NAIC President Susan E. Voss, is quoted on the NAIC 
website as saying,  
 
U.S. insurance regulators recognize the important 
role supervisory colleges can play in providing a 
forum to foster improved international 
communication and coordination regarding the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88 Id.!
89 Id.!
90 Id.!
91 Sturdevant, supra note 78. See discussion of IAIS MMoU on Cooperation 
and Information Exchange supra p. 163.!
92 Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, NAIC Develops International Supervisory 
Colleges Request Form (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.naic.org/Releases/2011_docs 
/international_request_form.htm (announcing the web-based tool to facilitate 
coordination of US insurance regulators’ participation in supervisory colleges).!
93 Id.!
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oversight of significant global insurance operations 
. . . .  We hope this web-based tool will aid 
international regulators to promptly notify the 
appropriate U.S. state insurance regulators 
regarding a particular supervisory college and 
secure the appropriate representation.94 
 
Furthermore, supervisory colleges are not the only way the NAIC and the 
IAIS are working towards international supervisory coordination.  There 
are two other significant solutions worth mentioning: one, the Supervisory 
Forum; and two, the “Common Framework for the Supervision of 
Internationally Active Insurance Groups” (“ComFrame”).  The NAIC 
chairs the Supervisory Forum at the IAIS.95  In addition to the increased use 
of supervisory colleges, state regulators are advocating the use of the 
Supervisory Forum to improve coordination.96  Former NAIC President 
Susan E. Voss described the objective of the Supervisory Forum as a way 
“to strengthen the effectiveness of insurance supervision and to foster 
convergence of supervisory practices through the exchange of real-world 
experiences.”97 
 First proposed by the IAIS,98 ComFrame lays out how supervisors 
around the globe can work together to supervise internationally active 
insurance groups.99  The GSI Working Group is aiding in this project by 
providing its own insight on how to identify internationally active 
insurance groups, and how to resolve jurisdictional issues.100  Participation 
in the development of ComFrame is an effective way for the GSI Working 
Group to further its original task to find a method of supervision that will 
allow state insurance regulators to monitor the combined capital adequacy 
of all entities within an insurance holding company system, including 
internationally active insurers.101  
There has been some concern that ComFrame would not be 
consistent with NAIC principles of state autonomy.  The GSI Working 
Group responded to this concern by stating that, “given the uniqueness and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 Id.!
95 Statement of Susan E. Voss, supra note 1, at 189.!
96 Id.!
97  Id at 189-90 (comparing the Supervisory Forum as akin to the multi-
jurisdictional coordination framework that the United States uses). !
98 DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, supra note 15, at 4.!
99 Id. !
100 Id. 
101 Id.  
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complexity of large insurance group issues, ComFrame should focus on 
general principles and high-level concepts, rather than specific compliance 
issues and capital requirements that more likely would be a source of 
conflict.”102  Former NAIC President, Susan Voss, further characterized 
ComFrame as a “multijurisdictional” approach to supervision. 103   She 
stated that, “If done right, ComFrame has the potential to create a 
multijurisdictional approach to supervision that emphasizes robust 
oversight and cooperation while maintaining the proper balance between 
home and host jurisdictions.”104 
 
VIII.  POTENTIAL OBSTACLES AND CONCERNS PRESENTED BY 
SUPERVISORY COLLEGES 
 
The design of a supervisory college turns on the assumption that all 
regulators will have the goal of group solvency and stability above all in 
mind.  This may not be the case.  Each individual regulator may be more 
focused on his own relevant market or sector in his own country or state.105  
In addition to a lack of consistency between regulator’s jurisdictional goals, 
there may also be an inconsistency within groups themselves.  Entity-level 
risks vary within a group, and regulators may not agree on how each 
individual entity should be treated.106  These differing objectives can be 
illustrated through how different regulators “in favor” of different entities 
within a group, may want to treat the group’s liquidity differently.  Imagine 
a scenario where a U.S.-based insurance company is owned by a foreign 
entity.  In this case, it is possible that the state insurance regulator will most 
want to keep capital with the insurer, while the foreign holding company 
regulator will want it to flow up as dividends.107   These inter-affiliate 
dividends are a potential “zero-sum” problem that could arise in a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102 Id. at 4-5 (explaining the GSI Working Group’s response to such concerns); 
Susan Voss expressed a similar sentiment on ComFrame’s limited purpose, when 
she said that it, “should neither be a platform for pushing a global capital standard 
for insurance, nor create prescriptive ways to promote a particular means for 
solvency standards, nor create additional layers of regulation.”  Statement of Susan 
E. Voss, supra note 1, at 178. 
103 Id. at 190. 
104 Id.  
105 Rabinowitz, supra note 15. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
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supervisory college,108 and impede on the ultimate success of coordination 
and cooperation. 
Supplemental to the above concern, is the potential for weakness 
due to a supervisory college’s strong reliance on supervisor cooperation 
and trust.  Because there is no mandatory mediation process to resolve 
supervisor disagreement on an action, supervisors are still legally free act 
on their own and not in coordination with their peers.109  It is not a far-
fetched argument to make that supervisors will first strive to protect their 
national interest, and the rights of the residents within their jurisdiction, 
before conceding to compromises that may not be in their jurisdiction’s 
best interest.  This focus could cause inconsistencies in resolutions if 
individual supervisors do not approach issues with the college’s end goals 
in mind. 
An additional concern is that the decision-making schemes for 
supervisory colleges are not consistent with the NAIC.  In particular, there 
is concern that international supervisors may be more accustomed to one 
lead supervisor making the decisions, whereas the NAIC fosters a system 
of “consensus” decision-making. 110   The GSI Working Group has 
responded to such a concern by addressing the role of the “group 
supervisor” of a supervisory college, and affirming that such supervisor 
will primarily have a coordinating, rather than decision-making function.111 
It has already been stressed that in recent years, international 
coordination has been an essential goal for the NAIC.  Each project, 
solution, and suggestion the NAIC has proposed was ultimately made with 
the U.S. and global insurance industry’s success in mind; however, it 
should be noted that opening doors in one area could leave potential holes 
in another.  With this in mind, another potential concern resides in the 
NAIC’s recently adopted “Own Risk and Solvency Assessment Model 
Act” (“ORSA”) that requires an insurance company, or insurance group, to 
produce a self-risk assessment report that must be filed with the insurer’s 
state insurance commissioner. 112 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
108 Id. 
109 IAIS Guidance Paper, supra note 41, § 5.1, ¶ 40. 
110 DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, supra note 15, at 5. 
111 Id. 
112 On September 12, 2012, the NAIC adopted the Draft version of the Model 
Act with some minor changes. The heart of ORSA, the “ORSA Summary Report,” 
is detailed in Section 5 of the Model Act. It reads as follows: “[u]pon the 
commissioner’s request, and no more than once each year, an insurer shall submit 
to the commissioner an ORSA Summary Report or any combination of reports that 
together contain the information described in the ORSA Guidance Manual, 
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Several concerns were raised at the NAIC’s Spring 2011 meeting 
in regards to the proposed U.S. “ORSA” plan.  One concern addressed 
confidentiality issues in particular, pointing out that information requested 
by the ORSA would have the potential to expose a company’s competitive 
advantage because the document would contain models that included 
competitively sensitive and forward-looking information.113   Should the 
ORSA reports ever be shared within a supervisory college in the future, this 
concern would literally be projected onto an international level.  When 
considering whether to allow an ORSA report to be shared and discussed in 
a supervisory college, the benefit of potentially exposing a risk through a 
window into an insurance company’s capital levels in light of its unique 
business strategy would have to be carefully weighed against the detriment 
if such valuable information were to be abused.  However, this does not 
seem to be a major concern of the NAIC.   
Section 8 of the ORSA Model Act discusses confidentiality, but 
not without many opportunities for sharing.  After initially addressing that 
all information collected by commissioners will be recognized as being 
proprietary and to contain trade secrets, subsection A provides a caveat for 
disclosure: “However, the commissioner is authorized to use the 
documents, materials or other information in the furtherance of any 
regulatory or legal action brought as a part of the commissioner’s official 
duties.”114  Subsection C(1) extrapolates the commissioner’s ability to share 
information in order to assist the commissioner in the performance of his 
regulatory duties, and specifically addresses a commissioner’s ability to 
share such confidential information within a supervisory college.115  With !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
applicable to the insurer and/or the insurance group of which it is a member. 
Notwithstanding any request from the commissioner, if the insurer is a member of 
an insurance group, the insurer shall submit the report(s) required by this 
subsection if the commissioner is the lead state commissioner of the insurance 
group as determined by the procedures within the Financial Analysis Handbook 
adopted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.”  NAT’L ASS’N 
INS. COMM’RS. RISK MANAGEMENT AND OWN RISK AND SOLVENCY ASSESSMENT 
MODEL ACT, §§ 1, 5 (2012) [hereinafter ORSA MODEL ACT]. 
113 DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, supra note 15, at 5-6. 
114 ORSA MODEL ACT, supra note 112, § 8(A). 
115 ORSA Section 8(C)(1) provides in relevant part: “In order to assist in the 
performance of the commissioner’s regulatory duties, the commissioner: May upon 
request, share documents, materials or other ORSA-related information, including 
the confidential and privileged documents, materials or information subject to 
subsection A, including proprietary and trade secret documents and materials with 
other state, federal and international financial regulatory agencies, including 
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this allowance for sharing, the NAIC is likely predicting scenarios where 
the ORSA Report becomes a substantial part of the Commissioner’s 
evaluative and investigatory process when evaluating an insurance 
company that is within its jurisdiction.  Section 8 further expands the 
commissioner’s ability to share ORSA-related confidential information in 
supervisory colleges by including the complementary subsection C(2), 
which provides for a commissioner’s ability to also receive confidential, 
ORSA-related materials while participating in a supervisory college 
forum.116  
Abuse of confidential information obtained through ORSA-related 
materials may not manifest in a typical breach; however, members of a 
supervisory college may become privy to sensitive information that could 
alter their personal opinions as to whether they would choose to do 
business with a particular insurer in the future after gaining access to a 
report that literally outlines the company’s greatest risks. The NAIC may 
implement endless provisions to ensure that the confidential nature of an 
ORSA Summary Report is legally upheld, but it would be impossible to 
control how such information could potentially influence each individual’s 
private judgments. Despite group discussions within the forum, whether 
disclosure of a particular insurer’s risks actually warrants such trepidation 
in future dealings will be a matter each member alone will ultimately 
decide. 
Yet another concern lies with the Form A.  Supervisory colleges’ 
influences on Form A are yet to be determined.  All acquisitions of 
insurance companies are subject to prior approval via submission of the 
Form A under the IHCA.  Where a state regulator normally feels neutral 
towards an acquisition as long as the transaction does not affect 
policyholder protection or insurer solvency, other interested parties might 
have a more biased view of controversial terms, like the purchase price.117  
This could potentially pose a problem if the domiciliary regulator is part of 
a supervisory college with these other interested parties.  For instance, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
members of any supervisory college . . . .” ORSA MODEL ACT, supra note 112, § 
8(C)(1). 
116 ORSA Section 8(C)(2) provides in relevant part: “In order to assist in the 
performance of the commissioner’s regulatory duties, the commissioner: May 
receive documents, materials or other ORSA-related information, including 
otherwise confidential and privileged documents, materials or information, 
including proprietary and trade-secret information or documents, from regulatory 
officials of other foreign or domestic jurisdictions, including members of any 
supervisory college . . . .”  ORSA MODEL ACT, supra note 112, §8(C)(2). 
117 Rabinowitz, supra note 15. 
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group that is selling its insurance entity will want to be sure that the 
purchase price is fair, and likely, is a smart deal.  As such, the regulator 
representing the interests of this holding company may feel more inclined 
to frame the situation to the state commissioner in a light more favorable to 
the holding company. 118   This could pose problems in the form of 
unnecessary complexity during the Form A proceedings, as well as 
misguided decisions by state commissioners receiving biased advice.   
Issues with inter-collegiate influence could cause problems of its 
own if the regulatory community decides to ostracize a particular 
commissioner that does not heed ill-motivated advice.  If a domestic 
regulator proposed that the supervisory college was treating one of his 
domestic insurers too aggressively, they could run the risk of effectively 
excluding themselves from discussions henceforth.  Furthermore, conflict 
at this level has the potential to affect not only the commissioner’s personal 
status in the college, but also his domestic insurers if his fellow regulators 
choose to collectively lash out as a punishment.  It is worth re-mentioning 
that participants in these colleges represent supervisors and regulators from 
jurisdictions across borders, as well as jurisdictions across sectors.  How 
each participant is connected with one another is likely to be incestual at 
times, and these relationships could just as easily be exploited in a negative 
manner as they could be used to the college’s advantage.  Regulators are 
people, and congruency between people—especially those who don’t 
choose to work together—is not a guarantee.  
 
 
 
 
 
IX. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER SUPERVISORY COLLEGES ARE 
OUTSIDE ‘BUSINESS OF INSURANCE’ AS DEFINED IN THE 
MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT 
 
A. THE ‘BUSINESS OF INSURANCE’ AS DEFINED IN THE 
MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT 
 
There are potential legal challenges that arise with the new powers 
afforded to a state insurance commissioner under the Amendments to the 
IHCA.  In particular, there are issues concerning whether a state insurance !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
118 Id. 
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commissioner’s new powers are within the accepted definition of the 
“business of insurance” under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.  Policing 
enterprise risk is outside the traditional realm of policyholder protection, 
and a commissioner’s involvement in a supervisory college is more likely 
to focus on enterprise risks rather than policyholder interest.119  
Put succinctly, the McCarran-Ferguson Act (hereafter “the Act”) is 
the response by Congress to a Supreme Court decision that would have 
placed regulation of insurance in the hands of the Federal government 
pursuant to the interstate Commerce Clause.120  The Act states that the 
“business of insurance . . . shall be subject to the laws of the several States 
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business,” and that “[n]o 
Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any 
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of 
insurance.”121  As such, what is outside the “business of insurance,” is 
outside the Act’s immunity, and thus subject to Federal regulation. 
The Supreme Court decided three major cases to shape the present 
day definition of what constitutes the “business of insurance” under the 
Act.122  First, in Security & Exchange Commission v. National Securities, 
Inc., the Court highlighted that the Act “did not purport to make the states 
supreme in regulating all activities of insurance companies; its language 
refers not to the persons or companies who are subject to state regulation, 
but to laws ‘regulating the business of insurance.’”123  The case involved a 
merger between two insurance companies that the state insurance 
commissioner believed to be fraudulent and borne from ill intent.124  The 
commissioner argued that if the Securities Exchange Act were to apply, it 
would supersede the state laws in place; however, the SEC argued that 
there was no conflict between the state and federal law, because the 
applicable state statutes did not give the state insurance commissioner the 
power to determine whether the interested parties in the merger had made 
full disclosure.125   
The court held that it did not believe that “a state statute aimed at 
protecting the interests of those who own stock in insurance companies !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
119 Id. 
120 1 LEE R. RUSS ET. AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 2:4 (2009). 
121 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2006). 
122 2 JOYCE PALOMAR, TITLE INS. LAW § 15:4 (2011). 
123 SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459 (1969) (emphasis in original). 
124 Id. at 455.  According to the amended complaint, National Securities had 
concocted a fraudulent scheme that centered around a merger between a insurance 
company they controlled and a second insurance company.  Id.  
125 Id. at 457. 
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comes within the sweep of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.”126  Therefore, the 
court held that such a statute was not an attempt to regulate with ‘business 
of insurance’ as the phrase is used in the Act.127  The Court went on to 
distinguish the ‘business of insurance’ from the activities of insurance 
companies in general, by narrowing the scope of the definition to concern 
only those statutes aimed at protecting the relationship between the 
insurance company and the policyholder. 128   Because the activity in 
question involved the insurance company’s relationship with its 
stockholders, not its policyholders, the court found that such activity was 
not within the ‘business of insurance.’129 
In the second major case, the Supreme Court in Group Life and 
Health Insurance v. Royal Drug Co. proposed a three-prong test to 
determine whether an activity falls within the Act’s scope of the ‘business 
of insurance.’130  This test is still used by courts today.  The facts of Royal 
Drug concerned agreements between the insurance company and local 
pharmacies, requiring the insured to pay only $2 for prescription drugs.131 
The Court began its examination of whether these agreements were within 
the Act’s business of insurance by emphasizing what had already been 
decided in National Securities—that the ‘business of insurance’ was 
categorically distinguishable from the business of insurance companies.  
From here the Court’s opinion laid out three key points of consideration 
when determining whether an activity falls within the business of 
insurance.  First, the Court determined that the “significance of 
underwriting or spreading of risk [is] an indispensible characteristic of 
insurance.”132  The insurance company argued that these agreements fell 
within the scope of ‘spreading risk’ because such agreements would reduce 
the premiums policyholders would have to pay in the long run.133  The 
Court adamantly disagreed with this argument and held that: 
 
By agreeing with pharmacies on the maximum 
prices it will pay for drugs, Blue Shield effectively 
reduces the total amount it must pay to its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
126 Id.  
127 Id. 
128 Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. at 460. 
129  Id.   
130 PALOMAR, supra note 122. 
131 Grp. Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 207 (1979). 
132 Id. at 212. 
133 Id. at 214. 
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policyholders. The Agreements thus enable Blue 
Shield to minimize costs and maximize profits. 
Such cost-savings arrangements may well be 
sound business practice, and may well inure 
ultimately to the benefit of policyholders in the 
form of lower premiums, but they are not the 
‘business of insurance.’134 
 
Because the arrangements with the pharmacies did not spread policyholder 
risk, they did not satisfy the first prong. 
Second, the Court extrapolated that Congress’ primary concern in 
enacting the Act was, “‘[t]he relationship between insurer and insured, the 
type of policy which could be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and 
enforcement-these were the core of the ‘business of insurance.’”135 It then 
held that the cost-saving effect the agreements produced for policyholders 
was not enough to satisfy the second prong’s insurer-insured relationship 
standard.136   The Court then again stressed the difference between the 
‘business of insurance’ and the business of the insurance company, stating 
that if activity such as the agreements in question were deemed included, 
then almost every business decision of an insurance company could be 
included in the ‘business of insurance[,]’” and that “[s]uch a result would 
be plainly contrary to the statutory language.”137 
Finally, the Court in Royal Drug consulted a brief legislative 
history of the Act, concluding that Congress intended to shield intra-
industry cooperative rate making from anti-trust laws because such activity 
was essential to underwriting risks accurately.138  Staying true to this intent, 
the Court held that, “[t]here is not the slightest suggestion in the legislative 
history that Congress in any way contemplated that arrangements such as 
the Pharmacy Agreements in this case, which involve the mass purchase of 
goods and services from entities outside the insurance industry, are the 
‘business of insurance.’”139  As such, the last prong of the Royal Drug test 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 215-16 (quoting Nat’l Sec., 393 U.S. at 460). 
136 Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. at 216. 
137 Id. at 217. 
138 See id. at 220-25 (discussing the history of Congress’s original intent for 
enacting the Act). 
139 Id. at 224. 
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requires courts to consider whether parties are wholly within the insurance 
industry.140  
The last chief case where the Supreme Court revisited the question 
of what comprised the ‘business of insurance,’ was Union Labor Life 
Insurance Co. v. Pireno.141  In Pireno, the Court examined whether the use 
of a peer review committee to determine if a chiropractor’s treatments were 
unnecessary, or his rates unreasonable, was not within the ‘business of 
insurance,’ and thus not exempt from antitrust scrutiny. 142  The Court 
concluded that the peer review committee failed all three prongs of the 
Royal Drug test, and thus was outside the ‘business of insurance.’ In 
regards to the third prong of the test, whether the involved parties were 
wholly within the insurance industry, the Court stated that such a failure 
alone need not deny the anti-trust exemption, but that “the involvement of 
such parties, even if not dispositive, constitutes part of the inquiry 
mandated by the Royal Drug analysis.” 143  More generally, the Court 
refined the test by asserting that none of the three elements alone are 
determinative of whether an activity is within the ‘business of insurance’; 
rather, all three elements must be taken together to form a collective 
picture.144 
These three cases left strong themes for future courts to consider, 
most notably, that the ‘business of insurance’ is not synonymous with the 
business of insurance companies.  In regards to supervisory colleges, the 
present concern proponents of the colleges should consider, is whether the 
new power of a state insurance commissioner to examine not only domestic 
insurers, but also affiliates, and to subsequently share such information 
with other regulators, is within the boundaries set by this definition.  If the 
activities and information sharing engaged in under supervisory colleges 
are considered outside the ‘business of insurance,’ there inevitably arises a 
corresponding argument that supervisory colleges are outside the power of 
states’ regulation, and are perhaps more appropriately situated under the 
jurisdiction of the Federal government. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
140 Id.  
141 PALOMAR, supra note 122, at 20. 
142  See Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 136 (1982) 
(“[Union Labor Life Insurance Co.]’s use of [New York State Chiropractor 
Association]'s Peer Review Committee does not constitute the ‘business of 
insurance’ within the meaning of § 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and thus is 
not exempt from antitrust scrutiny.”) 
143 Id. at 133. 
144 Id. at 129. 
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A Supreme Court of Nebraska case concerning the acquisition of a 
domestic insurer by a foreign holding company provides an exemplary 
discussion of how courts have since muddled the lines of the Royal Drug 
test.  Furthermore, the Court’s holding that a state statute providing for its 
insurance department to approve the acquisition of control of any domestic 
insurer pursuant to its Insurance Holding Company System Act is within 
the boundaries of the McCarran-Ferguson definition of ‘business of 
insurance,’ is a strong argument that the new Amendments to the NAIC’s 
IHCA do not trigger scrutiny of the Amendment’s validity under the Act. 
In CenTra, Inc. v. Chandler Ins. Co., Ltd., Nebraska’s Insurance 
Holding Company System Act required applicants looking to acquire a 
domestic insurance company to file a “Form A,” but the Act allowed an 
acquiring party to avoid the insurance department’s scrutiny by filing a 
disclaimer of control.145 CenTra, the foreign holding company in question, 
filed such a disclaimer. 146   The insurance department approved the 
disclaimer, but on the condition that CenTra cease to purchase the 
insurance company’s stock.147  In the following years, CenTra did not obey 
the order and continued to purchase the insurance stock from other 
stockholders until CenTra controlled 49.2 percent of the insurance 
company.148 
CenTra next took steps to officially acquire the insurance 
company, but following submission of the Form A, and the Form A 
hearing, the insurance department denied the applicant’s request.149  The 
department supported its decision by reasoning that, the financial condition 
of applicants could jeopardize the financial stability of the insurer or 
prejudice its policyholders; that applicants' competence, experience, and 
integrity were such that their acquisition of the insurer would not be in the 
policyholders' best interests; and that the acquisition of the insurer was 
likely to be hazardous to the public.150 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
145 CenTra, Inc. v. Chandler Ins. Co., 540 N.W.2d 318, 324 (Neb. 1995). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. (“CenTra filed such a disclaimer in 1989, and the department approved 
the disclaimer subject to CenTra's voluntary ‘Standstill Agreement’ to cease its 
stock purchases.”). 
148 Id. (stating that upon learning of CenTra's actions, the Nebraska insurance 
department issued two “cease and desist” orders to CenTra). 
149 Id. at 325 (explaining that despite CenTra's prior disclaimer of control, the 
Form A would have become relevant again upon renewal of CenTra's acquisition 
efforts). 
150 Id.  
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The Supreme Court of Nebraska employed the three-prong 
‘business of insurance’ test to determine “whether a restriction on the sale 
of stock in a domestic insurer is sufficiently connected to ‘the business of 
insurance’ to be shielded by the MFA from Commerce Clause attack,” or 
whether this restriction, “intrudes impermissibly into the federal realm of 
securities regulation.”151  Under the first prong, the court held that, “the 
restriction on stock disposition relates, albeit indirectly, to the transferring 
and spreading of risk . . . .  The Act affords the Director of Insurance a 
chance to review the financial stability of the acquiring company so that he 
can determine whether acquisition is in the best interests of Nebraska 
policyholders.”152 The court further found that the power of the director to 
“bring any threatened change of control under his own control” concerned 
policyholder protection because it allowed him to consider the impact such 
changes would have on policyholders.153  Ultimately it held that whether a 
domestic insurer will remain reliable to its policyholders does relate to the 
transferring and spreading of risk, because a change of control can affect 
the quality and stability of policies.154 
In discussing the second prong, the court found that the Nebraska 
Act satisfied the insurer-insured relationship requirement because the 
statute gives the director the power, ability, and statutory responsibility to 
ensure, “that the relationship between the insurer and the policyholder is 
one of mutual understanding and not one of deceit.” 155   The court 
reconciled the indirect nature of their connection by broadly recognizing 
that, “the individual policyholder is not in a position to understand the 
ramifications of a change of control in his insurer until the insurer becomes 
insolvent and unable to pay claims.”156 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
151 CenTra, Inc., 540 N.W.2d at 330. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. (citing Hoylake Invs. Ltd. v. Gallinger, 722 F. Supp. 573 (D. Ariz.1989) 
(applying Arizona law); Hoylake Invs. Ltd. v. Bell, 723 F. Supp. 576 (D. 
Kan.1989) (applying Kansas law); Hoylake Invs. Ltd. v. Washburn, 723 F. Supp. 
42 (N.D. Ill.1989) (applying Illinois law)).  The Nebraska court stated that these 
courts, in examining laws similar to the Nebraska statute in question, “reasoned 
that because a change of control of an insurer can affect the quality and stability of 
policies, these laws satisfy the requirement that they related to the transferring and 
spreading of risk.” Id.  
155 Id. at 330-31 (citing Bell, 723 F. Supp. 576; Washburn, 723 F. Supp. 42). 
156 CenTra, Inc., 540 N.W.2d at 330-31 (holding that the second prong of the 
‘business of insurance’ test is satisfied). 
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Finally, the court found the third prong of the ‘business of 
insurance’ test to be satisfied as well.  The court held that, despite the Act’s 
effects on investors and stockholders seeking to own stock in Nebraska 
domestic insurers, and despite that the Act restricts when an out-of-state 
stockholder may sell his interest in the domestic insurer, because the 
ultimate focus of these restrictions remains with the individual 
policyholder, the statute still fell within the ‘business of insurance.’157  The 
court categorized those looking to acquire the insurance company as those 
“who wished to control the handling of CenTra's insurance claims . . . who 
sought to gain control of their insurer by owning its stock; and . . . who 
chose to cast into jeopardy the one policy concern for whose protection the 
department was created: that an insurer should remain as reliable as it 
promises its insureds it will be.”158 
Prior to concluding, the court went on to distinguish the present 
case from the issue presented in National Securities.  Where the Court in 
National Securities held that, “regulation whose focus is the protection of 
stockholders does not sufficiently relate to the MFA to be shielded from 
Commerce Clause attack,” the court in CenTra thought the present statute 
in question did not purport to protect stockholders as in National Securities; 
rather, the Nebraska Act was purely concerned with policyholders and had 
no stake in the “security of or services rendered to stockholders; whether 
merger or acquisition is equitable to stockholders is immaterial in the eyes 
of the director.”159 Furthermore, the court pointed out that the Court in 
National Securities, “found that the section of the Arizona act that 
empowered the director to determine whether acquisition would 
substantially reduce the security of policyholders' interests clearly relates to 
the ‘business of insurance.’”160 
 
B. ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE ADOPTED REVISIONS TO THE 
AMENDED MODEL ACT BEING WITHIN THE ‘BUSINESS OF 
INSURANCE’ AS DEFINED BY THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON 
ACT 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
157 Id. at 331. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. (finding that despite the stockholder aspect of the Nebraska Act, the 
three-prong test to determine whether the statute satisfied the ‘business of 
insurance’ was satisfied). 
160 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 
U.S. 453, 462 (1969)). 
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If a court were to accept the fairly broad interpretation of the Royal 
Drug test from the CenTra holding, claims asserting that the Amendments 
to the IHCA are outside the ‘business of insurance’ would likely fail.  
Under CenTra, the extension of a state commissioner’s oversight 
jurisdiction to out-of-state affiliates would satisfy the first prong of the 
Royal Drug test because the Amendments afford the commissioner, like 
Nebraska’s Director of Insurance, a chance to review the financial stability 
of the holding company so that he can determine whether the group’s 
health as a whole is in the best interests of the policyholders. 
Similarly, under CenTra the commissioner’s powers would pass 
the second prong, relating to the insurer-insured relationship, because the 
individual policyholder is not in a position to understand the ramifications 
of multi-jurisdictional supervision, and would not become aware of the 
risks until the insurer becomes insolvent and unable to pay claims. 
Finally, the court in CenTra would most likely opine, despite the 
commissioner’s power to reach outside of his jurisdiction, and, 
furthermore, to reach outside of the insurance industry per se by examining 
non-insurance affiliates, that the commissioner’s actions were still 
ultimately for the benefit of the insurance industry.   
This expansive reasoning is easily extended to a state’s 
participation in supervisory colleges.  Supervisory colleges are also 
provided for under the Amendments to the IHCA, and, under CenTra, a 
court would likely find that the activity fell within the ‘business of 
insurance,’ because the colleges are ultimately meant to benefit 
policyholders.  Currently, the NAIC has put forth, “existing U.S. case law, 
[the] interests of other countries, and the renewed vigor that regulators 
enjoy . . . as a result of the 2008 crisis,” as reasons why the new IHCA 
Amendments should still be upheld under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.161  
Justice Brennan once wrote that “‘[t]he prevention of insolvency and the 
maintenance of ‘sound’ financial condition in terms of fixed-dollar 
obligations is precisely what traditional state regulation [of insurance] is 
aimed at.’” 162   However, should no opposition arise to supervisory 
colleges’ validity under the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s definition of the 
‘business of insurance,’ this concern would be entirely moot.  
 
C. ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ADOPTED REVISIONS TO THE 
AMENDED MODEL ACT BEING WITHIN THE ‘BUSINESS OF !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
161 Rabinowitz, supra note 15. 
162 CenTra, Inc., 540 N.W.2d at 331 (quoting SEC v. Variable Annuity Co., 
359 U.S. 65, 90-91 (1959) (concurring opinion)). 
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INSURANCE’ AS DEFINED BY THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON 
ACT 
 
Conversely, an alternative argument can be made for why the 
IHCA Amendments, particularly the state commissioner powers, and 
state’s participation in supervisory colleges, do not fall within the accepted 
definition of the ‘business of insurance.’  Where the CenTra court took a 
very macro approach to the Royal Drug test, a more micro examination of 
the recent changes could be considered outside the accepted ‘business of 
insurance’ and more inside the business of insurance companies.  
Challenges to the commissioner’s cross-jurisdictional reach and 
participation in supervisory colleges, would likely be brought by a variety 
of interested parties.  These opponents to the revisions have two potential 
grievances under which they may wish to challenge the Amended Model 
Act: one, the state commissioner’s ability to demand insurance holding 
company systems and insurance affiliate information; and two, the 
authority for a state’s participation in supervisory colleges. 
The first group encompasses those opponents that are most 
unsettled by the ability of a state insurance commissioner to request 
sensitive information from whomever they deem relevant.  An insurance 
holding company system’s affiliates are wide ranging—some may be less 
willing than others to relinquish confidential information all in the name of 
international coordination.  Affiliates that shelter information from their 
own regulators will be vehemently opposed to sharing such information 
with a state insurance commissioner. 
The second group includes potential supervisory college members 
who may choose not to participate because they have certain risks they do 
not want to surface.  The extensive information sharing environment a 
supervisory college fosters will create an ideal opportunity to unveil hidden 
perils.  For some, this exposure may be exactly what they wish to evade.  A 
successful challenge to the validity of supervisory colleges under the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act could result in the assurance that, at least while 
insurance remains under state regulation, information sharing across 
jurisdictional borders will be avoided. 
It was previously discussed that supervisory colleges run the risk of 
fostering adverse relationships amongst regulators in response to members 
of the community that do not “go with the flow,” so to speak.  With the 
potential for these adverse relationships to escalate into adverse actions, 
may come feelings of ill will towards what was supposed to be a 
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harmonious solution to international coordination and supervision. 163  
Shunned members pose a risk to the success of supervisory colleges as a 
whole if the injured parties decide their unfavorable experience with a 
college is indicative of its unruly powers.  Ostracized regulators could 
challenge the validity of the Amendments under the McCarran Ferguson 
Act to ensure the supervisory college’s failure.  In this case, a regulator, 
whether domestic or otherwise, may not even be opposed to the state 
insurance commissioner’s expansive powers; rather, he would be using the 
commissioner’s cross-jurisdictional reach as an additional argument for the 
colleges’ violative nature. 
In Pireno, the court determined that the use of a state peer review 
committee to share information and make evaluations of its members was 
outside the business of insurance as defined by the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act.164  The peer review board did not satisfy the first two prongs of the 
Royal Drug test because it did not spread policyholder risk,  nor was it part 
of the insurer/insured relationship. 165   It is not a stretch to equate a 
supervisory college to a peer review board as a basis for a challenge against 
their validity.  In Pireno, the committee worked together to determine 
whether a fellow chiropractor’s treatments were unnecessary, or his rates 
unreasonable.  In a supervisory college, members work together to 
determine whether a particular insurer, holding company system, or 
enterprise pose risks to global insurance stability.  Both groups have the 
goal of a safer environment for their practice to thrive, and both groups 
share sensitive information to achieve that goal. 
Additionally, a state’s participation in a supervisory college, or a 
state commissioner’s authority to access insurer affiliates, are both 
activities not wholly limited to entities within the insurance industry.  A 
supervisory college involves regulators from a spectrum of sectors, and an 
insurer affiliate could literally be any entity affiliated with the operations of 
an insurance company.  As such, it would not be a hard argument to make 
that the revisions in question to the Amended Model Act fail the third 
prong of the Royal Drug test as well. 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
163  It should be noted that the Basel Committee’s guidance paper on 
supervisory colleges recommends that “any confidential information [exchanged 
between] supervisor[s] should be used exclusively for lawful supervisory 
purposes.” Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, supra note 66, at 22. 
164  Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 134 (1982). 
165 Id. at 129-31.  
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X. CONCLUSION: SUPERVISORY COLLEGES WILL HELP 
FACILITATE INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY SUCCESS IN 
THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
 
Supervisory Colleges are a way to enhance state based insurance 
regulation in an increasingly international environment.  Where the concept 
of insurance companies as a completely independent entity is now more a 
legal fiction than reality, the success of supervisory colleges would help to 
appease those claims that a federal regulatory system is more adept to 
handle a global industry than the current state based system.  States have 
expressed that they are willing to implement the necessary regulatory 
revisions to ensure that the positive track record of state-based insurance 
regulation continues to evolve with the changing times. 166   State 
commissioners view themselves not only as policemen of individual 
insurance companies, but also as stewards of highly interconnected 
financial systems.   
The Amendments to the IHCA are only effective if adopted by 
individual state legislatures; however, the NAIC is moving to incorporate 
the changes into the required state accreditation standards, increasing the 
likeliness of states to comply.  Even without the threat of losing its 
accreditation, already some states are beginning to adopt the recent 
revisions.  West Virginia was first to make the changes to its own 
regulations in April of 2011, followed by Texas in June.167  States like 
Connecticut haven’t officially adopted the Amended Model Act as part of 
their insurance laws, but the state insurance commissioner is mimicking 
many of the changes the Model Act suggests on their own. 
Those opposed to the Amended Model Act should move forward 
with caution.  With the determination that the Model Act’s revisions step 
outside state jurisdiction comes a corresponding argument that such powers 
should reside with the Federal government.  Proponents for Federal 
insurance regulation could argue that the invalidity of state supervisory 
control in the international regulatory sector is indicative of the need for a 
more centralized approach to regulation—a more Federal approach.  
Banning state participation in supervisory colleges, and limiting a state !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
166  Statement of Susan E. Voss, supra note 1, at 7-8.  
167  Van R. Mayhall, III, Form F and Enterprise Risk: NAIC Expands 
Regulatory Authority under the Model Insurance Holding Company System 
Regulatory Act, BREAZEALE, SACHSE & WILSON, LLP (July 20, 2011), 
http://www.insuranceregulatorylaw.com/2011/07/form-f-and-enterprise-risk-naic-
expands.html.  
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insurance commissioner’s access to information, may prove to be a 
temporary dam that subsequently opens a floodgate of Federal regulatory 
power.   
The creation of the FIO should be viewed as the first step in this 
direction.  Even the FIO’s description of the Office’s function is alarmingly 
similar to what supervisory colleges set out to achieve.  The FIO has the 
authority “to monitor all aspects of the insurance industry, including 
identifying issues or gaps in the regulation of insurers that could contribute 
to a systemic crisis in the insurance industry or the United States financial 
system.”168  Whereas states are limited to the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s 
definition of the “business of insurance,” the Dodd-Frank Act expands the 
federal government’s reach to “all aspects of the insurance industry.” 
Furthermore, the power for the Federal government to enter into a covered 
agreement with respect to the “business of insurance” with foreign parties 
should draw attention.  Covered agreements touch three important points: 
one, the federal government; two, international parties; and three, the 
business of insurance.  Alternatively, supervisory colleges touch nearly the 
same three points: one, state insurance regulators; two, international 
parties; and three, the business of insurance.  A centralized regime could 
require international information sharing where no entity or enterprise 
would escape its reach. 
 Supervisory colleges are a step in the right direction for 
international regulatory success, and the provisions of the Amended Model 
Act that expand the state commissioner’s power will help to facilitate 
success in a college forum.  If not the state insurance commissioner, then it 
will be another regulatory body that will have access to affiliate 
information in order to best examine enterprise risk.  States should move 
forward with their commissioner’s participation, and opponents should 
mind that the alternative to colleges and extended commissioner power 
may prove to be even more evasive than option at hand. 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
168 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, tit. V, § 313(c)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 1580 (2010) (emphasis added).  
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*** 
 
 This article examines the issue of whether Comprehensive General 
Liability (CGL) insurance policy forms provide coverage for third party 
patent infringement claims under the forms’ “advertising injury” 
provision.  The paper traces the evolution of these Comprehensive General 
Liability forms, from the 1973 CGL standard forms through the 1986 forms 
and even up to the most recent set of revisions as reflected in the 1998 and 
2001 CGL broad form versions.  The article then discusses three leading 
cases on the issue, all of which stand for the proposition that insurers have 
a duty to defend policyholders against third party patent infringement 
claims when the insured was alleged to have infringed an advertising 
technique that was itself patented.  In the aftermath of these decisions, 
however, changes were made to the CGL policy forms which are likely to 
benefit the insurer seeking to avoid coverage and further the trend towards 
increasingly limited policyholder coverage for third party patent 
infringement. 
 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Internet commerce is growing at an exponential rate.  It is 
estimated that global usage doubles every one hundred days and increases 
between 200-600% annually.1  The drastic increase in internet commerce is 
directly attributable to the availability and affordability of personal 
computers and handheld devices equipped with internet connectivity.2  As a 
result of this increase in global usage, some insurance carriers have 
                                                                                                                                      
1 See Robert P. Norman, Virtual Insurance: Is Your Old Policy from 
InvisibleINC.com? If so, what Cyber Policy Adequately Covers Your Risks?, 673 
PLI/LIT 557, 565 (2002). 
2 See, e.g., id. 
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suggested that internet commerce will be the “single biggest insurance risk 
of the twenty-first century.”3   
Internet advertising is a relatively inexpensive and efficient means 
of marketing to a broad audience situated throughout the world.  Insurance 
policyholders engaged in internet business and advertising have seen an 
increase in intellectual property liability claims, including but not limited 
to, third party patent infringement claims based on the content and design 
of company websites.  This paper first discusses the evolution of the 
Insurance Service Office, Inc.’s (“ISO”) standard Comprehensive General 
Liability (“CGL”) insurance policy forms and then focuses on an insurer’s 
duty to defend against third party patent infringement claims under the 
“advertising injury” provision in these forms.  Subsequently, this paper will 
analyze the reasoning espoused by three separate courts holding that the 
advertising injury provision of a standard CGL insurance policy creates a 
duty for insurers to defend against third party patent infringement claims, 
in situations where the advertising technique itself was patented by the 
third party claimant.   
 
II. ADVERTISING INJURY COVERAGE IN ISO COMMERCIAL 
 OR COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY 
 FORMS 
 
The ISO is a subsidiary of Verisk Analytics Incorporated and it 
drafts standardized insurance policy forms that are utilized by over 1,400 
member companies operating in every state.4  Most of the member 
insurance companies “adopt ISO forms verbatim while … other[s] use 
[general] ISO forms as a starting point for their own modified forms.”5  
Although the forms used by member companies to service policyholders 
are substantially similar, standard ISO CGL insurance forms have 
historically provided varying degrees of coverage for policyholders within 
the purview of the advertising injury provision.  
                                                                                                                                      
3 See id. at 565 (quoting UDAY KHANDEPARKAR, Indian Security Firm Expects 
“Love Bug” Boost, REUTERS ENG. NEWS SERV. (May 9, 2000); J. OF COM., VIRUS 
UNDERSCORES RISKS IN E-COMMERCE (May 18, 2000), available at WestLaw 
2000 WLNR989539. 
4 INSURANCE SERVICE OFFICE, INC., http://www.iso.com (last visited Oct. 2, 
2012).    
5 Jerold Oshinsky & Damon A. Thayer, A Primer on Coverage for 
Infringement Suits, LAW360.COM, (Feb. 22, 2011, 1:56 PM)  http://www.law360 
.com/articles/225699/a-primer-on-coverage-for-infringement-suits. 
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Generally, an advertising injury is understood to be any injury to a 
third party brought about through the advertisement of a business’ goods 
and services.  Presently, ISO CGL insurance forms indemnify the 
policyholder from liability to third parties for bodily injury, personal injury, 
advertising injury and property damage under two primary policy 
provisions: (i) “Coverage A Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability, 
and (ii) Coverage B Personal and Advertising Liability.”6  The ISO CGL 
insurance forms have been modified extensively since 1973, and the 
current advertising injury provisions differ greatly from those forty years 
ago.  However, despite these extensive changes, many CGL insurance 
policies used today still contain the language of older ISO CGL 
endorsements.  
 
A. THE 1973 ISO BROAD FORM CGL ENDORSEMENT REVISIONS 
 
Prior to 1973, ISO CGL insurance forms did not include coverage 
for advertising injury and only a few insurers offered advertising coverage 
as an additional endorsement to their standard CGL policies.7  In 1973, the 
ISO radically altered its standard forms by making “advertising injury” and 
“personal injury” coverage available through the purchase of a Broad Form 
CGL endorsement or a Personal Injury Liability endorsement (“PIL”).8  
This was the first time the ISO specifically adopted an advertising injury 
coverage provision into its Broad Form CGL endorsement.9   
                                                                                                                                      
6 See Dawn Dinkins, Internet Liabilities: A Look at Coverage Under the 
Traditional Commercial General Liability Policy, 16 NO. 6 ANDREWS CORP. 
OFFICERS & DIRECTORS LIABILITY LITIG. REP., Jan. 2, 2001, at 2-; INS. SERVS. 
OFF., INC., COM.  GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM CG 00 01 10 01 (2000). 
7 See Lawrence O. Monin, ISO Advertising and Personal Injury Revisions: 
Major Surgery of Just a Band-Aid Fix?, 4-16 MEALEY’S EMERGING INS. DISPS. 6  
(1999).  
8 The PIL endorsement covered only personal injury, while the 1973 CGL 
Broad Form combined coverage for personal injury and liability arising out of 
advertising.  See JAMES L. HAIGH & SARAH L. SHOWALTER, HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
OF THE CHANGES TO COVERAGE B, reprinted in COUSINEAU LAW FORUM SERIES, 
http://cousineaulaw.com/forum/historical_analysis_of_the_changes_to_coverage_b 
(last accessed Oct. 2, 2012).  As such, this article will not explore the revisions of 
the PIL endorsement.   
9 See Bruce Telles, Insurance Coverage for Intellectual Property Torts, 602 
PLI/LIT 629, 645 (1999); Robert H Jerry, II & Michele L, Mekel, Cybercoverage 
for Cyber-Risks: An Overview of Insurers’ Responses to the Perils of E-Commerce, 
8 CONN. INS. L.J. 7, 17 (2001). 
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The 1973 Broad Form CGL endorsement provided policyholders 
with coverage for “all sums which the insured [became] legally obligated to 
pay as damages because of . . .  advertising injury to which the insurance 
applie[d] . . . arising out of the conduct of the named insured’s business . . . 
and the [insurance] company shall have the right and duty to defend. . . ”10  
Advertising injury was defined as any “[i]njury arising out of an offense 
committed during the policy period occurring in the course of the named 
insured’s advertising activities, if such injury ar[ose] out of libel, slander, 
defamation, violation of right of privacy, piracy, unfair competition, or 
infringement of copyright, title or slogan.”11   
Claims for “advertising injury arising out of … infringement of 
trademark, service mark or trade name, other than titles or slogans, by use 
thereof on or in connection with goods, products, or services sold, offered 
for sale, or advertised” were typically excluded from coverage for 
policyholders in the 1973 Broad Form CGL endorsement.12  In addition to 
these exclusions, coverage was not provided for any claims: (i) “[a]rising 
out of oral or written publication of material, if done by or at the direction 
of the insured with knowledge of its falsity,” (ii) “[a]rising out of oral or 
written publication of material whose first publication took place before the 
beginning of the policy,” and (iii) “[a]rising out of the willful violation of a 
penal statute or ordinance committed by or with the consent of the 
insured,” or (iv) “[f]or which the insured ha[d] assumed liability in a 
contract or agreement.”13  The advertising injury provision also did not 
apply to liabilities arising from damages that the policyholder incurred in 
the absence of the contract or agreement.   
Similar to most other occasions when the ISO implemented 
detailed changes to an endorsement, certain coverage issues surrounding 
the 1973 Broad Form CGL endorsement were highly litigated.  Most of the 
litigation relating to third party patent infringement claims focused on the 
ISO’s failure to define the term “advertising,” in the relevant policy 
language.  When faced with multiple propositions for the appropriate 
definition of the term “advertising,” courts repeatedly construed the term in 
favor of the carrier, and in most cases, the policyholder failed to persuade 
                                                                                                                                      
10 Richard Bale & Patrick J. Boley, Advertising Injury Coverage 1-2 (2007), 
available at http://www.larsonking.com/ArticleUploads/Advertising%20 
Injury%20Coverage.pdf. 
11 Id. (quoting Lebas Fashion Imps. of USA, Inc. v. ITT Hartford Ins. Grp., 59 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 36, 41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)). 
12 HAIGH & SHOWALTER, supra note 8. 
13 Id. 
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the court that the insurer had a duty to defend against third party patent 
infringement and other intellectual property claims under the advertising 
injury provision in their CGL policy.14  
 
B.  THE 1986 ISO BROAD FORM CGL ENDORSEMENT REVISIONS 
 
In 1986, the ISO made several major revisions to the 1973 Broad 
Form CGL endorsement which subsequently enabled courts to find that an 
insurer had a duty to defend against third party patent infringement claims 
under the “advertising injury” provision.15  In an attempt to clarify and 
expand the coverage provided in the 1973 Broad Form CGL endorsement, 
the ISO introduced “Coverage B.”16  “Coverage B” combined the 
“advertising injury” and “personal injury” provisions of the 1973 Broad 
Form CGL endorsement into one section and made changes to several of 
the enumerated offenses covered under the endorsement.17  Following these 
revisions to the 1986 Broad Form CGL endorsement, policyholders 
automatically received coverage for both types of injuries and no longer 
needed to purchase separate ISO CGL endorsements for “advertising 
injury” and “personal injury” coverage.18  
Similar to the 1973 Broad Form CGL endorsement, the ISO again 
failed to define the term “advertising.”   However, the ISO attempted to 
eliminate some of the previous uncertainty by enumerating several offenses 
to which advertising injury would apply.  The ISO 1986 Broad Form CGL 
endorsement stated that the “advertising injury” provision would provide 
coverage for any injury, committed during the coverage period, arising out 
of one of more of the following offenses: (i) “[o]ral or written publication 
of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a 
person’s or organization’s goods, products or services,” (ii) “[o]ral or 
written publication of material that violates a person’s right of privacy,” 
(iii) “[m]isappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business,” or 
(iv) “[i]nfringement of copyright, title or slogan.”19  In an attempt to further 
                                                                                                                                      
14 But see, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 769 
F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1985); CNA Cas. of Cal. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 222 Cal. Rptr. 
276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
15 See discussion infra Part III.  
16 See Telles, supra note 9, at 646; Monin, supra note 7, at 2-6. 
17 See Telles, supra note 9, at 646; Monin, supra note 7, at 2-6. 
18 See Telles, supra note 9, at 646; Monin, supra note 7, at 2-6. 
19 Policy form CG 00 01 11 85 (copyrighted in 1982 and 1984 by the ISO) 
(public promulgation and adoption of the states did not occur until the mid-1980s); 
see HAIGH & SHOWALTER, supra note 8, at n.5.  
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clarify issues that had plagued 1973 Broad Form CGL endorsement, the 
ISO inserted the same set of advertising injury exclusions, as well as 
defined a new set of exclusions.20  The new exclusions applied to any of the 
following claims: (i) a “[b]reach of contract, other than misappropriation of 
advertising ideas under an implied contract, (ii) “[t]he failure of goods, 
products, or services to conform with advertised quality or performance,” 
(iii) “[t]he wrong description of the price of the goods, products or 
services,” and (iv) any “[o]ffense committed by an insured whose business 
is advertising, broadcasting, publishing or telecasting.”21 
The 1986 Broad Form CGL endorsement differed from its 1973 
predecessor in that it no longer provided coverage for “piracy” nor the 
specific exclusion for “infringement of trademark, service mark or trade 
name other than titles or slogans.”22  Additionally, the ISO provided 
coverage for “misappropriation of advertising ideas and style of doing 
business” which replaces the 1973 endorsement’s “unfair competition” 
coverage.  Despite these changes to the 1986 Broad Form CGL 
endorsement, the ISO described the revisions as “non-substantive 
clarifications of prior coverage.”23   However, policyholders had greater 
success in obtaining coverage under the new revisions, despite the ISO’s 
characterization of the changes.24  This paper focuses on the 1986 Broad 
Form CGL endorsement language, “misappropriation of advertising ideas 
and style of doing business,” specifically, when the provision creates a duty 
for insurers to defend against third party patent infringement claims. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
20 Policy form CG 00 01 11 85 (copyrighted in 1982 and 1984 by the ISO) 
(public promulgation and adoption of the states did not occur until the mid-1980s); 
see HAIGH & SHOWALTER, supra note 8, at n.5. 
21 Policy form CG 00 01 11 85 (copyrighted in 1982 and 1984 by the ISO) 
(public promulgation and adoption of the states did not occur until the mid-1980s); 
see HAIGH & SHOWALTER, supra note 8, at n.5. 
22 Telles, supra note 9, at 652. 
23 Jerry, II & Mekel, supra note 9, at 18 (discussing the success of 
policyholders in obtaining coverage for trademark infringement under the 
“misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business” provision, 
despite the deletion of the term “trademark”). 
24  See ROBERT D. CHESLER & CINDY TZVI SONENBLICK, INSURANCE 
COVERAGE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT (Bloomberg Finance 
L.P. Law Reports, 2008). 
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III. DUTY TO DEFEND AGAINST THIRD PARTY PATENT 
 INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS  UNDER THE  “MISAPPROPRI 
 ATION OF ADVERTISING IDEAS AND STYLE OF DOING 
 BUSINESS” PROVISION IN  COMPREHENSIVE 
 GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE  POLICIES 
 
In the United States, a patent is a property right which grants the 
owner the power to exclude others from making, using, selling and offering 
to sell a new, non-obvious, useful invention in the United States for up to 
twenty years.25  Prior to 1994, it was well settled that patent infringement 
was not covered under the advertising injury provisions.26  In reaching this 
conclusion, courts looked to the language of the patent statute which 
prohibited “making, using or selling” a product which infringed on a 
patent.27  Based on this language, a majority of courts unequivocally 
rejected coverage for claims involving patent infringement under the 
advertising injury provisions of CGL policies.28   
In order to comply with the requirements of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Treaty, Congress amended the Patent Act 
                                                                                                                                      
25 See James R. Warnot, Jr. & Daniel C. Glazer, Insurance Coverage for 
Intellectual Property and Cyberspace Liability, 652 PLI/LIT 407, 409 (2001). 
26 See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Frosty Bites, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 101, 
103 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); BATES, CAREY & NICOLAIDES, LLP., PATENT CLAIMS NOT 
COVERED AS ADVERTISING INJURY (2004), available at 
http://www.bcnlaw.com/newsandarticles/newsletter1_patentclaims.asp (noting that 
“[t]he Mississippi Supreme Court recently joined the majority of courts in ruling 
that claims involving patent infringement are not covered under the advertising 
injury section of a commercial general liability policy.”); Heritage Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Advanced Polymer Tech., Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 913, 930 n.10 (S.D. Ind. 2000) 
(stating that patent infringement cannot be misappropriation of style of doing 
business); Auto Sox USA Inc. v. Zurich N. Am., 88 P.3d 1008, 1011 n.1 (2004) 
(noting that “the majority of cases hold that patent infringement is not covered by 
the misappropriation of an advertising idea in an insurance policy”); LINDA A. 
GALELLA, LIMITATIONS ON ADVERTISING INJURY COVERAGE CLAIMS (2000), 
available at http://www.capehart.com/Legal-Alerts-Table-of-Contents/Limitations-
on-Advertising-Injury-Coverage-Claims.shtml (concluding that “New Jersey 
courts do not find coverage for patent infringement under the advertising injury 
provisions of CGL policies”). 
27 See Auto Sox, 88 P.3d at 1011; GALELLA, supra note 26. 
28  See Auto Sox, 88 P.3d at 1012; Frosty Bites, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 106; 
Heritage, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 930 n.10. 
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in 1994.29  One of the amendments to the Patent Act was the inclusion of 
“offers to sell,” as a type of conduct that constituted a direct patent 
infringement.30  With the changes to the definitions in the patent statute, 
particularly, the inclusion of “offers to sell,” most courts have since 
concluded that advertising can give rise to a direct patent infringement.31  
Despite the generally accepted view that advertising can give rise to a 
direct patent infringement, some courts unequivocally reject insurance 
coverage for third party patent infringement claims under the advertising 
injury provisions of a CGL policy.32  However, a few courts have been 
willing to extend coverage against third party patent infringement claims 
when a policy contains language similar to that of the ISO 1986 Broad 
Form CGL endorsement.33     
Generally, misappropriation of a patented advertising idea must 
occur in the “elements of the advertising itself – in its text[,] form, logo, or 
pictures – rather than in the product being advertised.”34  In determining 
whether a third party patent infringement claim is covered under the 
advertising injury provisions of a CGL policy, courts examine several 
different factors.  To establish coverage, a policyholder must generally 
prove three elements; (i) that the alleged conduct potentially falls within the 
scope of the policy’s enumerated advertising injury provisions, (ii) that 
there is a causal nexus between the policyholder’s advertising activities and 
the alleged offense, in order to satisfy a typical policy’s requirement that 
the infringement “occur in the course of the insured’s advertising 
activities,” and (iii) that the conduct constitutes “advertising activity” 
                                                                                                                                      
29 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (and accompanying Historical and Statutory 
Notes re 1994 Amendments and Effective Date of 1994 Amendments). 
30 See id.  
31  See, e.g., HollyAnne Corp. v. TFT, Inc., 199 F.3d 1304, 1309 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (advertisements may be “offers to sell” and, thus, give rise to direct patent 
infringement claim); Homedics Inc. v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 315 F.3d 1135, 1138 
(9th Cir. 2003); Maxconn Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 750 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1999) (“[T]he amendment of the [patent] statute has nullified the argument 
that patent infringement could not arise out of the insured's advertising activities as 
a matter of law.”). 
32 See Homedics, 315 F.3d at 1137. 
33 See e.g., Amazon.com Int’l, Inc. v. Am. Dynasty Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 85 
P.3d 974 (Wash. App. Div. 1 2004); DISH Network Corp. v. Arch Specialty Ins. 
Co., 659 F.3d 1010, 1028 (10th Cir. 2011); Hyundai Motor Corp. v. Nat’l Union 
Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 600 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010). 
34 See Iolab Corp. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 15 F.3d 1500, 1506 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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within the meaning of the policy.  Decisions finding no duty to defend 
typically involve either:  
 
(i) direct infringement from the manufacture of sale of a 
patented subject matter that lacks the necessary causal 
relationship between an insured’s advertising activities 
and the infringement;35 (ii) induced infringement that 
lacks the necessary causal relationship between the 
insured’s advertising activities and the infringement;36 
(iii) overly technical readings of the scope of a policy’s 
advertising injury coverage for undefined offenses;37 or 
(iv) spurious statements of public policy that reflect a 
courts misunderstanding of the scienter requirement for 
induced patent infringement.38   
 
The majority of courts which unequivocally reject coverage under the 
advertising injury provisions of a CGL policy typically find that an insurer 
does not have duty to defend against a third party patent infringement claim 
because there is no causal connection between the policyholder’s 
advertising and the alleged offense.39  Specifically, the courts find that the 
alleged patent infringement did not occur in the course of advertising.40 
                                                                                                                                      
35 See David A. Gauntlett, Patents and Insurance: Who Will Pay for 
Reimbursement, 4 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 200, 203 (1998); Iolab Corp., 15 F.3d at 
1506-07; Davila v. Arlasky, 857 F. Supp. 1258, 1262-63 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Atlantic 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brotech Corp., 857 F. Supp. 423, 429-30 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Polaris 
Indus., L.P. v. Continental Ins. Co., 539 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
36 See Gauntlett, supra note 35, at 203; Gencor Indus., Inc. v. Wausau 
Underwriters Ins. Co., 857 F. Supp. 1560, 1565 (M.D. Fla. 1994); N.H. Ins. Co. v. 
R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 847 F. Supp. 1452, 1458-59 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Gitano 
Group, Inc. v. Kemper Group, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 271, 274 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
37 See Gauntlett, supra note 35, at 203; Iolab Corp., 15 F.3d at 1506; I.C.D. 
Indus., Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 879 F. Supp. 480, 485-86 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Gencor 
Indus., Inc., 857 F. Supp. at 1565-66; Classic Corp. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 
35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1726, 1728 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
38 See Gauntlett, supra note 35, at 203; Intex Plastics Sales Co. v. United Nat’l 
Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 254, 257 (9th Cir. 1994); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Superior 
Court, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 442, 447-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); see also David A. 
Gauntlett, Changing Winds: Recent Decisions Favor Policyholders in Intellectual 
Property Coverage Claims, 1, 20 COVERAGE, (May-June 1995). 
39 Brian W. Klemm, Insurance Coverage for Intellectual Property Claims: A 
Changing Landscape, 563 PLI/LIT 421, 424 (1997) (“When considering whether a 
claimed injury is a covered offense, courts have been asked to interpret the 
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Three situations currently support an insurer’s duty to defend and 
indemnify a policyholder against third party claims of patent infringement 
under the advertising injury provisions of a CGL policy; (i) when “a 
manufacturer advertises [a] component, which is used in a product patented 
by another party [and] the advertising induces a third party to combine the 
component with other element, the combination of which produces the 
product covered by the patent and infringes the patent claims”;41 (ii) when 
“a product manufactured using a protected process is advertised in such a 
way that, although the advertisement itself does not constitute 
infringement, the advertisement induces others to use the process to create 
the product”;42 and (iii) when “a manufacturer demonstrates the viability of 
its non-infringing process by using advertising that infringes another 
process.”43  In each of the cases discussed subsequently, the courts 
addressed a different situation and found that an insurer had a duty to 
defend a policyholder against third party patent infringement claims under 
the advertising injury provision of their CGL policy.44  The courts analyzed 
the “misappropriation of advertising or style of doing business” language in 
three different CGL policies, each of which contained language mirroring 
the “advertising injury” provisions of the ISO’s 1986 Broad Form CGL 
endorsement.45  Reaching the same conclusion, the courts found that a duty 
                                                                                                                                      
meanings of the terms piracy, unfair competition, and infringement of copyright, 
title, or slogan under the 1976 [ISO] form policy and policy, because typical CGL 
policies provide no definition of these terms.”) 
40 Brian W. Klemm, Insurance Coverage for Intellectual Property Claims: A 
Changing Landscape, 563 PLI/LIT 421, 424 (1997) (“When considering whether a 
claimed injury is a covered offense, courts have been asked to interpret the 
meanings of the terms piracy, unfair competition, and infringement of copyright, 
title, or slogan under the 1976 [ISO] form policy and policy, because typical CGL 
policies provide no definition of these terms.”) 
41 See Gauntlett, supra note 35, at 204; Union Ins. Co. v. Land & Sky, Inc., 
529 N.W.2d 773, 774-75 (Neb. 1995) 
42 See Gauntlett, supra note 35, at 204; Norton Alcoa Proppants v. American 
Motorists Ins. Co., No. C-4012-91-A (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 1993); Hyundai, 600 F.3d 
at 1103 n.4 (“There may be situations in which an advertisement induces another 
to infringe a patent.”). 
43 See Gauntlett, supra note 35, at 204; Omnitel v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 
26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1933, 1937-38 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1993). 
44 See, e.g., Amazon.com, 85 P.3d 974; DISH Network, 659 F.3d 1010; 
Hyundai, 600 F.3d 1092.  
45 See id.  
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to defend existed when the insured was alleged to have infringed an 
advertising technique that itself was patented.46 
 
A. AMAZON.COM INTERNATIONAL, INC. V. AMERICAN DYNASTY 
SURPLUS LINES INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
The first case to find that an insurer had a duty to defend a 
policyholder against a third party patent infringement claim was 
Amazon.com International, Inc. v. American Dynasty Surplus Lines 
Insurance Company.  Applying Washington state law, the Court of Appeals 
of Washington reversed a decision by the Superior Court of King County 
granting summary judgment in favor of the insurers.47  In the underlying 
action, Intouch, a software manufacturer alleged that Amazon had infringed 
upon its patents for “interactive music preview technology, which enabled 
customers to listen to samples of music products at kiosks and over the 
internet.”48  Specifically, Amazon used Intouch technology to permit its 
customers to preview music products available for sale on Amazon’s 
corporate website.49  
Amazon tendered a defense to its insurers under both its primary 
insurance and excess carrier policies.50  Each policy promised to defend 
and indemnify Amazon against third party claims alleging “advertising 
injury,” among other things.51  One of the enumerated offenses under the 
“advertising injury” provision mirrored that of the ISO’s 1986 Broad Form 
CGL endorsement and provided coverage for the “misappropriation of 
advertising ideas or style of doing business.”52  The court stated that 
“misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business” could be 
satisfied by: (i) the “wrongful taking of another’s manner of advertising,”53 
(ii) the “wrongful taking of an idea concerning the solicitation of business 
                                                                                                                                      
46 See id.  
47 See Amazon.com, 85 P.3d at 978. 
48 See id. at 975. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53  Id. at 976 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Am. States Ins. Co. v. 
Vortherms, 5 S.W.3d 538, 543 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); Fluoroware, Inc. v. Chubb 
Grp. of Ins. Cos., 545 N.W.2d 678, 682 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996)).  
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and customers,”54 or (iii) the “wrongful taking of the manner by which 
another advertises its goods or services.”55  The court determined that 
“patent infringement may constitute an advertising injury where an entity 
uses an advertising technique that is itself patented.”56  The court’s 
conclusions and rationale set precedent for subsequent courts to find a duty 
to defend against third party patent infringement claims, when the language 
of the advertising injury provisions in a CGL policy mirrors that of the ISO 
1986 Broad Form endorsement.57 
After concluding that patent infringement could constitute an 
advertising injury, the court determined that the injury to Intouch occurred 
in the course of advertising goods for sale.58  In the absence of a specific 
definition of the term “advertising,” the court noted that advertising 
typically refers to “any oral, written, or graphic statement made by the 
seller in any manner in connection with the solicitation of business, … [or 
the] widespread distribution of promotional material to the public at 
large.”59  Finally, the court concluded that a causal connection existed 
between the advertising injury and the policyholder’s advertising activities, 
stating that “an injury that could have occurred independent and 
irrespective of any advertising is not an advertising injury.”60  In most 
cases, the requisite causal relationship does not exist because the claim 
against the policyholder is based on the sale of an infringing product, not 
an advertisement.61  Courts reject these claims because an advertising 
injury does not occur “where the injury is caused by the subsequent 
                                                                                                                                      
54  Amazon.com, 85 P.3d at 976 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Green 
Mach. Corp v. Zurich-American Ins. Grp., 313 F.3d 837, 839 (3d Cir. 2002)); 
Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co., v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742, 748 (3d Cir. 1999). 
55 Amazon.com, 85 P.3d at 976-77 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Applied Bolting Tech. Prod., Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 942 F. 
Supp. 1029, 1034 (E.D.Pa. 1996)).  
56  Id. at 977 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Iolab Corp. v. Seaboard 
Sur. Co., 15 F.3d 1500, 1507 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Bank of the West v. 
Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 559 (Cal. 1992)) (emphasis added); State Auto Prop. 
& Cas. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 343 F.3d 249, 258, 258 n.12 (4th 
Cir. 2003).   
57 See DISH Network Corp. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., 659 F.3d 1010, 1018 
(10th Cir. 2011); Hyundai Motor Am. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 
Pa., 600 F.3d 1092, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2010). 
58 See Amazon.com, 85 P.3d at 977 (citing Vortherms, 5 S.W.3d at 544). 
59 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
60 See id. (citing Simply Fresh Fruit, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 
1219, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
61 See also Amazon.com, 85 P.3d at 977 n.20. 
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advertising of an already infringing product.”62  As such, the injury derived 
from the use of the software code as the means to market goods for sale 
satisfied the causation requirement.  In reaching this conclusion, the court 
noted that it is irrelevant whether the customer or policyholder has actual 
knowledge of the infringement.63 
 
B. HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA V. NATIONAL UNION FIRE 
INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA 
 
The first federal court case finding that an insurer had a duty to 
defend a policyholder against a third party patent infringement claim was 
Hyundai Motor America v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of 
Pittsburgh, PA.64  Applying California law, the United States Court of 
Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed a decision by the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California granting summary judgment in 
favor of the insurers.65  Similar to Amazon and most other major 
corporations, Hyundai maintained an interactive website.66  Hyundai’s 
corporate website allowed users to “build [their] own” vehicle by 
navigating through a series of questions on different menus pertaining to 
colors, engine types, transmission types, etc.67  In response to each user’s 
input, the corporate website “displayed customized vehicle images and 
pricing information.”68  The website also contained a similar feature that 
allowed customers to select customized parts for the very same vehicles.69  
In the underlying action pertaining to Hyundai’s interactive website, Orion 
IP, LLC, a patent-holding company alleged that the “build your own 
vehicle” feature and the parts catalogue feature infringed on Orion’s 
patented computer-based system which created customized product 
proposals, including pictures and text, to be used in the creation of a 
proposal.70  Hyundai tendered a defense under its primary insurance policy, 
which promised to defend and indemnify Hyundai against claims alleging 
                                                                                                                                      
62 See Amazon.com, 85 P.3d at 977-78 & n.21. 
63 See Amazon.com, 85 P.3d at 978 n.25 (rejecting the insurer’s argument that 
Intouch’s injury could not have been caused by Amazon’s advertising because 
customers would not have been aware that they were using an infringing product). 
64 600 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2010). 
65 See Hyundai, 600 F.3d at 1104. 
66 See id. at 1095. 
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 1095-96. 
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“advertising injury,” among other things.71  Similar to the provisions of the 
insurance policy at issue in Amazon, one of the enumerated offenses under 
the “advertising injury” provision mirrored that the of the ISO 1986 Broad 
Form CGL endorsement, and provided the policyholder with coverage for 
“misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business.”72 
To determine whether the insurer had a duty to defend Hyundai 
under the “advertising injury” provision of its insurance policy, the court 
looked to find the existence of three elements: (i) whether Hyundai 
engaged in “advertising” during the relevant policy period when the alleged 
“advertising injury” occurred, (ii) whether Orion’s allegations created a 
potential liability under one of the covered offenses (i.e., misappropriation 
of advertising ideas), and (iii) whether a causal connection existed between 
the alleged injury and the “advertising.”73 The court stated that “patent 
infringement can qualify as an advertising injury if the patent involves any 
process or invention which could reasonably be considered an advertising 
idea,” i.e., if the third party “allege[d] violation of a method patent 
involving advertising ideas.”74 
Similar to the ISO 1986 Broad Form endorsement, the CGL policy 
at issue in this case failed to define “advertising,” and the court was forced 
to determine the appropriate meaning of the undefined term.75  In the 
context of the insurance policy provision, the court concluded that the term 
“advertising” referred to the “widespread promotional activities usually 
directed to the public at large,” but it did “not encompass solicitation” 
under California law.76   The court determined that the BYO feature was 
“widely distributed to the public at large, to millions of unknown web-
browsing potential customers, even if the precise information conveyed to 
each … varie[d] with user input … [because] the users [we]re using the 
                                                                                                                                      
71 Hyundai, 600 F.3d at 1095-96. 
72 Compare Hyundai, 600 F.3d at 1096, and Amazon.com , 
85 P.3d at 976 , with INS. SERV. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL 
LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM CG 00 01 11 85 (1984). 
73 Hyundai, 600 F.3d at 1098 (quoting Hameid v. Nat’l Fire Ins. of Hartford, 
71 P.3d 761, 764-65 (Cal. 2003)). 
74 Id. at 1100 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Homedics, Inc. v. 
Valley Forge Ins. Co., 315 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
75 See id. at 1098; INS. SERV. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY 
COVERAGE FORM CG 00 01 11 85 (1984). 
76 See Hyundai, 600 F.3d at 1098 (quoting Hameid, 71 P.3d at 764-65) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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same BYO feature.”77  Therefore, the BYO feature was not a solicitation 
insofar as it varied for each different user, but rather, it was a widely 
distributed, public advertisement.  After concluding that the interactive 
website was not merely a “solicitation,” the court determined that Orion’s 
patent infringement claim constituted a “misappropriation of advertising 
idea,” because a lay person would reasonably understand the phrase to 
include Orion’s patent infringement claim.78  In reaching its conclusion, the 
court noted dicta in Iolab stating that “patent infringement may constitute 
an advertising injury where an entity uses an advertising technique that is 
itself patented.”79  The court also relied on Amazon, which it found 
analogous to the present case, because the BYO feature was the “form of 
the advertisement itself … and plainly is not the product being 
advertised.”80 
 Agreeing with the Court of Appeals of Washington in Amazon, the 
court stated that a causal relationship does not exist when the alleged 
infringement concerns patents covering the underlying product for sale.81  
The court summarized the causal connection requirement and concluded 
that “[w]hen the patent infringement occurs independent of the actual 
advertisement of the underlying product, because the patent concerns the 
underlying product … then the causal connection typically is not 
established, even when the advertising exposes the infringement.”82  
Conversely, “[w]hen the patent infringement occurs in the course of the 
advertising . . . the causal connection is established.”83  In the summary of 
the causal connection requirement, the court noted that many of the 
previous Ninth Circuit decisions suggested that a causal connection would 
never exist, even when the patent concerned the method of advertising.84  
                                                                                                                                      
77 Id. at 1099-1100 (alteration in original) (noting that the “patent’s raison 
d’etre is to create customized proposals, specific to an individual user.”). 
78 Id. at 1101. 
79 Id. at 1102 (emphasis added) (quoting Iolab Corp. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 15 
F.3d 1500, 1507 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
80 Id. at 1101-02 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Amazon Int’l, Inc. 
v. Am. Dynasty Surplus Linens Ins. Co., 85 P.3d 974, 977 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004)). 
81 Id. at 1102. 
82 Hyundai, 600 F.3d at 1103 (alteration in original). But see Hyundai, 600 
F.3d at 1103 n.4 (suggesting that situations where advertisements induce others to 
infringe on a patent may produce the requisite causal connection). 
83 Id. at 1103 (alteration in original). 
84 See id. at 1102-04; see also Simply Fresh Fruit v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 94 F.3d 
1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that “the advertising activities must cause the 
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However, the court distinguished the case on the basis that the infringement 
was Hyundai’s use of patented techniques as part of its own “marketing 
method” or “marketing system” and the claim potentially alleged 
advertising injury within the insurance policy coverage.85  Based on these 
differences, the court concluded that a duty to defend against the third party 
patent infringement existed under the CGL insurance policy “advertising 
injury” provision.86 
 
C. DISH NETWORK CORPORATION V. ARCH SPECIALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
The most recent case finding that an insurer had a duty to defend a 
policyholder against a third party patent infringement claim was DISH 
Network Corporation v. Arch Specialty Insurance Company.  Applying 
Colorado law, the Tenth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals 
reversed a decision by the District of Colorado granting summary judgment 
in favor of the insurers.87  In the underlying action, Ronald A. Katz 
Technology, Licensing, L.P. filed one or more claims on twenty-three 
different patents, alleging that by DISH Network committed patent 
infringement by “making, using, offering to sell, and/or selling … 
automated telephone systems, including … the DISH Network customer 
service telephone system, [which] allow[ed] [DISH’s] customers to 
perform pay-per-view ordering and customer service functions over the 
telephone.”88  DISH Network tendered a defense under its primary 
insurance and excess coverage policies, all of which promised to defend 
and indemnify DISH against claims alleging “advertising injury,” among 
other items.89  Four of DISH Network’s five insurance policies enumerated 
four categories of offenses which constituted “advertising injury,” in 
language identical to the advertising injury provisions in the ISO 1986 
Broad Form Endorsement.90  The fifth insurance policy explicitly excluded 
                                                                                                                                      
injury,” not merely expose it) (emphasis in original); Microtec Research v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 968, 971 (9th Cir. 1994). 
85 See Hyundai, 600 F.3d 1092. 
86 Id. 
87 DISH Network Corp. v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., 659 F.3d 1010, 1028 (10th 
Cir. 2011). 
88 Id. at 1012-13 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The language of the 
underlying action mirrors that of the revision to the Patent Act in 1994. 
89 Id. at 1013.  
90 Id.; INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL COMMERCE 
LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM, CG 00 01 11 85 (1984). 
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from coverage, “any claim … [a]rising out of the infringement of 
copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret or other intellectual property 
rights,” however, the exclusion did not apply to “infringement, in [the 
insured’s] ‘advertisement,’ of copyright, trade dress or slogan.”91  
Reviewing the lower court decision de novo, Colorado law 
required the Tenth Circuit to adhere to a “four corners rule,” under which 
the court was required to “compare the allegations of the underlying 
complaint with the terms of the applicable insurance policy.”92  In the 
context of a duty to defend against a third party patent infringement claim, 
the rule requires an insurer to tender a defense if the underlying action 
alleges any facts or claims that might fall within the insurance policy’s 
provisions.93  Adhering to the “four corners rule,” the court applied a three-
part test to determine whether the insurers owed a defense to DISH 
Network under the advertising injury provisions.94  Specifically, the court 
analyzed: (i) whether DISH Network “engaged in ‘advertising’ during the 
relevant period, (ii) whether the underlying complaint alleged the predicate 
“advertising injury” offense under the policy, and (iii) whether a causal 
connection existed between the advertising activity and the alleged injury 
suffered by the third party patent holder.95   
Prior to the analysis of the three-part test, the court first determined 
whether patent infringement could ever fall within the applicable CGL 
advertising injury provisions.96  Looking to other jurisdictions for guiding 
precedent, the court noted that a clear majority view had emerged and 
courts “routinely distinguish between claims based on the manufacture and 
sale of an infringing product-in which case the claim is not covered even if 
the product is used in advertising and a claim based on the unauthorized 
use of a patented advertising idea or method- in which case the claim is 
covered.”97  Despite the substantial number of cases suggesting that 
infringement of a patented idea will qualify for coverage under the 
advertising injury provisions of a CGL policy, the court noted that many 
                                                                                                                                      
91 DISH Network Corp., 659 F.3d at 1013-14 (citation omitted); See id. at 
1028-29 (remanding the case to the district court to determine whether the unique 
language regarding the intellectual property exclusion in the fifth insurance barred 
a duty to defend against the underlying third party patent infringement claim.). 
92 Id. at 1015. 
93 Id. (citing Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 74 P.3d 294, 
301 (Colo. 2003)).  
94 Id. at n.4. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 1017 (citation omitted). 
97 Id. (citation omitted). 
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cases “unequivocally reject patent coverage,” where it is not expressly 
included in the policy.98  Distinguishing the existing case law from the 
present facts, the Tenth Circuit explained that “[t]he bulk of the published 
case law addressing patent infringement as advertising injury deals with 
products the insured happened to advertise, rather than a means of 
advertising that the insured used to market its own [non-infringing] 
products.”99  The court concluded that “[d]epending on the context of the 
facts and circumstances of th[e] case, patent infringement can qualify as an 
advertising injury if the patent involve[s] any process or invention which 
could reasonably be considered an advertising idea,” noting that such cases 
are rare, in which an “allegedly infringed patent is itself and advertising 
idea rather than merely an advertised product.”100  In the underlying action, 
the court explained that DISH Network “allegedly committed patent 
infringement by using [patented] technology to sell Dish’s own non-
infringing … products and services.”101  The holding seems to suggest that 
coverage is only appropriate when both the accused activity and the 
patent’s claims are within the scope of advertising.  However, the logic 
espoused by the court clearly demonstrates a willingness to provide 
reasonable protection to policyholders in light of the broadly encompassing 
language in a CGL policy similar to the ISO 1986 Broad Form 
endorsement. 
After determining that patent infringement could fall within the 
applicable CGL advertising injury provisions, the Tenth Circuit applied the 
Novell analysis, and analyzed “whether the complaint potentially alleged a 
predicate offense, viz., ‘misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of 
doing business.”102  As was previously noted, the ISO 1986 Broad Form 
endorsement failed to define the meaning of the term “advertising,” and the 
definition varies between jurisdictions.  The court noted that some 
jurisdictions apply broadly encompassing definitions for “advertising,” 
such as; (i) the “action of calling something to the attention of the 
public,”103 or (ii) any oral, written or graphic statement made by the seller 
                                                                                                                                      
98 Id. at 1019 (citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Frosty Bites, Inc., 232 
F.Supp.2d 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). 
99 DISH Network, 659 F.3d at 1017-18 (alteration in original). 
100 Id. at 1020 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotations 
marks omitted) (quoting Hyundai Motor Am. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of 
Pittsburgh, Pa., 600 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
101 Id. at 1018 (alteration in original). 
102 Id. at 1020. 
103 Hyman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 304 F.3d 1179, 1188 (11th Cir. 
2002) (quoting Adolfo House Distrib. Corp. v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 
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in any manner in connection with the solicitation of business.”104  
Conversely, other jurisdictions provide a strict definition: “widespread 
distribution of promotional materials to the public at large,” in contrast 
with a one-on-one promotional activity known as a “solicitation.”105  The 
court failed to reach a conclusion as to which definition should apply to 
third party patent infringement claims, however, it concluded that the 
underlying complaint could be read to potentially allege the 
misappropriation of advertising ideas.106   Reasoning that the patented 
functions conceivably allowed DISH Network to sell their product, and 
conceivably make selling offers to the specific caller, the court stated that 
“the complaint … allege[d] misappropriation of a product specifically 
designed … for advertising purposes.”107   
After concluding that the complaint potentially alleged 
misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business under the 
advertising injury provisions of the insurance policies, the court then 
analyzed whether the requisite causal connection existed.108  Specifically, 
the court examined whether the alleged injury arose in the course of 
advertising as the policy language mandated.109  The causal requirement is 
important for public policy reasons because: 
 
“[v]irtually every business that sells a 
product or service advertises, if only in the 
sense of making representations to potential 
customers. If no causal relationship were 
required between “advertising activities and 
‘advertising injuries, the advertising injury 
                                                                                                                                      
165 F.Supp.2d 1332, 1339 (S.D.Fla. 2001)); see also discussion infra Part IV.A. 
(noting this definition of “advertising” is similar to that of the 1998 ISO Broad 
Form Endorsement). 
104 See Amazon.com Int’l, Inc. v. Am. Dynasty Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 85 P.3d 
974, 977 (Wash. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004) (quoting State Auto Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co. 
v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 343 F.3d 249, 259 (4th Cir. 2003)).  
105 See Hayward v. Centennial Ins. Co., 430 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(quoting Hameid v. Nat’l Fire Ins. of Hartford, 71 P.3d 761, 763 (Cal. 2003)). 
106 See DISH Network, 659 F.3d at 1022 (alteration in original). It is important 
to note that under Colorado law the issue is not whether the complaint definitively 
delineates the specific advertising activities Dish engaged in, but rather whether 
the alleged facts even potentially fall within the scope of coverage. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
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coverage, alone, would encompass most 
claims related to the insured’s business.”110   
  
In DISH, the court delineated several different approached, applied by 
various courts, to determining whether the requisite causal connection was 
satisfied.  In the first approach, causation was satisfied if the “alleged 
advertising activities alone would be actionable.”111  Another approach 
required that “the advertising activities must cause the injury-not merely 
expose it.”112  The final approach taken by courts fails to find the requisite 
causal connection “if the injury could have arisen in the absence of 
advertising,” specifically, if “any advertising done through the use of the 
software [wa]s incidental to [the underlying plaintiff’s] core complaint.”113  
The court declined to follow the final approach, which was utilized by the 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit in Delta Computer Corp. v. 
Frank, 196 F.3d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 1999), because the approach was 
inconsistent “with Colorado’s rule that a duty to defend arises wherever the 
complaint even potentially alleges conduct within the policy language.”114  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
110 Novell, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 983, 989 (10th Cir. 1998) (alteration 
in original) (quoting Bank of the W. v. Super. Ct., 833 P.2d 525, 560 (Cal. 1992)). 
111 See DISH Network, 659 F.3d at 1026 (citing Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co., Inc. 
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742, 750 n.8 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
112 See id. (citing Novell, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 141 F.3d at 989); see also 
Microtec Research v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 968, 971 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(alteration in original) (“If the [insured] does some wrongful act and then 
advertises it, harm caused by the wrongful act alone is not within the scope of the 
term advertising injury.”). 
113 See DISH Network, 659 F.3d at 1026, 1028 (quoting Delta Computer Corp. 
v. Frank, 196 F.3d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 1999)); see also Delta Computer Corp. v. 
Frank, 196 F.3d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 1999) (alteration in original) (concluding that 
the underlying claim was “essentially for infringement of [a] copyrighted software 
program,” not for any advertising the plaintiff may have done with it, and noting 
that the “underlying pleading state[d] nothing about advertising.”). 
114 See DISH Network, 659 F.3d at 1028 (citing Compass Ins. Co. v. City of 
Littleton, 984 F.3d 606, 614 (Colo. 1999)) (The court citing Cyprus Amax 
Minerals Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 74 P.3d 294, 301 (Colo. 2003), that Colorado 
requires a duty to defend the entire suit when any claim “might fall within the 
ambit of the policy”)).  
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IV.  RECENT CHANGES LIMITING ADVERTISING INJURY 
COVERAGE IN INSURANCE SERVICE OFFICE, INC. 
COMMERCIAL OR COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL 
LIABILITY POLICY FORMS 
 
A. THE 1998 ISO BROAD FORM CGL ENDORSEMENT REVISIONS 
 
In 1998, the ISO made several major revisions in an attempt to 
resolve some of the issues surrounding the 1986 Broad Form endorsement.  
The first substantial change was the combination of the definitions of 
“personal injury” and “advertising injury” into Part B coverage, “Personal 
and Advertising Injury.”115  In this section, the ISO defined the term 
“advertisement” for the first time in the advertising injury provisions, as 
“notice that is broadcast to or published to the general public or specific 
market segments … for the purpose of attaining customers or 
supporters.”116  The second substantial change from the ISO 1986 Broad 
Form endorsement was the replacement of the provision providing 
coverage for “infringement of copyright, title or slogan,” with a new 
provision providing coverage for “infring[ement] upon another’s copyright, 
trade dress or slogan in your advertisement.”117  Additionally, the ISO 1998 
Broad Form endorsement removed the provision providing coverage for 
“misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business,” and 
replaced the provision with coverage for “the use of another’s advertising 
idea in your advertisement.”118  Although the effects of these changes are 
unclear, these revisions may force courts to reach different conclusions 
under circumstances similar to those of the previously discussed decisions 
by the Court of Appeals of Washington and subsequently by the United 
States Court of Appeals, Ninth and Tenth Circuits.  
 
B. THE 2001 ISO BROAD FORM CGL ENDORSEMENT REVISIONS 
 
The ISO 1998 Broad Form endorsement revisions were released in 
2001 following major increases in the global use of electronic 
                                                                                                                                      
115 See INS. SERVS. OFFICE INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE 
FORM CG 00 01 07 98 (1997); See also  INS. SERVS. OFFICE INC., COMMERCIAL 
GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM CG 00 01 11 85 (1986). 
116 INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC. supra note 115. 
117 Id. (alteration in original). 
118 Id. 
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communications which raised concerns among ISO member companies.119  
In the ISO 2001 Broad Form endorsement, advertising injury coverage is 
described under six enumerated offenses: (i) false arrest, detention or 
imprisonment, (ii) malicious prosecution, (iii) libel, slander, or 
disparagement, (iv) violation of the right of privacy, (v) use of another’s 
advertising idea in your advertisement, and (vi) infringement of copyright, 
trade dress, or slogan in your advertising.120  The ISO 2001 Broad Form 
endorsement explicitly excludes coverage, any injury “arising out of the 
infringement of copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret or other 
intellectual property rights” from the “Personal and Advertising Injury” 
provisions.121  However, this exclusion “does not apply to infringement, in 
your ‘advertisement,’ of copyright, trade dress of slogan.”122  These 
changes appear to be in response to attempts by policyholder to secure 
coverage for third party patent infringement claim, as described in the 
previous sections.  Insurance policies that utilize language mirroring the 
newer editions of the Broad Form endorsements are likely to prevent 
policyholders from obtaining coverage.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Courts have not yet addressed the issue of whether the new 
exclusions in the “Personal and Advertising Injury” provision of the ISO 
2001 Broad Form endorsement bar coverage when the policyholder 
infringes on a patented advertising idea, but it is only a matter of time 
before the question is presented to a court.  Generally, courts faced with 
issues surrounding CGL policies are increasingly limiting policyholder 
coverage for infringement of intellectual property rights and third party 
patent infringement.  Although the previously discussed cases are a 
significant victory for policyholders, the ISO CGL endorsements now 
contain exclusions which are likely to prohibit courts from following the 
logic espoused by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits and the Washington Court 
of Appeals.  The revisions in the ISO 1998 and 2001 Broad Form 
                                                                                                                                      
119 See INS. SERVS. OFFICE INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE 
FORM CG 00 01 10 01 (2000). (alteration in original) (“Notices that are published 
include material placed on the Internet, or on similar electronic means of 
communication; and [r]egarding web-sites, only the part of a web-site that is about 
your goods, products or services for the purpose of attracting customers or 
supporters is considered an advertisement.”). 
120 See id.  
121 See id. (emphasis added). 
122 See id.  
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endorsements create more impediments for policyholders and limit the 
ability to obtain coverage for third party patent infringement claims.123  
“The combination of the sharply curtailed advertising injury coverage with 
the new IP exclusions mean[s] that, except for a tiny number of cases, the 
commercial general liability [insurance policies] no longer provides 
coverage for IP infringement generally, including for patent 
infringement.”124 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
123 See Robert D. Chesler & Cindy Tzvi Sonenblick, Insurance Coverage for 
Intellectual Property Infringement (pt. 3), BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS (2008), 
http://www.lowenstein.com/files/Publication/33ad0bf9-ca30-4c15-a20e-
05d8048333be/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/05af2561-74b2-4f37-951e-
0b181131c92b/Privacy%20Liability%20Part%203%20Bloomberg%20RC%20and
%20CS.%2006.08.pdf, (“[M]any companies now have essentially no coverage for 
intellectual property infringement.”). 
124 See id. (alteration in original). 
MEDICALLY UNNECESSARY:  HOW THE FLAWS IN 
MEDICARE PART D’S COVERAGE OF OFF-LABEL 
MEDICINES WITH DEMONSTRABLE MEDICAL NECESSITY 
PREVENTS BETTER HEALTHCARE OUTCOMES, INCLUDING 
FOR BENEFICIARIES WITH PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS 
 
ALEXANDER W. WING* 
 
*** 
 
This article examines the hardships faced by Medicare Part D patients, and 
especially mental health patients, with respect to obtaining coverage for 
necessary but off-label drug prescriptions.  The article posits that the 
Medicare Part D system, as it currently exists, is failing not only in its 
mission for quality of care, but also in its cost-effectiveness.   The paper 
advocates a comprehensive approach to Medicare Part D that addresses 
both deficiencies by allowing for exceptions to the FDA approved use 
requirement, on a case-by-case basis, where such exceptions are supported 
by scientific evidence.  An exception process of this nature would allow 
deserving beneficiaries to acquire the prescriptions they need while also 
avoiding the heightened costs associated with an abundance of under-
treated or mistreated patients. 
 
*** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 In November 2011, a psychiatrist published an article describing a 
problem the likes of which she has seen repeatedly in her practice.1 Her 
Medicare Part D enrolled patient was refused an antidepressant that he had 
been stable on for nearly a decade.2  Now he was required to go through a 
laborious prior authorization process that left him unmedicated and 
                                                                                                                 
* Alexander W. Wing; Juris Doctor Candidate – University of Connecticut 
School of Law.  I would like to thank my family and friends for supporting me 
while I wrote and worked on this note.  I would also like to thank the professors 
who gave me feedback and the late Jennifer Jaff for introducing me to this area of 
the law. 
1 Elissa Ely, The Run-Around with Medicare Part D, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 
26, 2011, at A.11. 
2 Id. 
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unstable.3  This unfortunate story is an exemplar of coverage issues faced 
by mentally disordered Medicare Part D beneficiaries.  A correlated and 
serious coverage problem faced by Medicare Part D patients, both mentally 
disordered and otherwise, is the unreasonable denial of medically necessary 
off-label medications. 
Medicare Part D was created by an amendment to the Social 
Security Act called, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act (MMA).4  The MMA was enacted in 2003 and became 
effective in 2006.5  The MMA provides an outpatient prescription drug 
coverage program for Medicare beneficiaries, on a voluntary basis, by 
offering a variety of plans from private insurers who have contracted with 
the Department of Health and Human Services.6   
Off-label drug use is the use of a drug, approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), for an indication other than that specified in 
FDA drug labeling.7  Beyond prescribing approved drugs for unapproved 
conditions, off-label use also includes prescribing medication for different 
populations (e.g. age groups) and at doses higher or lower than approved.8  
Pursuant to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), new medications 
are granted FDA approval only after being proven safe and effective for 
specific ailments at particular dosages.9  In 2000, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit noted that, “neither Congress nor the FDA has 
attempted to regulate the off-label use of drugs by doctors and consumers.  
A physician may prescribe a legal drug to serve any purpose that he or she 
                                                                                                                 
3 See id. 
4 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 
42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101 (2011). 
5 Id. 
6 See e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-366R, MEDICARE 
PART D FORMULARIES: CMS CONDUCTS OVERSIGHT OF MID-YEAR CHANGES; 
MOST MID-YEARS CHANGES WERE ENHANCEMENTS 1 (2011). 
7 See Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 332-33 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(citations omitted); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE COMM’R, OFFICE OF 
POLICY, GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL 
ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON 
UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED 
MEDICAL DEVICES 1 n.2 (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/ 
DOCKETS/98fr/FDA-2008-D-0053-gdl.pdf. 
8 See also With Precautions, Psychiatrists Need Not Shun Off-Label 
Prescribing, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, June 6, 2008, at 1, available at 
http://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/newsarticle.aspx?articleid=111823. 
9 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2010). 
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deems appropriate, regardless of whether the drug has been approved for 
that use by the FDA.”10  Off-label prescribing is a very common medical 
practice that is even “ubiquitous in certain specialties.”11  On its website, 
the FDA cautions physicians to prescribe off-label only when such use is 
supported by “sound medical evidence” while clearly distinguishing such 
practices from investigational uses that would fall under their scrutiny.12  
One district court has held that statute restricts Medicare Part D 
coverage to FDA approved uses and off-label uses endorsed by statutorily 
designated medical compendia of drug uses.13   Another court has 
interpreted the statute to be more encompassing and permissive of off-label 
uses not published in the compendia, provided that the off-label use at issue 
is medically necessary as supported by scientific evidence.14  At present, 
there is proposed legislation in Congress that would expressly require 
coverage of such meritorious off-label uses.15   
This note advocates for Medicare Part D coverage of off-label 
medications that are demonstrably necessary as indicated by an appropriate 
amount of reliable medical evidence.  Moreover, this note argues that such 
a process should have protections built into it to address the particular 
needs and problems faced by mentally disordered patients.  The political 
debates over Medicare, and Social Security in general, are outside of this 
note’s scope.  Rather, this note aims to make Medicare Part D, a new social 
safety net, as efficient as possible while still providing the base quality of 
care that is its objective.  By correctly providing optimal care for patients, 
Medicare would be more compassionate and cost-effective.  To curb costs 
at the expense of reasonably proper healthcare is contrary to Medicare’s 
purpose of providing coverage for a vulnerable high-risk insurance pool, 
while also combating the moral hazards posed when insuring these 
populations.   
In part II, this note provides more background information about 
Medicare Part D including: costs and mechanisms, an explanation of off-
label drug uses, and the use of formularies and drug compendia in 
                                                                                                                 
10 Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(citations omitted). 
11 Id. (citation omitted). 
12 “Off-Label” and Investigational Use Of Marketed Drugs, Biologics, and 
Medical Devices - Information Sheet, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126486.htm  (last 
updated Aug. 10, 2011). 
13 Kilmer v. Leavitt, 609 F. Supp. 2d 750, 753-54 (S.D. Ohio 2009). 
14 Layzer v. Leavitt, 770 F. Supp. 2d 579, 582-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
15 Part D Off-Label Parity Act, H.R. 1055, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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determining coverage.  Part III will explore problems and issues with off-
label uses and the utilization of compendia under Medicare Part D, and will 
also examine legal and legislative action pertaining to off-label coverage.  
The concerns of mentally disordered Medicare Part D beneficiaries will be 
analyzed in part IV by establishing the frequency of mental disorders 
among Medicare patients.  Part IV will continue with an examination of 
coverage for off-label medications in mental health contexts, followed by a 
discussion of policy that would expressly ensure mental health parity and 
facilitate proper access to medically necessary off-label drugs.  The note 
will conclude in Part V, with an emphasis on the mentally disordered, 
wherein the problems with off-label coverage under Medicare Part D will 
be recapped and policy solutions will be examined. 
 
II. MEDICARE PART D 
 
A. WHO IS COVERED UNDER MEDICARE PART D AND HOW DOES 
 IT WORK? 
 
In order to be entitled to Medicare Part D prescription benefits, one 
must be eligible under Medicare Part A or enrolled in Medicare Part B.16  
The MMA also established a program called Medicare+Choice under 
Medicare Part C.17 It provides coverage plans that are alternatives to those 
under Medicare Part A or Part B, and makes Part D coverage available.18  
Medicare Part C (also known as Medicare Advantage) prescription plans 
are called MA-PD, short form for Medicare Advantage prescription drug, 
and other Part D plans are called PDPs (prescription drug plans).19  
Medicare Part A (hospital insurance) entitlement extends to seniors aged 65 
and older who are eligible for Social Security benefits, as well as to those 
who have been qualified to receive Social Security Disability benefits for at 
least two years.20  Medicare Part B (medical insurance) coverage requires 
enrollment, and eligibility extends beyond that of Part A.21  Medicare Part 
B covers persons entitled to Social Security Benefits, as well as all that 
                                                                                                                 
16 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101(a)(3)(A) (2011). 
17 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21(a) (2011). 
18 Id. 
19 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-366R, MEDICARE PART 
D FORMULARIES: CMS CONDUCTS OVERSIGHT OF MID-YEAR CHANGES; MOST 
MID-YEARS CHANGES WERE ENHANCEMENTS 1 n.3 (2011). 
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(c) (2011). 
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(o) (2011). 
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have attained the age of 65 (provided that they are a citizen or an alien who 
has lawfully resided in the United States for at least 5 years).22  Social 
Security Disability benefits are available for a broad variety of 
impairments,23 including mental disorders in both adults24 and children.25 
  While Medicare Part D prescription drug plans must meet certain 
statutory guidelines, they differ in implementation when it comes to 
premiums, gap coverage, copayment tiers, deductibles, and other pricing 
structures.26  The MMA requires that Medicare Part D plans provide either 
“standard prescription drug coverage with access to negotiated prices,” as 
defined by the statute, or the actuarial equivalent thereof.27  The MMA 
definition of standard prescription drug coverage is codified in 42 U.S.C. § 
1395w-102 (b).28  It specifies that many of the listed patient costs be 
subjected to yearly price increases.29  This is determined by the Secretary 
of the Department of Health and Human Services (hereinafter Secretary), 
based on the “annual percentage increase [of the] average per capita 
aggregate expenditures for covered Part D drugs.”30  When the MMA came 
into effect in 2006, plan providers could charge beneficiaries a deductible 
of $250 that has since been raised to reflect the aforementioned annual 
percentage based price increase.31  The standard plan also requires that the 
patient pay 25% coinsurance until the costs expended reach $2,250, 
adjusted for the annual percentage increase.32  After reaching this cap, Part 
                                                                                                                 
22 See id. 
23 See Disability Evaluation Under Social Security: Part III –Listing of 
Impairments, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, http://www.ssa.gov/disability/ 
professionals/bluebook/listing-impairments.htm (last modified Jul. 6, 2012). 
24See Disability Evaluation Under Social Security: 12.00 Mental Disorders - 
Adult, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, http://www.ssa.gov/disability/ 
professionals/bluebook/12.00-MentalDisorders-Adult.htm (last modified Jul. 6, 
2012). 
25 See Disability Evaluation Under Social Security: 112.00 Mental Disorders - 
Childhood, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, http://www.ssa.gov/disability/ 
professionals/bluebook/112.00-MentalDisorders-Childhood.htm (last modified Jul. 
6, 2012). 
26 JACK HOADLEY ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., ANALYSIS OF MEDICARE 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG PLANS IN 2011 AND KEY TRENDS SINCE 2006 1 (2011), 
available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/8237.pdf. 
27 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(a) (2011). 
28 See id. § 1395w-102(b). 
29 See id. § 1395w-102(b)(6). 
30 Id. 
31 See id. § 1395w-102(b)(1). 
32 Id. § 1395w-102(b)(2)–(b)(3). 
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D beneficiaries enter a coverage gap, infamously known as the doughnut 
hole.33   While in the coverage gap, beneficiaries pay the next $3600 (plus 
the annual increases) for their prescriptions, after which they pay 5% 
coinsurance.34  The recent Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 
2010 (PPACA), also known as Obamacare, contains provisions aimed at 
ameliorating this problem.35  From 2011 onward, the PPACA will provide 
price discounts and government subsidies for Medicare Part D enrollees 
mired in the doughnut hole, with plans to phase out the coverage gap 
entirely by 2020.36  Moreover, most Part D plan insurers tend to opt for 
actuarial equivalency as implemented via tiered cost sharing schemes.37  As 
of November 2011, 53% of PDPs had a deductible and 43% used the 
standard plan amount.38  After charging a deductible, most plans utilized 
cost contingent tiered copayment schemes instead of the flat 25% 
coinsurance of the standard plan.39  In 2012 the standard plan deductible 
was $320 and the coverage gap was between $2930 and $6730.40  There are 
also provisions to provide subsidies and assistance to poor beneficiaries.41  
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) reported that over 
10 million enrollees received such help in 2011, although an estimated 
additional 2 million enrollees were eligible for such assistance but did not 
receive it.42  This figure is alarming, and starkly presents some of Medicare 
Part D’s problems, because 29.5 million people were enrolled under 
Medicare Part D as of September 2011.43  
The MMA directs the Secretary to promulgate an administrative 
grievance process by which a Part D enrollee may appeal a decision 
                                                                                                                 
33 JACK HOADLEY ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE PART D 2011: 
THE COVERAGE GAP 1, 3 (2011), available at http://www.kff.org/ 
medicare/upload/8222.pdf. 
34 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(b)(4) (2011). 
35 See HOADLEY, ANALYSIS OF MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG PLANS, supra 
note 26, at 1.  
36 See HOADLEY, THE COVERAGE GAP, supra note 33, at 1. 
37 See HOADLEY, ANALYSIS OF MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG PLANS, supra 
note 26, at 4. 
38 See THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 
MEDICARE POLICY FACT SHEET 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7044-12.pdf. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. at 2. 
42 See id. 
43 See id. 
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denying drug coverage.44  There are four levels of administrative appeal 
prior to district court jurisdiction.45  The four levels of administrative 
review are: internal to the provider, independent and external review, 
administrative law judge review, and finally a hearing before the Medicare 
Appeals Council.46  Not surprisingly, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third and Ninth Circuits have each held that the federal district 
courts have no jurisdiction until administrative remedies are fully 
exhausted, as required by law.47  Therefore, an individual may appeal in a 
federal district court, only if the amount in controversy is $1,300.00 or 
greater and only after the fourth level of appeal has been determined.48   
 
B. OFF-LABEL DRUG USE 
 
Prescribing FDA approved medications for off-label use is legal 
because regulation of the practice of medicine is outside the FDA’s 
purview.49  This policy makes sense because once safety is established, 
innovation in research may find new uses and verify them at a rate faster 
than the FDA approval process.  Such regulation could also pose logistical 
problems and might raise debate over governmental authority.  In 1982, the 
FDA acknowledged that prescribing off-label drugs often reflects valid 
clinical applications as established by thorough research.50  Since the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) does not forbid such usage, many safe 
and innovative uses of approved drugs aren’t promptly added to the FDA 
medical labeling, because of the time and expense involved.51  That off-
label prescribing is often dangerous or uncertain due to a lack of scientific 
                                                                                                                 
44 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-104 (f)-(i) (2011), cross referencing 42 U.S.C. § 
1395w-22 (2011); see appended flowchart infra p. 252. 
45 See appended flowchart infra p. 252. 
46 See appended flowchart infra p. 252. 
47 See Kopstein v. Indep. Blue Cross, 339 F. App’x 261, 264-65 (3d Cir. 
2009); Uhm v. Humana, Inc., 620 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2010). 
48 See appended flowchart infra p. 252 (note that the amount in controversy 
requirements are modified yearly to reflect the consumer price index). 
49 See More Information for Better Patient Care: Hearing of the Comm. On 
Labor and Human Res. U.S. S., 104th Cong. 81-82 (1996) (statement of William 
Schultz, Deputy Comm’r for Policy, Food and Drug Administration), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t960222a.html. 
50 See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Use of Approved Drugs for Unlabeled 
Indications, 12 FDA DRUG BULL. 3, 4-5 (Apr. 1982), available at 
http://www.circare.org/fda/fdadrugbulletin_041982.pdf. 
51 See id. 
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support has been well documented elsewhere.52  However, one need only 
look to the news to learn that FDA approval alone is no guarantor of safety 
or efficacy.53  Unfortunately, medication errors are so common that the 
FDA has a program, called MedWatch, whose sole purpose is to monitor 
adverse drug reactions.54  Concurrently, off-label use is frequently well 
supported by medical research and has therapeutic value embraced by 
health providers.55  A common and prominent example of a drug used for 
non-FDA sanctioned uses is aspirin.56  Aspirin’s efficacy in combating 
heart disease has long been known by the medical community yet its 
                                                                                                                 
52 See, e.g., David C Radley, et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based 
Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021 (2006), available at 
http://archinte.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/166/9/1021 (statistical analysis of drug 
use surveys found 21% of prescriptions are for off label use but only 27% of these 
uses had strong scientific support and cautions that off-label use without such 
support could be dangerous or fiscally wasteful). 
53 See, e.g., Shari Roan, Avastin Loses Approval as Breast Cancer Drug, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2011, at 9, available at http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2011/nov/18/health/la-he-avastin-breast-cancer-20111119 (FDA approval 
withdrawn for breast cancer because harms greater than therapeutic benefit, 
endorsement remains for other cancer types); Rita Rubin, How did Vioxx Debacle 
Happen?, USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.usatoday.com/ 
news/health/2004-10-12-vioxx-cover_x.htm (Vioxx manufacturer Merck withdrew 
dangerous drug from market in spite of FDA approval causing many to question 
and critique FDA). 
54 FDA 101: Medication Errors, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm048644.htm#Examples
ofMedicationErrors (last updated Feb. 20, 2009) (this service monitors all adverse 
drug events, many of which occur independently of the drug approval process). 
55 See Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use – Rethinking the 
Role of the FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427 (Apr. 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0802107.  
56 See Bayer: Science for a Better Life, BAYER.COM, 
http://www.bayer.com/en/History.aspx (last visited Sept. 6, 2012); Joseph Sirven, 
New Uses for Older Drugs: The Tales of Aspirin, Thalidomide, and Gabapentin, 
85 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 508, (June 2010), available at http://171.67.112.83/ 
content/85/6/508.full.pdf+html (aspirin is a complicated example because its use 
and discovery profoundly predates the founding of the FDA and its regulatory 
scheme); Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use – Rethinking the 
Role of the FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427 (Apr. 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0802107 (aspirin is used off-label to 
prevent heart disease among diabetes sufferers). 
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approved indications were slow to reflect that understanding.57  Thus, an 
off-label use of an approved drug is often supported by the medical 
community and can be of great benefit to a patient’s health.  A flexible 
prescription coverage regime predicated on medical evidence and best 
practices would be the most humane and efficient.  Therefore it is of 
paramount importance to ensure that off-label use, when it occurs, is 
meritorious.  It is illegal for a pharmaceutical manufacturer to label an 
approved drug for an unapproved indication and for them to market or 
promote an off-label use.58  This law hopefully helps reduce pressure on 
doctors to base their prescribing practices on biased information.  In the 
absence of information from drug companies, doctors must inform 
themselves about off-label uses “through compendia, journal articles, 
continuing medical education programs, symposia, and professional 
meetings.”59  To that end, the FDA has recently published guidance for the 
healthcare industry that stipulates what standards to look for in evaluating 
medical evidence for off-label use.60  
                                                                                                                 
57 See  Bayer: Science for a Better Life, BAYER.COM, http://www.bayer 
.com/en/History.aspx (last visited Sept. 6, 2012); Joseph Sirven, New Uses for 
Older Drugs: The Tales of Aspirin, Thalidomide, and Gabapentin, 85 MAYO 
CLINIC PROC. 508, (June 2010), available at http://171.67.112.83/content/ 
85/6/508.full.pdf+html (aspirin is a complicated example because its use and 
discovery profoundly predates the founding of the FDA and its regulatory scheme); 
Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use – Rethinking the Role of the 
FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427 (Apr. 3, 2008), available at http://www.nejm. 
org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0802107 (aspirin is used off-label to prevent heart 
disease among diabetes sufferers). 
58 E.g., Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 332-33 (D.C. Cir. 
2000) (citations omitted); United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 389 n. 2 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
59 Testimony on Unapproved Uses of Prescription Drugs: Before S. Comm. On 
Labor & Human Res., 104th Cong. (Feb. 22, 1996) (statement of William Schultz, 
Deputy Comm’r for Policy, Food and Drug Admin.), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t960222a.html. 
60 See also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OFFICE OF POLICY, OFFICE OF THE 
COMM’R, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC 
REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND 
APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES (2009), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/FDA-2008-D-0053-gdl.pdf (last 
updated Aug. 6, 2009). This guidance was published when 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa, 
which in certain contexts allowed pharmaceutical manufacturers to disseminate 
information on their product’s off label uses, was still in effect. While such 
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C.  FORMULARIES AND COMPENDIA 
 
The prescription drug plans available to Medicare Part D 
beneficiaries all provide basic coverage, but often differ in terms of pricing, 
which pharmacies may be used, and which medicines are covered.61  
Medicare Part D plans typically release a list of which medications are 
available with a given plan, in a compilation called a formulary.62  It is 
important to understand that a formulary is merely a list of prescriptions 
available.  The formulary does not dictate which ailments a given medicine 
may be prescribed for.  Still, these formularies must be developed and 
reviewed by a committee of doctors and pharmacists pursuant to scientific 
evidence.63  While compiling a formulary, a provider is required to provide 
coverage for certain pharmaceuticals, and classes of pharmaceuticals, as 
identified by the Secretary.64  Finally, the statute mandates that the 
formulary be periodically evaluated,65 explained to patients and healthcare 
professionals,66 and that patients and their healthcare providers are given 
notice of any adverse changes to the formulary.67  Prompted by statute, 
CMS has promulgated regulations that require formularies to contain “[a]ll 
or substantially all drugs in the antidepressants, antipsychotics, [and] 
anticonvulsants.” categories.68   
However, this regulatory provision does not guarantee that Part D 
patients suffering from mental disorder will be granted coverage or 
reimbursement for an off-label prescription drug.  This is significant 
because one study found that as many as 74% of anticonvulsant, and 60% 
                                                                                                                 
dissemination is no longer permitted by statute, off label use remains legal and the 
FDA’s guidance on evaluating medical literature is helpful. See id. at 6 & n.9.  
61Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, How Medicare Prescription 
Drug Plans and Medicare Advantage Plans with Prescription Drug Coverage 
(MA-PDs) Use Pharmacies, Formularies, and Common Coverage Rules, CMS. 
GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/11136.pdf (last updated Feb. 
2011). 
62 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(G)(i)(I) (2006). 
63 Id. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(A)(i).  
64 Id. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(C), (b)(3)(G). 
65 Id. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(F). 
66 Id. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(D). 
67 Id. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(E). 
68 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG 
BENEFIT MANUAL, CMS Pub. 100-18, ch. 6, § 30.2.5 (Rev. 10, Feb. 19, 2010), 
https://www.cms.gov/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/Chapter6.pdf  
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of antipsychotic, prescriptions were for off-label uses.69  Moreover, under 
this provision, formularies do not necessarily contain both the generic and 
brand name versions of drugs, all formulations of a drug (such as regular 
versus extended release), nor all isomers of a molecule.70  These classes of 
drugs are also subject to plan management techniques, such as prior 
authorization, which have historically chilled the utilization of such 
drugs.71  Coverage is similarly uncertain for all medications listed in a 
formulary if the prescribed use is off-label because of how the MMA 
determines whether an off-label use is medically necessary.  
While the various plans available under Medicare Part D vary in 
their coverage and cost, regulation stipulates that coverage of a medicine 
under Medicare Part D is predicated on a “medically accepted indication” 
as defined by statute.72  This terminology is distinguishable from the legal 
concept of medical necessity and should not be.73  A drug in a plan’s 
formulary may be denied coverage if the prescription is for a use that does 
not satisfy the statute’s criteria.  Under the MMA, a “medically accepted 
indication” is defined in various ways.74  When the pharmaceutical 
treatment in question is chemotherapeutic, the use is medically accepted 
when it is FDA approved, or supported by a designated medical 
compendium.75  A chemotherapeutic medication is also medically 
acceptable if the carrier determines the use is medically necessary pursuant 
to established medical practices and peer reviewed empirical literature, 
commensurate with the guidance of the Secretary.76  At least for 
chemotherapeutic medicines, Medicare Part D coverage is synchronous 
with typical definitions of medical necessity. 
  A medical compendium is a compilation of endorsed drug uses 
and adverse interactions that is supported by established medical practices 
                                                                                                                 
69 Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use – Rethinking the Role 
of the FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427 (2008), available at 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0802107. 
70 See Haiden Huskamp, et al., Coverage and Prior Authorization of 
Psychotropic Drugs Under Medicare Part D, 58 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 308, 308-
09 (2007), available at http://ps.psychiatryonline.org/data/Journals/PSS/3797/ 
07ps308.pdf.  
71 Id. at 308. 
72 42 C.F.R. § 423.100 (2011).  This regulation’s construction of statute was 
held to be invalid. Layzer v. Leavitt, 770 F. Supp. 579, 587 (2011). 
73 See 12 LEE R. RUSS ET. AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 181:2 (2011). 
74 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(e)(4) (2011). 
75 Id. § 1395x(t)(2)(B). 
76 Id. 
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and scientific research.77  Under Medicare Part D, all other types of drugs 
(non-chemotherapeutic) are medically accepted only if they are FDA 
approved for an application, or if their use is indicated by the medical 
compendia listed in 42 U.S.C. §1396r-8(g)(1)(B)(i).78  There are no 
exceptions for non-chemotherapeutic medicines.  Recall that 42 U.S.C. § 
1396r-8(g)(1)(B)(ii) provides that the medical acceptability of a 
chemotherapeutic drug’s usage can be determined by reference to peer 
reviewed literature and medical practices.  But, this fact-based exception 
was not included in the MMA framework for non-chemotherapeutic drugs.  
Furthermore, the statute, as originally drafted, did not allow for exceptions 
to the compendia for chemotherapeutic drugs either.79  This provision came 
from an amendment contained in the Medicare Improvements for Patients 
and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA).80  This came two years after the 
enactment of Medicare Part D, which even now is a relatively new 
program.   Since FDA approval of a drug also determines approved uses,81 
in practice these compendia are used to determine whether an off-label 
usage is medically acceptable.  
Under the MMA, the Secretary also has the authority to revise and 
update the list of approved compendia to insure that medically accepted 
indications are identifiable by carriers, patients, and health care providers.82  
Regulation requires that the formation of a federally used compendium be 
conducted through a transparent process subject to review by the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).83  The compendia listed in 
statute are: American Hospital Formulary Service Drug Information, the 
United States Pharmacopeia–Drug Information, and the DRUGDEX 
Information System.84  However, the United States Pharmacopeia-Drug 
Information is now defunct and the DRUGDEX Information System was 
added to this list at a later date.85  Thus, CMS configures and revises its 
                                                                                                                 
77 See 42 C.F.R. § 414.930(a).  See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r-8(g)(1)(A) to -
8(g)(2) (2011). 
78 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(e)(4) (2011)(cross referencing 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-
8(k)(6) (2011)).   
79 Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, H. R. 6331, 
110th Cong. § 182 (2008). 
80 Id. 
81 See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2010). 
82 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(w)-102(e)(4)(C) (Supp. IV 2011). 
83 See 42 C.F.R. § 414.930(b) (2011). 
84 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(1)(B)(i) (2000). 
85 See Ross McKinney et al., White Paper: Potential Conflict of Interest in the 
Production of Drug Compendia, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & 
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own working list of compendia pursuant to its regulatory authority.86  As of 
this writing, the agency has adopted National Comprehensive Cancer 
Network (NCCN) Drugs and Biologics Compendium87 and Clinical 
Pharmacology88 to serve alongside Thomson Micromedex DRUGDEX and 
American Hospital Formulary Service Drug Information as the current 
working compendia for Medicare.89  The various CMS approved 
compendia differ in their compilation process, but generally all strive to be 
unbiased and evidence based in their determinations.90  Unfortunately, 
medical compendia also tend to have a substantial price tag.  For example, 
the 2012 edition of the AHFS – Drug Information medical compendium is 
$329.00 for a softbound book that comes with access to online updates.91  
One could also presume that because the myriad compendia are produced 
by independent, competing organizations that the information in a given 
compendium is not entirely synchronous with others.  This reasonable 
inference has empirical support.  A study published in 2000 found 
discrepancies amongst several leading compendia in their listing and 
                                                                                                                 
QUALITY 1-5  (Apr. 27, 2009), http://www.cms.gov/determinationprocess/ 
downloads/id64TA.pdf.  
86 Id. 
87 NCCN Compendium Revision Request - CAG-00389, Centers for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services (June 5, 2008), available at https://www.cms.gov/medicare-
coverage-database/details/medicare-coverage-document-
details.aspx?MCDId=14&McdName=NCCN+Compendium+ Revision+Request+-
+CAG-00389&mcdtypename=Compendia&MCDIndexType 
=6&bc=AgAEAAAAAAAA&. 
88 Clinical Pharmacology Compendium Revision Request - CAG-00392, 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (July 2, 2008), available at 
https://www.cms.gov/medicare-coverage-database/details/medicare-coverage-
document-details.aspx?MCDId=17&McdName=Clinical+Pharmacology+ 
Compendium+Revision+Request+-+CAG-00392&mcdtypename=Compendia& 
MCDIndexType=6&bc=AgAEAAAAAAAA&. 
89 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(1)(B)(i) (2000). 
90 See, e.g., Overview, AHFS DRUG INFORMATION, http://www.ahfsdrug 
information.com/off_label/overview.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2012); DRUGDEX 
System, THOMSON REUTERS, http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/ 
healthcare/healthcare_products/a-z/drugdex_system/ (last visited Jan. 5 2012). 
91 AHFS Drug Information 2012, ASHP STORE, 
http://store.ashp.org/ProductDetails/tabid/216/Default.aspx?ProductID=25018234 
(last visited Jan. 5 2012). 
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evaluation of drug-drug interactions.92  For further discussion of issues vis-
à-vis medical compendia, see part III infra. 
In short, whether or not a (non-chemotherapeutic) medication is 
deemed medically appropriate for a given patient under Medicare Part D is 
dependent on either FDA approval for a given usage, or a listed indication 
in an approved medical compendium (whether it be designated by statute or 
adopted by the agency).  However, this statutory interpretation is in 
contention and this issue is the crux of this note.  How restrictive the term 
“medically accepted indication” is on coverage has been subject to 
reasonable debate between courts.  In Kilmer v. Leavitt, the District Court 
for the Southern District of Ohio interpreted the statute as limiting coverage 
to “medically accepted” as determined by FDA approval or compendia 
endorsement.93  The District Court for the Southern District of New York 
disagreed in Layzer v. Leavitt and interpreted the statutory term “include” 
to be inclusive rather than exclusive, thereby making strict compendia 
based restrictions at odds with the statute.94  This issue could develop into a 
circuit split, which would adversely impact the health of many, unless 
Congress more clearly addresses this issue.  To grant these compendia an 
oligopoly on off-label coverage decisions makes little sense on either a 
human or fiscal level.  There should be more than a limited ability, if any, 
to appeal for an exception.  If cause for an exception exists that is grounded 
in medical research, there should be a mechanism to pursue that eventuality 
to counteract the mistake or omission of a compendium. Otherwise any 
Medicare Part D enrollee, mentally disordered or otherwise, who is 
prescribed a non-chemotherapeutic medication will only have their drug 
covered if an approved compendium endorses its use.  It is clear such a 
framework will sometimes deny Medicare enrollees optimal, or perhaps 
necessary, healthcare. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
92 See Thomas R. Fulda et al., Disagreement Among Drug Compendia on 
Inclusion and Ratings of Drug-Drug Interactions, 61 CURRENT THERAPEUTIC RES., 
540, 540-48 (2000). 
93 Kilmer v. Leavitt, 609 F. Supp. 2d 750, 753-54 (S.D. Ohio 2009). 
94 Layzer v. Leavitt, 770 F. Supp. 2d 579, 583-85 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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III. RESHAPING THE COVERAGE OF OFF-LABEL 
 MEDICATIONS 
 
A. MEDICARE PART D ISSUES WITH OFF-LABEL PRESCRIPTIONS 
 AND COMPENDIA USE. 
 
 In its relatively short term of life, Medicare Part D has already seen 
a great deal of litigation regarding how coverage decisions are made.  This 
is particularly interesting given the amount in controversy threshold and the 
multi-step administrative grievance process that must be exhausted before a 
federal district court even has jurisdiction.95  The holding of Layzer v. 
Leavitt, whose appeal was dismissed by the United States Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals, has the best prospect of serving as an impetus to 
meaningful reform of Medicare prescription drug coverage policies.96  
Recent proposed legislation and regulatory amendments have also 
coincided with recent cases.  Recall that coverage exceptions to compendia 
indications for chemotherapeutic drugs, based on Secretary approved peer-
reviewed medical literature, only came with amendments contained in the 
Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA).97  
While this reform is a step in the right direction, it is not enough.  A 
Medicare Part D enrollee should be expressly allowed to appeal for 
coverage of any medication (not expressly excluded) whose medical 
necessity has empirical support.  This process should also contain 
protections for the unique needs of the mentally disordered.  As of this 
writing, there is a bipartisan bill proposed in the House of Representatives, 
currently under committee review, that encapsulates the spirit of Layzer v. 
Leavitt by promoting coverage parity for off-label uses when based on 
medical evidence.98  Unfortunately, the likelihood of this bill passing seems 
scant, so such legislation should be pursued in subsequent Congresses with 
the needs of all beneficiaries in mind. 
                                                                                                                 
95 See e.g., Kopstein v. Indep. Blue Cross, 339 F. App’x 261, 264-65 (3d Cir. 
2009); Uhm v. Humana, Inc., 620 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2010); See also 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare Prescription Drug (Part D): 
Coverage Determination/Appeals Process, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/ 
MedPrescriptDrugApplGriev/Downloads/PartDAppealsFlowchart.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2011). 
96 Layzer v. Leavitt, 770 F. Supp. 2d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
97 Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, H. R. 6331, 
110th Cong. § 182 (2008). 
98 Part D Off-Label Parity Act, H.R. 1055, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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While the plethora of legal action regarding Medicare Part D 
coverage is indicative of problems experienced by beneficiaries, it is useful 
to examine what sorts of difficulties arise.  By law, Medicare Part D 
prescription plans must cover all FDA approved uses.99  In 1996, then FDA 
Deputy Commissioner for Policy, William Schultz, testified before the 
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources regarding off-label drug 
use.100 He repeatedly stressed that “many off-label uses are quite 
appropriate, and some may even be the treatment of choice.”101  While 
arguing for the necessity of combating off-label promotion, the Deputy 
Commissioner also cautioned that it was imperative for medical 
professionals to make informed choices before prescribing off-label, given 
legitimate concerns about the speed and cost of FDA approval.102   
However, even off-label use that has been embraced by the medical 
community is often denied coverage summarily.  Frequently off-label 
usage of medicines, most notably for cancer treatment, is reflexively denied 
coverage or reimbursement on the grounds that the indication is 
“experimental” or “investigational” even when that is not the case.103  This 
experience is corroborated by a patient advocacy group who wrote to the 
Internal Revenue Service to convey that in the course of business they had 
seen medication coverage denials for many diseases on the grounds that the 
treatment was experimental or investigational when in fact it was an 
established and supported off-label use.104   
A report published by the Government Accountability Office found 
that many physicians are forced to resort to medication regiments that are 
less efficacious than the off-label use that was denied coverage or 
                                                                                                                 
99 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(x)(t)(2)(B)(i) (2006). 
100 Testimony on Unapproved Uses of Prescription Drugs: Before S. Comm. 
On Labor & Human Res., 104th Cong. (Feb. 22, 1996) (statement of William 
Schultz, Deputy Comm’r for Policy, Food and Drug Administration), 
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t960222a.html. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 American Society of Clinical Oncology, Reimbursement for Cancer 
Treatment: Coverage of Off-Label Drug Indications, 24 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1, 
1 (Feb. 27, 2006), available at  http://www.asco.org/ASCO/Downloads/Cancer 
%20Policy%20and%20Clinical%20Affairs/Off-Label%20Drug%20Indications/ 
Off-label%20statement.pdf; Katherine Tillman, et al., Compendia and Anticancer 
Therapy Under Medicare, 150 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 348, 348 (Mar. 2009). 
104 Public Comment Letter from Jennifer Jaff, Advocacy for Patients with 
Chronic Illness, Inc., to Internal Revenue Service (Sep. 15, 2010) at 2, available at 
Reg-125592-10 Jaff, 2010 WL 3829485 (I.R.S. Sept. 15, 2010). 
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reimbursement.105  Logically, a patient on a medication that is not optimal 
may be sicker and sicker people are likely to have greater total health costs.  
This is all the more worrisome for patients suffering from mental disorders 
because of the risk of healthcare prejudice and hardship they already 
face.106  The fact that competency issues render many incapable of self-
advocacy or thorough understanding of their plight makes this all the 
worse.  The report concluded that while the FDA’s process for updating a 
drug’s label to include new uses was faster and more efficient than it once 
was, the situation could still be improved because erroneous coverage or 
reimbursement denials persisted.107  It is perhaps due to this problem that, 
on its website, the FDA distinguishes investigational drugs from off-label 
use.108  Part of why off-label prescribing persists with such prevalence is 
that the time and expense of garnering FDA approval for a new use is often 
greater, or perceived to be greater, than any benefit FDA use approval 
carries.109  In an industry guidance about approving new uses for approved 
cancer drugs, the FDA conceded: 
 
[T]here are substantial disincentives, including (1) the cost 
and effort involved in completing new research (where 
necessary) to verify whether a product provides patient 
benefit in a new indication; (2) the cost and effort involved 
in submitting an application for regulatory approval of new 
clinical uses; and (3) the lack of perceived commercial 
benefit of revised labeling if the product is already being 
used for the new indication — especially if it no longer has 
                                                                                                                 
105 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/T-HEHS-96-212, 
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: IMPLICATIONS OF DRUG LABELING AND OFF-LABEL USE 4 
(1996). 
106 See also Are People With Mental Illness Getting the Help They Need? New 
Findings About Parity Laws, Insurance Coverage, and Access to Care, RAND 
CORP.  (2000), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB4533/index1.html (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2011). 
107See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 105, at 6-8. 
108  See “Off-Label” and Investigational Use Of Marketed Drugs, Biologics, 
and Medical Devices - Information Sheet, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126486.htm  (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2011).  
109 See, e.g., Alexander Tabarrok, Assessing the FDA via the Anomaly of Off-
Label Drug Prescribing, 5 INDEP. REV. 27-29 (2000), http://www. 
independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_05_1_tabarrok.pdf. 
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patent protection.110 
 
Some Medicare beneficiaries have diseases so rare that there are no 
medications that have FDA approved indications for their ailments.111  
Thus, it is foreseeable that compendia endorsement is similarly difficult to 
obtain for such afflictions.  Uncommon diseases pose a commensurate 
difficulty in research because of the small population affected, making it 
difficult to enlist a sufficient number of study participants.  Such was the 
case with the cancer suffered by Ms. Layzer, the plaintiff in Layzer v. 
Leavitt.112  Even with common diseases, proper studies are difficult, as 
patients often have multiple ailments and treatments.  Moreover, the 
possibility of being given a mere placebo is unappealing to those afflicted 
with debilitating, or fatal, diseases.  There is also little incentive to apply 
for new use approval when the drug is generic.  Here too, aspirin is a poster 
child for off-label use.  As a generic drug that predates the formation of the 
FDA, some of its new use approvals have been initiated by the agency, 
independent of pharmaceutical manufacturers.113   There would seem to be 
little incentive to seek additional FDA labeling when the medication is 
producing profit without it and the accompanying ability to promote such 
use.  Imagine a pain medication.  Because innumerable maladies cause pain 
it would be impractical to have a pain reliever approved for every possible 
application. 
The highest profile area with off-label coverage issues is the field 
of oncology, where desperate patients are often forced to pursue all 
                                                                                                                 
110 Guidance for Industry: FDA Approval of New Cancer Treatment Uses for 
Marketed Drug and Biological Products, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 2 (Dec. 1998), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation
/Guidances/ucm071657. 
111 See, e.g., Off-Base: The Exclusion of Off-Label Prescriptions from 
Medicare Part D Coverage, MEDICARE RIGHTS CENTER, 4 (Aug. 2007), 
http://www.medicarerights.org/pdf/Off_Base.pdf; See also Ross McKinney et al., 
White Paper: Potential Conflict of Interest in the Production of Drug Compendia, 
AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY 41 (Apr. 2006), 
http://www.cms.gov/determinationprocess/downloads/id64TA.pdf.  
112 Layzer v. Leavitt, 770 F. Supp. 2d 579, 582, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting 
the rareness of plaintiff’s disease made FDA approval difficult). 
113 See Joseph Sirven, New Uses for Older Drugs: The Tales of Aspirin, 
Thalidomide, and Gabapentin, 85 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 508, 508 (June 2010), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2878253/pdf/mayoclinproc_85_6_
002.pdf.  
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possible treatment options in a field with finite viable therapies.114  In fact, 
the National Comprehensive Cancer Network recently estimated that as 
much as 50 to 75% of cancer treatments were being used off-label.115  As 
such, it is perhaps unsurprising that cancer medicines were the first 
category under Medicare Part D to be given an evidence based exception to 
the compendia requirement.116  All beneficiaries, including the mentally 
disordered, also deserve to prove they need particular medications covered.   
As discussed in part IVb, infra, off-label use is very common in the mental 
health field as well.  Faced with an overabundance of coverage denials to 
patients prescribed meritorious off-label uses, Congress relied on medical 
compendia to curtail these improper denials.117  The utilization of 
compendia has reduced, but not solved this problem “and concerns have 
been expressed about the speed with which . . . compendia review the 
available evidence and issue their conclusions about off-label uses.”118   
One example of this arose in October 2009 when a bipartisan group of 30 
congressional representatives complained to CMS that the Medicare Parts 
A and B contractor for their area did not cover an off-label treatment for 
ovarian cancer, even though at least 29 other states had coverage for this 
use.119  This coverage denial was based on the recommendations of one of 
the approved compendia in direct contradiction to indications of safety and 
efficacy contained in the other three CMS compendia and the results of 
many clinical studies.120 
In addition to concerns that compendia may not always reflect the 
ever-evolving standards of medical practice, medical compendia, are 
susceptible to bias, error, and mistake much like any human artifice.  One 
study commissioned by the CMS, published in 2009, conducted a 
comparatively limited inquiry into off-label use of 14 cancer drugs across 
                                                                                                                 
114 See McKinney et al., supra note 111, at 40 (citations omitted).  
115 Id. (citations omitted). 
116 Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-275, 122 Stat. 2494 (2008) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (2008)). 
117 See, e.g., American Society of Clinical Oncology, Reimbursement for 
Cancer Treatment: Coverage of Off-Label Drug Indications, 24 J. CLINICAL 
ONCOLOGY 1, 1-2 (Feb. 27, 2006), available at http://www.asco.org/ 
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120 See Id. 
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six compendia (4 of which were utilized by the CMS at the time) and 
discovered some particularly troubling facts that put the reliability of 
compendia into question.121  Generally, the study found that the compendia 
did not make uniform recommendations of use because of various 
evidentiary discrepancies between them.122  Most had lack of transparency 
and other indicia of bias.123  Also they used scanty or insufficient citation to 
evidence too often, and that is poor support for their listed indications.124  
There was a tendency to use old or otherwise questionable research as well 
(only one compendium cited research published after 2000 even though all 
purported to be current as of 2008).125   The study expressed concern about 
the reliability of compendia given their status as “gatekeepers” to drug 
coverage decisions.126  It noted the disproportionate authority agencies give 
to their recommendations, which is disconcerting in light of their results, 
because the study surveyed only 14 oncological applications and forwent a 
broader study of more medications and afflictions.127  A report prepared for 
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality found that approved 
compendia generally did a poor job of citing the evidence for their 
endorsements.128  They did not utilize the most current or well-designed 
research, and were wracked with potential conflicts of interest and bias.129  
For example, one compendium combats bias in their publication by 
requiring that their reviewers not work for a drug company or hold a drug 
patent while working on the compendium, yet still allows them to hold up 
to $25,000 in pharmaceutical company stock.130  Another study published 
in 2000 examined the compendia listings of drug-drug interactions for 
various sorts of pharmaceuticals and unfortunately found discrepancies 
between the compendia.131  In addition to their disagreement, some of the 
                                                                                                                 
121 See Amy Abernathy, Reliability of Compendia Methods for Off-Label 
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compendia did not list certain dangerous drug-drug interactions.132  It is 
common knowledge that many people, not just Medicare beneficiaries, take 
multiple medications for multiple ailments so a deficit in this sort of data is 
very worrisome.  
 In general, these findings show that compendia make mistakes.  
Sometimes they recommend uses that are contraindicated by the evidence 
and sometimes they omit uses that are indicated.  With such authority and a 
reasonable chance of occasional error, it seems nonsensical not to have an 
expressly provided exception to compendia authority.  Such an exception 
should require a showing of what compendia purportedly do, that the off-
label use is shown to be effective and safe by medical industry practices 
and medical peer-reviewed literature of acceptable quality.  That is not to 
say that compendia are all bad or that peer-reviewed research is all good.  
Rather a compendia based coverage regime should be flexible and allow 
for a reasonable margin of error.  This can be done by providing a safety 
net wherein a patient proves a use to be medically necessary with scientific 
evidence.  Such a healthcare coverage regime would be more sensible and 
effective.  Cancer patients shouldn’t exclusively enjoy such an effective 
failsafe.  Rather, optimal pharmaceutical care of all maladies should be 
provided while striving to insure equity for the mentally disordered. 
 
B. LEGAL ACTION ON OFF-LABEL USE COVERAGE UNDER 
 MEDICARE  PART D 
 
In S.A.B. v. AARP Medicare Rx Plan, the Medicare Appeals 
Council considered a claim that a Part D plan should cover CellCept, an 
immunosuppressive drug, for the off-label use of controlling the symptoms 
of relapsing polychondritis.133  The enrollee suffered from several other 
serious conditions that were not deciding factors in this case.134  
Polychondritis is a rare chronic malady and it causes recurring 
inflammation and affects cartilage, and biochemically similar tissues, in 
various parts of the body including: the ears, nose, joints, spine, trachea, 
eyes, heart, and blood vessels.135  The beneficiary’s doctors, each of whom 
are acclaimed in their fields, declared that CellCept was “medically 
                                                                                                                 
132 See id. at 543-46. 
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necessary for her condition, and that there would be life-threatening 
consequences if the medication was stopped.”136  Methotrexate was used 
before CellCept, but the Methotrexate had not controlled her symptoms and 
had likely caused pulmonary fibrosis, a serious side effect.137  The 
Medicare Appeals Council denied reimbursement for CellCept “since it is 
neither FDA-approved nor supported in the compendia for treatment of any 
conditions with which the enrollee is diagnosed, it is not a covered 
Medicare Part D drug.”138   
This outcome is antithetical to the purpose of Medicare Part D and 
leaves the enrollee with a quality of life changing, and potentially life-
ending, outcome.  The fact independent reputable doctors staked their 
reputations for an off-label use that seemingly has little potential for 
recreational use or fraud should have counted for something.  Moreover, 
the patient’s record reflects the drug’s efficacy for her at the exclusion of 
everything else.  This is not to say that observational evidence should be 
dispositive of coverage outcomes.  Peer-reviewed empiricism and broadly 
supported standards of care should be factors.  Real people’s health 
shouldn’t be subject solely to FDA indications and demonstrably imperfect 
compendia.  There should be room for exceptions that are supported by a 
high scientific evidentiary threshold. 
Another Medicare Appeals Council case affirmed the 
administrative law judge’s decision and granted the Plaintiff an exception 
and coverage by granting her the off-label use of opium tincture for her 
Crohn’s disease.139  Factors in the decision included the individual patient’s 
long record of effective use of this treatment.140  Indeed the patient’s 
history shows it to be the only drug that has worked for her; this was 
bolstered by scientific support and the fact that the drug pre-dates the 
formation of the FDA, making the drug “grandfathered.”141  The opinion of 
the Medicare Appeals Council put great emphasis on the fact that the FDA 
has remained relatively silent in regards to opium tincture and many 
formularies include the drug while one compendium designates the drug as 
grandfathered.142  This Part D beneficiary was fortunate to have a 
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grandfathered drug that is widely used at issue.  In most other 
circumstances, factors such as the medical industry’s standard of care and 
the patient’s history would be of no avail absent FDA approval or clear 
compendia endorsement.  However, this case demonstrates that if an 
exception predicated on scientific evidence were to be adopted, meritorious 
claims could readily be differentiated from frivolous and unjustified 
attempts at obtaining coverage. 
  While the safety, efficacy, and cost considerations of the drug 
whose coverage is contested in the next case is beyond the scope of the 
court’s opinion, the human element is compelling and inspires sympathy.  
In Kilmer v. Leavitt, the plaintiff was afflicted with systemic lupus 
erythematosus and heterotopic bone ossification, a condition that causes 
bone to form in multiple areas of her body, such as her joints, where there 
would usually be soft tissue.143  As a result, the plaintiff was “unable to 
walk, stand, or move without assistance, and is confined to a 
wheelchair.”144  For her pain, the plaintiff was prescribed oral transmucosal 
fentanyl citrate, also called Actiq, which was provided by the manufacturer, 
for a time, at no or reduced charge.145   When the company changed its 
policy, her Medicare Part D provider denied coverage.146   
She conceded that her prescription did not meet the criteria for 
“medically accepted indication” as described in statute.147  Nevertheless, 
she asserted the statute concurrently did not restrict coverage only to 
medically accepted indications, but rather she should be granted coverage 
because the medication was “medically necessary.”148  The plaintiff argued 
on appeal to the district court that the “medically accepted indication” 
language in 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(e)(1) should not be read as a limitation 
but rather as an illustration of coverable medications.149  The court found 
this argument unpersuasive and contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, 
reasoning that the phrase “such term includes” most logically means the 
conclusion of a list of coverable drugs rather than an example thereof.150  
Furthermore, the court goes on to say that while they found the statutory 
meaning clear, if poorly drafted, even if they were to find it ambiguous the 
agency nevertheless made a reasonable interpretation and regulation 
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entitled to deference under a Chevron analysis.151  Assuming arguendo that 
the court’s statutory interpretation was correct, it compels one to reexamine 
said statute.  A person afflicted with lupus, as well as a condition that turns 
her soft tissue into bone, undoubtedly suffers a great deal of pain.  If the 
plaintiff could demonstrate that this particular pain medication was 
medically necessary for her pain, a law that purports to provide needed care 
but summarily denies it due to a technicality is antithetical to its purpose 
and seems inhumane. 
A few years later a district court in another jurisdiction disagreed 
with the statutory interpretation in Kilmer v. Leavitt.152  In Layzer v. 
Leavitt, the plaintiff suffered from a granulose cell tumor, an uncommon 
form of ovarian cancer.153  Her oncologists prescribed Cetrotide for cancer 
control and one oncologist stated that Cetrotide was medically necessary 
because there was no alternate treatment at that time.154  Specifically, he 
contended (and had other doctors and medical literature to support him) 
that Cetrotide was needed to prevent tumor growth and bleeding; even a 
temporary cessation in treatment would have dire consequences.155  The 
court also repeatedly restated the administrative law judge’s observation.156  
Namely, the administrative judge observed that the Plaintiff’s medication 
had established medical necessity but that the use had neither compendia 
endorsement nor FDA approval most likely because her form of ovarian 
cancer was so rare.157 
The court held that the compendia requirement is undoubtedly 
inconsistent with the purpose of the MMA under the rules of statutory 
interpretation, and that even if it were ambiguous, that the Secretary’s 
interpretation was unreasonable.158  The chief reason this court disagreed 
with the interpretation of Kilmer v. Leavitt is that the language at issue 
contains the word “includes.”159  This word was expressly defined in the 
definitions section of the Act to not “exclude other things otherwise within 
the meaning of the term defined.”160  Thus, the court reasons that had 
Congress intended the list of coverable drugs to be exhaustive, they could 
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have easily included language that would limit the list and impose the 
compendia requirement.161  Furthermore, the court notes that the phrase 
“medically accepted indication” is a cross-reference to another section of 
the Social Security Act.162  As such the Secretary’s argument that the 
interpretation they adopt renders the term superfluous, is unavailing.163  
Moreover, the court cites precedent requiring them to interpret such 
legislation broadly in a way that avoids unjust results.164  In particular, the 
court is obligated to interpret Social Security Act provisions in a way 
favorable to beneficiaries.165  Finally, the court points out that Medicare 
Part D legislation expressly excludes drugs from coverage elsewhere, 
thereby implying that “medically accepted indication” is but an addition to 
a list and not an end to it.166  As such, the court held that there was no 
restrictive compendia requirement in statute and instructed the Secretary to 
provide coverage.167  Alone this holding will not resolve this issue; the case 
was dismissed from the docket for the United States Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals (and was then being litigated by Ms. Layzer’s estate).168  Still, 
this outcome is based on a reasonable interpretation, and more importantly, 
is facially more equitable.  If a Medicare Part D enrollee can demonstrate 
the reasonableness and medical necessity of their treatment, lack of FDA 
approval or compendia endorsement for a use seems an arbitrary and unfair 
basis to withhold life preserving therapy. 
Currently there is legislation proposed that would resolve the issue 
if enacted.  Days after the ruling in Layzer v. Leavitt, a bill was introduced 
in the U. S House of Representatives, known as H.R. 1055, that would 
expressly allow compendia exceptions based on the guidance of the 
Secretary and peer reviewed medical literature.169  That this bill would 
clear any statutory ambiguity to align with the ruling of Layzer v. Leavitt is 
obvious.  The bill would amend the MMA by adding an additional 
subparagraph.170  The proposed act’s language when it was submitted to 
committee was, 
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(D) Clarification.  Notwithstanding subparagraph (A)(ii), 
none of the provisions of this subsection shall prevent a 
PDP sponsor offering a prescription drug plan or an MA 
organization offering an MA-PD plan from determining 
(whether through a determination, or an appeal of such 
determination under section 1852(g) or subsection (g) or 
(h) of section 1860D-4, as applicable) that a use of a 
covered Part D drug is for a medically accepted indication 
for purposes of coverage of such drug under such plan if 
such determination is based upon guidance provided by the 
Secretary for determining accepted uses of covered Part D 
drugs and on supportive clinical evidence in peer reviewed 
medical literature.171  
 
U.S. Representatives Mac Thornberry (R-TX) and Russ Carnahan (D-MO) 
introduced the bill and Thornberry said,  
 
Doctors and patients should be able to choose the safest and most 
effective medications for their treatments. Right now, the 
requirements for coverage of the off-label use of a drug are 
burdensome and often result in Medicare patients not being able to 
get the drug coverage they need.  Our bill helps fix that problem.172 
  
Several mental health advocacy groups have given their support for the 
provisions of this bill.173 However, the bill does not expressly contain 
provisions for parity for mental health prescriptions or any standards 
addressing considerations unique to off-label prescribing for mental 
disorder.174 Given the critical relationship between mental wellness and 
total health, the lack of such language is a mistake.  This mistake is more 
egregious when considered in light of the historical marginalization of 
mental health treatment and the unique problems associated with drugs 
used to treat these conditions.  Because it seems improbable, at the time of 
publication, that this bill will be passed before the next Congress, this note 
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urges that this line of legislation be resumed in a manner cognizant of 
mental health needs. 
 
IV. MENTAL HEALTH PARITY CONCERNS IN REFORM 
 
A.  MANY MEDICARE PART D BENEFICIARIES HAVE MENTAL 
 HEALTH CONCERNS 
 
Mental disorders are extremely prevalent.  Published in 2005, the 
results of the U.S. National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R) 
demonstrate that approximately 26% of Americans aged 18 and older were 
afflicted with a 12 month DSM-IV mental disorder.175  The DSM-IV is the 
current, and standard, diagnostic manual for mental disorders in the United 
States.176  A 2007 update of this survey viewed a smaller age range, 18-44, 
and found that roughly 32% of that population had a mental disorder.177  
The results of this study are conservative and are possibly higher in fact, 
because only 70.9% of the sample responded and lay people administered 
the survey.178  There is also a stigma that discourages those surveyed from 
admitting to their mental issues for fear of embarrassment, and the study 
design did not allow for the homeless, the institutionalized, or the non-
English speaking to be examined.179 Moreover not all DSM-IV diagnoses 
were part of the NCS-R, for example schizophrenia was not included.180  A 
related study found that 46.4% of Americans will have a DSM-IV disorder 
at some point in their lives, whereas 27.7% had two or more such disorders 
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and 17.3% had three or more.181  Much like its sister study, the NCS-R was 
the evaluative tool and thus the data is similarly conservative, including for 
older cohorts.182  Given the prevalence of mental illness it is troubling that 
less than half of people with such issues seek treatment, in part due to 
cultural norms and stigma, and many who do pursue therapy receive it from 
their general physician and not a psychiatrist.183  Clear data reflecting how 
Medicare Part D enrollees relate to this generalized health problem is 
elusive.  A cry for more research is not uncommon in the academic 
literature.  Part of the difficulty in conducting research on Medicare Part D 
enrollees stems from information access issues (such as confidentiality) and 
the newness of the program.  In March 2008, the National Opinion 
Research Center (NORC) submitted a report on improving the accessibility 
of Medicare Part D claims data while ensuring enrollee privacy.184  At that 
time the data was inaccessible even to other government agencies and was 
used only for payments.185 Happily, CMS promulgated rules allowing 
access to some information, under certain conditions, that May.186  Far 
more troubling, a 2008 report by the Government Accountability Office 
identified issues with oversight and data reporting for Medicare Part D 
complaints and grievances.187  Of particular concern was data (or lack 
thereof) from the grievance process wherein a beneficiary files a complaint 
                                                                                                                 
181 Ronald C. Kessler et al., Lifetime Prevalence and Age-of-Onset 
Distributions of DSM-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey 
Replication, 62 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 593, 595 (2005), available at 
http://clclinic.cos.ucf.edu/Documents%20and%20Files/Kessler,%20Berglund,%20
2005.pdf. 
182 Id. at 598-601. 
183 Michelle Andrews, For People with Mental Health Problems, Care Can Be 
Elusive, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2011/mar/21/health/la-he-healthcare-mental-health-20110321. 
184 ELIZABETH HARGRAVE & JACK HOADLEY, NAT’L OPINION RES. CTR., NO. 
08-2, FACILITATING ACCESS TO MEDICARE PART D DRUG CLAIMS DATA (2008) 
available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/ 
Mar08_PartD_CONTRACTOR_RS.pdf. 
185 Id. at 1.  
186 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS-4119-F, FACT SHEET: 
FINAL MEDICARE PART D DATA REGULATION (CMS-4119-F), OFFICE OF MEDIA 
AFF. (2008), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-Drug-Coverage/ 
PrescriptionDrugCovGenIn/Downloads/PartDClaimsDataFactSheet.pdf.  
187 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-719, MEDICARE PART D: 
COMPLAINT RATES ARE DECLINING, BUT OPERATIONAL AND OVERSIGHT 
CHALLENGES REMAIN (2008). 
2012            MEDICALLY UNNECESSARY             237 
  
with the plan provider.188  This is problematic given that these processes 
include coverage appeals, exceptions, and fraud and abuse data.189    
In spite of issues with data, available research does indicate 
medicine coverage issues for mental health patients enrolled in Medicare 
Part D.  While various studies and surveys investigating the pervasiveness 
of mental disorder among population groups differ slightly in their 
conclusions, all conservatively find that psychiatric conditions are 
common.  The elderly are at greater risk than the rest of the adult 
population for certain mental disorders.190  For example, clinical depression 
affects at least 15% of seniors.191  Depression among the elderly is 
underreported and undertreated.192  In fact, suicide is more common among 
people 65 and older than any other segment of the population.193  
Concurrently, mental illnesses afflict people with disabilities and chronic 
illnesses at rates higher than the general population.  For example, people 
afflicted with chronic diseases are more likely to have concomitant 
depressive disorders.194  Moreover, many are eligible for Medicare Part D 
enrollment from a mental illness driven disability.195  Prior to the advent of 
Medicare Part D, the 2002 Medicare Beneficiary Survey reported that 27% 
of the Medicare population had some form of cognitive or mental 
impairment.196  This group commonly has dual eligibility for Medicare and 
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Medicaid and they comprise 29% of Medicare Part D enrollees.197  60% of 
dually eligible disabled persons, and 20% of the elderly dually eligible, 
have at least one mental disorder.198  Thus it is unsurprising that at least a 
quarter of the senior, and half of the disabled, people eligible for Medicare 
use at least one psychotropic medication.199 
Considering that estimations of mental disorder prevalence are 
conservative, these usage figures translate into a decidedly sizable problem.  
When Medicare Part D came into effect it was estimated that 20% of all 
Americans with mental disorders were covered by another section of 
Medicare.200  In September 2011 29.5 million people were enrolled under 
Medicare Part D, of which 10.7 million had MA-PD plans.201  In 2010, the 
CMS published a statistical supplement of Medicare and Medicaid data that 
reported 2009 figures that demonstrated that of the nearly 28 million people 
enrolled in Part D that year, almost 13% of MA-PD enrollees and nearly 
24% of PDP enrollees were under 65 years of age.202  Given the sheer 
volume of psychiatric issues in this population, perhaps it is of no surprise 
that medications for the treatment of mental conditions were among the 
most heavily prescribed under the various drug plans.203  Such prescriptions 
are expensive and Medicare beneficiaries with mental disorder historically 
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have higher annual prescription costs than those who do not.204  The scope 
of this issue is poised to expand.  At present, roughly 12% of the total 
United States population is 65 or older, by 2030 it is predicted the figure 
will be closer to 20%.205  This is concerning because suicide is rampant 
among the elderly now.206  Baby-Boomers have historically been more 
suicide prone than other generations and the suicide rate amongst this age 
bracket is rising again.207  This is concerning when considered alongside 
predictions that recent healthcare reform will increase the proportion of 
Medicare Part D enrollees with mental health ailments.208  Because people 
with mental illness are historically marginalized, and often have issues with 
competency and self-advocacy, reform needs to be made to accommodate 
them.  This is particularly pressing because off-label use in psychiatric 
contexts has problems distinguishable from those of generalized health 
care. 
 
B.   PROBLEMS WITH OFF-LABEL USE AND COVERAGE FOR MENTAL 
 DISORDER OR ILLNESS 
 
Off-label use is widespread in mental health contexts.  Psychiatric 
News, a newspaper of the American Psychiatric Association (APA), 
published a story on a study that found 75% of antidepressants, 80% of 
anticonvulsants, and 64% of antipsychotics prescribed to Georgia Medicaid 
beneficiaries in 2001 were off-label.209  This trend was particularly 
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prevalent among the elderly.210  The article also characterized these 
findings as “certainly no surprise . . .” and noted that some of the uses 
found were reassuring in their appropriateness while others were alarming 
in their contraindication.211  Much like other pharmaceuticals, off-label 
medications used for mental disorders range from safe, established, and 
effective, to unsupported and potentially dangerous.  Because of this there 
was a workshop at the APA’s 2008 national meeting in Washington D.C. 
about off-label prescribing and liability.212  There it was stressed that off-
label uses should be prescribed only with adequate medical evidence.213  
More importantly, the workshop cautioned practitioners to only prescribe 
off-label drugs with well informed consent from the patient, or in the event 
of competency issues, from the patient’s family or guardian.214  Such 
training about off-label prescribing for the mentally disordered is wise.  
Many off-label uses have poor evidence of efficacy and subject patients to 
substantial danger.  In June 2008 the FDA promulgated an alert cautioning 
physicians not to prescribe conventional antipsychotics for dementia 
because, much like atypical antipsychotics, use of these drugs to treat 
dementia comes with an unacceptably elevated risk of death.215   
But, not all off-label uses in mental health contexts are so full of 
doom and gloom.  For example, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors 
(SSRIs) were FDA approved as antidepressants but have found safe, 
common, effective, and well supported off-label uses for conditions such as 
anxiety, premature ejaculation, and migraine.216  Moreover there are 
demonstrably effective, and much safer, off-label uses for some atypical 
antipsychotics.217  While CMS has required formularies to cover “[a]ll or 
substantially all drugs in the antidepressants, antipsychotics, [and] 
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anticonvulsants.” classes that does not ensure coverage of off-label 
applications.218  It may come as no shock that compendia are imperfect as 
applied to the mental health field as well.219   In response to studies 
published regarding compendia in oncological contexts, two doctors found 
that, “[t]o its credit, DRUGDEX is the only available compendium 
recognized by the U.S. government as a guide to reimbursement decisions 
that provides detailed evaluations for off-label indications of psychoactive 
drugs.”220  Unfortunately, when they looked into the off-label uses of seven 
atypical antipsychotic drugs they found that the compendium cited scanty 
evidence to support its endorsements.221   
 
C.  MENTAL HEALTH PARITY LAW IN GENERAL AND AS APPLIED TO 
 MEDICARE 
 
In 2000, RAND published a study that found that the mentally ill 
still lacked healthcare coverage equal to that of the general population and 
general illness, despite the passage of laws mandating mental health parity 
in the 1990’s.222  To address this issue Congress expanded mental health 
parity laws in 2008 with the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity 
Act.223 Many applauded President Obama’s signing of the Act despite the 
fact that it did not provide total parity, such as its lack of applicability to 
Medicaid.224  While the act made advances (as most plans under its scope 
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provide mental health benefits because it is well accepted that mental 
wellness affects total health) it also did not apply to Medicare.225 
The Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act 
(MIPPA), was another law passed in 2008 that addressed some mental 
health parity concerns and issues with Medicare Part D.226  MIPPA 
provided that Part D data be made available for research and evaluation227 
and requires the Secretary to collect data to monitor and prevent healthcare 
disparities predicated on race, gender, or ethnicity.228  There was no 
provision mandating the monitoring of care and coverage disparity between 
the mentally ill and the general Medicare beneficiary population. This was 
a grievous oversight that should be ameliorated in the future.  The act also 
added barbiturates and benzodiazepines to the classes of drugs covered 
under Medicare Part D229 and installed a compendia exception solely for 
anti-cancer off-label uses.230  MIPPA also required Part D formularies to 
include drugs that were unique and had no reasonable substitute.231  This 
was because a lack of access could be life threatening or force less than 
optimal care.  The CMS issued rules mandating formulary inclusion of 
antidepressants, antipsychotics, and anticonvulsants in response to this 
directive.232  While a great step forward, coverage for such drugs still 
hinges on FDA approval or the endorsement of a CMS adopted 
compendium.  Sadly, MIPPA did not explicitly provide a broader off-label 
exception or mental health drug parity.  For many Medicare Part D 
enrollees, coverage is an uncertain thing as demonstrated by the conflicting 
holdings of Kilmer v. Leavitt and Layzer v. Leavitt.233  These remaining 
defects in Medicare Part D law need to be rectified.  This fact is all the 
more pressing because MIPPA will also phase out Medicare’s 
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discriminatory cost sharing scheme for outpatient mental health services by 
2014.234  Some commentators argue this was an economic move because 
the outpatient pricing scheme for mental health services may have 
encouraged the utilization of inpatient services.235  Perhaps now more 
patients will use outpatient services and decrease costs for general care 
commensurately.236  Furthermore, “studies have shown that improvements 
in mental health decrease costs for physical health care.”237  The need to 
revise Medicare to ensure medically appropriate access to off-label drugs, 
with parity for the mentally ill, is incredibly urgent.  This is because, 
outpatient cost-sharing reform, when coupled with the aging of the baby 
boomer generation, and projections that the PPACA will expand utilization 
and coverage of psychiatric services, all forecast a growing problem.238  In 
light of litigation within the Second Circuit, a revision of the proposed Part 
D Off-Label Prescription Parity Act could address these concerns and 
prevent problems that are likely to occur, if such reform is not made, as the 
Medicare beneficiary population swells over the coming years.  Besides, 
there are prescription drug coverage issues for mentally ill Medicare Part D 
enrollees at present.  That is why it is imperative that such legislation, 
mindful of psychiatric ailments, remains a focus until passed. 
Restricting coverage of medically necessary medication is 
dangerous and costly for all. This includes medically accepted off-label use 
in general, and among the mentally ill.  As Tom Leibried, APA deputy 
director of congressional affairs, aptly told Psychiatric Times, “[l]ook at the 
complete cost picture. If a psychotic [person] suddenly loses access to a 
medication he has been taking successfully and has to be switched to an 
alternative, there may be a problem with compliance. It could result in 
higher utilization of emergency room services, for example.”239  In 2009, a 
study was published detailing the experiences of dually eligible persons 
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with mental disorders in the first year of Medicare Part D (2006).240  The 
study found that 35% of this population had trouble getting new or refilled 
psychiatric medications, while 19% were forced to switch from a stable 
medication to a new one.241  After, there was an increased number of 
emergency room visits for this cohort and it disproportionately impacted 
women.242  Dual eligibles were automatically enrolled in plans at Part D’s 
outset and are subject to utilization management techniques such as prior 
authorization.243  It goes without saying that an off-label use may have 
greater difficulty obtaining prior authorization.  However this should be 
based on a lack of medical necessity and not a convoluted rule.  This is also 
concerning because the mentally ill have been subjected to more and more 
utilization techniques over time.244  These hurdles and barriers to coverage 
have restricted access to needed medication for some.245  For 2010 there 
were fewer low-income subsidy plans available.246  Such cost and 
utilization management tools have been found to sometimes provide an 
economic incentive to prescribe drugs inappropriate for seniors as well.247  
Thus, some dually eligible enrollees had to find new prescription plans 
where prior authorizations and other drug coverage requirements would 
have to be satisfied anew.  Because of the expense of psychiatric drugs and 
the extended nature of their use, summary denial of coverage for off-label 
medications was a concern for some pharmacists and psychiatrists from 
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Part D’s inception.248  Remember that different forms of a drug (such as 
extended release) or different doses can also be considered off-label use.249 
Off-label uses in psychiatric contexts are often dangerous and 
poorly proven, despite the frequent appropriateness of off-label prescribing.  
As such, it is all the more important to clearly delineate the evidentiary 
requirements to support off-label use and coverage in either a compendium 
indication or as an exception thereto.  The mentally ill often have 
competency issues or similar disadvantages and are an easy demographic to 
take advantage of.  For example, the FDA reported that Jazz 
Pharmaceuticals paid a $20 million dollar settlement for its subsidiary’s 
illegal off-label promotion scheme.250  In that scam, they paid off a 
psychiatrist to promote one of their drugs for unsafe off-label psychiatric 
use and to also help prescribers hide the unsafe off-label prescribing to 
ensure that insurers paid for it.251  With such risks it is imperative to make 
sure that off-label psychiatric indications listed in compendia are accurate 
and that an exception to a compendia also has a sound evidentiary basis.  
Real world patients do not reflect the controlled conditions of a study; they 
often have multiple conditions, different drug tolerances, and some suffer 
from afflictions so rare that good scientific data is unobtainable.252  Such 
difficulties are unsurprising.  A well-constructed and statistically 
significant experiment has a large sample population and excludes external 
variables that skew data.  In 2003 a study was published that analyzed how 
evidence based practices were formulated in the field of geriatric 
psychiatry and it noted that certain limitations, 
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[M]ay result in overly conservative exclusion of 
informative studies, or alternatively, may cluster studies 
with inadequate attention to important differences. For, 
example, common problems affecting meta-analyses and 
evidence-based reviews include small sample sizes and 
lack of power, study heterogeneity, lack of interchangeable 
instruments, lack of extractable data, definitions of 
outcomes, quality and duration of studies, and reliance on 
statistical (as opposed to clinical) significance.253 
 
While randomized, placebo controlled, studies are valuable they 
have limitations because their narrow, variable controlled approach does 
not adequately predict important facets of clinical efficacy.254  The results 
of studies designed to test for one condition are not easily applicable to real 
world patients suffering from multiple conditions and comorbidities, or 
those who are refractory and need different medications or a combination 
thereof.255  Refractory patients are undoubtedly at issue in off-label use 
controversies.  These people are non-responsive to many drugs.256  Why 
then deny them a medication that works for them, provided it is safe and 
has solid evidentiary support?  Because patients often have multiple 
conditions and take multiple medications, it is imperative to verify and 
document data on such treatment.  The study suggested that evidence based 
practices should be established by various types of data such as: medical 
expert consensus guidelines, clinical studies, randomized controlled 
studies, patient records, and other medical data.257  Peer-reviewed studies 
that are not randomized or controlled still can provide scientifically valid 
and informative data on drug use.258  The study concluded that there were 
problems with various types of evidence, and the biases therein, and 
therefore called for evidence based practices to be predicated on as much 
credible data as possible as applied to the specific age and treatment 
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population.259  With improvements in technology it would be easier than 
ever before to make and implement such a database.  Medicare Part D can 
set such standards by cataloging its data (while preserving confidentiality 
and identifying data).  It may be advisable for Medicare to create or utilize 
compendia specific to the elderly or disabled, as well as compendia 
devoted to psychiatric uses.  A broad base of potential evidence sources, 
provided they meet exacting standards, will also provide a complete picture 
of which therapies are sound and advisable, and which are not.  Generally 
the government gives its agencies, such as HHS and CMS, broad discretion 
and deference to their expertise as well as their reasonable interpretation of 
their statutory directives.260  Prescription drug parity reform has the 
opportunity to ensure equal access to care for the mentally ill by explicitly 
directing the Secretary as to how drug coverage standards and exceptions 
thereto should be constructed.  They should be based on scientific evidence 
and medical standards of care.  Such measures will make Medicare more 
just and efficient, and possibly cheaper too. 
Some reports have found that Medicare has lower administrative 
costs than the private insurance industry.261  Conversely, one analysis found 
that Medicare’s administrative costs were greater than those of private 
insurance, and it also found that coverage claims were a relatively small 
proportion of those costs (although the study did not evaluate Part D claims 
nor directly examine Part D administrative costs).262  Either way, it seems 
intuitive that a clearer and more flexible coverage regime could reduce the 
number of coverage appeals that exhaust multiple steps in the process.  By 
more accurately analyzing meritorious drug use earlier in the process, costs 
may be reduced.  Also, an optimally treated patient is likely to be healthier 
and less expensive than one who is sick and unstable.  For example, an 
untreated patient with depression has higher healthcare costs across the 
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board than one who does not.263  Clearly, successful treatment could 
mitigate the heightened healthcare costs of such a patient.  Therefore 
preventing patients from having medically necessary off-label medication 
due to a lack of a reasonable, and expressly provided for, exception process 
makes little sense.  This is not just because it seems unfair to the patient, 
but also because the appeals process and untreated or undertreated (and 
therefore sicker) patients also cost money.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
As general policy, close scrutiny of off-label prescribing is wise.  
Assuming arguendo that FDA approval is a guarantor of safety and 
efficacy, then all inappropriate drug use is off-label.  However, as 
established in this note, off-label use is frequently appropriate 
commensurate with the medically necessary standard of care.  Because 
bias, error, and suggestibility are endemic to the human experience it is 
folly to allow disparate compendia to absolutely dictate what uses should 
be coverable.  There need to be exceptions for unforeseen contingencies 
and compendia inaccuracy or mistake.  To deny or delay coverage of a 
medically necessary off-label drug is detrimental to enrollees’ health and 
antithetical to the legislative purpose of the Medicare Part D program.  A 
program that doesn’t adequately satisfy its objectives is a waste.  Moreover, 
patients deprived of their medicines are likely to have deterioration of 
health and the resultant rise in other health costs.  Also, such enrollees are 
likely to file appeals, some of which may make it through to federal 
jurisdiction with meritorious cases that prevail.  It is obvious that both 
worsening health from a lack of drug coverage and the appeals process cost 
the government, the plan providers, and the beneficiaries money and time.  
If coverage ultimately is, or should be, granted to such enrollees, it would 
be more efficient and therefore cheaper to fairly and accurately reach this 
outcome as quickly as possible without unduly delaying coverage or 
exhausting multiple steps in the appeals process.  
 In the instance of rare or complicated conditions where the ideal 
standard of placebo controlled, peer-reviewed, evidence is difficult to 
obtain, the individual patient’s record, the results of less stringent but 
nevertheless statistically significant peer reviewed studies, clinical 
evidence, and medical industry best practices should also be factors.  Such 
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clear factors and exceptions will allow coverage determinations and 
exceptions to be made quickly pursuant to what is demonstrably the 
medical industry’s standard of care.  While incompetent, negligent, and 
unscrupulous doctors are definitely out there, in general a physician’s 
ethical and professional interests are aligned with providing their patients 
with the safest and most effective healthcare.  These standards should be 
built into any legislative reform or should be taken into account in the event 
that the compendia only requirement is obviated by litigation. 
However, off-label use in the treatment of psychiatric conditions is 
distinct.  The interests of the mentally disordered are still marginalized.  
Mental health has historically had disparate coverage and this is a pity 
given that mental well-being is integral and essential to total healthiness.  
Recent healthcare reform and proposed legislation, coupled with the aging 
of the baby-boomers, are very likely to profoundly increase the use of 
psychiatric medications under Medicare Part D.  Moreover, because some 
off-label uses in the mental health field are dangerous and unsupported it 
would be easy to categorically deny off-label psychiatric drugs, even 
medicines with a safe and medically necessary indication.  This foreseeable 
problem can be prevented with the utilization of psychiatry specific 
compendia and express provisions for compendia exceptions.  An 
evidentiary framework for coverage of off-label mental health drugs would 
establish parity under Medicare Part D for all, while also giving due 
consideration to the unique needs of patients with mental disorders. 
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